Parshas Vayikra
1. We learned at the conclusion of Tractate Menachos: "נאמר בעולת בהמה אשה ריח ניחוח ובעולת העוף אשה ריח ניחוח ובמנחה אשה ריח ניחוח" ("It is said of the burnt offering of an animal, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma,' and of the burnt offering of a bird, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma,' and of the meal offering, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma'")1, "לומר לך אחד המרבה ואחד הממעיט ובלבד שיכוין לבו לשמים" ("to tell you that it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven")2.
The plain meaning of the Mishnah is: From the fact that the same expression, "a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma," is said of each of the three kinds of offerings — animal, bird and meal offering — even though they are not at all equal (the burnt offering of an animal is greater than that of a bird, and the burnt offering of a bird is greater than the meal offering), it is proven that "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven": if the one who gives little directs his heart to Heaven just like the one who gives much3, then his little is considered just like the much.
This needs to be understood: The wording is "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little" (and not "to tell you that even (or also) the one who gives little, provided…"). This implies that regarding the one who gives much, too, there is a novelty — that he is equal to the one who gives little.
In the Gemara there, on this Mishnah, it is stated: "Rabbi Zeira said: What is the verse for this? (And he answers:) 'מתוקה שנת העובד אם מעט ואם הרבה יאכל' ('Sweet is the sleep of the laborer, whether he eats little or much')4. Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: From here: 'ברבות הטובה רבו אוכליה ומה כשרון לבעליה' ('When goods increase, those who eat them increase; and what advantage is there to their owner')"5. That is, this principle that "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs…" is derived from these verses cited by Rabbi Zeira and Rav Adda bar Ahavah.
This needs to be understood:
What is Rabbi Zeira's question ("What is the verse for this?"), and also what is the answer of Rabbi Zeira and Rav Adda bar Ahavah (that the derivation is from what is written, "Sweet is…" or "When goods increase…")? The Mishnah itself states explicitly that "it is the same whether one gives much…" is derived from the fact that "it is said… 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma'…"6!
And if, for some reason, the Mishnah's proof is not sufficient, the question arises from the opposite direction: Why were these verses, "Sweet is…" and "When goods increase…," not cited in the Mishnah — since they are sufficient proofs, unlike the verse "a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma"7?
2. Continuing the above subject, the Gemara cites a Baraisa that explains three matters concerning the offerings which contain a novelty: "It was taught: Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai said: Come and see what is written in the section of the offerings: that neither 'Kel' nor 'Elokim' is said of them, but only the Name Havaya (the L‑rd), 'שלא ליתן פתחון פה לבעל דין לחלוק' ('so as not to give an opening to an adversary to disagree')" (Rashi explains: "to those who say there are many powers; and the matter would prove it — that the One so named commanded them to offer Him a meal offering, and the One so named commanded them to offer Him bulls, and this one rams; therefore it says of all of them, 'a pleasing aroma to the L‑rd'"). "And it is said of the large ox, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma,' and of the small bird, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma,' and of the meal offering, 'a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma,' to tell you that it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven. And lest you say that He needs it for food — the verse states, 'אם ארעב לא אומר לך כי לי תבל ומלואה' ('If I were hungry I would not tell you, for Mine is the world and its fullness'), and it says, 'For Mine is every beast of the forest, the cattle upon a thousand hills… Do I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?'8 … You do not slaughter for My will; rather, you slaughter for your own will, as it says*8, 'לרצונכם תזבחהו' ('for your will you shall slaughter it')."
This needs to be understood:
a) What is the connection between these three matters, to the extent that Ben Azzai includes them in a single statement9 (especially since the latter matters are stated with a "conjunctive vav," as an addition to the first matter)10?
b) How does the fact that only the Name Havaya is said regarding the offerings help to prevent "giving an opening to an adversary to disagree"? We find many mitzvos regarding which both the name Elokim and the name Kel are said (and some regarding which the Name Havaya is said, as in the mitzvah of the offerings). If so, there remains "an opening for an adversary to disagree" and to say that "there are many powers," even though regarding the offerings only the Name Havaya is said?
c) How can one who says "there are many powers" be called a "בעל דין" ("litigant")? This description implies that the holder of this view has the status of someone with whom one must engage in argument and discussion — yet he denies the Oneness of G‑d!
d) The second matter in Ben Azzai's words is, seemingly, the very same matter stated in our Mishnah!
e) Accordingly, why did he change from the Mishnah's wording, and instead of "the burnt offering of an animal" and "the burnt offering of a bird" say "the large ox" and "the small bird"?
