Parshas Mishpatim
1. In this week's Sidrah, in four separate places, Rashi states a general rule: "דיבר הכתוב בהווה" ("Scripture speaks of the common case")1. The first time he states this rule is on the verse "וכי יגח שור" ("And if an ox gores")2: "אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה וחיי ועוף אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהווה" ("It is the same for an ox and for any domestic animal, wild animal or bird, except that Scripture speaks of the common case"), and afterward he states it on three further verses, as will be discussed below in Section 3.
We must understand: Even before the verse "And if an ox gores," and within the same3 Sidrah, there are verses where one should seemingly learn that the verse brings the pertinent example [not because the law of that verse applies specifically in the case mentioned, but] because "Scripture speaks of the common case" —
For example, in the verse "וכי יכה איש את עבדו או בשבט גו'" ("And if a man strikes his servant . . with a rod, etc.")4, whose law of "נקום ינקם, אך אם יום או יומיים יעמוד לא יוקם גו'" ("he shall surely be avenged; but if he survives a day or two, he shall not be avenged, etc.")5 applies (in the plain sense6) also when he strikes the servant not specifically with a rod but with something else7, and the word "with a rod" in the verse is only because "Scripture speaks of the common case"; the same is found in another, earlier verse: "וכי יריבון אנשים והכה איש את רעהו גו'" ("And if men quarrel, and one man strikes his fellow, etc.")8 — where surely all that matters is the point that "one man strikes his fellow," and the entire preface "if men quarrel" comes only because "Scripture speaks of the common case" —
So it is not understood: Why does Rashi wait with his explanation "Scripture speaks of the common case" until the verse "And if an ox gores," rather than saying it right away the first time (at least, the first time within this Sidrah)?
We must also understand why Rashi repeats the same rule four times, and in close proximity to one another (as will be discussed at length below)?
2. The source of this rule is seemingly taken from the Mishnah9: "אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה . . וכן חי' ועוף כיוצא בהן, א"כ למה נאמר שור או חמור אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהוה" ("It is the same for an ox and for any domestic animal . . and likewise wild animals and birds; if so, why does it say ox or donkey? Only because Scripture speaks of the common case"). However, regarding all the verses that the Mishnah explains — that the detail stated in the verse ("ox" and the like) is only because "Scripture speaks of the common case" — the Gemara10 brings proofs and evidence to show that the laws do not apply specifically to the detail stated explicitly in the verse; whereas Rashi states it as a rule that "Scripture speaks of the common case," and brings along with it no proof whatsoever that the law is likewise with other details. For example, on "And if an ox gores" Rashi brings no proofs that "ox" is not meant specifically11. And likewise in the other verses Rashi states the rule without giving any proof for it12.
The difficulty becomes even greater: Several verses further on13 — on "ונפל שמה שור או חמור" ("and an ox or a donkey falls there"), where Rashi also explains that "הוא הדין לכל בהמה וחיה" ("the same law applies to every domestic and wild animal") — he does bring a proof for it: "שבכל מקום שנאמר שור וחמור אנו למדין אותו שור שור משבת כו'" ("for wherever ox and donkey are stated, we derive it through 'ox, ox' from Shabbos, etc.").
Seemingly: That an ox and a donkey should fall into a pit is surely more common than "every domestic and wild animal" — as is said there in the Mishnah, that the reason it says "ox or donkey" regarding falling into the pit is because "Scripture speaks of the common case" (and in a matter of "reality" — the common case — there is no room to distinguish between the way of plain meaning and the way of halachah, etc.) — so then, since Rashi accepts the concept of "Scripture speaks of the common case" as a rule, why must he resort to the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos"?
Even if you will say that regarding falling into a pit there is reason to say that "בעל הבור ישלם" ("the owner of the pit shall pay") applies specifically when "an ox or a donkey falls there," because precisely since their falling into a pit is more common, digging or opening the pit is negligence specifically with regard to them14; and therefore Rashi must here resort to the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos," because, understandably, the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" applies only in a case where there is no reason to distinguish between the detail in the verse and other details15:
— it is still not understood: After Rashi has already brought a proof that "the same law applies to every domestic and wild animal," he concludes: "ולא נאמר שור וחמור אלא שור ולא אדם חמור ולא כלים" ("and 'ox and donkey' is stated only [to teach:] an ox but not a person, a donkey but not utensils"). For seemingly one should learn (according to the plain meaning, which is Rashi's way in his commentary on the Torah): "'Ox or donkey' is stated only because Scripture speaks of the common case" — so from where do we derive that this comes to exclude people and utensils?
3. The rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" is stated by Rashi, as mentioned above, another three times in our Sidrah:
On "מכשפה לא תחיי" ("A sorceress you shall not allow to live")16 Rashi explains: "אחד זכרים ואחד נקבות אלא שדיבר הכתוב בהוה, שהנשים מצויות מכשפות" ("Both males and females17, except that Scripture speaks of the common case, for women are commonly sorceresses")18. Rashi states it once more further on, on the verse "כל אלמנה ויתום לא תענון" ("You shall not afflict any widow or orphan")19: "הוא הדין לכל אדם אלא שדבר הכתוב בהוה לפי שהם תשושי כח ודבר מצוי לענותם" ("The same law applies to every person, except that Scripture speaks of the common case, because they are of weak strength and it is common20 to afflict them"). And then, on the verse "ובשר בשדה טריפה" ("and flesh torn in the field")21, he says yet again: "אף בבית כן אלא שדבר הכתוב בהוה מקום שדרך בהמות ליטרף" ("Even in the house likewise, except that Scripture speaks of the common case, the place where animals are usually torn")22.
