Parshas Yisro
1. Before the beginning of the Ten Commandments, it says in the verse1: "וידבר אלקים את כל הדברים האלה לאמר" ("And G‑d spoke all these words, saying"). The word lemor ("saying") is generally translated: [in order] to [re]tell*1 (for example, "וידבר ה׳ אל משה לאמר" ("And the L‑rd spoke to Moshe, saying") means that Moshe was to tell over to the Jewish people what G‑d had told him). In our verse, however, it cannot be translated this way, because at Matan Torah G‑d spoke to all the Jews2 (especially since "all the Jews" here means all the souls of Israel of all generations, every one of whom was present at the receiving of the Torah and heard the Commandments from G‑d Himself*2). To whom, then, were the Jews (or Moshe) supposed to tell over the Ten Commandments?3
The Mechilta therefore explains that here lemor means: to say back, to answer. To each utterance the Jews answered back that they would carry out what that utterance demanded of them.
As for the manner in which the Jews voiced their acceptance, the Mechilta brings two opinions. Rabbi Yishmael says: "שהיו אומרים על הן הן ועל לאו לאו" ("They would say to a yes, yes; and to a no, no") — to the Commandments in the category of "arise and do" (yes), the Jews answered "yes," that they would do; and to the Commandments that instructed them not to do (no), the Jews answered "no," that they would not do what G‑d had forbidden. Rabbi Akiva, however, says that the Jews answered "על הן הן ועל לאו הן" ("To a yes, yes; and to a no, yes"): to all the Commandments — both the Commandments of "yes" (positive) and the Commandments of "no" (prohibitive) — they answered with the same word, "yes," meaning by this that they would carry out G‑d's command, each according to its nature.
It is not understood: what is the substance of their dispute? What difference can there be whether the answer is phrased in the negative, "no" (that they will not transgress the prohibition), or in the affirmative, "yes" (that they will fulfill the command, and thus not do what is forbidden)? The intent of both kinds of answer is, on the face of it, the same.
2. There is another dispute between the same Tannaim (Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva), also connected with the subject of Matan Torah:
On the verse "וכל העם רואים את הקולות" ("And all the people saw the sounds")4, Rabbi Yishmael says "רואין הנראה ושומעין הנשמע" ("They saw what is seen and heard what is heard") — that the word "saw" refers not to the word "sounds," but to "the torches," which is mentioned further on in the verse; whereas the sounds, which are something heard, the Jews indeed heard (and did not see). Rabbi Akiva, however, says "רואין (הנשמע5) ושומעין הנראה" ("They saw (what is heard) and heard what is seen") — that the sounds, which by nature are something heard, they saw; and the torches, which are something seen, they heard6.
Now, the rule is known: "לא עביד קוב"ה ניסא למגנא" ("The Holy One, blessed be He, does not perform a miracle for nothing"). We must therefore say that the miracle of "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen" (according to Rabbi Akiva's view) was not something additional to the matter of Matan Torah — for then it would have been7 "a miracle for nothing." Rather, it was a miracle that is part of the matter of Matan Torah: Matan Torah raises the Jews to the highest levels, and as a part and an outcome of this ultimate elevation there is, in Rabbi Akiva's opinion, "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen"8.
So too must we say in the view of Rabbi Yishmael: according to his explanation (since the verse informs us of this in connection with Matan Torah), in the ultimate elevation of Matan Torah there is, as a part and an outcome of it, specifically the manner of "seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard." This is the manner of revelation that the Jews merited at Matan Torah. But on the face of it, that is simply the order of nature?!
3. Since the two above disputes are between the same two Tannaim, and on the same subject — Matan Torah — it stands to reason that the two opinions depend on one another, and that each of the disputants is consistent with his own view. According to the view of "seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard," one must say that they answered "to a yes, yes; and to a no, no"; and according to the view of "seeing (what is heard) and hearing what is seen," it must emerge that they answered "to a yes, yes; and to a no, yes."
There is no contradiction to this from Rashi's commentary on the Torah, which on the word "saying" learns like Rabbi Yishmael, "מלמד שהיו עונין על הן הן ועל לאו לאו" ("This teaches that they would answer to a yes, yes; and to a no, no"), and on "they saw the sounds" says "רואין את הנשמע" ("They saw what is heard") — like Rabbi Akiva9. For what compels Rabbi Akiva to learn "to a no, yes" is not his view on the detail of "seeing what is heard," but the second detail, "hearing what is seen." And since Rashi in his commentary on the Torah brings only the matter of "seeing what is heard"10, he can therefore learn on the word "saying" according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael: "to a no, no." He chooses this interpretation of "saying" because it is smoother in the plain meaning of Scripture.
