Parshas Vayikra
1. On the verse "אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לה' גו'" ("When a man from among you brings an offering to G‑d…")1, Rashi, after quoting the words "When a man from among you brings," explains: "כשיקריב, בקרבנות נדבה דבר הענין" ("When he brings — the passage speaks of voluntary offerings")2. Seemingly, he means that from the wording of the verse "כי יקריב" — which means "if he brings"3, i.e., that bringing the offering depends on the person's wish — it is evident that what is being discussed here (in this passage) is voluntary offerings, whose bringing depends on the person's will4, and not offerings that he is obligated to bring.
However, according to this, it needs clarification: since the proof is from the words "ki yakriv" ("when he brings")5, why does Rashi also quote the words "Adam . . mikem" ("a man . . from among you")6?
Afterwards Rashi quotes the word "Adam" from the verse on its own, and explains: "למה נאמר, מה אדם הראשון לא הקריב מן הגזל שהכל הי' שלו, אף אתם לא תקריבו מן הגזל" ("Why is it said? Just as Adam, the first man, did not offer from stolen property, since everything was his, so too you shall not offer from stolen property").
Now, one cannot say that by the question "why is it said" Rashi means that the word "Adam" is superfluous — for we find in many places7 that the verse begins with "Adam" or "Ish" ("a man"), and one must say that this is the way of Scripture8. And although one could distinguish and say that our case is different, since the verse also says (afterwards) "mikem" ("from among you"), so that one of them is superfluous — according to this the question should have been (not "Why is 'Adam' said?", since that is the usual style of Scripture, but rather) "Why is 'from among you' said?"9. For only when we reach the word "from among you" does the wonder arise, "Why is 'from among you' said?", after "Adam" has already been said; and from Rashi's wording, "Why is 'Adam' said?", it is evident that the question is on the word "Adam"10.
Therefore, seemingly, one must explain as the commentators do11, that Rashi's intent is to ask why "Adam" is said and not "Ish", and to this he answers that the term "Adam" was used to teach us that "just as Adam, the first man, etc."12.
But it needs clarification: what was the initial supposition that it should specifically say "Ish" and not "Adam" — both are common in Scripture13?
It also needs clarification why Rashi first explains the words "When a man brings" and only afterwards the word "Adam"14 — the order in the verse is "Adam" (and only afterwards, joined to it in continuation) "when he brings from among you"15?
Now, some commentators16 say that one question is answered by the other: before we establish that the verse speaks of voluntary offerings, one could say that it speaks here of obligatory offerings, and that is why "Adam" is said and not "Ish" — to exclude idolaters, as our Sages say17: "אדם אתם — אתם קרויים אדם ולא אומות העולם קרויין אדם" ("'You are Adam' — you are called Adam, but the nations of the world are not called Adam"). But after we infer from "when he brings" that the subject is voluntary offerings, which idolaters too are permitted to bring, as stated in Chullin18, the question arises: why is "Adam" said, which seemingly excludes idolaters? (The term "Ish", which does not exclude idolaters, would have been more fitting.)
But according to Rashi's approach in his commentary on the Torah, this cannot be said, because19: (a) From where do we know, in the plain meaning of Scripture, that only the Jewish people are called "Adam"? On the contrary: we find several times in Scripture20 (even before Parshas Vayikra) "Adam" in a sense that includes idolaters as well. And especially on the verse21 "אדם כי ימות באהל וגו'" ("When a man dies in a tent…"), on which our Sages expounded "You are called Adam, etc.", Rashi does not cite this exposition — which proves that in Rashi's view, in studying the plain meaning of Scripture, the meaning of "Adam" does not exclude idolaters.
(b) From where do we know — in the plain meaning of the verses of our parsha [and especially if we say that "Adam" comes to exclude idolaters] — that an idolater brings voluntary offerings? On the contrary — this law is learned from a special inclusion that comes in a later parsha, as Rashi explains further on in Parshas Emor22, on "ומיד בן נכר לא תקריבו וגו'" ("And from the hand of a foreigner you shall not offer…"): "אבל תמימה תקבלו מהם, לכך נאמר למעלה איש איש לרבות את הנכרים שנודרים נדרים ונדבות כישראל" ("But an unblemished one you may accept from them; that is why it says above, 'any man,' to include the gentiles, who make vows and freewill offerings like Jews") (since a verse was needed to include them, it follows that without this inclusion they would not be permitted). Since this is so, even after we infer that "the passage speaks of voluntary offerings," one cannot ask on our verse, "Why is 'Adam' (which excludes idolaters) said?", for we do not yet23 know that they bring a voluntary offering24.
