Parshas Vayikra
1. In many years, Parshas Vayikra is read on the Shabbos that is close to Purim. From this it is understood1 that Parshas Vayikra alludes to the essential theme and distinction of Purim.
What does the essential theme and distinction of Purim consist of?
One of the obligations of Purim (and it is understood that the obligations of a day point to its content) is — "חייב2 אינש לבסומי בפוריא עד דלא ידע בין ארור המן לברוך מרדכי" ("A person is obligated to become intoxicated on Purim until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'").3
Now the obligation of livsumei etc. is set apart from the other obligations of Purim in that (a) it is the only obligation that is above measure — "until he does not know." (b) The test of livsumei in a manner above measure is "(until he does not know) the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'" (for when he "does not know" about other matters, that is no test at all, and he has not thereby fulfilled the obligation of livsumei). It is therefore understood that the obligation of livsumei points to the inner content of Purim, and to the unique content of Purim (by which it is set apart entirely4 from other festivals, Yamim Tovim and the like).
2. It can further be said on this:
The obligation of livsumei etc. is the "ימי משתה ושמחה" ("days of feasting and joy") stated in Megillas Esther.5 That is to say, livsumei etc. is a law concerning the manner of the feast.6
And it can be said that the mitzvah of feasting and joy is distinguished from all the other mitzvos that the Sages instituted for the days of Purim, in that the obligation to fulfill this mitzvah is present throughout the entire day of Purim — in each and every moment of it,*6 unlike the other mitzvos of the day of Purim. For example, with the mitzvah of reading the Megillah: when a person reads the Megillah on Purim once at night and once by day, he has thereby discharged the mitzvah in full.7 Even the mitzvah of gifts to the poor, with which it is a mitzvah to do more and more,8 is nevertheless not an obligation upon the whole day. With "feasting and joy," however, since it is written "days of feasting and joy" — "feasting and joy" joined directly to the word "days" (unlike "ומשלוח מנות איש לרעהו ומתנות לאביונים" ["and sending portions to one another and gifts to the poor"], which are stated afterwards) — it can be said that the obligation is upon every moment of the "days," only that by fulfilling the mitzvah once during the day, it extends9 over each and every moment of the whole day.10
And since the obligation of the "feast" — livsumei — is that it be in the manner of "until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai,'" it follows that the obligation of "livsumei etc. until he does not know etc." applies to the entire day.
From this too it is understood (in addition to what was said above in section 1) that the content of Purim is expressed in the mitzvah of "livsumei etc. until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'" more than in the other mitzvos of the day.
3. How is it possible that the Torah should obligate a Jew to become so intoxicated that he does not know "the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'"? The commentators say11 that this means "שלא ידע לחשוב שארור המן בגימטריא ברוך מרדכי" ("that he is unable to calculate that 'Cursed is Haman' equals in numerical value 'Blessed is Mordechai'").
This, however, is not understood:
a) The measure of livsumei — "that he is unable to calculate" — has no particular connection to the numerical value of "Cursed is Haman" and "Blessed is Mordechai." When a person is intoxicated he is in no condition to work out any numerical value at all — even one far simpler than that of "Cursed is Haman" and "Blessed is Mordechai."12 Why, then, does the Gemara say: "until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'"?
b) The numerical equivalences cited in Torah are not, G‑d forbid, a matter of mere chance. Rather, a numerical equivalence indicates that the two things which come to the same sum share an inner connection (a likeness).13 This is understood from what is explained in Tanya,14 that creatures called by a name whose numerical value equals certain words of the Ten Utterances are so called because the G‑dly vitality of those creatures descends by stages from the corresponding words of the Ten Utterances. It follows, then, that there is also an inner likeness between different things whose names come to the same sum.
According to this it is not understood: What is the likeness between "Cursed is Haman" and "Blessed is Mordechai," which are two utterly opposite things?
