Parshas Bechukosai
1. At the conclusion of our parsha* it is written: "וכל מעשר בקר וצאן כל אשר יעבור תחת השבט העשירי יהי׳ קודש לה׳" ("And all the tithe of the herd and the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be holy to the L‑rd")1. This is the mitzvah of maaser beheimah (the animal tithe): every tenth animal of the cattle and the sheep that a Jew owns is "holy to the L‑rd." "כיצד מעשרן כונסן לדיר ועושה להן פתח קטן וכו׳ ומונה בשבט אחד שנים וכו׳ והיוצא עשירי סוקרו בסקרא ואומר הרי זה מעשר" ("How does one tithe them? He gathers them into a pen and makes a small opening for them, etc., and counts them with the rod one by one, etc.; and the one that comes out tenth he marks with red paint and says, 'This is maaser'")2.
From this verse we also learn a particular law in the separation of the animal tithe, namely what we learned in the last Mishnah of Tractate Bechoros: "קרא לתשיעי עשירי ולעשירי תשיעי ולאחד עשר עשירי שלשתן מקודשין" ("If he called the ninth 'tenth,' the tenth 'ninth,' and the eleventh 'tenth,' all three are consecrated"); and in the Gemara there3: "מנין שאם קרא לתשיעי עשירי ולעשירי תשיעי ולאחד עשר עשירי ששלשתן מקודשין ת״ל וכל מעשר בקר וצאן כל אשר יעבור תחת השבט העשירי יהי׳ קודש (לרבות את כולן)" ("From where do we know that if he called the ninth 'tenth,' the tenth 'ninth,' and the eleventh 'tenth,' all three are consecrated? The verse states: 'And all the tithe of the herd and the flock, whatever passes under the rod, the tenth shall be holy' (to include all of them)").
However, regarding the law of the sanctity of this eleventh animal that he called "tenth," R' Meir and R' Yehudah disagree in the above Mishnah: "ואחד עשר קרב שלמים ועושה תמורה דברי ר״מ, אמר ר״י וכי יש תמורה עושה תמורה, אמרו משום ר״מ אילו הי׳ תמורה לא הי׳ קרב" ("And the eleventh is offered as a shelamim and effects temurah — the words of R' Meir. R' Yehudah said: Does a temurah then effect temurah? They said in the name of R' Meir: Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered"). That is, R' Yehudah holds that the sanctity of the eleventh is only in the category of the sanctity of a temurah (substitute) of maaser: by calling it "tenth" when in truth it is the eleventh, it is as if he said "let it be the substitute of the tenth"3*. Therefore he says that the eleventh does not effect temurah (that is, if he were to declare another, non-consecrated animal to be the substitute of this eleventh, the sanctity of maaser would not take effect on it), because "אין תמורה עושה תמורה" ("a temurah does not effect temurah")4.
R' Meir, however, holds that the sanctity of the eleventh is not that of a temurah of maaser; rather, by his calling it "tenth," it is consecrated from the outset with the sanctity of maaser, and therefore it also effects temurah.
R' Meir brings a proof for his view from the fact that the eleventh is offered on the altar, whereas if it had the status of temurah it would not be offered — for according to R' Meir, the temurah of maaser is not offered on the altar5. R' Yehudah's view, however, is explained in the Gemara5*: that the temurah of maaser is offered on the altar, and consequently its being offered does not prove that it is not in the category of temurah.
2. Now, regarding the reasoning behind the dispute between R' Meir and R' Yehudah — whether the eleventh has the sanctity of maaser or only the sanctity of a temurah of maaser — it may be said that R' Yehudah holds that calling the eleventh "tenth" does not have the power to create new sanctity in the animal [OCR unclear] — the essential sanctity of maaser — for this sanctity takes effect only on that which is truly the tenth. And the fact that the eleventh, too, is consecrated when he called it "tenth" means that through this calling ("tenth") the sanctity of the tenth is drawn forth, extends, and takes effect upon it. Since what takes effect on the eleventh is only the extension of the sanctity of the tenth, its law is like that of temurah — which likewise is an extension of the sanctity of the offering onto a non-consecrated animal, and not essential sanctity. And this is R' Yehudah's reason that the eleventh does not effect temurah: since its sanctity is only like the sanctity of temurah, extending from the sanctity of the tenth, it is not as potent as in the tenth itself. For only (essential) sanctity has the power to extend into something else — whereas in the case of an extension, its sanctity does not have the power to extend further from it onward6; and this is the reason that a temurah does not effect temurah.