In this it is not understood: Why must Rashi state the same rule four times? Regarding the other three verses, one could seemingly already know it from Rashi's explanation on "And if an ox gores"23?
Regarding "A sorceress you shall not allow to live" one could answer that the "בן חמש (למקרא)" ("five-year-old [beginning Scripture]") has nothing to do with sorcery24 and does not know that sorcery is more common among women than among men, so he could err and think that the law of "you shall not allow to live" applies specifically to a sorceress and not to a sorcerer. Therefore Rashi must teach anew that the verse says "sorceress" only because "Scripture speaks of the common case, for women are commonly sorceresses"25.
But regarding "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan" and "flesh torn in the field," the student seemingly knows that the examples the verse writes are more common — so why should he err and think that "you shall not afflict" applies specifically to "a widow or orphan" and "you shall not eat" specifically to flesh torn "in the field," to the point that Rashi must teach anew that "the same law applies to every person" and "even in the house likewise"?
4. The wonder is even greater: When Rashi explains (for the fourth time —) on the verse "and flesh torn in the field" that the example "in the field" comes because "Scripture speaks of the common case," he elaborates, saying "וכן כו' וכן כו'" ("and likewise, etc., and likewise, etc.") — that this is found in other places where "Scripture speaks of the common case" (as below, Section 5), to demonstrate that this is not a case of "לא מצאתי לו חבר" ("I have found no parallel for it"); and only afterward does he bring a second explanation: "ואונקלוס תרגם כו'" ("And Onkelos translated, etc."), that the word "in the field" is meant specifically and not because "Scripture speaks of the common case."
This is entirely incomprehensible: In what way is "Scripture speaks of the common case" in the verse "and flesh torn in the field" harder than in all the earlier verses, to the point that because of this: a) Rashi must here bring proofs for it (although in the earlier verses he accepts it as a plain explanation and rule that requires no proofs), and — b) even after the proofs, he must here still resort to a second explanation?!
5. The proofs (on the verse "and flesh torn in the field") that Rashi brings for the explanation "Scripture speaks of the common case" are from two verses in Parshas Ki Seitzei: (a) "כי בשדה מצאה" ("for he found her in the field")26 — where the same law applies in any place where "אין מושיע לה" ("she has no rescuer")27, and the verse says "in the field" because "Scripture speaks of the common case"; and (b) "אשר לא יהי' טהור מקרה לילה" ("who is not clean by reason of a nighttime occurrence")28 — "הוא הדין למקרה יום אלא שדבר הכתוב בהוה" ("the same law applies to a daytime occurrence, except that Scripture speaks of the common case").
Simply, we must say that the fact that Rashi must resort to verses that come later, in Parshas Ki Seitzei, and brings no proof from the earlier verses mentioned in our Sidrah itself (nor from the many later verses that precede "for he found her in the field"29), is because the explanation "Scripture speaks of the common case" in this verse is (for some reason) different from and harder than the explanation in most places (as mentioned above, Section 4), and therefore Rashi must bring the verses "for he found her in the field" and "who is not clean by reason of a nighttime occurrence," where the "Scripture speaks of the common case" does resemble the "Scripture speaks of the common case" of our verse.
But this is not understood: a) Since the "Scripture speaks of the common case" in the two verses of Parshas Ki Seitzei does resemble the "Scripture speaks of the common case" of "and flesh torn in the field" — why must Rashi bring both verses, and not suffice with just one of them? b) If the "Scripture speaks of the common case" on "and flesh torn in the field" has a "parallel" in two other places, for what reason must Rashi resort to "Onkelos translated"?
6. Seemingly, one could have explained the difficulty of "Scripture speaks of the common case" in the verse "and flesh torn in the field," relative to the same explanation in the three preceding verses:
In the verse "And if an ox gores," by giving the common example — an ox — no superfluous word whatsoever is added: after all, the verse cannot simply say "And if it gores" — without stating who gored30 — and since this is so, it mentions "ox," because goring is more common with it. The same applies in the verse "A sorceress you shall not allow to live": the verse must, after all, set down a specific word — sorcerer or sorceress — so it chooses the word "sorceress" (the feminine form) because "women are commonly sorceresses." And likewise with "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan," where the example "widow or orphan" adds no superfluous expression to the verse, since something must, after all, come in continuation to "you shall not afflict."
Whereas in the verse "and flesh torn in the field" — were it not for the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case," it would have said only "and torn flesh (you shall not eat)," and consequently it is hard to say that the Torah should add a superfluous word on account of the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case," in that a field is "מקום שדרך בהמות ליטרף" ("a place where animals are usually torn"). Therefore Rashi must resort to a proof that, on account of the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case," it is also possible for the Torah to write a superfluous word.
And for this Rashi brings a proof from "for he found her in the field" and "who is not clean by reason of a nighttime occurrence," where the examples "in the field" and "a nighttime occurrence" also come through superfluous words (see below, Sections 12 and 13).