The explanation is as follows: The vitality of every thing is the Supernal Intent for which that thing was created. And since the intent in the coming into being of "Cursed is Haman" is that there should come about "ונהפוך הוא" ("and it was turned about"), that through their service Jews should transform it into "Blessed is Mordechai" (just as this is the intent in the coming into being of all matters of evil — that one should make of them "יום ואור" ["day and light"]15), it emerges that the G‑dly vitality (the intent) of "Cursed is Haman" is — "Blessed is Mordechai."16
And this is the inner meaning of "until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'": to transform "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai," until he "does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'" — no difference between them can be seen,17 for even out of "Cursed is Haman" there has come to be "Blessed is Mordechai."
More deeply: when he sees "Cursed is Haman," he immediately perceives (and on the contrary — that is all he perceives*17) the intent within it — "Blessed is Mordechai."18
4. One must, however, understand:
When a person transforms "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai," there is then indeed no difference between them. Why, then, does it say "until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai,'" from which it is evident that there certainly is a distinction between them, only that because he is intoxicated he does not know the distinction?
This will be understood by first considering the statement of our Sages, of blessed memory,19 "גדולה תשובה שזדונות נעשו לו כזכיות" ("Great is teshuvah, for willful sins become for him like merits") — that through teshuvah (out of love), even the sparks of holiness found within the willful sins20 are transformed into merits.
In this consists the advantage of baalei teshuvah over tzaddikim — as in the ruling "במקום שבעלי תשובה עומדים צדיקים גמורים אין יכולים לעמוד שם" ("In the place where baalei teshuvah stand, complete tzaddikim are unable to stand")21 — that tzaddikim refine only the sparks found in permitted things, whose vitality derives from kelipas nogah. But the sparks that have fallen into forbidden things, which derive from the three impure kelipos, cannot be refined according to Torah (on the contrary, according to Torah they must be rejected22). Baalei teshuvah, by contrast, refine even the sparks that have fallen into the three impure kelipos (even the sparks that have fallen into "willful sins" — which are lower still than forbidden things, for willful sins are the opposite of His blessed will23), so that these too are transformed into merits.24
5. The reason teshuvah has the power to refine even the sparks of "willful sins" — although they are the opposite of His blessed will — is that teshuvah reaches into the very Essence of the "Master of the Will,"25 Who, G‑d forbid, is not compelled by the will and is not held within it:26
From the perspective of His blessed Essence, it is "איני יודע באיזה מהם חפץ כו'" ("I do not know in which of them He desires, etc."),27 only that He chose (by free choice) to "desire the deeds of the righteous" and "not desire the deeds of the wicked." It follows, then, that the "willful sins" can occupy no place before Him, and can have no power to conceal the sparks of holiness that are within them.28
And the level of the "Master of the Will," Who is not held within the will of Torah and mitzvos, is drawn down specifically through the service of teshuvah: Tzaddikim, even those who have attained the rank of serving G‑d with great love in delights, since they have delight in their service, they are still "a being who loves"29 — "a holy existence" — and therefore they draw down only the level of will. Baalei teshuvah, by contrast, since their service is in a movement of bittul, for they are dissatisfied with their state and tear themselves away from it — "אסורה מכאן" ("I will turn away from here")30 — they therefore draw down the Master of the Will.31
And this is the meaning of "until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'":32 this very power to transform "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai" comes only through the service of "not knowing," the level of bittul that is above reason and understanding, which alone reaches the level of "I do not know in which of them He desires, etc." And from there is drawn the power to turn "Cursed is Haman"33 into "Blessed is Mordechai."34
6. This matter of "until he does not know etc." is alluded to in the two extremes of the beginning and the end of Parshas Vayikra:
