Parshas Mishpatim
1. On the verse "ראשית בכורי אדמתך גו' לא תבשל גדי בחלב אמו" ("The first of the first fruits of your land, etc. You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk"),1 Rashi (in his second dibbur) focuses on the words "לא תבשל גדי" ("You shall not cook a kid") and explains: "אף עגל וכבש בכלל גדי שאין גדי אלא לשון ולד רך ממה שאתה מוצא בכמה מקומות שכתב גדי והוצרך לפרש אחריו עזים את גדי העזים שני גדיי עזים ללמדך שכל מקום שנאמר גדי סתם אף עגל וכבש במשמע. ובשלשה מקומות נכתב בתורה אחד לאיסור אכילה ואחד לאיסור הנאה ואחד לאיסור בישול" ("Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,' for 'kid' [gedi] is only an expression for a tender young animal, as you find in several places where it is written 'kid' and it was necessary to specify after it 'of goats': 'the2 kid of the goats,'3 'two kids of goats,'4 to teach you that wherever 'kid' is stated without qualification, even a calf and a lamb are implied.5 And in three places6 it is written in the Torah: one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of deriving benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking").7
Now this is not understood: the conclusion of Rashi's explanation, "And in three places it is written in the Torah, etc.," seemingly has no connection to the beginning of his explanation, "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,' etc." It would surely have been more fitting for Rashi to write the two matters ("Even a calf and a lamb, etc." and "And in three places, etc.") in two separate headings [dibburim hamaschilim], and for the matter of "And in three places, etc." he should have quoted the words "You shall not cook a kid" over again, as is Rashi's way elsewhere in similar cases.
The question is even stronger: not only do the two aforementioned matters differ in their content, but they relate to separate words of the verse. The part of the explanation, "Even a calf and a lamb, etc.," interprets only the word "kid," and there is seemingly no need (for the sake of that part of his explanation) to quote also the words "You shall not cook." In contrast, for the second part of his explanation, "And in three places, etc.," where he explains why the warning as a whole is repeated three times, it is necessary to quote only "You shall not cook." Consequently, the question becomes (not only why both matters appear in the same dibbur, but also) why Rashi writes both matters on all three words, "You shall not cook a kid."
Also not understood is the order in which Rashi brings the two matters. Since with his explanation "And in three places, etc." he clarifies why the warning "You shall not cook, etc." needs to be stated at all, whereas with his statement "Even a calf and a lamb, etc." he merely interprets the word "kid," he should have placed "And in three places, etc." before "Even a calf and a lamb, etc."8 *8 Why does Rashi set out the two matters in reverse order?
2. Regarding the order in which Rashi writes the two matters, placing the explanation "And in three places, etc." after the explanation "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,' etc.," one can explain as follows:
According to Rashi's explanation, "one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of deriving benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking," one must say that the wording "You shall not cook" appears even in the two places where the Torah prohibits eating and benefit because cooking is the beginning that leads to eating and benefit. When a person cooks food, he does so in order to eat it, or in order to derive benefit from it in some other way: giving the food to his child, selling it, and so on. Therefore the Torah states the prohibition of eating and benefit using the term "You shall not cook," because this is comparable to*8 what the "בן חמש (למקרא)" ("five-year-old [beginning Scripture]") knows: that when he is about to do something bad, his teacher shouts at him, "Don't go!" even though what concerns the teacher is (not the going, but) the act he is preparing to do.9
(This is similar to what we find elsewhere,10 that the warning not to eat consecrated food is stated by the verse with the wording "בכל קודש לא תגע" ("You shall not touch anything holy"), because touching food is the beginning that leads to eating.)
It is understood, however, that interpreting "you shall cook" as eating or benefit is not the "פשוטו של מקרא" ("plain meaning of Scripture") of that mikra (verse) in its own right, but is done only because there is no other choice,11 on account of another consideration. In our parsha, if the meaning of "cook" were literal, the command "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" would be superfluous in two places.12 But if it were possible to derive another interpretation that would explain why the prohibition needs to be stated in three places, we would have learned that "cook" is literal in all three places.
