Parshas Behar
1. It is written in our Parsha:1 "וכי ימוך אחיך גו׳ גר ותושב וחי עמך, אל תקח מאתו נשך ותרבית גו׳" ("If your brother becomes impoverished… [whether] a stranger or a resident, he shall live with you. Do not take from him interest or increase…"). Our Sages explain in the Gemara2 that the statement "Do not take from him interest or increase" refers only to "your brother," and not to "a stranger and a resident" [which is why it says "Do not take from him" in the singular, and not "Do not take from them" in the plural]. The mention of "a stranger and a resident" relates only to "he shall live with you" — "שאתה מצווה להחיותו" ("that you are commanded to sustain him")3 — but not to "Do not take from him interest or increase."
The Rambam writes:4 "העכו"ם וגר תושב לוין מהם ומלוין אותן בריבית .. לאחיך אסור ולשאר העולם מותר. ומצות עשה להשיך לעכו"ם, שנאמר לנכרי תשיך, מפי השמועה למדו שזו מצות עשה" ("From an idolater and a ger toshav one may borrow with interest and lend to them with interest… To your brother it is forbidden, and to the rest of the world it is permitted. And it is a positive commandment to lend with interest to an idolater,5 as it says,6 'To a gentile you shall lend with interest' — from the Oral Tradition they learned that this is a positive commandment").
That is, there are three laws regarding lending with interest: a Jew — it is forbidden to lend to him with interest; a ger toshav — it is permitted to lend to him with interest; an idolater — it is a mitzvah to take interest from him.
Now, the fact that the Torah permitted taking interest from an idolater (and from a ger toshav) — even though "אסור לגזול או לגנוב כל שהוא דין תורה בין מישראל בין מנכרי" ("it is forbidden by Torah law to rob or to steal even the smallest amount, whether from a Jew or from a gentile"),7 and it is also "אסור לרמות את בני אדם במקח וממכר.. ואחד עכו"ם ואחד ישראל שוים בדבר זה" ("forbidden (by Torah law8) to deceive people in buying and selling… and an idolater and a Jew are equal in this matter")9 — is understandable, for interest is different10 from robbery and overcharging (ona'ah), as stated in the Gemara11 (that even with regard to a Jew we cannot derive the prohibition of taking interest from the prohibitions of robbery and overcharging, because): "מה להנך שכן שלא מדעת, תאמר בריבית דמדעתי׳" ("What of these (robbery and overcharging)? They are without consent [… overcharging — he does not know of it; robbery — he takes it against his will12]. Can you say the same of interest, which [he gives] with his consent?").
Since interest is different from robbery and overcharging, in that the money is taken "with the consent" of the borrower, it is therefore well understood that the Torah forbade taking interest (which is less severe than robbery and overcharging) only from "your brother," but not from an idolater (and a ger toshav).
However, the fact that there is also "a positive commandment to lend with interest to an idolater" requires explanation: Granted that the borrower gives the interest knowingly and of his own will — yet the Torah calls it "נשך" ("neshech," "a bite"),13 and ultimately "בכולן חסרון ממון שמחסר את חבירו" ("in all of them (robbery, overcharging and interest) there is a monetary loss by which one diminishes his fellow")14 — so what is the reason that we were commanded to diminish the money of an idolater through neshech?