However, according to this explanation the question (above, Section 1) from the verses "And if a man strikes . . with a rod, etc." and "And if men quarrel, etc." becomes even stronger: the word "with a rod" is also seemingly superfluous31, and all the more so the words "And if men quarrel" are superfluous. How is it, then, that there Rashi accepts the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" for so simple a matter that he need not explain it at all; and in the verse "and flesh torn in the field" he accepts it for so difficult an explanation that he must bring proofs for it, and only after the proofs must he resort to a second explanation?
Even if one were to suppose that the words "And if men quarrel" and "with a rod" appear for some other reason, and not because of "Scripture speaks of the common case" (and that also in all other verses where it appears to be a superfluous word because of "Scripture speaks of the common case," one will find some other reason) — yet on the verse "כי יסיתך גו' בסתר לאמר" ("If [your brother] entices you . . secretly, saying")32 Rashi himself says: "בסתר — דבר הכתוב בהוה כו'" ("'Secretly' — Scripture speaks of the common case, etc.") — and it is understood that were it not for "Scripture speaks of the common case," no other word would have stood there. So Rashi (on "and flesh torn in the field") should have brought a proof from "If he entices you . . secretly," which comes before the verse "for he found her in the field"?
7. The explanation of all this:
When a verse states a particular law in the manner of "סיפור דברים להבא" ("a narration of events for the future") — that if it will happen thus and so, the law shall be such and such — then it is reasonable to say that the details the verse writes in the narrative are brought in order to depict the event in its most usual, common way.
It is different, however, when the verse states a particular detail in the law — then there is already greater reason to say that this detail is meant specifically.
Therefore: In the verse "And if men quarrel, etc." Rashi need not specify that the same law of "והכה גו' ונקה גו' רק גו'" ("and one strikes . . shall be cleared . . only . .") applies also without "if men quarrel" — because, since the detail "if men quarrel" is a detail in the narrative (and only in the narrative), it is understood (even without Rashi explaining it) that this is only in order to depict the event in the usual way.
Likewise in the verse "And if a man strikes . . with a rod," Rashi need not specify that the same law applies also when the striking is not with a rod but with something else — since "with a rod" is part of the description of the occurrence (and only of the occurrence).
But when it comes to "And if an ox gores," where the law stated in that verse pertains [not only to the ox's owner, but also (and mainly)] to the ox itself — "סקול יסקל השור גו'" ("the ox shall surely be stoned, etc.") — it follows that the detail "ox" (although in a narrative style) is a detail (also) in the law itself, as though the verse had stated that an ox that gored, etc., its law is stoning. So there, there can already be reason to say that the verse states the law specifically regarding a goring ox, and not regarding another living creature. Therefore Rashi must specify there: "It is the same for an ox and for any domestic animal, wild animal or bird, except that Scripture speaks of the common case."
8. Based on the above, one will also understand the reason why on the verse "A sorceress you shall not allow to live" Rashi states the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" again, and does not rely on having already said it earlier on the verse "And if an ox gores"33:
Had Rashi stated the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" only on "And if an ox gores," one could have thought that this is because that verse at least speaks in a narrative style (although the detail "ox" also pertains to the law itself), whereas in the verse "A sorceress you shall not allow to live," since here there is no narrative of an event at all, here there is only a statement of the law that "A sorceress you shall not allow to live" — one could have learned that the law applies specifically to a sorceress —
Therefore Rashi says: "Both males and females, except that Scripture speaks of the common case34, for women are commonly sorceresses."
9. The reason why on the verse "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan" Rashi must again specify "the same law applies to every person, except that Scripture speaks of the common case"35:
The rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" (in the way of plain meaning) fits only when the verse writes one example, but when two examples appear in the verse, one cannot say that the verse speaks of the common case, because then it would have written just one example, the one which is more common (for simply, it is very rare36 that two examples should be exactly equally common); and in such a case one must say that the examples in the verse are (not because of "Scripture speaks of the common case," but they are) meant specifically37.
Therefore, when it comes to the verse "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan," a question arises for the "five-year-old beginning Scripture": Since the verse here states two examples, it necessarily follows that the examples are not because of "Scripture speaks of the common case," but are meant specifically. This is puzzling: Is it then permitted to afflict other people — why does the verse say specifically "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan"?
To this Rashi says (and with a change of wording) "the same law applies to every person"38: certainly the law is that one may indeed not afflict any person, and the fact that the verse states the warning specifically regarding "widow and orphan" (and speaks only39 of widow and orphan, and only among them: "any widow or orphan") is because "Scripture speaks of the common case, because they are of weak strength and it is common to afflict them": since they are "of weak strength" and it is "common to afflict them," one must therefore specially warn not to afflict them.
10. Based on the above it will also be understood why on the verse "and an ox or a donkey falls there" Rashi must resort to a "derivation" that "the same law applies to every domestic and wild animal," and must also explain that "ox or donkey" come to exclude people and utensils: Because since two examples appear in the verse — "ox" and "donkey" — then were it not for the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos," one would have said that "the owner of the pit shall pay, etc."* applies specifically to an ox and a donkey, and only the "derivation" tells us that "the same law applies to every domestic and wild animal"; and the two examples in the verse are two exclusions: "(an ox) but not a person, (a donkey) but not utensils."