Therefore Rashi writes his explanation "And in three places, etc., one for the prohibition of eating, etc." after his explanation "Even a calf and a lamb, etc.," and in one continuous sequence:
Were we to assume that "kid" means only a "kid of goats," the "three places" could be explained far more smoothly: the first "You shall not cook a kid, etc." prohibits a kid of goats; the second, a calf and a lamb13 (which are closest to "kid" in that they too are tender young of the domestic species14); and the third, tender young of the wild species.15
And although, according to this explanation, the word "kid" is not strictly literal in two places, it is understood that it is much smoother to say that the verse calls the "tender young" of a calf, etc., by the term "kid" because it has the same quality (characteristic)16 as the meat of a kid, which is distinguished by being soft, than to say that the verse prohibits eating and benefit using the term "You shall not cook" because the purpose of cooking is eating or benefit.
However, once we know that Rashi explains "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'" one can no longer say that the other two places add further details concerning "kid," since "kid" already means every tender young of the domestic species.17 There now remains only one thing to include, tender young of the wild species, whereas there are two extra verses.18 One must therefore learn that the three come to prohibit (not three details in "kid," but) three details in "You shall not cook": eating, benefit, and cooking.
3. But the difficulty still remains. In many places Rashi writes his explanation of a word that appears later in the verse before he explains a word that appears earlier in it. This is in a case where the explanation of the earlier word becomes compelling (or understandable) only after his explanation of the later word.
But even in such a case, if the two explanations are different matters (it is merely that one compels the other), Rashi divides them into two separate dibburim. And if Rashi does write two matters in one and the same dibbur, this is evidence that the connection between them consists (not only in that one compels, or is a cause for, the other, but) also in their content. That is, the substance (part of it, or all of it) of the two matters is the same, and therefore they come in one sequence.
Accordingly, it is not understood: what is the common point in the content of the two matters, "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'" which interprets the word "kid," and "And in three places, etc.," which explains the reason the prohibition is stated three times, such that because of their shared content Rashi writes them in the same dibbur (especially since the first part concerns only the word "kid," and not "You shall not cook")?
4. In addition to the above difficulty (what is the connection in content between "And in three places it is written in the Torah, etc." and the beginning of the explanation, "Even a calf and a lamb, etc."), the explanation "And in three places, etc." is itself not understood:
a) In a case where a question on one verse arises on account of another verse, it is Rashi's way to resolve the question at the second verse and not at the first. For when studying the first verse, no question has yet arisen for the student that would need answering.
All the more so where the question stems (not from a contradiction between one verse and another, but) from the fact that a matter is written two or more times. It is plainly understood that there is no place to explain and relate, at the first verse, the novelty that is brought about only because a second verse, which comes (much) later, is seemingly superfluous.19
It is thus very difficult that Rashi writes here "And in three places, etc.": what relevance does it have now, in our verse, to explain the novelties that emerge only on account of the two subsequent verses?20
b) According to the plain wording of the verse "You shall not cook, etc.," it should follow that if it were stated only once, it would mean the prohibition of cooking, "You shall not cook." When "You shall not cook" is stated twice more, one includes (besides cooking) also the prohibition of eating, from the second time, and the prohibition of benefit, from the third time.
But Rashi's wording is "one for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of deriving benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking."21 Knowing that in Rashi's commentary even the order is precise, it follows that the first "You shall not cook" refers to the prohibition of eating, the second to the prohibition of benefit, and only the third refers to the prohibition of cooking! This proves that "You shall not cook" meaning literal cooking is so great a novelty that it is stated only after there is no other choice left (since eating and benefit are already known from the previous two verses)! From where does Rashi take this?
The wonder is even greater. The Rambam in his Sefer HaMitzvos22 and the Chinuch in his work,23 both of which are books of Halachah, explain24 that "You shall not cook" of Parshas Mishpatim means, literally, the prohibition of cooking, while "You shall not cook" of Parshas Ki Sisa and Parshas Re'eh, since they were stated "פעם שני'" ("a second time"), refer to the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of benefit. Yet Rashi, who explains the plain meaning of Scripture, actually learns that the first two warnings concern the prohibition of eating and of benefit, and only the third states the prohibition of cooking!