2. This will be understood by first explaining the dispute among the Poskim whether forgiveness (mechilah) is effective with regard to interest. The view of the Geonim15 is that even if the lender has already collected the interest, the borrower's forgiveness does not exempt the lender from returning it to the borrower. The reason for this: "כל ריבית שבעולם מחילה היא, אבל התורה לא מחלה ואסרה מחילה זו, לפיכך אין המחילה מועלת בריבית" ("All interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness, but the Torah did not forgive, and it forbade this forgiveness; therefore forgiveness is not effective regarding interest"). But the view of the Rosh16 (and so the halachah was ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch17) is that forgiveness does not permit taking the interest in the first place (for all interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness, and the Torah forbade this forgiveness), but "אם (כבר) לקח ממנו ריבית וצריך להחזירה לו, מועלת מחילה לפוטרו כמו בכל גזל" ("if he (already) took interest from him and must return it to him, forgiveness is effective to exempt him, as with any robbery").18
Now, the reason of the Geonim that forgiveness is not effective at all regarding interest, even after the borrower gave it to the lender willingly
[even though this novel point, "that the Torah did not forgive, and it forbade this forgiveness," apparently concerns only the borrower's forgiveness and his agreement to give the interest; but after the interest has been given, we do not find that the Torah forbade forgiveness]
is explained by the Ritva19 as follows: "תביעת ריבית לא הויא כשאר תביעות בגזל ואונאה וכיוצא בהן דאית לי׳ על חברי׳ שעבוד ממון, אלא חיוב הוא שחייב הכתוב להחזיר איסור שבלע .. דחיובא דרמא עלי׳ רחמנא הוא, וכענין חוב למ"ד פריעת בע"ח מצוה ושעבודא לאו דאורייתא, אלא דהתם איכא דין ממון לחבירו ומהניא מחילה, אבל הכא לשמים הוא חייב, וכיון שכן לא תועיל לו מחילת חבירו" ("A claim for interest is not like other claims of robbery, overcharging and the like, where one has a monetary lien upon his fellow. Rather, it is an obligation which Scripture imposed, to return a forbidden thing that he swallowed… for it is an obligation that the Merciful One placed upon him; it is like a debt according to the opinion that repaying a creditor is a mitzvah and the lien is not of Torah origin. Except that there, there is a monetary claim belonging to his fellow, and forgiveness is effective; but here he is obligated to Heaven, and since this is so, his fellow's forgiveness does not help him").
That is to say, the intent of the Geonim in the proof that "all interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness etc." is:19* Since "all interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness," yet "the Torah did not forgive, and it forbade" it, this proves that the prohibition of taking interest and the obligation to return it are not in the category of a monetary law, a debt that he owes his fellow (since the other has forgiven the interest). Rather, it is a matter and a prohibition that the Torah imposed upon the lender in the category of a mitzvah and an obligation to Heaven (and in the obligation to return it to the borrower, he is bound to the Most High). Therefore "forgiveness is not effective regarding interest" even after the lender has received it, for he does not discharge his obligation to Heaven until he returns the "forbidden thing that he swallowed."
3. Accordingly, it must be said that the reasoning of the Rosh (and of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch), that forgiveness is effective regarding interest (after it has come into the lender's hands), is as follows:
Even though the obligation to return the interest is an obligation that the Merciful One placed upon him, and not because of a monetary lien (as the Ritva proved there20), nevertheless, this obligation which the Torah imposed upon him is not one of "he is obligated to Heaven." Rather, the Merciful One placed upon him an obligation to return the money by which he unlawfully diminished his fellow — meaning that he became obligated (by virtue of this mitzvah) with an obligation toward his fellow, and with regard to such an obligation forgiveness is effective.
As explained in the words of the Ritva cited above (according to the view of the Geonim), the matter of returning interest by virtue of an obligation that the Merciful One placed upon him (and not because of a monetary lien) is "like [the view that] repaying a creditor is a mitzvah." Except that the Ritva distinguished (according to the view of the Geonim) between repaying a creditor and returning interest: in repaying a creditor "there is a monetary claim belonging to his fellow, and forgiveness is effective, but here he is obligated to Heaven." The view of the Rosh, however, is that the essence of the mitzvah of returning interest, too, is that the Torah obligated him to return the money by which he diminished his fellow, and it is not in the category of "an obligation to Heaven."21
It emerges that both according to the view of the Geonim and according to the view of the Rosh (and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch),22 the interest money is considered the lender's money,23 and he has no obligation to return it by virtue of monetary law in itself, but only by virtue of the obligation imposed by the Merciful One.