4. This will be understood from an explanation of the differences in definition between sight and hearing:
a) The difference with regard to the person who sees or hears: sight "reaches" deeper into the soul of the one seeing — and therefore with greater certainty — than does hearing. When a person sees with his eyes that a thing is so, no intellectual reasoning will convince him that the thing is otherwise. For the clarification that comes through sight is lodged in the soul far more deeply and with far more certainty than the clarification of the intellect, as emerges from the practical halachic ruling "אין עד נעשה דיין" ("A witness cannot become a judge")11. Hearing, by contrast, does not reach so deep into the soul; what is heard with the sense of hearing is not engraved so strongly in the soul. And certainly hearing in the sense of comprehension, "catching" and understanding with the intellect, is not as forceful and certain as the matter of sight12.
b) The difference between them with regard to the thing heard and seen: sight "takes" (sees) physicality; through sight one grasps (a) physical (thing). Hearing, however, cannot take a physical thing (the sound that is heard is spiritual relative to the physicality of the thing that is seen, and all the more so is intellectual comprehension a spiritual matter).
These two differences between sight and hearing depend on one another13. A person is a physical being, and so it is natural that he should receive and grasp a physical thing, through the sense of sight, with more closeness and solidity than a spiritual thing. For spirituality a person is not a "close" vessel, and therefore he takes it through hearing, through the intellect — (and thus) farther from his own being.
5. This is what Matan Torah accomplished: "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen"14. That which is "heard," which can be taken only through hearing — the matter of (spirituality) G‑dliness — the Jews took with the certainty and tangibility of sight; they saw G‑dliness. And that which had always been "seen," physical things, the physical world, was for them at that time no more than in the manner of "hearing," like something that is only heard or understood15.
With this it is also understood that the miracle of "seeing what is heard" was not something separate from the revelation of Matan Torah, but an integral part of it. At Matan Torah the Jews merited the revelation of the Essence of the Infinite Light, blessed be He — "אנכי הוי׳ אלקיך" ("I am16 the L‑rd17 — your G‑d18"). They therefore "took" G‑dliness (spirituality) with sight (seeing what is heard). And consequently, with such a revelation of G‑dliness, the physicality of the world lost for them its palpable existence, and they merely "heard" and understood that it exists (hearing what is seen). This is similar to the explanation we find in Chassidus19: G‑d is One and Unique in the ultimate sense, and apart from Him there is no existence at all; if so, perhaps the entire world is no more than an illusion? To this Chassidus answers and explains that a proof (one of the proofs) of the existence of the world is the fact that the Torah of truth says "בראשית ברא אלקים" ("In the beginning G‑d created").
6. A semblance of an example of this: when two litigants come to a din Torah — for instance, "שנים אוחזין בטלית כו׳" ("Two are holding a garment...") — the judge examines the laws, analyzes their claims and issues the ruling, "זה ישבע כו׳ ויחלוקו" ("This one shall swear... and they shall divide it")20, and then the officer compels the litigants to carry out the judge's ruling. There are three matters here: the reasonings (which necessitate the ruling), the ruling, and the oath and division of the garment.
In this the litigants, the officer and the judge differ from one another; for each of them the "certainty" and the "reality" in this matter is something else:
The litigants: in their "world" there is only the oath and the division of the garment. This, for them, is the "reality" of the whole matter. And although they too, if they "inquire" and investigate, will learn that the cause of the division is the ruling that was given over to the officer (a ruling that comes as an outcome of the reasonings), all of that is for them only something in their intellect.
The officer, whose task is to see that the ruling is carried out: his "certainty" and "reality" in the matter is the ruling.
And the judge who issues the ruling: for him the "reality" is the reasonings that brought about the ruling, while the ruling and its implementation are merely an outcome of the reasonings and of the give-and-take.
7. In light of this we must understand the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael: what sort of elevation, especially the elevation of Matan Torah, which is the ultimate elevation, is expressed in the natural manner of "seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard"?
The explanation is this. What Matan Torah accomplished is: "ירד ה׳ על הר סיני — עליונים ירדו למטה, אני המתחיל" ("The L‑rd descended upon Mount Sinai" — "Those above shall descend below, and I shall be the one to begin")21 — the drawing down of G‑dliness below, that G‑dliness should be drawn into the world specifically as the world remains in its natural limitations, and yet there (through the Torah — the Giver of the Torah) G‑dliness should be perceived.
Therefore, Rabbi Yishmael holds, the Jews at the time of Matan Torah stood within the natural limits of the world. But precisely in this was expressed the accomplishment and the ultimate elevation: although "they saw what is seen and heard what is heard," nevertheless at Matan Torah, in this very sight and in this very hearing, "אמת הוי׳ לעולם" ("the truth of the L‑rd [endures] forever") of G‑dliness shone to such an extent that it brought the Jews to ultimate self-nullification: "וינועו ויעמדו מרחוק" ("And they trembled and stood from afar").