5. The explanation of this is as follows: Rashi, with his explanation "And in three places, etc.," aims to resolve a puzzling matter that arises immediately in our verse, "You shall not cook a kid":
We find nowhere in the Torah (and certainly not according to the knowledge of a five-year-old beginning Scripture, and what he sees) that a thing should be forbidden in cooking. Certain things are forbidden to be eaten, other things are forbidden for benefit, but nothing else is forbidden to be cooked.25 Why, then, should a "kid in its mother's milk" be forbidden to be cooked?26
Therefore Rashi explains immediately here, "In three places it is written in the Torah, one for the prohibition of eating, etc.": our verse prohibits eating, not cooking; rather, it is a warning concerning the prohibition of eating.27
But in order to be able to derive such an interpretation according to Rashi's way, the plain meaning of Scripture, Rashi must explain "In three places, etc.":
Had "You shall not cook" been stated only once, one would have had to learn that it means the prohibition of cooking literally, despite the fact that no similar prohibition is found anywhere. For although it is a great novelty, since "לא מצאתי לו חבר" ("I have found no parallel to it") and nothing else is forbidden to be cooked, one nevertheless cannot interpret "cook" as eating.
Since, however, "in three places it is written in the Torah," which plainly is not "להרבות בלאו" ("to add further prohibitions")28 but rather three warnings concerning three separate matters,29 and since in two places one must take "You shall not cook" out of its literal meaning and interpret it to mean (not "cook" as it stops at the cooking, but what comes immediately after it, for the sake of which he cooks) eating and benefit, and all three things are forbidden, cooking, eating and benefit, it is logical to say that the first "You shall not cook" means eating, because a prohibition of eating is no novelty at all: the very first prohibition in the Torah is "לא תאכל ממנו" ("You shall not eat from it") (from the Tree of Knowledge).30
[And although with the prohibition of eating "a kid in its mother's milk" there is also a novelty, in that each of them ("kid" and "milk") by itself is permitted to be eaten,31 this novelty is nothing new even to a five-year-old beginning Scripture, since he already knows about the prohibition of shaatnez];32
with the second "You shall not cook," the Torah adds a further prohibition to "a kid in its mother's milk," the prohibition of benefit; and the prohibition of cooking, which is an extremely great novelty (a category of prohibition that exists only with "a kid in its mother's milk"), is learned only from the third time.
6. Seemingly one could ask on this: in the end, even according to Rashi's explanation in the plain meaning of Scripture, meat and milk is forbidden to be cooked. So what do we gain (in terms of there being less of a novelty) by explaining that the first (and second) "You shall not cook" does not mean the prohibition of cooking? How does it make things easier for us if the Scriptural decree appears not in Parshas Mishpatim but in Parshas Re'eh?
In truth, however, it is understandable. When one learns that "You shall not cook" means only cooking (or at least, one does not yet know about the prohibition of eating and benefit), then it is indeed an extremely great novelty. It is different, however, when we (already) know that meat and milk is forbidden to be eaten and for benefit; then one can already understand the prohibition of cooking in it. The simple explanation: the prohibition of cooking meat and milk is a result of the prohibition of eating and benefit. The prohibition of eating and benefit is so severe (with meat and milk) that because of it the Torah forbade also the cooking of meat and milk, since it may lead to eating and benefit.32
An illustration of this comes from long before. When Chava heard "מפרי עץ הגן נאכל ומפרי העץ אשר בתוך הגן" (and nevertheless) "אמר אלקים לא תאכלו ממנו" ("Of the fruit of the trees of the garden we may eat, but of the fruit of the tree in the midst of the garden" (and nevertheless) "G‑d said, 'You shall not eat of it'"), it was plain to her33 that the command also (includes) "ולא תגעו בו" ("and you shall not touch it").34
This is a further explanation of why Rashi derives the prohibition of cooking meat and milk only from the third "You shall not cook," although this is not in keeping with the plain translation. For (besides the fact that logic requires pushing off a prohibition containing more novelty until as late as possible, as above, Section 5) the prohibition of cooking becomes understandable and has a place specifically after, and because of the fact that, meat and milk is forbidden to be eaten and for benefit.*34
7. According to the above one will also understand the connection of the conclusion of Rashi's words, "And in three places it is written in the Torah, one for the prohibition of eating, etc.," to the beginning of his explanation, "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,' etc.":
With the explanation "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'" Rashi aims (not only to explain the meaning of "kid," but) also to resolve a question that arises in the words "You shall not cook a kid," the words on which he focuses: in what way is "kid" set apart from other kinds of animals, that specifically on it there should be the prohibition "You shall not cook in its mother's milk"?