At the beginning of the Sidrah it speaks of a most exalted rank. As Rashi says on "ויקרא אל משה" ("And He called to Moshe"): "לכל דברות ולכל אמירות ולכל ציוויים קדמה קריאה לשון חיבה" ("Every speaking, every saying and every command was preceded by a calling, an expression of affection"). With such a calling35 it emerges that the meaning of "preceded" is not only precedence in time, but also precedence in rank. That is to say, the calling, "an expression of affection," is (also) a matter unto itself36 and is higher than the speakings, sayings and commands of Torah.36* This is also understood from the fact that it says "ויקרא" ("And He called") alone, and not "ויקרא הוי'" ("And the L‑rd called") — unlike speaking, saying and commanding, where it says "וידבר הוי'" ("And the L‑rd spoke"), "ויאמר הוי'" ("And the L‑rd said"), and the like — because the calling of affection came from the Almighty Himself, as He is higher even than the Name Havayah,37 "דלא אתרמיז בשום אות כו'" ("Who is not alluded to in any letter, etc.").37*
At the close of the Sidrah,38 however, it speaks actually of "נפש כי תחטא" ("a soul that sins"); and not of an unintentional sin (as in several of the earlier matters in the Parshah), but of a deliberate sin; and what kind of sin does it speak of here? — "ומעלה מעל בה'" ("and commits a trespass against the L‑rd"), a betrayal, G‑d forbid, may G‑d spare us, of the Almighty;39 and on top of that — "ונשבע על שקר" ("and swears falsely"). So much so, that even the very last words of the Sidrah are "לאשמה בה" ("to incur guilt thereby").
This is not understood: The name of a Sidrah is not only for its beginning,40 but it also indicates the content of the entire Sidrah — even of its last words.41 On the contrary: because "נעוץ תחלתן בסופן וסופן בתחלתן" ("their beginning is embedded in their end, and their end in their beginning"),42 the close of the Sidrah has a special connection to the beginning of the Sidrah — "Vayikra," an expression of affection. How is it, then, that the very last words of Parshas Vayikra (an expression of affection), with which the Sidrah concludes, are "to incur guilt thereby"?
7. This will be understood by first considering the continuation of that Rashi:
After Rashi explains that "Vayikra" is an expression of affection, and that the calling preceded every speaking, every saying and every command, he continues: "אבל לנביאי אומות העולם נגלה עליהן בלשון עראי וטומאה כו'" ("But to the prophets of the nations of the world He revealed Himself in an expression of casualness and impurity, etc."). This is not understood: How could one even entertain the thought that G‑d would show such great affection to the prophets of the nations of the world — an affection that is higher even than Torah — so that in order to rule out this thought Rashi must caution and state that the calling was not to them?
The explanation is that this itself is the reason: Had the calling been on the same level as Torah, it would be simply understood that it has no connection to the nations of the world, for it is written "ומשפטים בל ידעום" ("and ordinances they do not know"),43 to the point that a non-Jew who engages in Torah is liable to death.44
But since the calling preceded every speaking, etc. (and it comes from a place that is higher than the Name Havayah,45 as above in section 6), one could have said that since from the perspective of His blessed Essence it is "I do not know in which of them He desires, etc.," the calling is perhaps also to the prophets of the nations of the world. Therefore Rashi comes to caution that to the prophets of the nations of the world not only was there no calling, an expression of affection, but on the contrary: "He revealed Himself in an expression of casualness and impurity, etc." And the reason for this is that even on the level where "אח עשו ליעקב" ("Esav is Yaakov's brother") — seemingly both equal — it is "ואוהב את יעקב ואת עשו שנאתי" ("and I loved Yaakov, and Esav I hated").46
And this also explains the connection between the beginning of the Sidrah and its close, as "their beginning is embedded in their end, and their end in their beginning": specifically "to incur guilt thereby" — those very debts which are transformed into merits through "וכפר גו' ונסלח" ("and he shall atone etc. and he shall be forgiven"), for true atonement and forgiveness is when the debts are turned over into merits — this is the close and seal of "Vayikra, an expression of affection." Through this is expressed the true affection of the Almighty for Jews, which precedes Torah; for by virtue of this affection, even when a Jew transgresses the mitzvos of the Torah and performs the deeds of Esav, may G‑d spare us, even then it is "and I loved Yaakov," which is within this Jew, and the Almighty atones for and forgives his guilt, to the point that the willful sins are transformed into merits.