8. What, indeed, is the reason that Rabbi Yishmael's opinion is that the ultimate elevation consists in "seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard," and Rabbi Akiva's opinion is that the ultimate elevation is in "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen"?
The explanation is this:
Rabbi Yishmael was a Kohen22 (a Kohen Gadol23), and the matter of a Kohen is that by his birth (by his nature) "קדוש הוא לאלקיו" ("He is holy unto his G‑d")*23. That is, his service is in the manner of the service of tzaddikim. Therefore he holds, in keeping with his nature and the order of his service, that the ultimate elevation consists in "seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard" — drawing G‑dliness into the world as it stands below in its limitations — for that is the descending service of tzaddikim, the drawing down of G‑dliness from above to below24.
The service of Rabbi Akiva was in the motion of teshuvah. He descended from converts25 and began learning Torah at the age of forty26; and therefore his service was in the motion of teshuvah27 — going out of the world28.
— As we find29 that all his days Rabbi Akiva yearned actually to give up his life [and especially according to what is known, that "במקום שרצונו של אדם שם הוא נמצא כולו" ("Where a person's will is, there he is entirely")27, it emerges that all his days he stood in mesirus nefesh] —
And this is the very point: according to his opinion the ultimate elevation consists in "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen," in going out of all the limitations of the world.
9. Mitzvos contain within them two matters30: a) the common point and shared aspect of all mitzvos — that all of them are a command of G‑d31; b) how mitzvos divide into categories and so on, down to the particular matter present in each individual mitzvah, through which a particular refinement is accomplished in a person's powers and in the physical things that relate specifically to that mitzvah*31.
In these two matters are expressed the two (modes of service and) views of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva:
According to Rabbi Yishmael's view ("seeing what is seen and hearing what is heard") — that the ultimate elevation consists in G‑dliness being drawn down and perceived in the world specifically through its natural limits in all their details — it is understood that in the Jews' fulfillment of mitzvos too there must be (not only the general feeling of kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim, but) chiefly a perceiving of and devotion to accomplishing the specific matter and particular uniqueness that each individual mitzvah carries within it.
Therefore Rabbi Yishmael says that the Jews answered "to a yes, yes; and to a no, no": in each mitzvah they perceived its particular matter. In the positive mitzvos ("yes") they perceived the "yes," the affirmative matter, the good and elevation that is in them. And in the prohibitive mitzvos ("no") they perceived the "no," the negative matter, the opposite of good that lies in the prohibitions.
According to Rabbi Akiva, however, who holds that the ultimate elevation consists in the motion of "going out" of the world and its limitations, it must consequently also emerge that the emphasis in fulfilling mitzvos is (not on the particular refinements they accomplish in the matters of the world, but) on obeying the command of the Creator — a feeling that is above details and definitions.
Therefore Rabbi Akiva holds "to a yes, yes; and to a no, yes"32: what they chiefly perceived was (not the detail of the mitzvah, but) the general command of the Holy One, blessed be He, in which all mitzvos are equal. For this reason they made no distinction, in their answer, between positive mitzvos and prohibitive mitzvos. To all the commands, both positive and prohibitive, there was one and the same answer, "yes": they would fulfill what G‑d commands33.
In other words: in the service of Rabbi Yishmael (tzaddikim), in fulfilling the mitzvos one perceives the mitzvah and its effect in the world. Therefore the mitzvos divide into details, into divisions, down, in general terms, to two categories: "yes" and "no." And in the service of Rabbi Akiva (teshuvah and mesirus nefesh), one perceives the One Who commands and the fulfillment of His will — "yes"*33.
10. Another explanation of Rabbi Akiva's view, "to a yes, yes; and to a no, yes": their answer "yes" even to a "no" (a prohibitive mitzvah) is not only because of the aspect shared by prohibitive and positive mitzvos, fulfilling the Creator's command, but also because of the "yes" that the "no" itself contains34. Even in the forbidden things, about which they were commanded "You shall not do," they saw and felt only the "yes," the good and holiness that comes about through fulfilling "You shall not do"35.
This fits with his view of "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen." When one is at the level of "hearing what is seen," when the "visible," physical world is received only through the distant grasp of "hearing" — that is, in truth the existence of the world is entirely dismissed, and its whole existence is perceived (heard) only because of the proofs that the Torah gives for it — it is then understood that in every existence one sees only its content that has to do with Torah and mitzvos.
Consequently, when one encounters a "no," something opposed to holiness — even such a "no" as "אלקים אחרים" ("other gods"), the greatest opposition to the oneness of G‑d — one feels even in this not so much the "no," the bad side, but chiefly the "yes," the good side: the fact that through this opposing thing one can fulfill G‑d's command "לא יהי׳ לך" ("You shall have no...") — "to a no, yes."