Based on this one can say that in this verse too we find the matter of "Scripture speaks of the common case." For on account of the need for two exclusions alone, it could have said "ונפלה שמה בהמה או חיה" ("and a domestic or wild animal falls there") (or the like), from which one would also have derived "a domestic animal but not a person, a wild animal but not utensils"40. Why indeed does it say "ox or donkey"? It is because their falling into a pit is more common, as mentioned above, Section 241.
11. Although the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" applies (as Rashi explained in the earlier verses) not only to an example stated by way of "narrative," but also when the example comes as part of the law itself
[as for example in "A sorceress you shall not allow to live," where the word "sorceress" is part of the law itself, and nonetheless the example is stated in the feminine form — because "women are commonly sorceresses"]
it is nonetheless reasonable to say that in the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case," when the example is part of the law, there are certain limitations:
When the Torah speaks in the style of a narrative of an event that will occur, the verse depicts the event in its most common manner, even in a case where it must add superfluous words for this, as in the verse "And if men quarrel, and one man strikes his fellow, etc.": since the matter is written there in the style of a "narrative," the verse also depicts the manner in which this will occur — "if men quarrel" — although it adds superfluous words for this.
But when the verse states only the law (not "ובשר כי יטרף" ("and flesh when it is torn"), but "ובשר טרפה" ("and torn flesh")) and the example ("torn in the field") is part of the statement of the law itself, it is reasonable that the details of the example are also part of the law (even when in another case too the law is the same, and the example comes because "Scripture speaks of the common case"). Therefore it does not make sense that in order to depict a common example the verse should add superfluous words that do not pertain to the essential law. And it is also reasonable to say that in such a case the verse will state only the matter itself under discussion, but not the manner in which the matter occurred, if this does not pertain to the law itself (even when this would not add any superfluous words).
Therefore, in the verse "and flesh torn in the field" one should have learned that the added word "in the field" (like the words "torn flesh") pertains to the essential law, that is, that the prohibition applies specifically to flesh torn in a field. Therefore Rashi teaches anew "even in the house likewise42, except that Scripture speaks of the common case, the place where animals are usually torn," that the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" applies even when a superfluous word is added because of this, and even when the word is not a detail in the matter itself, but merely "a place where animals are usually torn."
12. Based on the above one will also understand why Rashi must bring two verses to demonstrate that in our case too the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" applies — because each of the two verses proves a different point43:
From "for he found her in the field" Rashi demonstrates that in order to depict the manner of its occurrence, the verse can add words even in a law; and from "who is not clean by reason of a nighttime occurrence" Rashi brings a proof that the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" (even in a law) also concerns the manner of the matter on which the law comes, as will be explained below.
13. The verse "for he found her in the field" is [not a matter of "narrative," but "for" —] a reason for the law (and consequently, part of the law) "ולנערה לא תעשה דבר" ("and to the maiden you shall do nothing"): Why does she receive no punishment? "For he found her in the field" — because he found her "in the field," in a place where "she has no rescuer."
The question arises: The same law applies also when "he found her in the city," if only "she has no rescuer"; so why does the verse say (as a reason) "for he found her in the field"?
True, "she has no rescuer" is more common "in the field" — but it would surely suffice for it to say "כי צעקה גו' ואין מושיע לה" ("for she cried out . . and she had no rescuer"). Why must the verse add "he found her in the field"? It necessarily follows from this that on account of "Scripture speaks of the common case," the verse adds words even in a law44.
But Rashi cannot suffice with this verse alone. For since the reason for "and to the maiden you shall do nothing" is the place where "she has no rescuer," it automatically follows that the example "in the field" — which is the common case of "she has no rescuer" — is not connected with a second matter, but connected with the law itself.
Therefore "for he found her in the field" (although there too the words are superfluous) is still not a real "parallel" to the "in the field" of our verse, where the place in which the animal was torn is an entirely tangential matter that has no bearing on the law "and torn flesh (you shall not eat)."
Therefore Rashi adds "וכן אשר לא יהי' טהור מקרה לילה" ("and likewise, who is not clean by reason of a nighttime occurrence"), where the example "night" is also a tangential matter, and the time when this occurred has no bearing at all on the law of an "occurrence."
But Rashi cannot suffice with this verse alone either. For the word "night" is not superfluous45, since before it is written "ונשמרת מכל דבר רע" ("and you shall guard yourself from every evil thing"), and immediately afterward (without the preface "והי' אם לא תשמע" ("and if you do not heed")) it is written "כי יהי' . . מקרה" ("if there will be . . an occurrence"), which does not read smoothly: How can this be? So the verse adds "night" — and as in Rashi's precise wording, "the same law applies to a daytime occurrence," but Scripture speaks only of night (as above regarding widow and orphan).
Consequently, from there no proof can be brought for the "in the field" of our verse, where the word is entirely superfluous, and without it nothing at all is lacking in the meaning of "and torn flesh."
— Therefore Rashi also brings the verse "for he found her in the field," where too nothing would be lacking were it to say only "for she cried out . . and she had no rescuer," and the words "he found her in the field" come only on account of "Scripture speaks of the common case."
Based on the above it is also understood why Rashi must resort to a second explanation even after bringing both verses from Parshas Ki Seitzei — because both proofs still do not clearly demonstrate that in a law the Torah should add a superfluous word concerning an entirely tangential matter.