f) How could it ever occur to anyone to say that "He (the Holy One, blessed be He) needs it for food," G‑d forbid, to the point that Ben Azzai had to dispel this error — and through proofs from several verses, etc.?
g) If indeed this statement must be negated, it should have been said as an introduction to the laws of the offerings — at the beginning of Tractate Zevachim, and not at the conclusion of Tractate Menachos.
h) In negating the supposition (that "He needs it for food"), Ben Azzai does not say that the concept of eating is not relevant Above. Rather, he says "If I were hungry I would not tell you, for Mine is the world…"11 — meaning that "hunger," as it were, is indeed relevant Above, only that then "I would not tell you" (and the reason is) "for Mine is…".
3. The explanation of all this:
The difference between the one who "gives much" and the one who "gives little" in an offering — whose concept is "אדם כי יקריב גו' לה'" ("When a man brings… to the L‑rd") — is on two sides. From the side of the person who brings the offering: whether the offering was brought by the person in the complete manner fitting for the one offering it, or whether he "gives little" in it. From the side of the Holy One, blessed be He: whether the offering was accepted favorably Above in completeness — similar to the fact that there is a case of "it atoned, and it did not atone"12, the distinction between the appeasement effected by a sin offering and by a burnt offering13, and more.
And this is the difference between the Mishnah and the Gemara: The Mishnah speaks of the primary concept (and effect) of the offering — as it is accepted Above. Therefore the Mishnah's proof comes from the fact that "a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma" is said of each of the three kinds of offerings, even though this one gives much and that one gives little — "to tell you that it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven." That is, with regard to the "pleasing aroma" of the offering and its favorable acceptance Above, they are all equal14.
Now, in bringing an offering there must also be "the offering of the person himself"15, as it is written, "for your will" — in the plain sense, that he brings it from his own money, etc., and also, in the words of the Ramban16, "its blood (of the offering) in place of his blood, a soul in place of a soul," etc.
And regarding the offering of the person himself — it is specifically regarding the meal offering that it says, "נפש כי תקריב" ("When a soul brings") — as if he had offered his very soul17. And the verse teaches the novelty that the animal and bird offering, too, is a pleasing aroma, just like that of the one who gives little.
Afterwards, as an addition to this, comes the question in the Gemara, "What is the verse for this?" That is, where does Scripture teach us a further detail of "it is the same whether one gives much…" which is not proven from the verse cited in the Mishnah18? Namely, that also in the bringing of the offering from the side of the person (who brings the offering) there is no difference between the one who gives much and the one who gives little.
It is obvious to him that this is so, and his question is only "What is the verse for this?" For since the main point of an offering from the side of the person is "that he directs his heart to Heaven"19, logic dictates that if the intention was complete, the bringing of the offering by the person who "gives little" is also complete.
And for the verse regarding the person, Rabbi Zeira cites (in the Gemara) the verse "Sweet is the sleep of the laborer, whether he eats little or much." "The laborer" refers to the person who brings his offering (as Rashi explains), whose sleep (the laborer's) is "sweet," "whether little or much" (in equal measure, whether the offering is "little" or "much"); "he eats" — his reward. Thus from this verse we derive that (also) from the side of "the laborer" there is no difference between "the one who gives much" and "the one who gives little."
And Rav Adda bar Ahavah cites the verse "When goods increase, those who eat them increase; and what advantage is there to their owner" — that there is no advantage or superiority for the "owner" of (the goods, that is,) the offering21 through "the increase of the goods," by increasing his offering. In other words, also from the side of the owner of the offering ("their owner"), it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little…20
This also explains the connection between the (above-mentioned) conclusion of the tractate and its beginning — "כל המנחות שנקמצו שלא לשמן כשרות אלא שלא עלו לבעלים לשם חובה" ("All meal offerings from which the handful was taken not for their own sake are valid, but they do not count for the owners toward fulfilling their obligation"). That is, the first Mishnah, too, discusses and distinguishes between these two matters: the validity of the offering in itself, i.e., that it be in accordance with His will and for His will, may He be blessed (similar to the concept of "a pleasing aroma to the L‑rd"); and the obligation of the owners in bringing the offering. In connection with this comes the conclusion at the end of the tractate: although these are two matters in the bringing of an offering, the common aspect of both (both regarding the "pleasing aroma" to the L‑rd and regarding the person who offers) is that "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven" — and, as mentioned above, it is understood simply from the Mishnah that also from the side of the person it is the same whether one gives much…
4. In continuation of this, the Baraisa is cited further on in the Gemara (at the very end of the tractate): "Ben Azzai said: Come and see… in the section of the offerings, that neither 'Kel' nor 'Elokim' is said of them, but only Havaya." The novelty of Ben Azzai is this: there are several kinds of offerings22. There are those that come for atonement, such as the sin offering, the guilt offering, etc., which come to appease the attribute of judgment Above, so that it would have been fitting for the name Elokim to be said of them. And there are offerings that come as thanksgiving for the kindness done to the person, such as the thanksgiving offering, and likewise offerings brought in connection with joy, such as the peace offerings of rejoicing, etc. — and for these the name Kel, which denotes kindness, would be fitting, as it is written23, "חסד א־ל כל היום" ("The kindness of Kel is all the day")24. Nevertheless, in all the offerings we find only the Name Havaya25.