In general we do not find in the Torah distinctions, regarding prohibitions and the like, between one animal and another. This is so obvious that Rashi therefore explains (without any proofs for it) that "יגח שור" ("[if] an ox gores") means "אחד שור ואחד כל בהמה וחי' ועוף" ("whether an ox or any domestic animal, wild animal or fowl").35
And this Rashi resolves with his explanation "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'"*35 namely, that the prohibition "You shall not cook a kid" indeed applies also to a calf and a lamb.36
And although even according to Rashi's explanation, "kid" includes only tender young37 (and at that) of domestic animals (not of wild animals),38 one cannot ask: in what way is the tender young of domestic animals different from all other kinds? For since the prohibition "You shall not cook" (in this verse) is, in its plain sense,39 "in its mother's milk,"40 it is understandable that the reason for the prohibition stems from cruelty41 to living creatures (and if so, all the more so that causing them pain is forbidden),42 and consequently it is understood why the prohibition applies specifically to "kid." For the "cooking" (comprising all three details: eating, benefit and cooking) of a young one in its mother's milk is more cruel than that of an older one, and among young ones themselves, it is more so with the domestic species,43 which are more within man's power than wild animals,44 and in general weaker than them, and so on.
Based on this it emerges that both matters that Rashi writes in his explanation of "You shall not cook a kid" have a common point. These are "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'" in which he explains the reason for the prohibition specifically with "kid," and "And in three places, etc., for the prohibition of eating, etc.," in which he explains the reason for the prohibition "You shall not cook." Through both matters he brings out that the prohibition "You shall not cook a kid" is not a Scriptural decree that is entirely beyond understanding, but has a rationale also in intellect.
8. Rashi's commentary also contains "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of Torah"),45 47 and one of the directives that can be learned from this Rashi is the following:
The only thing that the Torah prohibited in cooking is a kid in its mother's milk, and according to what was said above, its reason is to negate cruelty and pain to living creatures. From this we see how severe the prohibition of tzaar baalei chaim (causing pain to living creatures) is:46 although the matter of tzaar baalei chaim, directly, is a reason to prohibit a kid in its mother's milk only in eating (or also in benefit), the Torah forbade it also in cooking, because this can lead to eating.47
And from this one must learn how careful one must be, with every kind of caution, not to cause, G‑d forbid, any pain to another Jew. For if with animals the Torah was so particular regarding their pain, how much more so regarding human beings, and regarding Jews in particular (the chosen people, "בחרתנו מכל העמים" ("You have chosen us from all the nations")), all the more so.
(From the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Ki Sisa, 5728.)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 23:19.
2) So in the first printing. In several printings: "כגון אנכי אשלח גדי עזים (וישב לח, יז) את גדי כו'" ("such as 'I will send a kid of goats' (Vayeshev 38:17), 'the kid, etc.'"). There are also a number of other variations.
3) Vayeshev 38:20.
4) Toldos 27:9.