R' Meir, however, holds that the Torah introduced a new law here as a "גזירת מלך" ("decree of the King")6*: this calling it "tenth" (in error) has the power to create sanctity; that is, the sanctity of the eleventh is not an extension (and temurah), but essential sanctity7.
R' Meir brings a proof for his view — that a mistaken maaser is not in the category of temurah and extension — from the fact that it is offered on the altar. For if the sanctity of a mistaken maaser were like the sanctity of temurah, then just as the temurah of maaser is not offered on the altar (according to R' Meir), because its sanctity (an "extension") lacks the potency fitting for offering, the same would apply to a mistaken maaser: it should not be offered on the altar. Since it is offered, this proves that it possesses essential sanctity.
This needs to be understood:
What compels R' Yehudah to say that the sanctity of the eleventh is only an extension of the sanctity of the tenth? On the simple level, the intent of the derivation from the verse "And all the tithe of the herd and the flock, etc." seems to be that all maaser is equal to one another8, i.e., that a mistaken maaser has the law of complete maaser — and this is a novel law, like many laws regarding consecrated things. So from where does R' Yehudah derive that one should distinguish between one maaser and another within "all the tithe," and say that it is only a temurah of maaser?
It may be said in explanation of the proof for R' Yehudah's view: The law is that the sanctity of a mistaken maaser takes effect only on the ninth and the eleventh (and not on the eighth, the twelfth, etc.). The reason for this is explained in the Gemara8*: "מה הוא (עשירי) אינו מקודש אלא בסמוך ... אף טעותו אינה מתקדשת אלא בסמוך" ("Just as it (the tenth) is consecrated only when adjacent" (Rashi: "for nothing is more adjacent to it than itself"), "so too its error is consecrated only when adjacent" (Rashi: "such as the ninth and the eleventh, which are adjacent to it")). This proves that the sanctity of a mistaken maaser is not a special novel law (i.e., that the calling of "tenth" itself effects sanctity in the ninth and the eleventh) — for if so, what is the difference with the eighth and the twelfth, which are not consecrated when he called them "tenth"? Rather, perforce, calling the ninth or the eleventh "tenth" does not have the power (to effect essential sanctity in it), but only to draw upon it the extension of the sanctity of the tenth; and since it is in the category of an extension from the tenth, "it is consecrated only when adjacent": the sanctity is able to extend only to that which is adjacent to the tenth.
3. Now, in explanation of R' Meir's proof — from the fact that it is offered on the altar — it may be said that he follows his own approach elsewhere. It is stated at the end of Tractate Horayos9 that R' Meir and R' Nasan wished to remove Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel from his position as Nasi by saying: "נימא ליה גלי עוקצים דלית ליה" ("Let us say to him, 'Expound Uktzin'" (Rashi: "expound for us Tractate Uktzin"), "which he does not have; and since he has not mastered it, we will say to him: 'מי ימלל גבורות ה׳ ישמיע כל תהלתו' ('Who can utter the mighty acts of the L‑rd, who can declare all His praise?')10 — for whom is it fitting to utter the mighty acts of the L‑rd? For one who can declare all His praises"). But they did not succeed, for that very night Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel studied Tractate Uktzin, and the next day, when they asked him to expound Tractate Uktzin, he immediately expounded it, etc. In the end they penalized R' Meir and R' Nasan "that teachings not be said in their names — they designated R' Meir as 'Acherim' (Others) and R' Nasan as 'Yesh Omrim' (Some say)."