8. This common point — "אתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא" ("the transformation of darkness into light") — which is found in Parshas Vayikra and in Purim, is alluded to especially in the verse47 "ולא תשבית מלח ברית אלקיך וגו'" ("You shall not omit the salt of the covenant of your G‑d, etc.") in Parshas Vayikra:
It is explained in Likkutei Torah48 on this verse that salt is called "the covenant of your G‑d" because in the Name Elokim there are 120 permutations, from which the 120 permutations of nogah draw nourishment. From these two times 120 permutations (of the Name Elokim and of nogah) comes "מר" ("bitter"), which amounts to two times 120 — "וכחשבון עמלק" ("and like the numerical value of Amalek"). And therefore salt is called "the covenant of your G‑d," because salt sweetens the severities and the bitterness ("mar") that come from the Name Elokim.
9. In light of the above, one will also understand a wondrous matter found in the aforementioned maamar in Likkutei Torah, in an earlier section:49 The maamar states that Torah is "חכמתו ית' שבה מלובש אור א"ס ב"ה ממש" ("His blessed wisdom, in which the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, is actually enclothed"), and on this the Tzemach Tzedek adds in a gloss: "ולכן נקרא התורה משל הקדמוני שהיא בחי' ח"ע שהוא כלי לאוא"ס ב"ה קדמונו של עולם, כמ"ש מזה בדרוש פורים" ("Therefore the Torah is called 'the Ancient Parable,' for it is the level of Supernal Chochmah, which is a vessel for the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, the Ancient One of the world, as is written on this in the Derush on Purim").
In this it is not understood:
a) A "parable" comprises a thing and its opposite: on the one hand it is a vessel for the lesson, and the lesson is enclothed within it; and on the other hand it is not the lesson, and more than that: it actually conceals the lesson. In the language of Torah Ohr (in the "Derush on Purim" to which the Tzemach Tzedek refers, as above50): "שאינו ממהות הנמשל כלל" ("it is not at all of the nature of the lesson"),51 "שמעלים על הנמשל" ("it conceals the lesson").52 We must therefore understand: The maamar in Likkutei Torah is speaking of the distinction of Torah, in which "the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, is actually enclothed." What, then, is added here by citing that Torah is called "the Ancient Parable"? On the contrary — this actually indicates also that as a parable it conceals the lesson — "the Ancient One of the world"!
b) When one refers to a particular derush, the custom (also with the Tzemach Tzedek) is to call the maamar by its opening words. Here too, then, it should have said "as is written in the maamar beginning Chayav Inish Livsumei." Why does it say "in the Derush on Purim"?
The explanation is: The Tzemach Tzedek, by citing here that Torah is called "the Ancient Parable," and by referring to the "Derush on Purim," alludes to a matter that pertains to "the transformation of darkness into light" — which is the content of the maamar "You shall not omit the salt."
10. As stated above, a parable conceals the lesson. And in a certain particular its concealment is even greater than the concealment by a "riddle" of the thing that is understood through it. For since the riddle on its own — without the matter it signifies — has no intellectual content or idea, or even contradicts intellect, as with Shimshon's riddle "מעז יצא מתוק גו'" ("out of the strong came forth sweetness, etc.")53 — this itself makes one understand that the riddle points to a certain matter concealed within it. With a parable, however, even without the lesson there is a certain content in the parable itself, and therefore it can happen that on hearing the parable, one does not grasp at all that it carries a lesson within it.54
(It is indeed sometimes said that a parable covers the lesson less than a riddle covers the subject of the riddle. That, however, is said when one already knows that the parable has a lesson within it; then it is far easier to arrive at the lesson through the parable than through a riddle. But one may very well, at times, assume that the entire content of the matter consists of the parable itself, and not know at all that it holds a lesson — and in this respect the parable is a greater concealment than the riddle.)