(c) According to the above, the question is not "Why is 'Adam' said?" but rather "How can 'Adam' be said?" (since it excludes idolaters — contrary to the law).
It also needs clarification: a) Since the word "from among you" is superfluous according to all opinions, as mentioned, Rashi should have resolved this in his commentary?
b) The source of Rashi's answer is in the Midrash Rabbah25 and in the Tanchuma26, but there are differences between them, among them: in the Tanchuma the wording is "שלא הי' גוזל מאחרים שהוא הי' יחידי בעולם" ("that he did not steal from others, since he was alone in the world"), while in the Midrash Rabbah it is "שהי' הכל ברשותו ולא הקריב מן הגזילות ומן החמסים" ("that everything was in his possession, and he did not offer from robbery and plunder"). From Rashi's wording, "since everything was his," it is implied that he intends the words of the Midrash Rabbah, "that everything was in his possession"27. It needs clarification what the practical difference between the wordings is, and Rashi's reason for choosing the Midrash Rabbah.
2. The explanation of all this:
In the plain sense of the matter, since our parsha is the beginning of the laws of the offerings, it is reasonable to say that it is speaking of obligatory offerings — which are the primary (and necessary) category of offerings — and not of voluntary offerings28. Therefore, as far as possible, one should read into the verse, even with some strain, that it speaks of obligatory offerings — unless there is proof and absolutely compelling evidence that the passage speaks of voluntary offerings. This compelling evidence is alluded to in Rashi's commentary by his quoting also the words "Adam (ki yakriv) mikem" — meaning that from "ki yakriv" alone there is not yet sufficient proof that the verse speaks of voluntary offerings:
It was explained above that in the plain meaning of Scripture the term "Adam" does not exclude the gentiles; on the contrary, it includes them too. Since this is so, according to the above reasoning one must explain that the passage speaks of obligatory offerings, and the reason it says "ki [Adam] yakriv" is that the gentiles too are included in the passage of the "Adam" who brings offerings29 — and for them this is not an obligation and a command, but a permission and an allowance. Therefore it says "ki yakriv", an expression of permission, which suits the offerings of gentiles as well.
That is why Rashi also quotes the word "mikem", to emphasize that the verse cannot be explained as (also) referring to the offerings of gentiles — for the precise wording "from among you" means from the Jewish people and not from the gentiles30. Consequently, the wording "ki yakriv" compels us to say that "the passage speaks of voluntary offerings."
However, there is still room to say that this is not entirely compelling: even when the subject is offerings brought "from among you," one could strain (for the reason above) to say that the verse speaks of obligatory offerings, and it says "ki yakriv" because the verse is also speaking of "obligatory" offerings of a kind that, although they are of the "obligatory" type, one is nevertheless not obligated to bring them, but it depends on his will. That is, the act of transgression requires an offering, but the sinner cannot be obligated to bring it, since we are speaking of one who sinned as a minor, and a minor, even if he killed a person, is not punished or held liable31. And we would explain (at least in a strained way, as mentioned) that the verse teaches us that when he grows up and becomes obligated in mitzvos (including the bringing of offerings), if he wishes32, "he shall bring… and it will be accepted for him, to atone for him."
But according to this, the precise wording of the verse "ki yakriv" — an expression of permission — is because of the difference in the age (and in the obligations) of the one bringing it between the time he committed the transgression and the time he brings the offering. If so, the verse should have emphasized the matter of age (and obligation), that is, it should have written: "Ish" (since he is already an adult and relevant to offerings) "ki (im) yakriv… v'nirtzah lo" ("if he brings… it will be accepted for him") (for a positive commandment etc. that he transgressed before this).
But since it says "Adam ki yakriv," in which the matter of age is not emphasized at all — for "Adam" in many places includes both minor and adult32* (except that in general it is understood that the commands of the Torah were said to adults) —
we must say that (the verse is not emphasizing a change in age, i.e., that) the subject is not a minor who grew up, and consequently this compels us to say that the passage speaks of voluntary offerings —
and that is why Rashi also quotes the word "Adam."