4. On this basis one can explain, in the inner dimension of the matter, a detail in the law of returning interest: When one who lent with interest comes to do teshuvah and return the interest, it is not accepted from him;24 and although it is not accepted from him, he is obligated to return it in order to fulfill his duty to Heaven; nevertheless, it is a measure of piety (middas chassidus) not to accept it from him.25 The explanation of this is as follows:
Our Sages said:26 "התורה חסה על ממונם של ישראל" ("The Torah is protective of the money of Israel"). The reason for this can be said to be: It is a ruling that "כל מעשיך לשם שמים" ("All your deeds shall be for the sake of Heaven") and "בכל דרכיך דעהו" ("In all your ways, know Him").27 Consequently, since this is his money, he must fulfill this ruling with all of his money as well;28 and in the words of the Rambam,29 "לא יהי׳ בלבו לקיבוץ ממון בלבד אלא כו׳" ("His heart shall not be set merely on amassing money, but…").
In the style of the teachings of Chassidus: within the money of a Jew there are "ניצוצין קדושים השייכים לשרש נשמתו" ("holy sparks that belong to the root of his soul").30
Now, since the Holy One, blessed be He, fashioned His world in such a manner and order that a person can profit with his money by lending it with interest31 — and moreover, that "אגר נטר לי׳" ("payment for waiting [for one's money]")32 is something that reason requires33 — it is understood that the sparks within the interest, too, have some connection to the root of his soul. However, since the Torah forbade interest, he is not permitted to refine these sparks, and the manner of his service with respect to them is by way of rejection (as with the sparks within all forbidden things34).
However, after the lender has taken the interest money and it has already become part of his property, and he has no obligation to return it by virtue of monetary law in itself, but only by virtue of the obligation that the Merciful One placed upon him, as explained above — then, although he transgressed a prohibition in doing so and is obligated to return the interest, nevertheless, wherever there is another way that makes it possible for him not to have to return it, one must endeavor that the interest remain in his hands, since the sparks within it belong to the root of his soul.
This is the (inner) reason why it is a measure of piety not to accept the return of the interest from one who comes to fulfill his duty to Heaven: because the sparks within the interest money belong to the root of the lender's soul.
5. In light of all the above, one can also explain the reason we were commanded to take interest from a gentile — even though it is forbidden to diminish his money through robbery or overcharging: These sparks within the interest money of the gentile who borrows from a Jew belong to the lender, and he must refine these sparks from the domain of kelipah and elevate them to holiness.35
On this basis one can also understand the view of some36 that the mitzvah of "לנכרי תשיך" ("To a gentile you shall lend with interest") is (not only to take interest from him, but also) a mitzvah to lend to the gentile in order to take interest from him. For the very fact that the gentile needs the Jew to lend him money proves that the sparks found in this gentile's money belong to the Jew. Therefore it is a mitzvah to lend to him in order to take interest from him, so as to elevate these sparks to holiness.
(From the sichah of Shabbos Parshas Mishpatim, 5723)
Notes
1) [Vayikra] 25:35–36.
2) Bava Metzia 71a, end.
3) Rashi there.
4) Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, [ch.] 5, [halachah 1].
5) He also writes so in Sefer HaMitzvos, positive mitzvah 198; and so the Alter Rebbe rules in [his Shulchan Aruch,] Yoreh De'ah, Hilchos Ribbis, se'if 5, that it is a positive mitzvah. See the commentators on the Rambam there; the commentaries on the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 6; Bayis Chadash on Yoreh De'ah, beginning of siman 159.
6) Teitzei 23:21.
7) The wording of the Alter Rebbe in his Shulchan Aruch, beginning of Hilchos Gezeilah U'Geneivah, based on the Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Geneivah. Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of siman 348. Regarding robbery, see the Rambam, beginning of Hilchos Gezeilah Va'Aveidah; Tur and Shulchan Aruch there, beginning of siman 359 (see Shach there, se'if katan 2, citing the Maharshal, that the Rambam and the Smag hold that it is of Torah origin).
8) Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Hilchos Ona'ah U'Geneivas Da'as, se'if 1.
9) Rambam, Hilchos Mechirah, beginning of ch. 18. See also Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 228, se'if 6.
10) On all this, see Ramban on Teitzei there, [verse] 20; Abarbanel on Teitzei there, s.v. "VehaTeshuvah HaDalet"; Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, end of siman 62.
11) Bava Metzia 61a.