And it can be said that this is what the Tzemach Tzedek means by writing here "ולכן נקרא התורה משל הקדמוני . . שהוא כלי לאוא"ס ב"ה כו'" ("Therefore the Torah is called the Ancient Parable . . which is a vessel for the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, etc."): that even the concealment of the parable must be transformed, so that it should become a vessel.
And it is for this reason that he also refers to the "Derush on Purim,"55 in order to allude to the matter of "Purim," whose chief theme (as above in sections 3 and 5) is to transform (from "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai").
11. As discussed earlier (section 3 and onward), in the obligation of "livsumei on Purim until he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'" (which, as above [section 2], applies in each moment of Purim, and in which the chief theme of Purim is expressed), there are two particulars: transforming "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai"; and the service of "not knowing" (bittul above intellect), which gives the power for the "transformation."
And since both matters express the chief theme of Purim, it is understood that in alluding to the matter of "Purim" (by referring to the "Derush on Purim"), the Tzemach Tzedek also means the matter of "not knowing."
At the very beginning of the section of the maamar in Likkutei Torah (where the Tzemach Tzedek inserts his gloss regarding "the Ancient Parable"), it speaks of the matter of mesirus nefesh, that this derives from "עצמיות הנפש שלמעלה מהשכל" ("the very essence of the soul, which is above intellect"). Therefore it can be said that the gloss relates (not only to the words preceding and adjoining it — that in Torah "the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, is actually enclothed," but) also to the beginning of the section, which speaks of the matter of mesirus nefesh.
For the two matters, mesirus nefesh and "the Ancient Parable," are connected to one another: The matter of mesirus nefesh, deriving from "the very essence of the soul, which is above intellect, which is nullified to the very Essence of the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, Who is exceedingly high above Chochmah as well" — the level of "not knowing" within man, which is bound up with the level where it is "I do not know in which of them He desires" — this gives the power for, and is expressed in, the service of "the Ancient Parable": making of the "parable" a "vessel" for the Ancient One.
And this too the Tzemach Tzedek alludes to with his reference to the "Derush on Purim," meaning by it both matters of Purim: the service of transforming "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai," and also that which gives the power for it — the service of "not knowing," which is explained at the beginning of the section.
12. Here too we see (as we see in many places) that all matters in Chassidus, even those that seemingly come only in passing, are utterly precise, and wondrous matters are alluded to in them.
Even the verses (or statements of our Sages) with which the maamarim open, and also the Sidros (when the maamarim were said, or where they were placed in the books of Chassidus), have an inner connection to the matters spoken of in the maamarim.56 This is seen in the matter of "the Ancient Parable" — that it is connected to the matter of "You shall not omit the salt" (with which the maamar opens) and to Parshas Vayikra (where the maamar is printed) in general. For (as stated above) "salt" and "Vayikra" point to the matter of "the transformation of darkness into light," which comes by virtue of the service that is above reason and understanding.
And this teaches us how far one must apply oneself, and how much one must contemplate when learning the Torah of our Rebbeim, the Nesi'im, and their words — even matters that appear to be brought seemingly only in passing,
and as our Sages say on the verse57 "כי לא דבר רק הוא מכם" ("For it is not an empty thing for you"): "it is not an empty thing, and if it is empty — it is from you. Why? Because you do not toil in Torah" —
even those matters are of great precision: they hold abundant content, and they allude to wondrous matters.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Vayikra, 5725)
Notes
1) See Shelah, section on the Written Torah, beginning of Parshas Vayeshev (cited in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 5, p. 129, note 1).
2) In our text of the Talmud the reading is michayev. But in HaMaor HaKatan on the Rif, Shaar HaKavanos at its end, Shelah on Parshas Tetzaveh, and all the discourses of Chassidus that I have seen, the wording is chayav inish. So too in Orchos Chaim (cited in Beis Yosef, sec. 695), Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, sec. 695, par. 2, Siddur Yaavetz, and elsewhere.
3) Megillah 7b.