However, according to this it is understood that in order to know that the passage speaks of voluntary offerings33, the verse must write "from among you", which excludes the gentiles, as mentioned. But there is a difficulty: why is "Adam" said?
a) The above inference is compelled by the fact that "Ish" was not said — not by the saying of "Adam". b) One cannot explain that it is the way of Scripture to begin with "Adam" or "Ish" etc., for in our case, where it says "Adam — mikem," and "mikem" must be explained as above, "Adam" is superfluous.
3. Rashi answers that it comes to teach us: "Just as Adam, the first man, did not offer from stolen property, since everything was his, so too you shall not offer from stolen property." Rashi is precise and does not quote "since he was alone in the world" — and the reason for this is:
The difference between the wording (of the Tanchuma), "that he did not steal from others, since he was alone in the world," and the wording (that Rashi uses), "did not offer from stolen property, since everything was his," is this: according to the first wording, the reason "that he did not steal from others" is that he had no one from whom to steal, since "he was alone in the world"; whereas according to the second wording, the reason is that he had nothing to steal, since "everything was his."
Now, we do not find in the Torah, according to the plain meaning34, that Adam brought an offering. Therefore we must say that Rashi's intent is (not that Adam actually brought an offering which was not from stolen property, but rather) that he had no possibility of offering from stolen property, since "everything was his" [and according to this, Rashi's wording "did not offer from stolen property," rather than "offered not from stolen property," is all the more understood].
If we say that the reason Adam did not offer from stolen property is that "he was alone in the world," and therefore had no one to steal from, one can ask: he was "alone in the world" only for a very short time, for (on the same day35 that Adam was created) Chavah was created, and (on that very day36) Cain and Abel were born, along with daughters, etc. Thus it is obvious that throughout the vast majority of his years there were many people from whom he could have stolen. (And it is very strained to say, according to the plain meaning, that the allusion in "Adam" is to that brief moment of Adam's life when he was the only person in the world!)
Therefore, according to Rashi, for whom the intent is that it was impossible to offer from stolen property, one cannot bring proof from the fact that he was "alone in the world" [whereas the Tanchuma can be explained as holding that Adam actually brought an offering — at the time when he was still "alone in the world"37 — and to this the verse alludes].
And even if we say that according to the plain meaning too it is understood that Adam actually brought an offering38 — as is somewhat implied by the fact that Cain and Abel brought offerings39, which presumably they knew of from their father's practice — it is nevertheless reasonable that the offering was as atonement for the sin of the Tree of Knowledge (like Noach, who brought an offering after the Flood40), when he was already no longer "alone in the world."
[Especially since before Chavah was created, in that short time, many things took place: the naming "לכל הבהמה ולעוף השמים ולכל חית השדה" ("of all the cattle, the birds of the heavens, and all the beasts of the field")41; "בא אדם על כל בהמה וחי' וכו'" ("Adam came upon every animal and beast, etc.")42; "ויפל ה"א תרדמה על האדם וגו'" ("And the L‑rd G‑d cast a deep sleep upon the man…")43.]
Therefore Rashi explains that it was impossible to offer from stolen property because "everything was his"44 — that is, immediately when he was created everything became his, and consequently later as well, when Chavah was created and sons and daughters were born, his ownership did not lapse and "everything was his." Thus it is well understood that it was impossible for him to offer from stolen property throughout all the days of his life.
And although one must say that other people as well had many things "of their own" (which were in their possession and under their ownership) during Adam's lifetime, and Scripture says that Cain and Abel had sheep, produce, etc. — this is like "sons who are supported at their father's table,"
[And perhaps this is Rashi's precision in saying "since everything was his," changing the wording from the source of his commentary — the wording of the Midrash Rabbah, "since everything was in his possession" — meaning that it was his, except that he gave it and it was placed in the possession of others,]
and even if we say that Adam gave them a share as an outright gift, since the giving was by his choice and out of his goodwill, and they were his children and grandchildren etc., he certainly would not steal from their share.
4. However, it needs clarification:
How did it come about in the first place that "everything was his" (Adam's)? It is obvious that to acquire something there must be an act of acquisition (kinyan). It is very strained — and we do not find it — that Adam performed an effective act of acquisition on every single thing in the world, and all of it within that brief time before Chavah was created, etc. And since Rashi writes simply, "since everything was his," without any further explanation, one must say that it is so obvious that Rashi need not explain it.