And continuing from this, the Gemara there states: "Rebbi taught his son R' Shimon: 'Acherim say: Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered.' He said to him: 'Who are these, whose waters we drink and whose names we do not mention?' He said to him: 'People who sought to uproot your honor and the honor of your father's house.' He said to him: 'גם אהבתם גם שנאתם גם קנאתם כבר אבדה' ('Their love, their hatred, and their envy have already perished')11, etc. He then taught him again: 'They said in the name of R' Meir: Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered.'"
Afterwards the Gemara brings: "Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis disagreed about this: one said 'Sinai' is preferable, and one said 'Oker Harim' (the uprooter of mountains) is preferable, etc. They sent there [to Eretz Yisrael]: Which of them takes precedence? They sent back to them: 'Sinai' is preferable, for the master said: All need the owner of the wheat."
This needs to be understood: What is the connection between this dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis (whether "Sinai" is preferable or "Oker Harim" is preferable) and the give-and-take of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, R' Meir and R' Nasan in the preceding passage? The sefer Be'er Sheva explains this: "It is brought here in connection with the incident of R' Meir and R' Nasan, who had in mind to remove Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel from his position as Nasi because he was not a 'Sinai' like them; and it is written, 'Who can utter the mighty acts of the L‑rd' — that is, for whom is it fitting to utter the mighty acts of the L‑rd? For one who can declare all His praises. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis disagreed whether 'Sinai' is preferable, to be called one who can declare all His praises, or whether 'Oker Harim' is called one who can declare all His praises and takes precedence." That is, R' Meir and R' Nasan possessed the quality termed "Sinai," since they were well-versed even in Tractate Uktzin, while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was an "Oker Harim," and the exchange between them was based on this distinction. Therefore, following this, the dispute between Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis (who, according to the Be'er Sheva's explanation, are R' Meir and R' Nasan12) is brought, as to which is preferable, "Sinai" or "Oker Harim."
But according to this explanation there is a difficulty from what is stated in Sanhedrin13: "כל הרואה ר״מ בביהמ״ד כאלו עוקר הרי הרים וטוחנן זה בזה" ("Whoever saw R' Meir in the study hall [saw him] as if he were uprooting mountain upon mountain and grinding them against one another") — so, on the contrary, it is stated explicitly that R' Meir was an "uprooter of mountain upon mountain"14. Our Sages also said in Eruvin15: "It is revealed and known before Him Who spoke and the world came into being that there was none in R' Meir's generation like him; and why did they not establish the halachah according to him? Because his colleagues could not fathom the depth of his reasoning." And further there: "R' Meir had a student named Sumchus, who would state forty-eight reasons for impurity for every matter of impurity, and forty-eight reasons for purity for every matter of purity" — so that even R' Meir's student was an "Oker Harim." We also find in Sotah16: "At first he (R' Meir) came before R' Akiva; since he could not keep up with him, he came before R' Yishmael and learned the Gemara (Rashi: the Mishnayos as they are, unexplained, etc.); then he came back before R' Akiva and reasoned out the logic" (Rashi: to grasp the core reasons of the Mishnah ... and to understand one thing from another, etc.). Thus, even while still R' Akiva's student, R' Meir already grasped the core reasons of the Mishnayos, etc. — this being the matter17 of sharpness and "uprooting mountains"18.
Accordingly, explanation is needed: What is the connection and juxtaposition between the dispute whether "Sinai" is preferable or "Oker Harim," and the above incident that precedes it?
4. In addition to this, several matters and precise points in the passage require explanation:
a) When they penalized R' Meir and R' Nasan "that teachings not be said in their names" — why did they choose specifically the designation "Acherim" for R' Meir19 and "Yesh Omrim" for R' Nasan?
b) We find many Mishnayos in which R' Meir's name is mentioned explicitly — how does this fit with the penalty "that [teachings] not be said ... in their names"? And it is strained to say that all these numerous Mishnayos in which his name is mentioned had their wording fixed before the above incident20, while after they penalized him only those few halachos were said in which he is cited as "Acherim"21.
c) The passage brings the incident that "Rebbi taught his son R' Shimon." On the simple level, the point of this is the discussion between Rebbi and his son regarding the manner of citing something in R' Meir's name (as "Acherim" or "in the name of R' Meir"), but not the content of the matter said in his name, since that has no bearing on the subject at hand. If so, why is the substance of the matter also brought? Moreover, after the Gemara concludes, "He then taught him again: 'They said in the name of R' Meir'" — it repeats once more: "Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered"?