4) By contrast, the other mitzvos of Purim — although they too pertain specifically to Purim and indicate its theme (as with the special mitzvos of every Yom Tov) — since they are within measure, have some equivalence and relation to other Yamim Tovim. But the obligation of livsumei until he does not know, since it is above measure, is more inward and essential, beyond comparison with anything within measure (even of Purim), and it differs entirely from other festivals and Yamim Tovim.
5) Esther 9:22.
6) See Rambam, Laws of Megillah 2:15: "What is the obligation of this meal? (referring to the 'feasting and joy' in the preceding halachah) . . And he drinks wine until he becomes drunk, etc."
*6) Although the time for the Purim meal is by day, in the afternoon (Rema in Orach Chaim, ibid.).
7) Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, beginning of sec. 689.
8) Rambam, ibid., 2:17.
9) This is similar to taking the Four Species: according to the view (Sukkah 46b) that "it is set apart for the entire day," his taking the Four Species for one moment of the day extends over the whole span of the day (see Tzafnas Paneach, Kuntres HaShlamah, p. 6).
10) From the prohibition of fasting — which is also derived from "days of feasting" — which is forbidden the entire day, there is no proof to our matter, since that is something that contradicts joy and is its opposite.
11) Agudah — cited in Darkei Moshe and Bach on Tur, Orach Chaim, beginning of sec. 695. So too in Magen Avraham, ibid., sub-par. 3.
12) As is evident from the fact that through livsumei Rabbah slaughtered R. Zeira (Megillah, ibid.).
13) See Shomer Emunim, First Debate, secs. 21–23.
14) Part II, ch. 1; ch. 7 (84b).
15) Tanya, ch. 27 — on the verse (Mishlei 16:4) "וגם רשע ליום רעה" ("and even the wicked for the day of evil").
16) Except that since the G‑dly vitality in "Cursed is Haman," which is drawn from "Blessed is Mordechai," is utterly hidden, it is in the manner of a "numerical equivalence," which is an exceedingly minimal vitality (Tanya, Part II, ibid.). See similarly Likkutei Sichos, vol. 5, p. 347, on the matter of "b'chli."
17) Note the statement that at the Giving of the Torah they answered "yes" to a positive command and "yes" to a negative command (explained in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 6, p. 124 ff.).
*17) According to this we can understand the obligation "just as etc. to accept with joy" (Berachos 60b) — an obligation according to the Torah of Truth, that is, true joy, just as etc. See also Tanya, ch. 26.
18) According to this the wording "that he does not know the difference between 'Cursed is Haman' and 'Blessed is Mordechai'" is the more apt — for this wording implies that he does not know the difference between them. By contrast, according to the interpretation "that he is unable to calculate that 'Cursed is Haman' equals in numerical value 'Blessed is Mordechai,'" on the contrary, the "not knowing" concerns the way they are similar to each other, and not the difference between them.
19) Yoma 86b.
20) For they too are called by the name "willful sins," because the spark "is so distanced and darkened that it is as if evil," in the manner of "a piece [of meat] becoming forbidden neveilah" (maamar Padah BeShalom 5670 [Hemshech 5672, vol. 2], ch. 374 — excerpted in Kitzurim LeTanya, p. 143) — but not the willful sins themselves, G‑d forbid (maamar Nichoach 5670. See also below, note 28).
21) Cited as obvious in many places in Chassidus. This is the view of R. Abahu in Berachos (34b), and Rambam cites it in Laws of Teshuvah 7:4. See at length note 1 to maamar Padah BeShalom 5709 (Sefer HaMaamarim 5709, p. 183); Likkutei Sichos, vol. 14, p. 361.
22) See also Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 6d.
23) See Tanya, ch. 24.
24) See on all this at length Derech Mitzvosecha 191a.
25) Maamar Tiku 5691 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 1), near its end, and in many places.
26) See maamar Shuvah אעש"ר, near its end, which states: "The root of the matter of teshuvah is that the Essence of the Ein Sof Light is, G‑d forbid, not compelled by His will. For although the will for mitzvos is also in the inwardness and Essence of the Ein Sof Light, He is, G‑d forbid, neither limited nor compelled by the will."