Now, there are those who bring proof from this (that "everything was his" (Adam's) even though he performed no act of acquisition)45 that when there is an ownerless object that only one person in the world can acquire (for whatever reason46), that person need not perform an act of acquisition; rather, it becomes his automatically.
[This would be understood if we say that the definition of hefker (ownerless property) is47 (not that it belongs to no one in the world, but rather) that it belongs to everyone in the world48. Accordingly, the act of acquisition required for ownerless property is only in order to cancel the rights of other people, and therefore, in a case where other people have no right in it at all, no act of acquisition is needed.]
But [besides the fact that also according to halachah this is very questionable and not at all simple49,] this is a great novelty, and Rashi would have had to explain it.
This will be understood by first introducing what the Alter Rebbe writes in his Shulchan Aruch50: "מלך אפי' נכרי שכבש איזו מדינה במלחמה קונה אותה עם כל הנהרות והערים שבה כו' שכל הארץ כולה, עם הנהרות והיערים, היא ברשות המלך בין מדינתו בין מדינה שכובש במלחמה וכו'" ("A king, even a gentile, who conquers a country in war acquires it with all its rivers and forests etc., for the entire land, with the rivers and forests, is in the king's domain, whether his own country or a country that he conquers in war, etc.").
From this it is understood regarding Adam that, being alone in the world and ruling over everything51, the whole world was conquered under him and became his. This is similar to a king52 who conquers a country, which enters under his rule and becomes his53. Especially since all the living creatures (which are the subject of the passage of the offerings) were conquered under his rule in actual practice, as Rashi explains54.
And acquisition by conquest exists also according to the plain meaning of Scripture55, as is evident also from Rashi's explanation56 that it says "אל תצר את מואב וכו'" ("Do not harass Moav…") because "שסיחון לקחה מהם ועל ידו טיהרה לישראל" ("Sichon took it from them, and through him it became permitted to Israel") — meaning that through Sichon's conquest of the land of Moav it became his, and it was permitted for the Jewish people to take it. (And since Rashi does not explain there the matter itself, that through conquest it became his etc., it is understood that this is not a novelty of the passage there, but is understood simply, and the novelty there is only that this was so with regard to Moav.)
Consequently, it is simply understood how "everything was his" without Rashi needing to explain it.
(From the sichah of Shabbos Parshas Vayikra, 5732)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 1:2.
2) He is precise in writing "the passage speaks" and not "the verse speaks," as is the usual expression, because it is not only this verse alone that deals with voluntary offerings, but the entire passage.
3) The Re'em asks: how do we know that "ki yakriv" means "if he brings"? Perhaps it means "when he brings," in which case it is not necessarily speaking of voluntary offerings. What the Re'em answered, and likewise what the Gur Aryeh answered, the Levush HaOrah has already challenged. And what the Levush answered — that the proof is from the word "mikem", which means "of your own will" [and according to this the question below also falls away, namely why Rashi quotes the word "mikem"] — is also strained to say in the plain meaning of Scripture. For the simple meaning of the verse is that "mikem" continues the word "Adam", as if it were written "a man from among you, when he brings," and not that "mikem" means "from you" (from within him — his will) of the person*. And why would Rashi take the verse out of its plain meaning? See below, note 12 (and see Tzeidah LaDerech, who also challenges the Levush — but according to the way of halachah).
One may explain according to what was explained (in Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 78), that from what Rashi writes (Vayeira 18:15), "כי משמש בד' לשונות אי דילמא אלא דהא" ("'Ki' serves in four meanings: 'if,' 'perhaps,' 'but,' 'because'"), it is implied from the order (although this is not compelling, since he first states that there are four meanings) that the plainest meaning of "ki" is "ee" ("if"), i.e., it is uncertain whether the thing will come about, for this is the plainest meaning of "if" (see there, notes 3 and 4). And in our case too the plain meaning is "if (it is uncertain whether) he brings" [and see Devek Tov: "ki" implies uncertainty, therefore he concludes "with voluntary offerings"].
*) And note the Ibn Ezra, who explains the word "mikem" in both ways. (And his first (and main) explanation is like the explanation in the text.)