This view of Rabbi Akiva regarding matters of "no" is also reflected in the story that the Gemara36 relates. When Rabbi Akiva and other Tannaim saw "שועל יוצא מבית קדשי הקדשים" ("a fox emerging from the place of the Holy of Holies"), the other Tannaim wept over it because "מקום שכתוב בו והזר הקרב יומת ועכשיו שועלים הלכו בו" ("the place of which it is written, 'The stranger who approaches shall be put to death,' and now foxes walk in it"), while Rabbi Akiva laughed. To the Tannaim's question, "מפני מה אתה מצחק" ("Why are you laughing?"), Rabbi Akiva answered and explained that seeing how the prophecy of Uriah concerning the destruction of Yerushalayim and the Beis HaMikdash was being fulfilled led him to await with certainty the fulfillment of the prophecy of Zecharyah: "עוד ישבו זקנים וזקנות ברחובות ירושלים" ("Old men and old women will yet sit in the streets of Yerushalayim"). This means that even in such a "no" as "a fox emerging from the place of the Holy of Holies," Rabbi Akiva saw (not the "no," its not-good side, but) the "yes," how it bears witness to the fulfillment of Zecharyah's prophecy.
11. These two views and modes of service — Rabbi Yishmael (the service of tzaddikim) and Rabbi Akiva (the service of teshuvah) — apply to a Jew who is already in the midst of his service. But with a "בן חמש (למקרא)" ("five-year-old (at Scripture)") [even if in years he is already an "adult," but in the service of G‑d he is only at the level of a "five-year-old"], who must only begin serving G‑d, and this too in the manner of early training —
from him no more is demanded than the detail of "seeing what is heard": that he train himself in the service of the beginning37 (and introduction) of all the parts of the Shulchan Aruch, the start of Siman 1 of Part 1 (Orach Chaim), "שויתי הוי׳ לנגדי תמיד" ("I have set the L‑rd before me always"), that the verification of G‑dliness ("what is heard") should be for him in the manner of sight, G‑dliness as a simple matter.
But to demand of him that he also stand at the level of "hearing what is seen," that he not "see" the matters of the world, that he take the existence of the world only in the manner of "hearing," "an existence that is being renewed" — this cannot yet be done. For at the beginning of one's service, even when he has already achieved within himself that spiritual matters settle in him as a simple matter, physical matters too still occupy a place for him, and they too as a simple matter.
In plain terms this means: for the "five-year-old" it is indeed simple that he must learn Torah and fulfill mitzvos, and this simplicity is so great for him that he need not force himself to it at all. But physical matters too, such as eating and drinking and the like, are at the same time a simple matter for him. He is not yet in the category of achieving within himself that his physical needs should occupy no place at all and that he should do them only for the sake of Heaven*37.
Therefore in Rashi's commentary on the Torah — and as mentioned a number of times, Rashi wrote his commentary (first of all) according to the plain meaning, and in such a way that even a "five-year-old" can understand it — only the matter of "seeing what is heard" is brought, and not "hearing what is seen." For at the beginning of one's service, both what is "heard" (spirituality) and what is "seen" (physicality) are in the manner of sight, simply.
— And this itself is also the explanation of why Rashi in his commentary learns that the manner of "saying" was "to a no, no." Since here the discussion concerns one who is only at the beginning of his service, when the world still occupies a place for him, he still sees in "other gods" (as well as in the other forbidden things) the "no" that is in them.
12. The fact that Rashi learns that the answer was in the order of "to a yes, yes; and to a no, no," and that the Jews attained only "seeing what is heard" — because this is discussing the beginning of service — is in accord not only with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva as above (according to whose view the ultimate elevation consists in "hearing what is seen," and consequently "to a no, yes"), but also with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael:
According to Rabbi Yishmael's view, the ultimate elevation is in "hearing what is heard": that the drawing down of G‑dliness from above to below should reach the very lowest level, "שאין תחתון למטה ממנו" ("than which there is none lower")38. That is, G‑dliness should be drawn down and revealed not only where the [OCR unclear] of the world is in the manner of "seeing what is seen" (where the existence of the world is as plain as sight, and it is not apparent how this entire existence is constantly renewed by G‑d, Who constantly brings it into being from absolute nothingness39), but also where the concealment is so great that it is no more than "hearing what is heard" — a place full of kelipos and sitra achra that say "אני ואפסי עוד" ("I am, and there is none besides me")40, whose existence expresses the opposite, G‑d forbid, of the oneness and existence of the Creator, and where one must resort to intellectual proofs (in the sense of "hearing") of the existence of G‑dliness ("what is heard").
All this, however, was said with regard to a Jew who has already reached the point where he can, by virtue of the level of "tzaddik" within him, accomplish the drawing down of G‑dliness even into such a lowest realm, where G‑dliness is present in the manner of hearing. But when he is still only a "five-year-old," at the level of early training, he has no connection to the level of service in the place and matter where it is "hearing what is heard." This is not yet within his strength; it will disturb his Torah study and his fulfillment of mitzvos. For the time being he needs the manner of "seeing what is heard," that matters of G‑dliness should be for him simple.