27) Bereishis Rabbah, end of ch. 2. See also Likkutei Torah, Tzav 7d.
28) But one cannot say that since He is not compelled in His will, it may be that even the willful sins themselves are transformed into merits — for the mitzvos relate to the Essence. As is explicit in maamar Shuvah, ibid., that even in the inwardness and Essence of the Ein Sof Light (the root of teshuvah) there is the will for mitzvos (as is also understood from Bereishis Rabbah, ibid., that (even) in the choice concerning which they said "I do not know in which of them He desires," on this very level He desires the deeds of the righteous and does not desire the deeds of the wicked) [On the contrary: since His blessed Essence is not held within the will, and the rejection of evil derives from His choice — by virtue of this choice, evil becomes rejected and refuted absolutely, even more than on the level of the revelations (as explained in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 4, p. 1341)]. Rather, since He is not held etc., it does not conceal before Him etc., as in the text.
29) Tanya, chs. 35, 37.
30) Rashi, Shemos 3:3. This refers to the movement of teshuvah (Toras HaBaal Shem Tov on the verse "And an angel of the L‑rd appeared to him" [printed in Sefer HaSichos 5702, p. 46]; maamar Min HaMeitzar 5705, at its beginning).
31) See similarly maamar Tiku, cited above, ch. 7.
32) See similarly Torah Ohr 99, beginning of col. d (and see below in the gloss to note 55); maamar Amar Rava Chayav Inish 5700, ch. 27.
33) That is, the sparks within him, but not "Haman" himself, as above, notes 20 and 28. This too is alluded to in "until he does not know": even on the level of "not knowing" there is a measure — "until" (see similarly maamar Amar Rava etc., cited above, ibid.).
34) See similarly Hemshech Rosh Hashanah 5695 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 2), at its end; maamar Hayom Haras Olam 5713: that the matter of "the transformation of darkness into light" derives from the ability of the Essence, for Whom the ability to illuminate and not to illuminate is one and the same — and therefore through the revelation of this level, even darkness can be transformed into light. See there.
35) Unlike a case where he calls him (not out of affection, but) because "one should not say anything to his fellow unless he calls him" (Yoma 4b), where on the contrary, the calling is a preparation for the speech and lower than it.
36) According to this we can understand Rashi's statement: "One might think there was a calling even for the pauses; therefore the verse says 'and He spoke' — there was a calling for the speech, and not for the pauses. And what purpose did the pauses serve? To give Moshe space to contemplate between one section and the next" — for seemingly, what relevance does the question "what purpose did the pauses serve" have to explaining this verse? — Because since the calling, an expression of affection, is a matter unto itself that has no bearing on "and He spoke" (and that the calling precedes the speech is only because it is not usual and common to call someone when not speaking to him), therefore, plainly (were it not for the derivation from "and He spoke" that there was a calling for the speech and not for the pauses), one would have had to say that there was a calling for the pauses as well — so as to express the affection all the more, and that the whole need for the pauses was only so that the matter of the calling — the affection — could be possible. But once we learn from "and He spoke" that there was no calling for the pauses, Rashi had the difficulty "and what purpose did the pauses serve? (and he answers) to give, etc." (As for why Rashi wrote the interpretation "One might think there was a calling even for the pauses" under the second heading "And He called to Moshe" — although the reason for this assumption is that a calling is an expression of affection [under the preceding heading] — this was explained at length at the farbrengen.)
36*) As in the Mishnah in Avos (3:14): "Beloved are Israel, for a precious vessel was given to them."
37) See Zohar I, 102b; Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshas Vayikra. See also the end of maamar Vayikra 5670 (in Hemshech 5672, vol. 2).
37*) Likkutei Torah, Pinchas 40b. See also Zohar III, 257b. See also below, note 45.
38) Our Parshah, 5:21 ff.
39) 5:21 and Rashi there.