4) See Rashi, Beitzah (20a): "The verse speaks of voluntary offerings, as it is written, 'Adam ki yakriv mikem,' implying: when he wishes, he shall bring." And see Toras Kohanim on the verse: "'Adam ki yakriv' — could it be an obligation? Therefore it says 'ki yakriv' — it is only optional."
5) Which is not so according to the explanation of the Levush, above, note 3.
6) So it is in most printings, and so it is cited by the commentators. But in the second printing and in Rashi manuscripts the text reads: "'Adam ki yakriv' — when he brings, etc." (without the word "mikem").
7) Tisa 30:33, 38. Tazria 13:2. Chukas 19:14. And elsewhere.
8) This requires further study in Devek Tov (in the second explanation) and in Be'er Mayim Chaim (on Rashi), who wrote that the meaning in Rashi is that "Adam" need not have been written at all, because it is obvious that the commandments were said to man and not to animals. (And it is very strained to say that this question arises only because "mikem" is written afterwards, as below.)
9) See Ohr HaChaim on the verse: "Why did it need to say 'mikem'?" And see also Sforno. And elsewhere.
10) According to this it is understood that one cannot say, as written in Divrei David by the Taz (cited also in Sifsei Chachamim), that Rashi's question "Why is 'Adam' said?" is because of the doubling of "Adam" and "mikem", since it would have sufficed to say "Adam ki yakriv" alone, or "ki yakriv mikem" alone [and on this basis he answers the question below — why Rashi gives this explanation after the explanation of the words "ki yakriv" — because this question arises from the doubling of "mikem", which is written after "ki yakriv"]. For Rashi's wording, "Why is 'Adam' said?", does not imply this, as in the text.
11) Re'em, Gur Aryeh, and Devek Tov (in the first explanation).
12) Maskil LeDavid writes that it should have said "Adam mikem ki yakriv"; therefore he answers that "Adam" does not refer to "mikem". But this is not understood: a) Rashi's question is "Why is 'Adam' said?", whereas according to his explanation Rashi should have said (at least) "Why is 'Adam ki yakriv mikem' said?" b) Also according to the answer, in Rashi's "just as Adam etc.", "Adam" does refer to "mikem", except that the verse alludes thereby to Adam, the first man; but Rashi does not take the verse out of its simple plain meaning.
13) As indicated in the Concordance under "Adam" and under "Ish". And see Gur Aryeh (Shemos 21:16): what is the difference between "Ish" and "Adam"?
14) And although in the previous comment, too, Rashi quotes the word "Adam" — he does not explain it there (and although one must say that it is relevant to his explanation there, it is nevertheless understood that this only adds understanding to the explanation of "ki yakriv", but not that he is explaining this word).
15) As the commentators asked (and see above, note 10).
The Gur Aryeh answers (and so too in Devek Tov) that Rashi brings proof for his first words, that the passage speaks of a voluntary offering: for seemingly, why is "Adam" said (and not "Ish")? One must say that the verse intends to say that you shall not offer from stolen property, and if so it is understood that it speaks of a voluntary offering — for if it were an obligation, it is obvious that one may not offer (i.e., pay one's debt) from stolen property that is not his. Also: since it compares it to Adam, the first man, it is evident that it speaks of a voluntary offering, for Adam was not commanded to bring an offering.
But [in addition to the fact that according to his explanation this is not sufficient proof that it speaks of a voluntary offering, for in the plain meaning of Scripture it is obvious that even with a voluntary offering one may not donate something that is not his, and this is not the place to elaborate; for this too the word "Adam" is not needed —] according to his explanation it is even more difficult: Rashi should have begun his explanation by explaining the word "Adam", and afterwards explained that the passage speaks of voluntary offerings, for it is the explanation "just as Adam etc." that compels that it speaks of voluntary offerings.
Maskil LeDavid (and see also Re'em and Chizkuni here, and elsewhere) writes that Rashi is answering a possible difficulty: why did he not explain according to the exposition of Toras Kohanim (on the verse; Yerushalmi Shekalim 1:4), "'Adam' — to include converts"? Therefore he first states that "the passage speaks of voluntary offerings," which idolaters too make as vows and freewill offerings (but see below, note 23; and see below, end of section 2), and if so it is obvious that there is no need to include converts. Therefore one must say that "Adam" comes to exclude stolen property (and see Torah Temimah on the verse).