5. The explanation of all the above: The flow of the passage is to be understood according to the Be'er Sheva, i.e., that the incident of R' Meir and R' Nasan, too, stems from their dispute with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel whether "Sinai" or "Oker Harim" is preferable. But as to which of them was "Sinai" and which "Oker Harim," in my humble opinion the approach is reversed: R' Meir (as proven above) and R' Nasan possessed the quality of "Oker Harim," while Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was "Sinai." This is also implied by the wording, "Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Rabbis disagreed about this: one said 'Sinai' is preferable, and one said 'Oker Harim' is preferable." It is known22 that in this style, where it is not specified who is the first "one said" and who is the second, we hold that the one whose name is mentioned first holds the first opinion. Accordingly, in our case, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is the one who said "Sinai" is preferable23, and R' Meir and R' Nasan say "Oker Harim" is preferable. And although Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel "had not mastered" Tractate Uktzin, this does not mean that he had not studied it at all24 — for if so, how could he have learned all the subject matter of Uktzin in one night (especially since the passage does not imply that he learned it from a sage expert in the laws of Uktzin; moreover, it is not in keeping with the dignity of the Nasi that someone should need to teach him a subject from its beginning)? Rather, it means that he "had not mastered" Uktzin with precision and in the depths of the reasons of the Mishnayos of this tractate25.
This also makes clear why they chose Uktzin specifically. For it is said in Berachos26 about Rav Yehudah: "All of their learning was in Nezikin27, etc., and when he reached Uktzin, etc., he would say: 'I see here the discussions of Rav and Shmuel,'" and Rashi explains: "That is, the reasoning of these Mishnayos is difficult for me, etc." Therefore, when R' Meir and R' Nasan wished to display their sharpness in the depths of the reasons of the Mishnayos, etc., they asked Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel about Uktzin28.
Accordingly, we can understand why "they designated R' Meir as 'Acherim,'" as well as R' Meir's reasoning in the law "Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered," and also why this halachah is brought here — for through it his nature and approach are clarified, as will be explained below.
6. Now, the general dispute whether "Sinai" is preferable or "Oker Harim" is preferable may be said to be rooted in the well-known inquiry29 whether quantity outweighs quality, or the reverse; that is, when one thing is great in quantity and small in quality, and opposite it is something of great quality and small quantity — which of them is more significant?
Similarly, it may be said in our case: "Sinai" — one "who has Mishnah and Baraisa arranged for him as they were given from Mount Sinai" — his greatness in Torah study is in quantity, although in quality he does not grasp so fully the depths of the reasons of the halachos and their analysis; and the "Oker Harim," who is sharp in the reasons of the halachos, etc., his greatness in Torah study is in quality, although in quantity he is not as well-versed as "Sinai." The dispute is which is preferable: abundance of quantity or abundance of quality. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds that quantity is the main thing, and R' Meir and R' Nasan hold that the main thing is quality.
Accordingly, it is understood why "they designated R' Meir as 'Acherim'" — meaning that he is of an entirely other kind, a different quality. Therefore, even when they came to penalize him "that teachings not be said in his name," they nevertheless wished to call him by a designation through which his virtue, "Oker Harim," would also be expressed; therefore they called him "Acherim." This is not so with the designation "Yesh Omrim," which does not emphasize that he is of another kind, but only that "there is" (yesh) someone who holds another view.
And although R' Nasan too was an "Oker Harim," it is nevertheless understood that there are several levels in this, and R' Meir was more of an "Oker Harim"30 [as is precise in the wording that R' Meir was "uprooting mountain upon mountain and grinding them against one another"]; therefore they called R' Meir by a name that indicates more the greatness of his sharpness — a special kind31.