13. What emerges from all that has been said is that the mode of service indicated in Rashi's commentary on the Torah — that matters of G‑dliness must be simple, "seeing what is heard," while the matters of the world still occupy a place, and therefore "to a no, no" — applies only at the beginning of one's service. But afterward one must ascend and arrive at one of the two modes of service: either the service of drawing G‑dliness down from above to below, down to that "below" which is at the level of "hearing what is heard"; or the service of raising up from below to above, lifting (oneself and) the world out of its natural limits, until (not only does it no longer conceal G‑dliness, and on the contrary: "seeing what is heard," but also) the world does not appear at all as an existence of its own: "hearing what is seen" and "to a no, yes."
And since both views, the view of Rabbi Yishmael and the view of Rabbi Akiva, are parts of the (Oral) Torah, which is a directive for each and every Jew, everyone must therefore have both of these modes of service: drawing down from above to below and raising up from below to above.
This is a preparation and a vessel for the fulfillment of the prophecy "ושמתי כדכד שמשותיך — ליהוי כדין וכדין" ("I will make your windows of kadkod" — "Let it be like this and like that")41, which will come about in the true and complete Redemption, through Moshiach Tzidkeinu, very soon indeed.
(From the sichos of Chag HaShavuos and Shabbos Parshas Naso, 5726)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 20:1.
*1) See Rashi in our parsha, 19:12; Vayikra 1:1; Behaalosecha 12:13; and in a number of places. Malbim on Vayikra there, ch. 3, sec. 6. Sefer Erkei HaKinuyim (by the author of Seder HaDoros), entry "Amirah."
2) See Mishnah, Sotah 5:4, and Rashi there.
*2) Pirkei d'Rabbi Eliezer, end of ch. 41. Shemos Rabbah 28:6. Tanchuma, Yisro 11. Zohar I, 91a.
3) The same question is asked in Torah Or 66b. In Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim (40b), it is specified that the question arises from "שאר מצותי׳ של תורה" ("the rest of the mitzvos of the Torah"). This removes the objection from Bereishis 5:29; 15:1; and elsewhere.
4) Our parsha, 20:15.
5) The wording in the Mechilta is "רואין ושומעין הנראה" ("They saw and heard what is seen"). But it is obvious that "they saw" refers [not to "what is seen" — for the statement of the Mechilta is on "they saw the sounds" and does not quote "and the torches" — but] to "what is heard" (see also Rashi here), and follows on from the end of Rabbi Yishmael's words, "and heard what is heard." On this Rabbi Akiva disagrees, that "what is heard" they saw, and he then adds a second matter, "and heard what is seen." See also, in the places cited in the next note, "they saw what is heard and heard what is seen." Some emend (cited in Meir Ayin on the Mechilta): "רואין ושומעין הנראה והנשמע" ("They saw and heard what is seen and what is heard"). But in all the printed editions and the manuscripts the wording is as above.
6) According to those who emend (in the previous note), they saw and heard both what is seen and what is heard. But according to the version before us, "they saw and heard what is seen," it is implied that "they saw" refers only to what is heard, and "heard" only to what is seen. This is also clear in Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar 10c; Siddur 308d; the maamar Shelach 5672; and elsewhere. (However, in the maamar V'Chol HaAm 5706, ch. 3, it is explicit (and so is implied in Likkutei Torah, Haazinu 76c; Sefer HaMaamarim 5629, p. 198) that they saw and heard both what is seen and what is heard.)
7) Cited above, p. 49, note 16.
8) According to this, the end of Rabbi Akiva's words, "and heard what is seen," will also be understood. For seemingly, the verse "they saw the sounds" proves only "they saw what is heard," so from where does he know "heard what is seen"*? Because the miracle of "they saw what is heard" necessitates that at the time of Matan Torah they reached the ultimate elevation, and this also necessitates (according to Rabbi Akiva)** that they heard what is seen.
*) In "Zeh Yenachameinu" it is explained that the source for this is from Parshas Va'eschanan. But from the plain wording of the Mechilta it is implied that this too is derived from the verse "they saw the sounds" in Parshas Yisro.
**) And although according to the view of Rashi on the Torah there was only "seeing what is heard" and not "hearing what is seen," as below, section 11, nevertheless from the standpoint of the motion of teshuvah (the view and reasoning of Rabbi Akiva) there is no distinguishing between them.