12) Rashi there.
13) See Rashi on Mishpatim 22:26 [as printed]: "Like the bite of a snake, which bites a small wound in one's foot and he does not feel it… until the interest increases and causes him to lose much money." See also Tanchuma, Mishpatim 9; Shemos Rabbah 31:6.
14) The wording of Rashi, Bava Metzia there (s.v. "Lamah Li").
15) Cited in the Rambam, Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh 4:13; and in the Rosh and the new Chiddushei HaRitva (cited in the Shitah Mekubetzes) on Bava Metzia there.
16) Bava Metzia there. This is also the view of the Rambam there (according to the explanation of the Maggid Mishneh and the aforementioned Ritva).
17) Yoreh De'ah, siman 160, se'if 5. So too in the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Hilchos Ribbis, se'if 5.
18) The wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch there.
19) Bava Metzia there.
19*) In Responsa Avnei Nezer (Yoreh De'ah, part 1, simanim 146 and 103) [it is written] that the reasoning of the Geonim, "All interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness, and the Torah did not forgive etc.," and the reasoning of the Ritva, "he is obligated to Heaven," are two separate reasons. But according to what was stated above in the text — that the novel point "that the Torah did not forgive" is found only with regard to forgiveness in giving the interest, and not with regard to forgiveness after the interest has been given — it is understood that the reasoning "the Torah did not forgive etc." (by itself) does not suffice to establish that, for this reason, forgiveness should not be effective afterward as well [note also the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe (Hilchos Ribbis there), who writes, "All interest in the world is [given with] forgiveness etc., and the Torah did not forgive, and it forbade this forgiveness," and nevertheless rules like the Rosh that forgiveness after the interest has been taken is effective]. Therefore one must say that the Ritva's reasoning, "he is obligated to Heaven," is an explanation of the words of the Geonim, "the Torah did not forgive etc.," as in the text.
20) From the fact that "Rabbi Yochanan holds (Bava Metzia 61b) that fixed interest (ribbis ketzutzah) is not recoverable through the judges; and also according to all opinions, if [the lender] died, his children are exempt [from returning it], except for a distinct item, only because of their father's honor" (ibid., 62a).
21) The proofs in the Ritva there (cited in the previous note) show only that it is not a monetary lien but an obligation that the Merciful One placed upon him — unlike robbery and overcharging, where there is a monetary lien; see there. But [they do] not [prove] the point that "he is obligated to Heaven."
22) But see the Ramban on Sefer HaMitzvos, positive mitzvah 10 (in his own count of the mitzvos), and the Megillas Esther there. Someone pointed out to me: In Responsa Avnei Nezer (siman 168, se'if katan 1) he writes that the Rambam holds (according to the explanation of the Megillas Esther, that the reason the Rambam did not count the mitzvah of returning interest is that it is included in the mitzvah of returning a stolen object) that it is "a monetary obligation."* And there, in se'if katan 2, [he writes] that those who hold that forgiveness is effective follow this view. But** see the Beis Yosef (Yoreh De'ah 160, s.v. "U'Mah SheKasav Rabbeinu"; ibid., end of 161, s.v. "VeRibbis DeOraisa" (from the Nimukei Yosef, chapter Eizehu Neshech, citing the Rashba and the Ran); and so he rules in the Shulchan Aruch there, se'if 5): "That it is certainly recoverable through the judges means that we compel him… so that he will fulfill the mitzvah, but the court does not seize his property"*** — implying that the author [of the Shulchan Aruch] holds that the interest is the lender's money. And since the author also (Yoreh De'ah, siman 160, se'if 5) rules like the Rosh that "forgiveness is effective to exempt him" [see Avnei Nezer there: "In my humble opinion, the words of the author contradict each other, and this requires study"], one is compelled to say that the reason for this is that the essence of this mitzvah is to return the money by which he diminished his fellow, as stated above in the text. See also the sources cited below, note 23.
*) One can say (at least with difficulty) that the Megillas Esther, too, holds that the interest money is considered the lender's money and the obligation to return it is only a mitzvah; and the fact that it is counted within the mitzvah of returning a stolen object is only because the essence of the mitzvah of returning interest is to return the money by which he diminished his fellow (as in the text), similar to returning a stolen object.