But one cannot say this, for according to Rashi it is obvious in any case that converts bring offerings — from what is said (Bo 12:49), "תורה אחת יהי' לאזרח ולגר" ("There shall be one law for the native and for the convert"), and Rashi explains: "to equate the convert with the native even regarding the other mitzvos of the Torah."
In the commentary of the Maharshak on the Torah and in the Ra'av it is written that Rashi therefore first explained "ki yakriv", because if it were speaking of an obligatory offering brought for a sin, one could say that this is why the term "Adam", which indicates lowliness, was used (see Malbim on the verse, and elsewhere)*; but after "the passage speaks of voluntary offerings," one must explain "Adam" in another way. But it is obvious that this is not according to the plain meaning.
*) But see Zohar III, 48a, and Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 25a, that "Adam" is a term of distinction. And see below, note 17. And see Torah Temimah here.
16) Divrei David, in the name of the Maharan (cited also in Sifsei Chachamim).
17) Yevamos 61a, beginning. And see Zohar II, 26a.
18) 13b.
19) But the difficulty that the Divrei David himself raised ["If so, in Parshas Tazria (13:2), where it is written 'אדם כי יהי' בעור בשרו' ('When a man has on the skin of his flesh'), what will you say there — why was 'Ish' not said?"] is no difficulty at all — for the laws of leprous afflictions apply only to Jews and not to idolaters, and therefore "Adam" is written; whereas voluntary offerings apply to idolaters as well.
20) See the Concordance. And we find this even where "Adam" (without qualification) is written, and not only where "ha'adam" is written with the definite article "hei" (see Tosafos, Yevamos there, s.v. "Ve'ein", that it refers to the human species as a whole; and see Encyclopedia Talmudis under that entry), or where the prefix letter serves in place of the definite "hei" (when it is vowelled with a kamatz and the like*); and also not only where it is written in contrast to animals (where there are those who hold (see Yevamos there and Rashi; Kerisus 6b and Rashi) that it refers to the human species as a whole — as it says (Bereishis 2:5), "ואדם אין לעבוד את האדמה" ("and there was no man to work the ground")).
*) According to this, the difficulty raised by the Gilyon HaShas there on Yevamos (from 32:20, "ובישראל ובאדם" — "and in Israel and among mankind") is resolved — for there a kamatz is written under the "beis", so that the meaning is like "ba-ha'adam" — the human species.
21) Chukas 19:14. And especially since there, just before it, on the verse (13) "כל הנוגע במת בנפש האדם וגו'" ("Whoever touches a corpse, the body of a person…"), Rashi expounds "to exclude the body of an animal," and here he does not write "to exclude idolaters."
22) 22:25.
23) One cannot say that his question is this itself: since ultimately it is written further on (22:18), "איש איש גו'" ("any man…"), which includes idolaters, why then does it not write here too "Ish" instead of "Adam", to include idolaters [and we would know from here that idolaters make vows and freewill offerings]? For even if "Ish" were written, we would not include idolaters, since plainly the proof there is from the words "Ish Ish" (twice)*. Moreover: Rashi did not write this even in its own place, on the verse "איש איש מבית ישראל וגו' אשר יקריב קרבנו" ("Any man of the house of Israel… who brings his offering"), and it is evident from this that even "Ish Ish" does not yet necessarily come to include (idolaters**) — and in many places "Ish Ish" is said and Rashi does not explain the doubling. Rather, from the fact that the verse afterwards informs us that a foreigner may not offer a blemished animal, it is understood (retroactively) that what was said before it, "Ish Ish," included idolaters. Consequently, in our case, even if "Ish" (and even "Ish Ish") were written, it would not include idolaters (although in a strained way one could say that "Ish" includes the meaning of "great one" (— mighty; Rashi, Beshalach 15:3), and there is no difference between Jews and idolaters; but there one cannot explain so, since the verse adds "of the house of Israel"). And note the Ohr HaChaim cited in note 29 regarding our verse.
*) One cannot ask that it should then have added here and doubled "Ish Ish" — for according to the plain meaning (and also according to the Talmud) we find in many places that a passage is repeated because of one detail added in it (see Mishpatim 23:19 and Tisa 34:26, and elsewhere; and even more — in Rashi, Re'eh 14:7: "Why were they repeated, etc.").