5) So too in Chullin 113b. In Chullin there: "פרה ורחל" ("a cow and a ewe"), and in Rashi here "a calf and a lamb," because "kid" means "tender young." However, from what Rashi writes (Chullin ibid., s.v. Mechad Kra; and there 114a, s.v. B'chalev Imo), "a calf and a lamb," it is evident that also according to the way of Halachah the meaning of "kid" is as above,* and the wording of the Gemara, "even a cow and a ewe are implied," is because according to the way of Halachah there is no distinction in this matter. Alternatively, one could say (since according to the above the wording "are implied" is somewhat strained) that the intent is to the "young" of the cow and ewe. Based on this, the change to "cow" will also be better appreciated (and not "bull" or "ox," since usually, in most places where it includes males and females, it uses the masculine form). See also Rambam, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros 9:3: "וגדי הוא כולל ולד השור ולד השה ולד העז" ("And 'kid' includes the young of the ox, the young of the sheep and the young of the goat").
*) In the Chinuch, Mitzvah 92: "שאין גדי אלא לשון בהמה והוציא בלשון גדי לפי שהבשר הוא דבר רך כגדי" ("for 'kid' is simply an expression for a domestic animal, and it is expressed with the term 'kid' because the meat is something soft, like a kid").
6) Here in our parsha; Ki Sisa 34:26; Re'eh 14:21.
7) So too in Chullin 115b.
8) As above (21:14-18 [OCR unclear]), that at first [he quotes only the beginning of the verse and] explains "למה נאמר" ("why it was stated"), the matter as a whole, and afterward explains the details.
*8) But one cannot say that it expressed the prohibition of eating with the term of cooking only to teach that it is forbidden only by way of cooking (as in Sanhedrin 4, end of side b; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, beginning of Siman 87), because the plain wording "You shall not cook" indicates that the verse is warning about the cooking (and not about the eating, by way of cooking). Therefore one must say as in the text, that it expressed the prohibition of eating with the term of cooking because cooking is a preparation for eating. Nevertheless, from the fact that it says "You shall not cook," and not "You shall not prepare" (like Beshalach (16:5) "והכינו" ("and they shall prepare")) or the like, it is proven (also according to the way of plain meaning) that the prohibition of eating (and of benefit) is specifically by way of cooking.
9) According to this: a) Rashi's explanation (Bereishis 3:3) "הוסיפה על הציווי" ("she added to the command") (and not simply "she added," or "to the prohibition," and the like) will be better appreciated. b) It will be understood why the serpent's proof, "כשם שאין מיתה בנגיעה כך אין מיתה באכילה" ("just as there is no death through touching, so there is no death through eating") (Rashi ibid., 3:4), was accepted by Chava. c) There is no contradiction to this from the fact that Avraham decreed "גזירות להרחקה על אזהרות שבתורה" ("decrees as safeguards for the Torah's warnings") (Rashi, Toldos 26:5).
10) Tazria 12:4, and Rashi there.
11) It should be noted that in Parshas Tazria there, Rashi adds: "כמו ששנוי ביבמות" ("as taught in Yevamos").
12) Seemingly one could ask: the beginning of the verse too, "The first of the first fruits of your land, etc." [and likewise the verses preceding it], is repeated in Parshas Ki Sisa? However, the novelty of these verses is explained by Rashi in Parshas Ki Sisa (as explained at length in the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Vayakhel 5728).
13) Or that the second "kid" includes only a "lamb," which more closely resembles a "kid (of goats)," since both are small domestic animals, and the third "kid" refers to the tender young of a large domestic animal (see similarly the Mechilta here: "אחת לבהמה גסה ואחת לעזים ואחת לרחלים" ("one for large domestic animals, one for goats and one for ewes")).
14) But the tender young of the wild species we do not derive from the "kid" stated the second time (only from the third time). See similarly the Mechilta here: "one for domestic animals (large, and one for small) and one for wild animals."
15) Also according to the way of Halachah there is an opinion that "kid" is specifically a kid (of goats), and that the meat of wild animals and of other domestic animals is derived from the extra "kid" (see Rashi, Chullin 113a, s.v. B'chalev Imo).