And he explains the reason for this: "so as not to give an opening to an adversary to disagree." The intent is not someone who says "there are many powers" in the plain sense of the matter26 — for then he would not be called a "litigant." Rather, the intent is one who holds that the Creator is certainly One and has no second, G‑d forbid, but that "many powers" are contained within Him: His kindness is a matter unto itself and His judgment a matter unto itself (like a human being — to make the distinction — who comprises several separate attributes). Therefore, had Scripture attributed one particular kind of offerings to the name Kel (the kind that "fits" this name, as above) and another kind to the name Elokim, an "opening" would have been given to the position of the "litigant" to say that "there are many powers" within the "One" Above, and that each offering is brought to, and belongs only to, a particular, separate "power" and "part" within the existence of the Creator, may He be blessed, G‑d forbid — Who in truth is in the ultimate state of simple Oneness. This is alluded to in the precise wording: "an opening for an adversary to disagree" (lachalok — literally, "to divide"); that is, the main "claim" of the "litigant"27 is that there is, G‑d forbid, a matter of division and separation Above.
In order not to give the "litigant" an opening to say that there is a division of "powers" Above, G‑d forbid, in all the offerings (even though they are utterly different from one another) only one Name is mentioned, and specifically the Name Havaya. For the Name Havaya is the Explicit Name28, the Essential Name29, and the Unique Name29*, which indicates that G‑d is above any matter of change and division. And this itself teaches us that the division we find among the Names is only because "לפי מעשי אני נקרא" ("I am called according to My deeds")30 — that is, according to how the Creator, blessed be He, appears to us through His deeds, His conduct and His influence in the world, but not that there is, G‑d forbid, any division in His Being.
The reason that specifically regarding the offerings Scripture needed to exclude the "opening" of the "litigant" is that this error ("to divide") is more liable to arise regarding the offerings. The function of the offerings is to bring about a change (and an addition) of will, as it were, Above — this is the concept of the "pleasing aroma"31. This is especially so with offerings that come to atone for a person's sin: by sinning he transgressed His will, may He be blessed, and the purpose of the offering is that he be found favorable before Him, may He be blessed, as is written at the beginning of the section of the offerings32: "ונרצה לו לכפר" ("and it shall be accepted for him, to atone"). And even more than this, we find: "… (Noach) … on the altar [OCR unclear]. And the L‑rd smelled the pleasing aroma and said… 'I will no longer curse… for the inclination…'"33 — even though before this, when "the L‑rd saw that… and every inclination…"34, He brought the Flood: a change regarding (on account of) this very matter.
Since this is so, it is understood that this change of will, effected through the offerings, gives room ("an opening") to those who err and say that there is, G‑d forbid, a "division" of "many powers" within the existence of the Creator, blessed be He. For the change in will from judgment to kindness is seemingly caused by the "division" between the attribute of kindness and the attribute of severity — Kel and Elokim.
Now it will be understood why specifically in the section of the offerings Scripture was concerned about giving an opening to an adversary; and therefore "neither… the name Kel, etc., is said of it, but only Havaya" — which is the Essential Name and the Explicit Name, denoting the simplicity and Oneness of the Holy One, blessed be He — to indicate that the entire bringing of the offering is for the sake of Havaya, Who is above all matters of division and change.
5. Accordingly, the content of the connection between the first clause of the Baraisa and its second clause will be understood — the second clause stating, "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little, provided that he directs his heart to Heaven" (as in the words of the Mishnah). After the first clause explains that there is no division or change in the place that the offerings reach and ascend to Above, since they are all to the Name Havaya ("and it does not say in the section of the offerings… but only Havaya"), the second clause comes to negate a second type of division as well in the matter of the offerings — from the side of the person offering below: that there is no difference between the one who gives much and the one who gives little in the quantity of the offering, "provided that he directs his heart to Heaven."