7. Accordingly, R' Meir's reasoning in the law of temurah can be explained — and through this one will also understand why R' Meir's statement "Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered" is brought here (in connection with the discussion between Rebbi and his son R' Shimon about how to refer to R' Meir), for in this reasoning R' Meir follows his approach regarding the superiority of quality:
Since R' Meir holds that quality is the main thing, therefore in his view (although a proof can be brought from the law that "it is consecrated only when adjacent," that it is only an extension (temurah), nevertheless) the proof that it has essential sanctity — from the fact that it is offered on the altar — is weightier:
For the proof from the law that "its error is consecrated only when adjacent" stems from the aspect of quantity, since the difference between the ninth and eleventh and the eighth and twelfth, etc., is one of quantity (of adjacency) — the ninth and eleventh being closer to the tenth. Whereas the proof from the fact that it is offered on the altar is a proof from quality (of the sanctity), since the offering of a sacrifice is a special quality.
Therefore R' Meir, who holds that quality is the main thing, holds that it is not a temurah, since from the aspect of quality (from the fact that it is offered, etc.) it is proven that it has essential sanctity31*. [And as for the law that "its error is consecrated only when adjacent" — it must be said according to R' Meir that "adjacent" is only a sign32 as to which animal the essential sanctity takes effect on; that is, the advantage of "adjacent" serves only to indicate that this animal is fit for the sanctity of maaser to take effect on it; but the sanctity itself that takes effect on it through the calling of the name "tenth" is (not that the sanctity of the tenth extends to it (as R' Yehudah holds), but rather that the calling of the name "tenth" effects in it) essential sanctity.]
Therefore, when the Gemara relates that Rebbi told his son R' Shimon that R' Meir was called "Acherim," it also brings the matter in connection with which he told him this — because in this halachah R' Meir's approach that quality is preferable finds expression, and this is the very reason why "they designated R' Meir as 'Acherim,'" as explained above. Therefore also, after Rebbi said that he does not mention R' Meir's name because he is among the "people who sought to uproot your honor and the honor of your father's house," and R' Shimon answered him that nevertheless his name should be mentioned, the Gemara repeats once again the matter of "Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered." This comes to hint that although by means of the reasoning underlying this halachah, "Had it been, etc." (that quality is the main thing, etc.), it is possible to uproot your honor and the honor of your father's house, nevertheless he mentions the name of the author of the statement, because of R' Shimon's argument; and on the other hand, it shows that because of the honor of the father's house, etc., it is necessary to change and say "They said in the name of R' Meir," and not "R' Meir says," because through the reasoning of "Had it been a temurah, it would not be offered" they sought to uproot the honor of his father's house.
Accordingly, it is simply resolved why in many places in the Mishnah it says "the words of R' Meir," even though "they designated R' Meir as 'Acherim'": only in those Mishnayos in which R' Meir's words depend on his general approach that quality is preferable, and which were said after the above incident33, does it say "Acherim say," whereas in the other Mishnayos [OCR unclear] they mention R' Meir by name3435.
(From the sicha of Yud-Tes Kislev, 5732)
Notes
*) And the conclusion of Tractate Bechoros (and Horayos).
1) Vayikra 27:32.
2) Bechoros 58b. And so it is in Rashi's commentary on the verse.
3) 60b, beginning.
3*) See the Ra'av (Bartenura) on the Mishnah.
4) Temurah 12a. And in the Gemara there (13a): "אמר קרא ותמורתו ולא תמורת תמורתו" ("The verse states, 'and its substitute' — and not the substitute of its substitute").
5) As we derive in Temurah (21a) from "קדש הם" ("they are holy"): "they are offered, but their substitutes are not offered."
5*) Bechoros 61a.
6) Similar to the distinction between an av hatumah (primary source of impurity) and a rishon (first-degree impurity), etc. (see Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Meis 5:7–8).
6*) Rashi (manuscript); the Ra'av.