14. From the matters of the "יינה של תורה" ("wine of Torah") in this explanation of Rashi:
When an unusual thing occurs, a person will more easily accept that the event came from Above; but concerning ordinary things and events the yetzer hara entices: "עולם כמנהגו נוהג" ("the world follows its custom" — its own custom and nature)46.
And Avraham's great wonder47: "תאמר שהעולם הזה בלא מנהיג?!" ("Would you say that this world is without a leader?!") — he argues that even for this one must be "משוטט בדעתו" ("roaming in his mind") and "לחשוב ביום ובלילה" ("contemplating day and night"), etc.; and even though the truth has already been discovered, and those who initially did not agree with this, "גבר עליהם בראיותיו" ("he overcame them with his proofs")48 — the "זקן וכסיל" ("old and foolish" king)49 brings a spirit of folly50 into the heart of the fool, at his left51: There is no wonder or question here at all, and "האמת נעדרת" ("the truth is absent").
To this Rashi brings the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" — that even a "הוה" ("common occurrence"), the most common thing, comes (not from nature, G‑d forbid, but) because "דבר הכתוב" ("the word of Scripture")52, on account of the Ten Utterances written in Scripture that give life to and bring into being ("הוה" from the word מהווה, "brings into being") all the particulars of created beings every single moment53.
And Rashi makes this rule known even to a five-year-old (beginning Scripture) — for he too is among those of whom it says, in the Rambam's words54, "בחר ה' ישראל לנחלה" ("G‑d chose Israel as an inheritance") — at the time when "נתנבא משה רבנו" ("Moshe our Teacher prophesied"), meaning at Matan Torah, "והודיעם דרך עבודתו" ("and informed them of the way of His service").
15. This matter Rashi explains (and reveals in plain terms) only in Parshas Mishpatim, because before Matan Torah, when there was the "גזירה" ("decree," the cut) between the "עליונים" ("higher realms") and the "תחתונים" ("lower realms")55, one could not see in actual revelation the "speech of Scripture" — "higher realms" — within the matters of the common case — "lower realms" (in the ultimate sense) — in which there is greater room for the error that "עולם כמנהגו בלי מנהיג נוהג" ("the world follows its custom without a leader"). Only after Matan Torah, when the "Scripture" (the Torah) came down here below, and there came about the "חיבור עליונים ותחתונים" ("union of higher and lower realms") — then one can see, even within the common case of the lower realms, the "speech of Scripture" openly.
Nonetheless, Rashi states the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" not in Parshas Yisro but in Parshas Mishpatim, which comes after the Sidrah of Matan Torah — because the main accomplishment of the "union of higher and lower realms" newly brought about at Matan Torah is that also after Matan Torah56, after "במשוך היובל" ("when the ram's horn sounds long")57, Jews through their service should unite higher and lower realms — revealing within the common case the "speech of Scripture."
Therefore Rashi states the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" in Parshas Mishpatim, because [in addition to its being the first Sidrah after Matan Torah58] the "content" of the Sidrah is that even within "משפטים" ("laws"), which are rational mitzvos, one must reveal that they are "מסיני" ("from Sinai")60.
16. One could still think that Divine Providence applies only to the matter itself, but not to the manner in which the matter should occur. To this Rashi says on the verse "and flesh torn in the field" that the rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" applies not only to the matter itself, but also to the place and time ("field" and "night") where and when the matter should occur;
from which it is understood also regarding all other details and modes of an event — as in the saying of the Baal Shem Tov59 that not only the movement from place to place, even of a straw, is by Divine Providence, but also the manner in which this should occur, whether by the feet of a person or an animal or through a stormy wind and the like — all of it, every smallest detail in it, is by Divine Providence.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim, Tisa, and Vayakhel-Pekudei 5728)
Notes
1) Thus also in Rashi's commentary on Re'eh 13:7; 15:19; Ki Seitzei 23:11; 25:4.
2) 21:28.
3) And even in the Sidros before this; for example, in Yisro: 19:13; and in Beshalach 16:23, etc.
4) 21:20.
5) Ibid., 20-21.
6) In Rambam, Laws of Murderers, ch. 2, halachah 14: "Therefore it says 'with a rod,' for the Torah gave permission to strike him only with a rod, stick, strap or the like." See also Ohr HaChaim here. However: (a) In Rashi's commentary this is not mentioned at all. (b) Even according to this, one must say that the expression "with a rod" is because "Scripture speaks of the common case," since the exclusion of "a striking to kill" (mentioned in Rambam there) applies also to "stick, strap or the like."
7) On the contrary: Were it not for the reason "Scripture speaks of the common case," it should have stated (according to the plain meaning) specifically another example, because the word "rod" includes also a rod that is insufficient to kill (unlike "an iron implement" — see Rashi, Mattos 35:16), and the law stated in the verse is specifically when he struck him with something capable of killing (see Rashi on the verse).
8) 21:18.
9) Bava Kamma 54b. In Rashi on Sanhedrin 2a, s.v. "הזאב," this Mishnah is cited regarding "And if an ox gores." See Tosafos Yom Tov, Sanhedrin 1:4. (Note also Tur, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of Siman 389, and Drisha there.) This is not the place to elaborate.