16) Moreover, this is very common in the Torah, as Rashi explains: "חיות .. ור"ד .. שאינן צריכות מילדות" ("'Chayos' ... and our Sages expounded ... who do not need midwives"), like wild animals [chayos] (Shemos 1:19). This is so not only according to the way of Midrash (which is close to the plain meaning), as in our case, but also in the plain meaning of Scripture, for example: "גור ארי' יהודה" ("Yehudah is a lion cub") (and it does not say, as at the end of the verse, "like a lion cub"), Vayechi 49:9. And in many other places.
17) But not of the wild species. This is why Rashi writes specifically "a calf and a lamb" (see Rashi, Vayikra 1:2). One should not ask: from the fact that it was necessary (Chullin 113, end of side a) to exclude "פרט לחיה" ("except for a wild animal"), it is seemingly proven that without this exclusion a wild animal too would be included in "kid" (see Rashi, Chullin ibid.). For besides the fact that there is no proof from a derivation in the way of Halachah to a derivation in the way of plain meaning,* the Gemara's wording (ibid., beginning of side b), "a cow and a ewe," implies that (also in the way of Halachah) only a domestic animal is included in "kid." And a verse is needed to exclude wild animals because according to the Gemara's approach there, there is no logical basis at all to distinguish between them (which is why a verse is needed even to exclude fowl). See also Lechem Mishneh on the Rambam ibid., that the meat of a domestic animal is within the meaning of the verse, and the meat of a wild animal is learned from oral tradition.
*) In Rashi on Re'eh (14:21): "three times ... excluding a wild animal, etc." But this is after "You shall not cook, etc." has been stated a second time (in Parshas Ki Sisa), from which we learn all meat (as Rashi explains there, "a warning regarding meat in milk"; see at length below, p. 201 ff.), and therefore an exclusion is needed for fowl and wild animals (as below there, p. 204). This is not so regarding the "kid" of Parshas Mishpatim.
18) One cannot say that the third "kid" also includes meat that is not from tender young, because this is the opposite of the implication of the term "kid" (see note 5 above). Likewise one cannot say that it includes fowl (as in the Mechilta here: "one for domestic animals, one for wild animals and one for fowl"), because fowl has no mother's milk, and "You shall not cook in its mother's milk" does not apply to it.
19) This is why Rashi does not explain in our parsha the reason why the command "The first of the first fruits of your land, etc.," and likewise several commands preceding it, are repeated in Parshas Ki Sisa.
20) It should be noted that even the Chinuch (Mitzvah 92) explains nothing in Parshas Mishpatim regarding the novelty in Parshas Ki Sisa and Parshas Re'eh. See also Ibn Ezra here: "ועוד אזכר למה הזכיר .. פעם שנית .. במקום כל אחד מהם" ("And I will yet mention why it mentioned ... a second time ... in the place of each of them").
21) And although this is the wording of the Gemara (ibid. 115b), had the first "You shall not cook" come (according to Rashi) for the prohibition of cooking, Rashi would have departed from the wording of the Talmud (as is his way in many places), so that people would not say that according to the plain meaning of Scripture the first "You shall not cook" comes for the prohibition of eating.
22) Negative commandments 186-187.
23) Mitzvos 92 and 113.
24) This is also implied by the order in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, beginning of Siman 87.
25) It is plainly understood that the prohibition of cooking on Shabbos (see above, Beshalach 16:23) is not at all relevant to our case. For there the prohibition is, like the prohibition that those gathering the manna should not go out to gather it (Rashi ibid., 16:29), because (as the verse itself prefaces, that the day is) "שבתון שבת קודש להוי'" ("a rest, a holy Shabbos to the L‑rd"). But we do not find (anywhere) a thing that is forbidden to be cooked.
26) It should be noted that the Chinuch too (Mitzvah 92) writes [after explaining a reason for the prohibition of cooking meat in milk] "ועדיין צריכים אנו למודעי המקובלים" ("and we still need the knowledgeable among the Kabbalists"), and also, after citing the reason of the Rambam: "וכל זה איננו שוה לי" ("and all this does not satisfy me").
27) Based on this it is understood why Targum Onkelos, which is close to the plain meaning of Scripture (unlike Targum Yonasan), renders (in all three places) "לא תיכלון" ("You shall not eat"). But this is not Rashi's approach; see further in the text.