7) As for the ninth that he called "tenth" being eaten only when it becomes blemished — this is because "before" the tenth there is not yet in the world the sanctity of maaser of this count. Similarly, when he called the tenth "tenth," the sanctity of maaser of this count is exhausted, and the eleventh is not consecrated. The Malbim (Vayikra 3:1, §157) writes [OCR unclear] that it is because the Torah excluded it from "the tenth" (Temurah 21a). In my humble opinion this is strained, for this is not mentioned at all in its place in Bechoros.
8) The ninth that he called "tenth" is different, since it can be said that "consecration before it consecrates" (61a), or — that the verse excluded it (see above, note 7).
8*) Ibid., 60b. And see Nazir 31a, end.
9) 13b.
10) Tehillim 106:2.
11) Koheles 9:6.
12) He calls them simply "the Rabbis" because they penalized them "that teachings not be said in their names."
13) 24a. And see Tosafos (s.v. Chacham — Gittin 67a): "R' Meir is sharp and raises difficulties, and R' Y[ose] is deliberate and reaches conclusions"; and see Sefer HaMaamarim 5708, p. 123, note 67, that "sharp and raising difficulties" is "Oker Harim."
14) One cannot bring a proof that R' Meir was more of an "Oker Harim" than Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel from our own passage — "they would write difficulties on a slip of paper, etc., and what he could not resolve, they would write the resolutions and throw them" — on the grounds that the matter of difficulties and resolutions pertains to an "Oker Harim" (and it is impossible to say that the main point written in that very passage escaped the Be'er Sheva). For on the simple level, the difficulties and answers were in Tractate Uktzin (since their whole intent in this was to show that he did not know as they did), and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel had studied Tractate Uktzin for only one night; consequently there is no proof at all from this that in general they were more "uprooters of mountains" than Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel.
15) 13b.
16) 20a, end. Note that about R' Akiva they said (ibid. 49b): "When R' Akiva died, the arms of Torah ceased," and Rashi explains: "depth of reasoning, and supporting the reasons of the Oral Torah, etc." Note also Sanhedrin (86a): "The Mishnah ... Tosefta ... Sifra ... Sifri ... and all of them follow R' Akiva," and R' Meir was R' Akiva's preeminent student; and in the Jerusalem Talmud (Berachos 2:1): "R' Meir sat and expounded and said a teaching in the name of R' Yishmael, and did not say a teaching in the name of R' Akiva, etc. — the whole world knows that R' Meir is R' Akiva's student." Thus it is understood that the core of R' Meir's approach followed the manner of his study with R' Akiva.
17) As is understood from what Tosafos write in Eruvin (40a, s.v. Ad'ata), that Rav Chisda was an "Oker Harim," for they said (ibid. 67a): "Rav Sheshes's whole body would tremble from Rav Chisda's pilpul," and there Rashi explains (s.v. Mipilpulei): "He was exceedingly sharp and reasoning, and deep in his questions." And in Yoma (33a, end), Rashi: "I do not know the reasoning — to give a reason for the matter on my own"; and likewise in Sukkah (29a, beginning), Rashi: "And then they examine the reasoning — what is the reason for the matter, and whether there is anything to rebut." And see Eruvin (72b, beginning) and Rashi there (s.v. Hasbar); Sanhedrin (42a) and Rashi there (s.v. Milchamah); Avodah Zarah (19a, end) and Rashi there (s.v. Sevara). And see Hilchos Talmud Torah of the Alter Rebbe, ch. 2, halachos 1–2.
18) Note also regarding R' Nasan, from Bava Kamma (53a) and Bava Metzia (117b): "R' Nasan is a judge and descends to the depth of the law."
19) It is cited from Sefer Kerisus, part 4 (Yemos Olam), gate 1 (§19), and in Seder HaTanna'im VeHa'Amora'im, §4, that in the halachos that R' Meir said in the name of Elisha "Acher," he is called "Acherim." But see below, note 21.
20) Especially since in this very Mishnah cited in our passage, it first says "the words of R' Meir" and afterwards "they said in the name of R' Meir."