And similar to what was explained above regarding the Gemara's question, "What is the verse for this?" — that the intent is: from where do we know from a verse that also from the side of the person offering there is no difference between the one who gives much and the one who gives little — so too in the Baraisa (whose function is to explain what is taught in the Mishnah concisely or by allusion35), the main emphasis is (in addition to the Mishnah) that also from the side of the person offering there is no distinction between the one who gives much and the one who gives little.
Therefore the Baraisa is precise in saying, "and it is said of the large ox… and of the small bird… and of the meal offering…," changing from the wording of the Mishnah, "it is said of the burnt offering of an animal… and of the burnt offering of a bird… and of the meal offering." For the Mishnah explains the equality between the one who gives much and the one who gives little as it is expressed in the offering and ascent of the sacrifice to Havaya. Therefore the Mishnah says "the burnt offering of an animal" and "the burnt offering of a bird" — for the burnt offering is entirely consumed upon the altar, entirely for the Holy One, blessed be He. That is, the measure of much and little is in the quantity offered upon the altar: whether the burnt offering of an animal, which is "entirely consumed" in its large quantity; or the burnt offering of a bird, whose "entire consumption" is much smaller in quantity; or the meal offering (which is the utmost minimum in the quantity offered to Havaya, since it is not entirely consumed; rather,) only its handful is burned upon the altar36 — of each one of them it says, "a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma, to tell you that it is the same whether one gives much…, provided that he directs…"
The Baraisa, however, speaks of "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little" with regard to the person offering. Therefore it changed from the term "burnt offering" (for in relation to the one offering there is no difference between a burnt offering or a sin offering, etc.) to wording that describes the size (and coarseness) of the offering itself: "it is said of the large ox… and of the small bird…". Since the emphasis is from the side of the one offering, the measure of the largeness and smallness of the offering itself is what is fitting.
6. However, the Baraisa's emphasis on the equality with regard to the person offering is not only because it comes to add another detail to what is stated in the Mishnah. Rather, in Ben Azzai's view, this is the very interpretation and explanation of the Mishnah itself. Although the offering has two aspects — as it is from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, and as it is from the side of the person offering, as mentioned above — in truth, even the "pleasing aroma" from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, has as its purpose and aim the person offering, for he is the one who is atoned for and found favorable through the offering. Therefore it is logical that all aspects of the offering should be judged as they relate to the person37.
This is the reason the Baraisa brings the proof from the verse "a fire-offering, a pleasing aroma" — as (the offering is accepted Above) — even though in the Baraisa the aspect of the offering as it relates to the person offering is emphasized (and accordingly it would seemingly have been fitting to bring the proof from the verses cited in the Gemara, as mentioned above). For, on the contrary, the very fact that regarding the "pleasing aroma" the one who gives much and the one who gives little were made equal, necessitates that they are equal also with regard to the person offering, since the entire matter of the "pleasing aroma" depends on the person offering and comes entirely for his sake.
This also explains the connection of the continuation of the Baraisa in its third clause (to the one before it): "And lest you say that He needs it for food." The intent here is not to negate the concept of eating Above38 (for physical eating is not being discussed (but rather, as it is written, "לחם אלקיו" ("the bread of his G‑d")38*), as will be explained below; and it is also obvious that there is no need to negate physical eating, as mentioned above). Rather, it comes to explain that although there is a concept of "eating" Above, this is not something that "He needs" — this "eating" and offering of the sacrifice. This is in continuation of what was alluded to just before, that the entire concept of the offering is only for the sake of (and therefore it is also judged in relation to) the person offering.
This will be understood by first explaining the concept of eating Above.
7. It is stated in the Sifri39 — regarding the reason for the juxtaposition of the section of the Tamid (the daily offering) to Moshe's request, "יפקוד ה' גו' איש על העדה אשר יצא לפניהם ואשר יבא לפניהם" ("Let the L‑rd… appoint a man over the congregation, who will go out before them and who will come in before them")40: "A parable: to what is this comparable? To a king whose wife was departing from the world, and she was instructing him regarding her children… He said to her: Rather than instructing me regarding my children, instruct my children regarding me, that they not rebel against me… So too the Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Rather than instructing Me regarding My children, instruct My children regarding Me, that they not treat Me with disrespect…"
From the words of the Midrash it is understood that the section and concept of the Tamid has a connection and similarity to the content of Moshe's request, "Let the L‑rd appoint…," since the response to this request (and understandably, this is also the fulfillment of the request) is the section of the Tamid (which is the "instruct My children regarding Me" that the Holy One, blessed be He, asked of Moshe in place of "instructing Me regarding My children").