**) But see Targum Yonasan ben Uziel there, and elsewhere.
24) See below, note 30.
25) Vayikra Rabbah 2:7.
26) Parshas Tzav, section 1.
27) Note Rashi, Pesachim 6b: "'It is not in his possession' — it is not his." One may explain the difference between the two expressions (and therefore Rashi explains that our case is different [OCR unclear]): "in his possession" can be said even of ownerless property, according to what is explained in the text, section 4.
28) Especially since it says afterwards that through the offering "ונרצה לו" ("it will be accepted for him") in place of punishment for his sin, as Rashi explains — so he must be obligated in this.
29) The Ohr HaChaim here: "for its saying 'Speak to the children of Israel' — the verse speaks only of Israel." But in the plain meaning of Scripture this is no proof, for it is understood simply that the Torah was said to the Jewish people specifically (even the laws that apply to idolaters as well).
30) One cannot ask: why does the Torah first exclude idolaters from voluntary offerings, and afterwards introduce the novelty that idolaters too bring vows and freewill offerings (seemingly it should have included idolaters from the outset)? For one may say simply: in our parsha it concludes (several times) "אשה ריח ניחוח לה'" ("a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance to G‑d"), and Rashi explains (1:9): "נחת רוח לפני שאמרתי ונעשה רצוני" ("it is pleasing to Me that I spoke and My will was done"), and this does not apply to idolaters. Therefore in our parsha only Jews are spoken of, and not idolaters; whereas in Parshas Emor, which deals with the bringing of the offering alone, it says that an idolater too can (only) bring an offering (but he does not bring about the "pleasure" etc.).
31) Rashi, Mishpatim 21:12, 17.
32) Note Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, end of siman 343: "for repentance and atonement." And in the Responsa of the Radbaz, vol. 1, 94: "A minor also requires atonement." And see Rambam, Laws of Shegagos 9:3: "[A minor] who had relations with a betrothed maidservant . . brings an offering, and it seems to me* that he does not bring it until he grows up and has understanding."
*) And here note: from what the Rambam writes in many places "it seems to me" (see the Introduction to the Rambam, photo-offset of the Rome printing [5]240 — Jerusalem 5715, p. 76) there is support for the rule that the Rambam's way is not to introduce new laws (Yad Malachi, Rules of the Rambam, 5, and sources cited there) — since when he does introduce something new, he states on the spot, "it seems to me."
32*) See Rashi there. Beis HaOtzar, Maareches Alef–Dalet, rule 11. Encyclopedia Talmudis under that entry.
33) The reason that the Torah began the passage of the offerings with voluntary offerings is explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 9 ff.
34) Unlike according to Midrash and allusion — see Shabbos (28b); Avodah Zarah (8a); Chullin (60a); Bereishis Rabbah 34:9; and elsewhere.
35) Rashi, Bereishis 1:27.
36) Rashi there, 4:1. And see Sanhedrin 38b.
37) And it disagrees with the discussion in Avodah Zarah (there) that he brought his offering after the sun had already set and risen again. One may say that according to the Tanchuma the bringing of the offering was a sort of thanksgiving for having been created, and the like.
38) And the reason the Written Torah did not tell of this offering is that it makes no practical difference; whereas the offering of Cain and Abel led to Cain's killing of Abel, to the birth and naming of "Shes" (Bereishis 4:25), etc.
39) Bereishis 4:3–4.
40) Noach 8:20. And although one may say that Noach's offering was as thanksgiving for being saved from the Flood, in our case too one may say (even in the plain meaning of Scripture) that it was as thanksgiving that he was only banished from Gan Eden and nothing more, as stated explicitly in Avodah Zarah there.
41) Bereishis 2:20.
42) Rashi there, 22.
43) There, 21.
44) One may say that this is why Rashi changed from the wording of Vayikra Rabbah, "since everything was in his possession": for then one might mistakenly think that the intent is as in the Tanchuma, that he had no one from whom to steal, since everything was in his possession (within his ability) to take, because there were not yet other people (and as explained in the Responsa Machaneh Chaim (by Rabbi Chaim Sofer), vol. 2, Choshen Mishpat, end of siman 41); whereas "since everything was his" emphasizes that he had nothing to steal. And see below in the text.