9) In simple terms one can say that the connection between the two statements is only in the inner dimension of the matters (regarding the manner of the revelation of Matan Torah), and not in the way of plain meaning. Since Rashi explains the plain meaning of Scripture, there is no necessity from one matter to the other. He therefore explains each place as the plain sense of the verse necessitates. The plain explanation of "saying" is that they answered in the same words they heard from the Holy One, blessed be He (like the "saying" in "And the L‑rd spoke to Moshe, saying," where it is obvious that Moshe told the Jews the same words he heard from the Holy One, blessed be He); he therefore explains "to a yes, yes; and to a no, no." And the plain explanation of "they saw the sounds" is that "they saw" refers to the sounds (which are adjacent to it, and not to "the torches"): "they saw what is heard." However, since Rashi's commentary also contains "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of Torah") (Hayom Yom, p. 24), it stands to reason that the two explanations in Rashi's commentary correspond in the inner dimension of the matters as well.
10) Also, the fact that Rashi does not write "hearing what is seen" is [not only because of the plain sense of the matter, since in the way of plain meaning "they saw the sounds" necessitates only "seeing what is heard," but also] because of the "wine of Torah," as below, section 11 and onward.
11) As the reason is explained (Rosh Hashanah 26a): "כיון דחזיוהו כו׳ לא מצו חזו לי׳ זכותא" ("Since they have seen him... they cannot find any merit for him") (whereas when judges hear from witnesses, even though it is clear to them that the witnesses are telling the truth, they can find merit for him). For the certainty and arousal that come through sight are greater than the certainty and arousal that come through hearing. See also in the places cited in the next note.
12) See at length the maamar Padah B'Shalom 5713. See also the maamarim V'Chol Ma'aminim 5663 and Ki Chelek 5709. And note also Iggeres HaKodesh, sec. 20.
13) See along similar lines Or HaTorah, Va'eschanan, p. 63.
14) So it is in the maamar Shelach Lecha 5672. See along similar lines Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar 10c. (And there: that this is the matter of a baal teshuvah; see below, section 8.)
15) In Or HaTorah, Va'eschanan there: that the level of Yichuda Tata'ah is grasped through sight, and the level of Yichuda Ila'ah through hearing. According to this one can say that the meaning of "seeing what is heard and hearing what is seen" is that even in the levels of the nullification of the worlds, the level of Yichuda Ila'ah was for them in the manner of sight from close by, and the level of Yichuda Tata'ah (since it is only the nullification of existence) was for them in the manner of hearing from afar. See also below, note 19.
16) "דלא אתרמיז לא בשום אות וקוץ" ("Which is not alluded to in any letter or tip of a letter") (Likkutei Torah, Pinchas 80b. See also Zohar III, 257b).
17) See the statement of our Sages on the verse "ושמי הוי׳ לא נודעתי להם" ("But by My name, the L‑rd, I did not make Myself known to them") (Va'eira 6:3).
18) "כח שלך וחיותך" ("Your strength and your life"); see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, sec. 5.
19) Maamar Mi Chamocha 5629, sec. 3. Mayim Rabbim 5636, ch. 158. Maamar Kol HaShoneh Halachos 5666. And in a number of places. In the maamar Kol HaShoneh there: that this is specifically relative to the level of the "nothing" that brings the "something" into being, but relative to the Essence of the Infinite Light, "אין שום מציאות כלל" ("there is no existence at all"). See there.
20) Beginning of Bava Metzia.
21) Shemos Rabbah 12:3.
22) Chullin 49a, end (and it is speaking of Rabbi Yishmael, the colleague and disputant of Rabbi Akiva).
23) In the Shitah Mekubetzes on Rashi's commentary on Chullin there (cited in Seder HaDoros, entry "Rabbi Yishmael," sec. 8, from some commentaries of Rashi): "והוא ר׳ ישמעאל בן אלישע כה״ג" ("He is Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha the Kohen Gadol"). But see Seder HaDoros there. See also there the entry "Rabbi [Yishmael] ben Elisha the Kohen Gadol," sec. 3.
*23) Vayikra 21:7.
24) See at length the maamar Tik'u 5661, Likkutei Dibburim vol. 1 (147a and onward), and in a number of places, that the service of tzaddikim is in the manner of direct light and the service of the baal teshuvah in the manner of returning light.
25) See Seder HaDoros under his entry. See also Or HaTorah, Chayei Sarah (123a, end). Rashi, s.v. "שלא הי׳ בו" ("who had no..."), Yoma 22b.
26) Avos d'Rabbi Nosson 6:2. See also Pesachim 49b. Kesubos 62b.
27) See Yoma there: "שאם תזוח דעתו כו׳" ("So that if he becomes haughty..."). And note the sequence of matters in the Mishnah (Bava Metzia 58b): "אם הי׳ בעל תשובה כו׳ אם הוא בן גרים כו׳" ("If he was a baal teshuvah... if he is the son of converts...").
28) Berachos 61b.