Now, the content of Moshe's request is, in its plain sense: since the Jewish people are entering the Land, there is a need to appoint "a man over the congregation, who will go out before them and who will come in before them…" — who will stand at their head in the war of conquering the Land and lead them afterwards in all their affairs — "so that the congregation of the L‑rd will not be like sheep that have no shepherd"40.
From this it is understood that the same applies to the Tamid (and to the offerings in general), whose purpose is to negate the error that there is "no shepherd" in the world and that "עולם כמנהגו נוהג" ("the world follows its natural course")41, and even that "this palace is without a master"42. Through the Tamid, etc., it will be recognized and revealed that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the One "who will go out before them and who will come in before them" — that all the affairs of the entire world are conducted according to the individual Divine Providence of the Holy One, blessed be He — so that even as the human eye sees it, the world will not be "like sheep that have no shepherd."
This is also the reason43 that the offerings are called "bread"44, and "eating" in relation to Above, as it is written45, "קרבני לחמי וגו'" ("My offering, My bread…"):
For our Sages said46: "הנפש הזו ממלאה את הגוף והקב"ה ממלא את עולמו" ("This soul fills the body, and the Holy One, blessed be He, fills His world"). Just as a person's eating (and all his needs that are included in it47) is what brings about that "the soul fills the body" — the union of soul and body in such a way that the powers and vitality of the soul are revealed in the body and direct it in all its affairs — so too regarding "the Holy One, blessed be He, fills His world": the offerings are called "bread" and "eating" because they are what reveal in the world that the Holy One, blessed be He, is "the Master of this palace," that is, that there be a revealed union of G‑dly light and vitality with the world, as mentioned above.
8. And this is what Ben Azzai says [in continuation of his view that the entire concept of the offering, including the "pleasing aroma," is for the sake of the person and for his benefit — and so that one should not raise a difficulty against him]: "And lest you say that He needs it for food." That is, since "נתאוה הקב"ה להיות לו ית' דירה בתחתונים" ("the Holy One, blessed be He, desired to have a dwelling place in the lower realms")48 — that there be a revelation of His G‑dliness in this lowest world, in the manner of a dwelling — then this necessitates that there be a concept of "eating" Above, through which "the Holy One, blessed be He, fills the world" in the manner of "union" and revelation; and thus, seemingly, (the "eating" of) the offerings also involves a "need," as it were, Above. To this the verse states, "If I were hungry I would not tell you" — meaning that there is no necessity, as it were, regarding the "eating" Above, such that "I would tell you — for Mine is the world and its fullness," and there is no necessity that the "eating" come specifically through the Jewish people's service of the offerings49. Rather, the "eating" that comes through the offerings is for the good and benefit of the person.
And this is what he continues and concludes with: "You do not slaughter for My will; rather, you slaughter for your own will, as it says, 'for your will you shall slaughter it.'" This explains and emphasizes the general point (and the continuity) of his words: from the fact that "it is the same whether one gives much or one gives little" regarding the "pleasing aroma" of the offering, it is certainly so also with regard to the person (since the entire benefit of the "pleasing aroma" of the offerings is for him), whether he brought "a large ox" or a meal offering. For "He does not need (the offerings) for food" ("for My will"), and the entire purpose of the offerings is "for your will" — that of the person.
9. However, even though the Holy One, blessed be He, has, as it were, the "choice" of "the world and its fullness…", nevertheless He commanded specifically the Jewish people that they offer "My offering, My bread." And although before the command — "If I were hungry I would not tell you," for He is not, as it were, compelled in this — nevertheless, after the command to the Jewish people (which itself shows their importance before Him — that specifically them He commanded), "למעשה ידיך תכסוף" ("You will long for the work of Your hands")50. The Holy One, blessed be He, asks (through Moshe — "instruct My children regarding Me") that the Jewish people fulfill the Torah and mitzvos, whose general theme is the concept of the offerings51 — to make of all the matters of the world an offering to Him, may He be blessed — through which the world becomes a dwelling place for Him, may He be blessed.
(From the sicha of 6 Tishrei, 5730)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 1:9; 1:17; 2:4.
2) Regarding the explanation that the reward, etc., will be equal even though this one gives much, etc. — note what is explained concerning Rabbi Elazar ben Durdaya (Likkutei Torah of the Arizal, Tehillim, ch. 32; and further study is needed in Likkutei Torah, the first maamar "Ki Bayom Hazeh," 64d, and the first maamar "Usekatem," 62b), and from what is written in Torah Or, the second maamar "Chayav Inish" (98c).