**) This is also evident from the fact that the Tur etc. did not cite (the point written by the Ramban or the Megillas Esther) that one must return interest just as one must return a stolen object etc. (And it is understood that this is not comparable to what the Tur writes (citing the Rosh), that forgiveness is effective etc., as with any robbery. See the Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, Dinei Ribbis, siman 10) on what he writes concerning the Rosh.)
***) The Machaneh Ephraim (there, siman 1) writes that according to the Rosh, [the court] seizes his property; but see there that this is not because of a monetary lien, but rather that we seize his property so that he will fulfill the mitzvah — just as we compel him with his body, we compel him with his money. See also Piskei Dinim of the Tzemach Tzedek, Chiddushim on the Rambam, at the beginning (p. 339); Ketzos HaChoshen, siman 39, se'if katan 1; siman 290, se'if katan 3.
23) See Chiddushei HaRitva, Kiddushin 6b; the new Chiddushei HaRitva, Bava Metzia 65a, citing the Ramban (cited in the Shitah Mekubetzes there). The Machaneh Ephraim (Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, Dinei Ribbis, siman 2) seeks to prove from Bava Metzia (unlike the Ritva) that when the interest is still extant, the lender has not acquired it. But see the Sha'ar HaMelech (ch. 8 of Hilchos Ishus, halachah 15), who disputes him. See also Avnei Milu'im, siman 28, se'if katan 22; Pnei Yehoshua, Bava Metzia 61b; Chiddushei Rabbi Akiva Eiger there, a–b; and elsewhere.
24) Bava Kamma 94b. Rambam, Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh 4:5. Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, siman 161, se'if 7.
25) Responsa of the Rivash, siman 417; cited in the Beis Yosef, Yoreh De'ah, siman 161, s.v. "VeHeicha." This is not so regarding robbery — see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of siman 366, and Chochmas Shlomo (by the Maharshak) there.
26) Rosh Hashanah 27a, and the sources cited there.
27) Avos 2:12. Mishlei 3:6. See also Likkutei Sichos, vol. 3, pp. 907, 932.
28) Note the command "Do not destroy…" (except that since this is actual damage — and not merely the withholding of profit — the Torah warned even regarding ownerless property (and even regarding that of the gentiles with whom one is at war); Hilchos Shemiras Guf etc. of the Alter Rebbe, se'if 14).
29) Hilchos De'os 3:2 (and the conclusion of the matter in halachah 3 there).
30) Kesser Shem Tov, siman 218 (Kehot edition). Or Torah of the Maggid, 101d (Kehot edition).
31) See the Abarbanel cited in note 10. And even after the Torah forbade interest, "the interest is a debt that the borrower became obligated in and is obligated to pay, but the Torah decreed that even though he is obligated, [the lender] should not take it" (Mishneh LaMelech, ch. 8 of Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, halachah 1, s.v. "Mi SheHayah"). See also Tzafnas Pa'aneach on the Torah, Teitzei 23:20 (p. 216): "for in truth he owes him interest etc., only that the Torah forbade this."
32) Bava Metzia 63b.
33) To the extent that "fifty that are put to work are better than two hundred that are not" (Yerushalmi, Pe'ah 8:8).
34) See Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 6d.
35) See Or HaTorah, Devarim, the maamar beginning "Lanochri Tashich" (p. 2108): "Therefore one should take interest from him (from the gentile)." See also Or HaTorah (Yahel Or) on Tehillim 15:1, se'if katan 4: "However, for idolaters interest was permitted… so that Malchus of Atzilus be filled from the destruction of the three [impure] kelipos."
36) See Knesses HaGedolah on Yoreh De'ah, siman 159.
Key Lesson
Even a Jew's money holds holy sparks bound to the root of his soul, which is why the Torah is protective of it and why a pious person does not take back interest that has already passed into the lender's hands. Every coin a Jew earns is meant to be used "for the sake of Heaven," so that the G‑dliness hidden in his material dealings is elevated to holiness.