29) A saying of the Baal Shem Tov, cited in the maamar Mayim Rabbim 5636, ch. 103; Refa'eini 5698, ch. 5; and elsewhere. Hosafos to Keser Shem Tov (Kehot), sec. 38, and sources cited there.
30) Therefore, in performing every mitzvah there must be two intentions: a general intention, to fulfill the will of the Creator, and a particular intention, the particular matter and refinement unique to this mitzvah (see Tanya, beginning of ch. 41, and in a number of places).
31) As in the wording common to the blessings of all the mitzvos: "קדשנו במצותיו וצונו" ("Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us").
*31) As is also evident from the saying of our Sages (Zohar I, 190b): "רמ״ח מ״ע כנגד רמ״ח אברים ושס״ה מל״ת כנגד שס״ה גידים" ("The 248 positive mitzvos correspond to the 248 limbs, and the 365 prohibitive mitzvos correspond to the 365 sinews").
32) According to this it is well understood why Rabbi Akiva repeats and says "to a yes, yes" as well, even though seemingly Rabbi Akiva's innovation over Rabbi Yishmael is only in "to a no, yes." For the answer "yes" to a "yes" according to Rabbi Akiva's opinion differs from the answer "yes" according to Rabbi Yishmael's opinion: the intent in the answer "yes" is not the particular matter of the mitzvah but the (general) command of the Holy One, blessed be He.
33) In Tzafnas Paneach on the Torah, by the Rogatchover, he connects this dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva with their dispute (Bava Kamma 33a, end) over "יושם" ("it is assessed") or "יוחלט" ("it is awarded outright"), in which according to Rabbi Akiva "it is awarded outright" — the reality is made so. See there. This may be connected with what is stated in the text: since the entire existence of the world is only by virtue of the Torah, this comes about of itself. According to Rabbi Yishmael, on the contrary: since the ultimate elevation is that the drawing down should be also in an existence which (of itself and openly) is not in accordance with the Torah, and nevertheless a person should affect it so that it will be in accordance with the Torah, he therefore holds "it is assessed," and through this the person afterward makes it so.
*33) Note the dispute of Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva (Sotah 3a) over a number of matters, which Rabbi Yishmael holds are optional and Rabbi Akiva holds are obligatory (to the point that there is a suggestion there that their dispute applies "בכל התורה כולה" ("in the entire Torah")). For tzaddikim, since the main thrust of their service in fulfilling the mitzvos is due to the particular elevation and quality in the mitzvah, will fulfill them even where there is no command to do so: "optional." Baalei teshuvah, however, fulfill the mitzvos only because of the command of the mitzvah: "obligatory."
34) According to this it is well understood why "yes" is said twice — "to a yes, yes; and to a no, yes" — and it is not abbreviated without it, as "על הן ולאו הן" ("to a yes and a no, yes") or the like. For the answer "yes" to a "no" is a greater innovation (see the next note) and loftier than the answer "yes" to a "yes."
35) According to this it will be understood what is related in Berachos (61b), that when Rabbi Akiva accepted upon himself the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven ["קורא קריאת שמע" ("reciting the Shema") — Rashi there] as they were raking his flesh with iron combs, "אמרו לו תלמידיו רבינו עד כאן" ("His disciples said to him: Our master, even to this point?"). Seemingly this is puzzling: it is obvious that Rabbi Akiva's disciples were themselves of very lofty standing, so what was their wonder that Rabbi Akiva overcame his bodily suffering and fulfilled the mitzvah of reciting the Shema? The explanation is that the content of the Shema is the oneness of G‑d, and this is what it means that Rabbi Akiva recited the Shema even as they were raking his flesh and so on because he engaged in Torah: in this too he saw and felt G‑d's oneness [similar to what our Sages said (Chullin 7b), "אין עוד מלבדו . . ואפילו כשפים . . שמכחישין פמליא של מעלה" ("There is none besides Him . . even sorcery . . for they contradict the heavenly household"), the meaning being (not only that they do not oppose G‑d's oneness because kelipos are "absence," but) that through them themselves (by virtue of the sparks of holiness in them) G‑d's oneness is revealed. And similar to what our Sages said (Yalkut Shimoni, Nechemiah, remez 671; see also Yoma 69b), "הן הן גבורותיו" ("These are His mighty deeds"). See Likkutei Torah, L'Gimmel Parshiyos 44c (Or HaTorah, Bereishis vol. 2, p. 574b); Haghos to Tanya, p. 62 (printed in "Kitzurim V'He'aros"); maamar L'Maan Daas 5713]. And regarding this his disciples said to him "even to this point?" (in wonder): how can the matter of oneness apply to this event, when a wicked man of kelipah rules so that he rakes his flesh and so on? And Rabbi Akiva answered "כל ימי הייתי מצטער כו׳" ("All my days I was pained..."). Since all his days he was in the motion of mesirus nefesh, of going out of the constraints of the world, the existence of the world was for him only at the level of "hearing" (as above, section 8), while the inner dimension of the world, the purpose of its creation and the word of G‑d that brings it into being were for him at the level of "sight." Therefore even in the "no" he saw the "yes," as in the text.