21) Tosafos (Sotah 12a, s.v. Acherim): "Teachings he received from Elisha ben Avuyah they recorded in the name of 'Acherim,' since his name was 'Acher,' but other teachings they recorded in his name. But this is not reasonable, etc.; rather, it seems that after they designated him 'Acherim,' they reversed this, etc." And Sefer Kerisus, part 5, Lashon Limudim (gate 1, end of §30 — also cited in Seder HaDoros), writes (regarding R' Meir's exposition in Rosh Hashanah (8a) of "עשר תעשר" ("you shall surely tithe"), whereas in Kerisus (11a) "Acherim" say "the Torah spoke in human language"): "Perhaps it is possible to explain that at the end of his days, when they called him 'Acherim' as a result of that incident in Horayos, he retracted from [his exposition of] 'you shall surely tithe.'" Accordingly, there would be room to say that the same applies to all the teachings — that he is called "Acherim" only in those that he said after that incident; but this would be strained, as stated in the main text. Seder HaDoros raises this difficulty as well. And see the Be'er Sheva here, and Seder HaDoros's objection to him.
22) See Radvaz, Hilchos Maaser Sheni 6:3.
23) According to this (that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel is "Sinai"), what our Sages said (Gittin 38a, and the sources cited there) is all the more understandable: "Wherever Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel taught in our Mishnah, the halachah follows him, except, etc." — for the conclusion is "'Sinai' is preferable." And see the note in Sefer HaMaamarim 5708 (cited in note 13), that although they did not accept what was sent — that "Sinai" is preferable — and therefore the question was raised later, nevertheless it is proven from other places that "Sinai" is preferable.
24) And although they said "Expound Uktzin, which he does not have," the meaning is that he did not have the sharpness and the reasons in it to be able to resolve the difficulties they raised afterwards. And "had not mastered" here also means this [for in the matter of "gemar" there are several levels, as is evident in many places, among them Bava Basra (145b), where the title "Gemara" is contrasted with "baal shemuos," although generally "Gemara" means a "baal hashemuos." And see Hilchos Talmud Torah of the Alter Rebbe (2:1) that specifically "to reason out the reasonings in the depth of examining the reasons of the halachos, etc." is called "lisbar," whereas knowledge of "the reasons in brief" is included in "ligmar"]. And see Tzafnas Pa'neach on Horayos. (And the same may be said of the statement "and he studied it the next day.")
As for Rashi's explanation, "which he does not have — that he does not have it arranged," and on s.v. "'Sinai' is preferable" (and elsewhere there) he explains: "one who has Mishnah and Baraisa arranged for him as they were given from Mount Sinai" — it may be said that within the matter of "arrangement" itself there are two levels: "arranged for him (from what he received orally)" — a quality found in the "owner of the wheat" and in "Sinai"; and "arranged for him" in a manner that he grasps the depth of the reasons of the matter — a quality found only in the "Oker Harim."
And although they cited for this the verse "Who can utter, etc.," and expounded, "for whom is it fitting to utter the mighty acts of the L‑rd? For one who can declare all His praises," and in Makkos (10a) Rashi explains (s.v. Shekol): "well-versed in Scripture, in Mishnah, in halachos and aggados," nevertheless they held that the intent of the verse is that one must be an "Oker Harim" in "all His praise." And on this very point they disagreed: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel did not hold so, but rather that the verse refers to "Sinai" (along the lines of the Be'er Sheva's explanation). Accordingly, there is no need to strain and multiply the dispute and say (as the Maharsha writes in Chiddushei Aggados) that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel held that the verse refers to recounting the praise of the Omnipresent, as in Megillah (18a); rather, according to both of them it refers to Torah study, and they disagreed only whether it refers to "Sinai" or to "Oker Harim." But see the maamar beginning Mi Yemalel in Or HaTorah, Bereishis (vol. 2), p. 461b (also cited in the Miluim to Yahel Or on Tehillim, pp. 649–650). This requires further study.
25) And see Eruvin 53a, end: "who revealed the tractate," and Rashi (s.v. Dagalu) in his second explanation: "they explain their teachings and are precise in the reason for the matter"; and here they demanded "Expound Uktzin."