10) Bava Kamma ibid. And in Rashi, Berachos 26a, s.v. "שנסקל": we derive by gezeirah shavah "ox, ox" from Shabbos regarding "the ox shall be stoned." In Tosafos there: only three things can be derived from Shabbos. But see Mechilta here; Bach on Choshen Mishpat ibid. This is not the place to elaborate.
11) In Sifsei Chachamim here (see also Re'em and Gur Aryeh here): "We derive 'ox, ox' from Shabbos, etc., as Rashi will explain on the verse (21:33) 'ox or donkey.'" But even aside from this, simply, there is no room to say that Rashi would rely on what he writes later.
12) See below, notes 17, 22.
13) 21:33.
14) Even though digging the pit is negligence (regarding an ox and a donkey), one could nonetheless say that he would be exempt for another animal's falling; note Bava Kamma 52, end of side a, and onward.
15) There are two points in this: a) Since there is reason to distinguish between the example stated in the verse and other examples, one cannot newly assert (without any proof) that the law stated in the verse applies also to other examples, and that the example appears in the verse only because Scripture speaks of the common case (unlike where there is no reason to distinguish, when it is forced to say that this is a Scriptural decree). b) (Even further:) If the law in the verse also applied to other examples, the verse would not have stated an example of this kind, where there is reason to think it comes specifically — only because it is more usual — since through this there is room to err (see Ohr HaTorah, Kedoshim 19:19: that it will not speak of the common case where there is room to err). If so, this itself proves that the law applies specifically with this example.
16) 22:17.
17) In Rashi on Sanhedrin 67a: "דהא גבי אוב וידעוני דמכשפים הם לא חלק בין איש לאשה דכתיב איש או אשה" ("for regarding ov and yidoni, who are sorcerers, it did not distinguish between man and woman, as it is written 'a man or a woman'"). However, from the fact that in his commentary on the Torah he does not bring this proof [especially since the student has not yet learned the verse stated regarding ov and yidoni], it is proven that his proof for "both males and females" according to the way of plain meaning is from this verse itself (unlike the Sifsei Chachamim here). For since there is no reason to say that the law "you shall not allow to live"* [which means "she shall be put to death by the court"*] applies only to a sorceress and not to a sorcerer, one must say that the fact that it says "sorceress" is because Scripture speaks of the common case, as above, Section 2 and note 15.
*) Based on this one can also explain the continuity in Rashi of "both males, etc." with "rather she shall be put to death by the court," in that he wrote the two matters in one comment, and even writes "and both males, etc." with a connecting vav: Regarding men there is reason to say that their punishment is more severe (which is why Scripture needed to equate woman with man for all punishments, etc., in the Torah (Kiddushin 35a, see there, and sources cited there)). And the woman is a helper opposite him (Bereishis 2:20), and it is said of her: "and he shall rule over you" (ibid., 3:16). See also Rashi above, 21:16: "I only have a man . . a woman . . from where?" Therefore, if the meaning of "you shall not allow to live" were (only) not to keep her alive (that is, not to supply her with water and food — see Rashi above (Shemos 1:17) on the explanation of "and they kept alive"), it would not be difficult for the student why it says "sorceress" (the feminine form), for he would say, perhaps a verse will come later about a sorcerer, whose punishment is greater — death by the court. But after Rashi explains "rather she shall be put to death by the court," the student simply asks: Why is only a sorceress liable to death and not a sorcerer — on the contrary, men's punishment should be more severe? Therefore Rashi continues "and both males, etc."
18) Thus also in Sanhedrin ibid., except that there "Scripture speaks of the common case" is not stated. See below, note 34. Another difference in Rashi's commentary from the wording of the Gemara there: In Sanhedrin ibid.: "for most women, etc.," and Rashi omits the word "most" — for according to the plain meaning and the reality visible to the naked eye, it is not so that most women, etc. Especially as the verse speaks of an actual sorceress. — And in the Talmud it requires investigation: that the punishment would prevent them from acting in practice. It appears more likely to me that this is along the lines of the explanation in Rashi's commentary regarding blood (see Re'eh 12:23, 25), where he brought two opposite opinions on the reality [OCR unclear]. See what is written (see Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 47 and onward).
19) 22:21.
20) See also Mechilta here (in the words of Rabbi Akiva). See Gur Aryeh on Rashi here.
21) 22:30.
22) Mechilta on the verse. There we derive that the same applies "in the house" from a hekesh. But from the fact that Rashi does not bring the hekesh, it is proven that in the way of plain meaning this is so by reason — see above, Section 2.
23) Even further: What is the reason that in all these verses Rashi varies from one place to another: a) In the first two verses — "both . . and . ."; in "any widow or orphan" (and "a nighttime occurrence," in Rashi on the verse "and flesh, etc.") — "the same law applies . ."; in "and flesh torn in the field" — "even [in the house] . ." (And [OCR unclear] varies in his proof for this from "a nighttime occurrence" — "the same law applies," as above.) b) On "And if an ox gores" he writes only that "Scripture speaks of the common case" (and does not add that "an ox's way is to gore" or the like), whereas in the three places after this he explains how the example in the verse is the common case*. And even within these three places — in "any widow or orphan" he varies from "sorceress" and from "and flesh torn in the field": (a) He adds "because." (b) He explains also the reason why "it is common to afflict them" — "of weak strength."