36) End of tractate Makkos.
37) See also the beginning of the Siddur of the Alter Rebbe — whose Siddur, as is known, is meant to apply equally to every soul — before the introduction and even before the recital of "Modeh Ani": "יתאמץ לקום כו׳ ומיד כו׳ ירגיל א״ע להתבונן מיד לפני מי כו׳" ("He should strengthen himself to rise... and immediately... he should accustom himself to contemplate immediately before Whom...").
*37) According to this it will also be understood what is written*: "לו חפץ ה׳ להמיתנו גו׳ ולא הראנו את כל אלה וכעת לא השמיענו כזאת" ("If the L‑rd had wished to put us to death... He would not have shown us all these things, nor at this time let us hear such a thing"). For seemingly, from the plain wording "let us hear," and also from what is said "nor at this time let us hear such a thing" following upon "He would not have accepted... (He would not have received them with favor — Metzudos there) nor have shown us...," it is implied that the proof from "nor at this time let us hear such a thing" that G‑d did not wish to put them to death is not because the good news could not be fulfilled if they die (as in the explanation of Metzudos there), but from the fact that G‑d "let us hear" (and the meaning of "such a thing" is as below), which shows that they are beloved in G‑d's eyes and He does not wish to put them to death**. According to this it is not understood: what is so very wondrous about "let us hear," more than "shown us" (for after she said "He would not have accepted... nor have shown us..." she added "nor at this time let us hear..."), since sight is loftier than hearing? For "shown us all these things" is the matter of seeing G‑dliness (like "seeing what is heard"), and "let us hear such a thing" means that the matters of the world were for them only at the level of hearing (like "hearing what is seen"), and further, that they were "such a thing" (like "shown us all these things"), that their entire existence was from G‑dliness***. And this is what she added with "let us hear such a thing" beyond "shown us all these things," because the level of "hearing what is seen" is loftier than the level of "seeing what is heard," as in the text.
*) Shoftim 13:23. And note that this verse is in the Haftarah of Shabbos Parshas Naso, which is adjacent (after it or before it) to Chag HaShavuos, the time of Matan Torah.
**) One can say that this is also the precise wording of Rashi there, "לא הי׳ משמיענו בשורה זו אם ראויים אנו למות" ("He would not have let us hear this good news if we deserve to die") (and not "we will die"). For the proof from the hearing of the good news is (not that the good news cannot be fulfilled if they die, since it is possible that Manoach will die after she has conceived and that his wife will die after she gives birth, but) that from the fact that He let them hear this good news, it is proven that they are beloved in G‑d's eyes and do not deserve to die. See the gloss that follows.
***) This may be combined with the explanation that "let us hear such a thing" is the hearing of the good news (see the preceding marginal note). For in the hearing of the good news too, "הנך הרה ויולדת בן" ("You shall conceive and give birth to a son"), even though it is physical, there was the emphasis "נזיר אלקים יהי׳ גו׳" ("He shall be a nazirite of G‑d...") and "והוא יחל להושיע את ישראל גו׳" ("And he shall begin to save Israel...").
38) Tanya, ch. 36. See also above, p. 17 and onward.
39) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, at its beginning.
40) Tanya, there. One can say that this is what is added in Tanya there, "עד שהוא מלא קליפות וסט״א . . אני ואפסי עוד" ("Until it is full of kelipos and sitra achra . . 'I am, and there is none besides me'"), beyond what it says before that, "שאין תחתון למטה ממנו בענין הסתר אורו ית׳ וחשך כפול ומכופל" ("Than which there is none lower in terms of the concealment of His light, blessed be He, and doubled and redoubled darkness"). For the concealment and darkness of this world in itself is that it is not felt that its coming into being is from G‑dliness; but neither does it oppose and so on. On this it adds afterward, "until it is full of kelipos and sitra achra, which are actually against G‑d, saying 'I am, and there is none besides me.'"
41) Yeshayahu 54:12. Bava Basra 75a. And in Likkutei Torah, Parshas Re'eh, in the discourses, the maamar V'Samti Kadkod (see the maamar Tik'u 5661 regarding tzaddikim and baalei teshuvah), that these are the two lines of drawing down and raising up. See there.
Key Lesson
In this Sicha the Rebbe teaches that every Jew begins with the simple awareness of "seeing what is heard," treating G‑dliness as a plain fact even while the world still occupies a place in his life. From there each person must grow in both directions: drawing G‑dliness down into the lowest parts of the world, like Rabbi Yishmael, and rising beyond the world's limitations until even a "no" reveals a "yes," like Rabbi Akiva. This double service prepares for the true and complete Redemption through Moshiach.