28) See also Pesachim 26, beginning of side b: "כל היכא דאיכא למידרש דרשינן ולא מוקמינן בלאוי יתירי" ("wherever there is something to derive, we derive it, and we do not establish it as superfluous prohibitions").
29) Bereishis 2:17.
30) Rashi, s.v. Mai Ta'ama, Chullin 108a.
31) Rashi, Toldos 26:5. See Pesachim 44b; Nazir 37a; Tosafos, s.v. D'Chidush (Chullin ibid.).
32) See Kesef Mishneh, Hilchos Tumas Meis 1:2. See also Lekach Tov (by R. Yosef Engel, Klal 8), several examples of a protective fence within Torah law.
33) This is why the serpent's proof, "just as there is no, etc.," was accepted by her (see note 9 above).
34) Bereishis 3:2-3.
*34) Also according to what is explained below in Section 7, that the reason for the prohibition of "a kid in its mother's milk" stems from cruelty, one cannot say that the prohibition of cooking is on its own account, because cooking too is cruelty. For if so, the Torah should (also) have forbidden placing it in its mother's milk (and cooking is impossible without first placing it), and from this it is proven that the cruelty is specifically in the eating (and the benefit), and not in the cooking. There is no contradiction to this from "אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו" ("It and its young you shall not slaughter"), though that too is on account of cruelty (especially since, according to the Rambam (Hilchos Shechitah, beginning of ch. 12), if one transgressed and slaughtered them, it is permitted to eat them). For the cruelty in slaughtering it and its young also involves tzaar baalei chaim (see below, note 41), and therefore the essence of the cruelty is specifically in the slaughter.
35) Our parsha, 21:28. See similarly Rashi, 21:37.
*35) This is why Rashi first states "Even a calf and a lamb are included in 'kid,'" and only afterward adds "for 'kid' is only an expression for tender young," unlike in Parshas Ki Sisa, where he first explains "every tender young is implied" and afterward writes "and even a calf and a lamb."* For in Ki Sisa there he is explaining the term "kid" [which is why he does not quote "You shall not cook"]; see below, the second sicha on Parshas Ki Sisa (end of p. 205 ff.). In our parsha, however, he explains that "You shall not cook" applies also to a calf and a lamb, and in continuation of this he explains "שאין (with a shin) גדי כו'" ("for 'kid,' etc."), to explain what is written before it.
*) According to the first printing, "even a calf and a lamb" is in the following dibbur.
36) In Ibn Ezra and Rashbam here: this is because the verse speaks of the common case. But Rashi does not explain this way, since he holds that according to the plain meaning a calf and a lamb too are included in "kid."
37) See note 5 above. And the reason Rashi does not explain that the prohibition applies to all meat,** and that "kid" is stated because the verse speaks of the common case,*** is that the explanation "the verse speaks of the common case" applies specifically where there is no logical basis to distinguish between what is stated in the verse and other similar matters. In our case, however, there is a logical basis to say that the prohibition applies only to "kid" (as explained further in the text).
**) And although in Parshas Ki Sisa Rashi explains "a warning regarding meat, etc." (by which he intends all meat, and not only "kid," a tender young animal), from the fact that in our parsha he does not explain "a warning regarding meat," it is proven that the warning in Parshas Mishpatim is only for "kid," because it is understood that Rashi does not rely, in what is compelled by the plain meaning of Scripture, on what he will explain later. As for what compels Rashi in Parshas Ki Sisa to explain "a warning regarding meat," see below (p. 201 ff.).
***) One cannot say that according to the explanation that "kid" includes all tender young, the example of "kid" is not more common than other meat. For in the Rambam, Hilchos Maachalos Asuros ibid., and in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch ibid. too, "the verse speaks of the common case" is cited (see the explanation of this in the Prishah there), and the "common case" is the actual reality; therefore one cannot differentiate in this regard between a derivation in the way of plain meaning, or Halachah, and so on. See also below there (p. 206), that Rashi too in Parshas Ki Sisa explains this way.