*) Regarding "sorceress" — one could seemingly say that this is because the student is unfamiliar with matters of sorcery, as below in the main text. But this is forced, because for this, what Rashi writes, "that Scripture speaks of the common case," suffices.
24) Note Rashi, Shoftim 18:9.
25) But this is forced, because according to this it would suffice for him to write only "for women are commonly sorceresses" (as in Sanhedrin ibid.). From his adding "that Scripture speaks of the common case" (although he already explained this above, 21:28), it is implied that the novelty here is [not only that sorcery among women is the common case, but also] the very concept of "Scripture speaks of the common case," as below, note 34.
26) 22:27.
27) And in Mechilta here and Sifri there. In Rambam, Laws of Naarah Besulah, ch. 1, halachah 2: "כל הנבעלת בשדה הרי זו בחזקת אנוסה . . וכל הנבעלת בעיר הרי זו בחזקת מפותה" ("Any woman violated in a field is presumed to have been forced . . and any woman violated in a city is presumed to have been seduced"). According to this one could explain that "for he found her in the field" is meant specifically. But simply, the main distinction is only whether this was in a place where she has a rescuer or in a place where she has no rescuer, as in Sifri there. (It appears that "field" and "city" in Rambam there are also only by way of example, because usually a field is a place where she has no rescuers, unlike a city (and he used the language of the verse), and follow the reason.) See also Ramban on the Torah, Ki Seitzei ibid.
28) 23:11.
29) Not even from "ואם בשדה ימצא" ("But if in the field he finds") at the beginning of this very section (Ki Seitzei 22:25). See below, note 44.
30) Especially as the law "the ox shall surely be stoned" applies to the goring animal; see below, Section 7.
31) See above, note 6.
32) Re'eh 13:7.
33) One can also say: The way of the verses everywhere [when speaking of a matter in which male and female are equal] is to write in the masculine form. So there would be reason to say that because of "Scripture speaks of the common case" the verse would not vary from the way of the verses everywhere, and therefore one cannot derive our case from "And if an ox gores," for in the word "ox" Scripture does not vary from its way everywhere.
34) Based on this it is also understood why Rashi writes that "Scripture speaks of the common case" [and does not suffice with "for women are commonly sorceresses" — see above, note 25] — although he already wrote this above (21:28) — because here he teaches anew that even in such a case Scripture speaks of the common case. Based on this one can also understand why Rashi needed to add "for women are commonly sorceresses" (see above, note 23) — and also why he writes "for women are commonly sorceresses" (and similarly in the Talmud) and not "for sorcery is common among women" — because since the word "sorceress" here is part of the law, as above, if women were not commonly sorceresses and the common case of "sorceress" were that the event of sorcery is more common among women, it would not have said (in the feminine form —) "sorceress" (especially according to what is explained in the previous note). Therefore he adds and emphasizes "for women are commonly sorceresses," that is, that this is a matter in the subject and not in the event.
35) One can also say (in addition to what is written below in the main text): (a) The rule "Scripture speaks of the common case" can seemingly be said when the common case is in the event (and not in the command and the law, which must be most precise, understandably). As in "A sorceress (you shall not allow to live)," where the common case is in the matter of "sorceress" — for women are commonly sorceresses (and not in the command "you shall not allow to live"), so that it is understood why it is written (regarding the one who practices sorcery) "sorceress" — although the command applies also to a sorcerer. This is not so in our case: although it is common to afflict a widow and orphan, in the verse "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan" the common case ("you shall afflict") is in the matter of the command, and the command concerns the affliction of every person. Therefore one might think that there is no reason to say that the command "You shall not afflict any widow or orphan" means: You shall not afflict any person. (b) If the intent of the verse's warning is every person, there is seemingly no meaning to the words "any widow or orphan" (every widow and every orphan), since the intent is every person.
36) Note the dispute as to whether it is possible to measure exactly (Bechoros 17a). But in our case, the Torah of truth can certainly measure exactly. One can say, however (at least in a forced way), that this varies from time to time, and therefore in verses that cannot be explained in another way, one must conclude that it uses two examples because of the variation, etc.
37) Based on this it is also understood simply why Rashi does not explain (above, verse 26) that "tooth and eye" are stated because Scripture speaks of the common case (as Ibn Ezra there). In addition: from the style of the verse "ואם שן כו'" ("And if a tooth, etc.") (beginning a new law, and at great length, in a separate verse), it is proven that this is not because of "Scripture speaks of the common case" (even if we were to say that this rule also applies with two examples).
38) That is, only the law of "you shall not afflict" concerns every person, but the verse speaks only of widow and orphan, as is also proven from its conclusion "והיו . . אלמנות . . יתומים" ("and [your wives] will be . . widows . . [your children] orphans"), which simply is a kind of measure for measure (as Chizkuni writes).
39) Therefore Rashi adds "because" (see above, note 23) — for his intent with "because they are of weak strength, etc." is to explain [not only how the example in the verse is the common case (as above, 22:17; below, 22:30), but also] the reason for "Scripture speaks, etc.," as in the main text.