3) The case is where the one who gives little did not have the ability to give more* (Magen Avraham, Orach Chaim 1, sub-par. 6 (see also Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav there, sub-par. 3, that the Taz there also does not disagree with this); Tosafos Yom Tov on Avos, end of ch. 2; and elsewhere). For if he had the ability and nevertheless does not give much, he is not equal to the one who gives much in directing his heart to Heaven**.
*) Or that it is a matter in which abundance is of no significance. And this is the question of Tosafos s.v. "Lelamedcha" (Shevuos 66a), that the concept of "it is the same whether one gives much…" does not apply there, since the two above-mentioned conditions are absent: there abundance is a mitzvah, and he also had the ability to give more. (And it answers that from "it is the same whether one gives much…" we know that one should not take pride, etc.) Whereas when there is a mitzvah to give more and one has the ability, then it must specifically be "according to the camel, the load" (Kesubos 67a). Seemingly, it may be said that regarding offerings one must bring the choicest of the kind that one wishes to bring (Menachos 83b), but there is no obligation to increase the number of offerings — even though one receives reward for the increase. Only regarding the appearance offering and the festival offering, of which it is said "according to the gift of his hand," must it be according to his wealth (Chagigah 8b) — to the point that one may bring a bird even though he is wealthy (see Lechem Mishneh, Laws of Maaseh HaKorbanos 16:3). And this is the precision of the Talmud's extra wording in Menachos (104b), "Who is accustomed, etc." — meaning that this is the usual way, but it is possible that a wealthy person, too, will bring a meal offering*.
Accordingly one can explain: 1) the intent of Rashi in Menachos (110a) s.v. "Echad hamarbeh," who added the words "to bring offerings" — meaning that one gives more in number, unlike the discussion in Shevuos, which refers to an increase in quality; 2) the extra wording of Rashi in Berachos (5b; 17a), who writes, "'It is the same whether one gives much…' was said regarding offerings." That is, because the expression "one who gives little" implies to Rashi that he is able to give more but reduces what he is capable of. And since in Berachos the subject is Torah study, Rashi therefore emphasizes that it was taught specifically regarding offerings — and the reason is as above, that there is no obligation, etc., unlike Torah study.
And the fact that the Talmud in Berachos brings a proof from this is because if the one who gives little does not give less in directing his heart to Heaven (and in Torah study this is possible only if he lacks the ability, as is understood — for otherwise it is said of him, "for he has despised the word of the L‑rd" — Sanhedrin 99a), then it is the same whether one gives much…; consequently, in Torah study, where one gives little because he did not have the ability, his reward is like that of the one who gives much. And this is easily understood.
*) [On the preceding starred note:] Note the saying of our Sages (Bereishis Rabbah 22:5, cited in Rashi on Bereishis 4:3) that Kayin brought of the fruit of the ground, from the inferior produce, while Hevel brought from the firstborn of his flock and from their choicest. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 23 ff.
**) See Berachos 5b, where this saying of our Sages is cited regarding Rabbi Elazar, who wept that he had not studied as much as he wished — according to the initial supposition. (And they also said of Rabbi Elazar — Eruvin 57b — "באהבתה תשגה תמיד" ("with her love you will always be ravished").) And in Berachos 17a, Rashi s.v. "Ushema": he did not have an open heart, etc.
4) Koheles 5:11.
5) Koheles there, 5:10. This is also the reading in Ein Yaakov; but in our printed Talmud: "lebaalav" ("to its owner").
6) See Iyun Yaakov here: "For the fact that 'a pleasing aroma' is written of all of them is not such a strong proof, since one could say that nevertheless each one, according to its level and degree, is a pleasing aroma, one higher than the other." Nevertheless, it is as explained in the text.
7) Also from the fact that in the Mishnah the verses are cited first and afterwards the derivation "it is the same whether one gives much…," and not in the reverse order, it is implied that the verses are what compel the statement that "it is the same whether one gives much…," and obviously they are a sufficient proof.
8) Tehillim 50:12; 10–11.
*8) Vayikra 19:5.
9) One cannot answer that it is because these matters contain a novelty regarding offerings — for there are certainly many other matters regarding offerings that contain a novelty; so why did specifically these three come in this Baraisa?