45) Rabbi Sofer (Machaneh Chaim, there, at the beginning of the siman); Sefer HaMakneh, vol. 1, rule 2, detail 10.
46) See several examples in the places cited in the previous note.
47) This is discussed at length in the Tzafnas Pa'neach, Laws of Vows 2:14 (10c); Laws of Gifts to the Poor, ch. 2 (31c); and Mahadura Tinyana (59c). And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 136 ff.
48) And note what the Alter Rebbe writes in his Shulchan Aruch (Laws of Hefker, section 2): "המדברות הימים והנהרות והיערים וכל מה שבהם הם מופקרים ועומדים מאליהם כו'" ("The deserts, seas, rivers and forests and all that is in them are ownerless of themselves etc., because no person has yet taken possession of them with a possession that is effective according to the Torah to acquire from ownerless property, for they have been ownerless since the six days of Creation, etc."). Seemingly, Rashi writes that everything belonged to Adam — so he took effective possession of it (in whatever way we explain it; and especially according to what is explained below, certainly according to halachah too it became his). Perhaps one may say that the Alter Rebbe's intent is [according to the rule noted in Likkutei Sichos vol. 11, p. 56, gloss to note 13, not to multiply disputes] that although Adam acquired everything, nevertheless, since afterwards "החל האדם לרוב על פני האדמה גו'" ("man began to multiply on the face of the earth…"), there is no greater relinquishment (ye'ush) than this, and after this "no person has yet taken possession of them with a possession effective according to the Torah."
But his saying "for they have been ownerless since the six days of Creation" does not imply this. And one cannot say that his intent is that since everything was ownerless from the six days of Creation, Adam therefore acquired everything immediately when he was created etc., as above — for he states explicitly "to acquire from ownerless property, for they have been ownerless since the six days of Creation."
Therefore one may say that the Alter Rebbe holds like the Tanchuma, that it was impossible for Adam to steal because he was alone in the world, but not everything was his — only what he took possession of; whereas what was in the forests etc. was ownerless.
49) And see also Machaneh Chaim there.
50) Laws of Hefker, section 3. And see there, siman 649, section 10.
51) Note Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 139, section 6.
52) This requires further study, since (in Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, ch. 11) he is not counted among the kings who reigned from one end of the world to the other. One may say this is because there is no king without a people, which does not apply with regard to his children and household alone.
53) And although in practice there was no one who crowned him, and there was no conquest by war here — the reason a king needs conquest by war to acquire a country is that the country belongs to another (king) and they fight against him; therefore conquest is needed to remove it from its previous ownership so that it may enter his ownership and rule. Adam, however, since there was no one to fight against him and it was not owned by any person, did not need conquest by war, but [acquired it] through some act of acquisition (like "locking, fencing, etc.," which acquires all of it — Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 192). One may say that through "ויניחהו בגן עדן לעבדה ולשמרה" ("He placed him in the Garden of Eden, to work it and to guard it") (and all the more so through the working and guarding itself) he acquired Gan Eden, and thereby the whole world (and note the conquest of Jericho — as the "lock" of the Land of Israel, situated on its border) — whatever he wished to acquire (unlike "the deserts, seas, etc." in the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe (cited above, note 48), which were ownerless, etc.).
According to this, the precise wording of our Sages (Berachos 31a) is better understood: "A land that Adam decreed should be settled was settled, and any land that Adam did not decree should be settled was not settled" — and not "that he decreed that it should not be settled." This is not the place to elaborate.
54) Bereishis 2:19.
55) Note Rashi, Bereishis 12:6; 23:17; Va'era 6:9.
56) Chukas 21:26. And see Rashi, Lech Lecha 14:21. And see also Rashi, Devarim (2:23): "The Avim are of the Philistines etc.; Israel could not take their land from them etc., and they destroyed them and dwelled in their place, and now you are permitted to take it from them" (and there too Rashi writes this simply, without first explaining that through conquest one acquires etc.). And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 8 ff.; Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 62, section 6, and note 24.
Key Lesson
Rashi learns from Adam, the first man, that one may not bring an offering to G‑d from stolen property: what is offered must be truly one's own. This Sicha shows that Adam owned everything not through a technical act of acquisition, but because he ruled over the entire world like a king over the land he has conquered. So too, a person's service of G‑d must come only from what is rightfully and fully his own.