*) [OCR unclear]
40) Based on this, the question of the commentators (Baalei HaTosafos, Re'em and Gur Aryeh here) is resolved: How can one exclude a person from "ox," when the word "ox" is not superfluous, for it is needed to derive "ox, ox" from Shabbos? — Because the derivation "not a person . . not utensils" is [not from the precise wording "ox" and "donkey," but] from the fact that the verse has two examples, and even if it had said "domestic or wild animal" we would exclude people and utensils, as in the main text.
41) The fact that Rashi needed to prove "the same law applies to every domestic animal, etc." from the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos," and did not explain "Scripture speaks of the common case" — although the need for two examples has a reason — one can say: a) Because there is reason to say that the law "the owner of the pit shall pay" applies specifically to an ox and a donkey, as above, Section 2. b) Even if we say there is no reason to distinguish between an ox and a donkey and every domestic and wild animal — the reason for the explanation "Scripture speaks of the common case" (when there is no reason to distinguish between the example in the verse and other examples) is so that we not say it is a Scriptural decree (as above, note 15). But in our case, even according to the explanation "the same law applies to every domestic and wild animal" there is here a Scriptural decree — the distinction between domestic and wild animals and people and utensils [for if there were a reason to distinguish between them, no exclusion would be needed. See Rashi, Bava Kamma 52a, s.v. "בן"] — and if so, it would be possible to say (without the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos") that the ox and donkey in the verse are meant specifically, by Scriptural decree. c) Since in most places, when there are two examples, they are (not because of "Scripture speaks of the common case," but) meant specifically — this itself proves (without the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos") that the examples of ox and donkey in the verse are also meant specifically, as everywhere there are two examples [for if the law in the verse applied to every domestic and wild animal, it would not have said "ox or donkey," since through this there is room to err in the intent (and along the lines of what is written at the end of the note mentioned above)], and therefore Rashi needed the derivation "ox, ox from Shabbos." Based on this, what Rashi is precise to say, "wherever, etc.," is made more pleasing — for seemingly, what practical difference does it make? — in order to explain that the words "ox or donkey" in the verse give no room for error, since wherever ox or donkey is stated we derive from Shabbos.
42) Based on this it is understood (see above, note 23) why he writes "even in the house likewise," in a style of greater novelty, and not "both in the house and in the field" (along the lines of what is written above, 21:28; 22:17).
43) Based on this it is understood why regarding the second verse Rashi writes again "וכן" ("and likewise") — because the proof from this verse is on a different point. See Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 253, note 20.
44) Based on this it is more pleasing (a) that Rashi also quotes the word "for" — since through this word it is emphasized that "he found her in the field" is not a matter of narrative. (b) that he does not prove from "But if in the field he finds" at the beginning of the section (and likewise from "ומצאה איש בעיר" ("and a man finds her in the city") in verse 23) — because there it is a matter of narrative. And the fact that he does not prove from "על דבר אשר לא צעקה בעיר" ("because she did not cry out in the city") (ibid., 24) — although there too it is a reason for the law "and you shall stone" — is because "in the city" is the explanation of the claim "because she did not cry out" [for since a "city" is (usually) a place where she has rescuers, she should have cried out], whereas "he found her in the field" is superfluous, since it says "(she cried out . .) and she had no rescuer."
45) For this too is called "an occurrence" (without the addition of the word "night") — I Shmuel 20:26. Note also Balak 23:4 and Rashi there.
46) Avodah Zarah 54b.
47) Bereishis Rabbah, beginning of Lech Lecha.
48) Rambam, Laws of Idolatry, ch. 1, halachah 3.
49) Koheles 4:13 and Koheles Rabbah there.
50) See Sotah 3a.
51) Koheles 10:2.
52) See Likkutei Torah, Devarim 86a.
53) See Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, at its beginning.
54) Rambam ibid., end of ch. 1.
55) Shemos Rabbah 12:3; Tanchuma, Va'eira 9.
56) The union at the time of Matan Torah itself, however, is not such a novelty, since the "lower realms" were not then in the state they were in before or afterward, for "לית אתר דלא מליל מיני' עמהון" ("there is no place from which He did not speak with them") (Tikkunei Zohar, cited in Tanya, ch. 36, see there. See also Baalei HaTosafos on the verse "I am the L‑rd your G‑d"); "צפור לא צווח וכו'" ("a bird did not cry out, etc.") (Shemos Rabbah, end of ch. 29), and more. See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 1027 and onward, on the reason for the special endearment of the first twenty-four hours after Matan Torah, for then the matter of service began.
57) Yisro 19:13. In Rashi's commentary there: it is a sign of the departure of the Shechinah. Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Laws of Yom Kippur, end of Siman 623.
58) Note that similarly regarding the special endearment of the second day of Shavuos (see above, note 56): besides being the first day after Matan Torah, the matter of this day itself also indicates the matter of service, as explained in Likkutei Sichos ibid.
59) Rashi, beginning of Mishpatim. See Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 899; Likkutei Sichos vol. 8, p. 130 [OCR unclear].
60) See Likkutei Dibburim vol. 1, 83b (talk of 19 Kislev 5694, Section 3).
Key Lesson
Even the most ordinary events are not mere nature: as this Sicha draws from Rashi's rule, the common case itself is brought into being by the word of Scripture. A Jew's service after Matan Torah is to reveal this within everyday life, recognizing, as the Baal Shem Tov teaches, Divine Providence in every smallest detail of what happens, including its place, time and manner.