10) In the Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha here, he explains the sequence of the clauses: that "it is the same whether one gives much…" is a proof that the offerings are for the sake of the L‑rd, whereas other gods would certainly be more pleased with a greater quantity of food. And when he says, "And lest you say that He too needs it for food," this is explicitly refuted by the proofs that He does not, etc.
But in my humble opinion this is not understood: What compels that one who says there are two powers, G‑d forbid, would say that "they would certainly be more pleased with more food"? It is also not understood what he continues: "And lest you say that He too needs it for food…" — for he has already proven that it is the same whether one gives much, etc., unlike other gods who "would be more pleased with more food"; if so, how can one then say, "And lest you say that He too needs it for food"?
And see Iyun Yaakov, who explains the first two clauses as if they were one clause — which is not implied by the wording of the Baraisa. And what he explains concerning the sequence of the third clause — "that is, since it is all the same to You, much or little, You might say that this is the way of one who is hungry and craves to eat, etc.; therefore Scripture brings 'If I were hungry…,' that it is only to do My will" — is not understood. For the proof from "If I were hungry…" is not that hunger is not relevant Above; on the contrary, it is that it exists — only that "I would not tell you," as explained below in the text.
11) Even according to what the Ibn Ezra (and others) writes in explaining "If I were hungry…" — "were I like a person who has a need, etc.," and that in truth hunger is not relevant Above — at any rate there is no proof from the verse that hunger is not relevant.
12) Zevachim 7a.
13) There, 7b. See also Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 2.
14) It may be said that this is also the precision of the Mishnah's wording, "(provided that he directs his heart) to Heaven," which is seemingly superfluous. Rather, the intent of the Mishnah is to emphasize that the equality is because he directs his heart to Heaven; and from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He (which is what the Mishnah is speaking of, as in the text), it is the same whether one gives much, etc. See the Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharal of Prague (here): "For with G‑d, may He be blessed, everything is one, much and little. Therefore, if he does not direct his heart to Heaven, there is a difference in this between much and little, but not when he directs his heart to Heaven; and from the side of G‑d, may He be blessed, everything is one." Note also Shevuos (15a): "Is there any importance before Heaven? But it was taught: 'It is the same whether one gives much…'"
15) As is known, the teaching of the Alter Rebbe: "When a man brings — of you — an offering to the L‑rd" (Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 2c; see also the maamar "Basi LeGani" 5710, ch. 2; the maamar "Basi LeGani" 5712).
16) Vayikra 1:9.
17) Menachos 104b; cited in Rashi in its place (2:1).
18) In Tzon Kodashim it is written that "What is the verse for this?" comes to add that even a wealthy person who is able to give more yet gives little — nevertheless, etc., provided that he directs his heart to Heaven. But see above, note 3, that if he is able to give more, it is not applicable to say "provided that he directs…," since then he is not equal in his intention to the one who gives much.
19) See at length the commentators on the Torah at the beginning of Parshas Vayikra, and Torah Sheleimah, Miluim to Parshas Vayikra, at its beginning. This is also understood from the fact that there are many disqualifications in offerings that arise from a deficiency in thought and intention.
20) So writes the Maharsha in Chiddushei Aggados here. However, in Rashi here it refers to the Holy One, blessed be He. It may be said that this follows the reading in the Gemara that also cites the end of the verse, "but the sight of his eyes" (as in Ein Yaakov here; see also the Maharsha at its conclusion, that regarding the word "but (so that you say, etc.)" too, Rashi reads as in Ein Yaakov; and in Rashi here, a new heading should begin with the words "but the sight of his eyes," as in the Rashi printed in Ein Yaakov), which refers to the Holy One, blessed be He. Whereas according to our reading in the Talmud, which does not cite the continuation of the verse (nor is it alluded to by an "etc."), one may explain that "their owner" refers to the owner of the offering. And the Maharsha writes that "their owner" refers to the owner of the offering even according to the reading in the Gemara that cites the end of the verse.
21) The difference between these two verses: The verse "Sweet is the sleep of the laborer, whether he eats little or much" emphasizes the matter from the side of the one who gives little — that the one who gives little, too, "eats" his reward. The verse "When goods increase… and what advantage is there to their owner" emphasizes the matter from the side of the one who gives much — that he has no advantage over the one who gives little.
22) See the details of the kinds of offerings in the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, in the introduction to Seder Kodashim.
23) Tehillim 52:3.
24) Zohar I, 94a; Tikkunei Zohar, Tikkun 22 (67a). See also the next note.
25) See similarly in the Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha — except that he writes that the name Kel denotes the attribute of judgment. See Zohar III, 30b: "Sometimes it is judgment and sometimes it is… kindness"; and see Nitzutzei Oros there. See also Zohar III, 5a, and Nitzutzei Zohar there.