38) See note 17 above.
39) Further on, in Parshas Ki Sisa (34:26), Rashi explains: "בחלב אמו פרט לעוף שאין לו חלב אם" ("'in its mother's milk': this excludes fowl, which has no mother's milk"). According to this (that it is necessary to exclude fowl), it is understood that the prohibition "You shall not cook" applies also with other milk. However, besides what is plainly understood (and as has been discussed several times), that Rashi does not rely on what he will explain later, in our case, in Parshas Mishpatim, one cannot explain "excluding fowl, etc.," since "kid" (in our parsha) is specifically the domestic species (as above in the text), and not wild animals and fowl. Hence there is no reason to take "in its mother's milk" in our parsha out of its plain meaning (that the prohibition "You shall not cook" is only "in its mother's milk"). See Likkutei Sichos vol. 27, p. 42, note 35.
40) Based on this it is plainly understood* why it says "ויקח חמאה וחלב ובן הבקר" ("And he took butter and milk and the young calf") (which was "רך" ("tender"), as in the preceding verse) "אשר עשה ויתן" ("which he had prepared, and he placed") (Avraham, who was the utter opposite of cruelty, besides having observed the entire Torah), etc. (Vayera 18:8).
*) According to Rashi in Parshas Ki Sisa, that from the second "You shall not cook a kid" we learn that the prohibition applies also with other milk (see note 39), the answer is: a) They ate them one after the other (and even without this it is proven so; see Rashi there on the verse: "קמא קמא כו'" ("the first, the first, etc.")). b) Whoever ate this did not eat that. And although he gave them three tongues, and even gave butter, it was so that the choice would be [OCR unclear] each one, and perhaps they would all want only the young calf. This is hospitality done in a beautiful manner. And this is easily understood.
41) Ramban on Parshas Re'eh, 14:21. See also Ibn Ezra here. The Moreh Nevuchim, Part III, ch. 48, implies that this does not involve tzaar baalei chaim. The reason is simple: "tzaar baalei chaim" applies only when it is alive [but the "cruelty" of the human soul applies also with meat in milk].
42) For if cruelty is forbidden, it is obvious that tzaar baalei chaim is forbidden. See the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe (ח"י [OCR unclear]), Hilchos צ"ד [OCR unclear] and Tzaar Baalei Chaim, par. 4.
43) It should be noted that the prohibition of "אותו ואת בנו לא תשחטו ביום אחד" ("It and its young you shall not slaughter on one day") [which is also on account of cruelty (Chinuch, Mitzvah 292 (in the second reason). See Ibn Ezra and Rashbam here, that the prohibition of "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" is analogous to the prohibition of "It and its young")] applies only to a domestic animal and not to a wild animal (Yoreh De'ah, Siman 16).
44) As is plainly understood. Based on what is stated in the text, the precise wording of Rashi (Bereishis 1:26) will be understood: "בחיות ובבהמות כו' ירוד לפניהם (in the plural) והחי' מושלת בו" ("over the wild animals and domestic animals, etc.: he descends before them (in the plural), and the wild animal rules over him"). For "before them" (in the plural, which includes the domestic animals as well) is only "he descends," while the wild animal (also) rules over him.
45) Hayom Yom, p. 24.
46) See Bava Metzia 32b. In the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe (Orach Chaim, Siman 305, par. 26; ח"ו [OCR unclear] ibid.), he rules according to the opinion of the authorities (cited in Sdei Chemed, Klalim, Ma'areches Tzaar Baalei Chaim) that it is a Biblical prohibition.
47) Moreover, it is for this reason that the Torah forbade all meat in milk, and also not only in eating and benefit but in cooking as well, as explained further on there (pp. 201; 204 ff.).
Key Lesson
The Torah's only prohibition of cooking, a kid in its mother's milk, shows how seriously it treats cruelty and pain even toward animals, extending the safeguard from eating to the cooking that can lead to it. How much more careful, then, must one be, with every kind of caution, never to cause pain to another Jew.