26) 20a. Taanis 24a, end, and onward. And there, that Rabbah studied Uktzin in "thirteen sessions" (and in Berachos, Rashi (s.v. Bislisar) explains: in thirteen ways) — and he was an "Oker Harim," as explained in this very passage at the end of Horayos.
27) And they said (Bava Basra 175b): "One who wishes to become wise should occupy himself with monetary laws."
28) Accordingly, it is also better understood why the Gemara does not conclude from the passage before us, "It may be concluded that Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said 'Sinai' is preferable and the Rabbis say 'Oker Harim' is preferable" — because from this story itself there is no proof as to what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel lacked in Uktzin, breadth of knowledge or sharpness. Only through proofs from elsewhere (that R' Meir was "uprooting mountain upon mountain and grinding them against one another," and that in Uktzin there are several difficult matters, etc.) is it understood that what Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel lacked was sharpness; without these proofs, on the contrary, the simple reading of the story implies as the Be'er Sheva explains.
29) See Lekach Tov by R' Yosef Engel, principle 15, at length. And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 65 ff.
30) Accordingly, it is also resolved why R' Meir is listed before R' Nasan throughout the passage, although R' Meir was the Chacham and R' Nasan the Av Beis Din, and the Av Beis Din precedes the Chacham (as is evident from the preceding passage: "When the Nasi enters, etc.; when the Av Beis Din enters, etc.; when the Chacham enters, etc.") — because he was sharper. And the reason he was not made the Av Beis Din is that R' Nasan was helped by "your father's belt" (Rashi: that is ... your father's prominence), whereas R' Meir was a descendant of converts (Gittin 56a).
31) As in the wording, "his colleagues could not fathom the depth of his reasoning."
31*) And although even without this it may be said that the proof "from the fact that it is offered, etc." is weightier for him, since it is a proof from the very level of sanctity of the animal itself, whereas the proof from "it is consecrated only when adjacent" is a proof from something external to it (that the sanctity cannot extend from it onward) — nevertheless, it is understood that according to the view that quantity is preferable, the proof from "it is consecrated only when adjacent" must be preferred because of the advantage of quantity in it; and since for R' Meir the proof from its being offered, etc., is preferable, it is evident that in his view quality is preferable.
32) Note the inquiry regarding the signs of a kosher animal — whether they are signs that identify or signs that cause (see at length in Tzafnas Pa'neach (by the Rogatchover) on the Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Maachalos Asuros; and see Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 222. Note also Moreh Nevuchim III:48).
33) This requires further study and clarification whether both conditions are necessary or one suffices. And see the sefer Toldos Tanna'im VeAmora'im (Hyman) on where in the Talmud he is cited by the name "Acherim": Berachos 29b; Shabbos 5a; Eruvin 58b; Sukkah 7b, 54b [OCR: "נד, ג"]; Megillah 31b; Chagigah 4a; Yevamos 48b; Nedarim 20a; Sotah 46b; Gittin 27b; Bava Basra 96b, 107a; Sanhedrin 63a; Shevuos 35b; Avodah Zarah 30b; Horayos 9a; Zevachim 29a, 43b, 94a; Menachos 67b, 36a; Chullin 65a, 119a; Kerisus 11a.
34) As is also evident from the fact that in this very Mishnah, regarding the law itself that it "effects temurah," the wording is "the words of R' Meir" — because without the reason "had it been, etc." R' Meir's approach is not explained.
35) For this is not an incidental penalty, but rather so that it should not be emphasized that it is possible to uproot the honor of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel [OCR: the note breaks off here].
Key Lesson
The Rebbe teaches that R' Meir's halachic reasoning — that the eleventh animal mistakenly called "tenth" has essential sanctity, proven from its being offered on the altar — flows from his general approach that quality outweighs quantity, the hallmark of the "Oker Harim." This Sicha shows how a Sage's personal path in Torah study shapes even his rulings, and reminds us that while broad knowledge ("Sinai") is indispensable, depth and inner understanding give Torah learning its unique quality.