26) It may be said that this is also the intent of Rashi here (and it may be said that this is the difference between our reading in Rashi, "to those who say there are many powers, etc.," and the reading in the Rashi printed in Ein Yaakov: "for heretics, to say there are many powers, etc."). See in the Sifri, Pinchas 28:8, the reading in the Baraisa of Rabbi Shimon ben Azzai: "so as not to give an opening to heretics, etc." (whereas here the reading is "to an adversary"). See also Sanhedrin 38a.
27) From what is explained in Zohar III there, the precise wording "litigant" (baal din) is understood. Also according to what is explained here, it may be said that the concept of division comes from severity and judgment, as explained in Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah (end of ch. 4), and in several places.
28) Sotah 38a; Rambam, Laws of Yesodei HaTorah 6:2.
29) Pardes, Shaar 19; Moreh Nevuchim I, ch. 61 ff.; Ikarim, Maamar 2, ch. 28.
29*) Sotah there; Sanhedrin 60a: "And it is the Unique Name, etc." All the Names are included in it (at length in the above sources — Pardes there; Shaarei Orah (by Rabbi Yosef Gikatilla), Shaar 5; Torah Or, end of Parshas Noach; and elsewhere).
30) Shemos Rabbah 3:6. See also Sefer HaMitzvos of the Tzemach Tzedek, the root of the mitzvah of prayer, ch. 5; and in several places.
31) See the Siddur of the Alter Rebbe, p. 66; Torah Or, Vayishlach 25d; Or HaTorah, Pinchas, p. 1179, at the end.
32) Vayikra 1:4.
33) Noach 8:20–21.
34) Bereishis 6:5. Toras Chaim, Bereishis 13d; Vayeira 101c.
35) The Rambam's introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah.
36) As the section continues: "And the remainder of the meal offering shall be for Aharon…"
37) This is unlike the statements of Rabbi Zeira and Rav Adda bar Ahavah, which come only to add a detail to what is explained in the Mishnah, since their words come only as an answer to the question "What is the verse for this?" — whose intent, as in the text, is: from where do we know this additional detail, that this is so also from the side of the person.
38) See the variant readings in the Sifri there. What is explained in the text follows the reading in the Talmud here.
38*) Vayikra 21:6.
39) Pinchas 28:1.
40) There, 27:17.
41) Avodah Zarah 54b. See also Rambam, Laws of Taaniyos 1:3.
42) Bereishis Rabbah, beginning of ch. 39.
43) See Kuzari, Maamar 2, ch. 26; Likkutei Torah, Pinchas 77a; Siddur of the Alter Rebbe 36a; Or HaTorah, Pinchas, p. 1172 ff., and the sources cited there; and in several places.
44) See Toras Kohanim on the verse (Emor 21:21) "the bread of his G‑d," that all the offerings are called by the name "bread" (and not only the Tamid offerings).
45) Pinchas 28:2.
46) Vayikra Rabbah, end of ch. 4. See also Berachos 10a, in reverse order.
47) See Sanhedrin 33a.
48) Tanchuma, Naso 16.
49) See Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar (18d), that "tevel" ("world") is numerically equal to twice "aryeh" ("lion") — referring to the lion of the Ofanim and the lion of the Chayos. And in the sayings of our Sages (s.v. "Chayos"), "the beasts of the forest" refers to the angels of Asiyah, and "bird" also refers to angels (Bereishis Rabbah 1:3, and the sources cited there; see also Zohar I, 46b). See also Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim (66a), that "the cattle upon a thousand hills" refers to Malchus [OCR unclear] that descends and is concealed in Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah. It may be said that the intent is that the drawing down of G‑dliness into the world could have come about through the service of the angels, etc.
50) Iyov 14:15 — that the service is a "need on high," to the extent of "longing": the Holy One, blessed be He, desired to have a dwelling place in the lower realms. See at length the Shelah, Shaar HaGadol (29b ff.). See also Shemos Rabbah (36:4): "'For the work…' — He longed for four things, etc." And perhaps this is why this verse is not cited in several places as a proof that (all) service is a "need on high."
51) See the Siddur of the Alter Rebbe 33a.
Key Lesson
Whether a person gives much or little, what matters Above is that his heart is directed to Heaven; G‑d does not need our offerings, and their entire benefit is for us. Yet once He commanded us, He longs for our service, so every Jew can make all the matters of his world into an "offering," turning this world into a dwelling place for G‑d.