40) One of the proofs of this, simply: The Sidrah beginning "These are the generations of Noach" is called "Noach," and the Sidrah beginning "And these are the generations of Yitzchak" is called "Toldos." Yet seemingly — if we were to say that the names of the Sidros are only for their beginnings — then "These are the generations of Noach," being the first to begin "These are the generations," should have been called "Toldos" (since the word "Toldos" comes before the word "Noach"), and the Sidrah "And these are the generations of Yitzchak" after it, which also begins with the word "Toldos" — by the name "Yitzchak" (to distinguish it from the Parshah of "These are the generations of Noach")! From this it must be that the names of the Sidros are for their content, and therefore the first Parshah is called "Noach" and the second — "Toldos," for these names indicate their content, as explained elsewhere (see Likkutei Sichos, vol. 5, p. 354 ff.).
41) For all of them are parts of it and are called Parshas Vayikra and the like. See at length Likkutei Sichos, vol. 5, p. 57 ff.; p. 337 ff.
42) Sefer Yetzirah 1:7.
43) Tehillim 147:19.
44) Sanhedrin, beginning of 59a.
45) Note Likkutei Torah, Acharei (26, ג־ג), that Torah and mitzvos draw down the level of Havayah, while teshuvah (which, as above in section 5, reaches the level of "I do not know etc.") draws from the level of "Rock," which is above Havayah. Note also Torah Ohr, maamar Chayav Inish etc. Ad D'lo Yada (100b), the reason the Name Havayah is not mentioned in the Megillah: because "on Purim, through mesirus nefesh, they reached the Essence of the Ein Sof, blessed be He, which is above the level of the Name Havayah."
46) Malachi 1:2–3. Explained in Torah Ohr 120c; Likkutei Torah, for the Three Parshiyos, 37a ff.; Ohr HaTorah, Bereishis (vol. 3), 565a ff.; and in many places.
47) 2:13.
48) 6, beginning of col. c.
49) In section 2 (4c).
50) This is the maamar beginning Chayav Inish (the second).
51) 98b.
52) Ibid., c.
53) Shoftim 14:14.
54) Note that the matter "that the Torah is His blessed wisdom etc." in Likkutei Torah there [on which the Tzemach Tzedek explains in his gloss "Therefore the Torah is called the Ancient Parable"] comes as an introduction to what is explained further there (section 4): the distinction of engaging in the revealed Torah — engaging in the halachos, and not in the narratives of the Written Torah and the Aggados. For the halachos (like parables), since they are enclothed in intellect, one can mistakenly think, G‑d forbid, that they contain only the externality, "the bodies of Torah" — and in the words of the Zohar (Beha'aloscha 152a): "The importance of the body is the soul. In the same way, the Torah has a body etc. the bodies of Torah etc., the soul, which is the essence of all, the Torah itself etc." By contrast, the narratives and Aggados, since they are not enclothed in instructions (which is the meaning of the word "Torah" and the matter of Torah), one sees of them that they allude to secrets (of the Torah) — like a riddle. And this is what is written here: "the Ancient Parable . . which is a vessel": that through studying the inner dimension of the Torah (which is called "salt"), even the parable (the revealed Torah) becomes a vessel for the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, as below in the text (like salt, which sweetens the meat), and as explained in Kuntres Etz HaChaim, ch. 12 ff., and in many places.
55) Note that the "Derush on Purim" to which Likkutei Torah refers opens with "Chayav Inish etc. Ad D'lo Yada etc." And it can be said that this is why this derush is called simply "Derush on Purim" — although there are several discourses that speak of the matters of Purim — because the theme of Purim is expressed in this mitzvah. Nevertheless he does not cite "the derush beginning Chayav Inish etc. Ad D'lo Yada" — although his intent in "Derush on Purim" is to the matter of "obligated etc. until he does not know" on Purim — for then, since the customary manner of citation everywhere is "the maamar beginning etc.," it would not be evident that he is alluding here to some matter, and consequently we would not know that his intent is (also) to the matter of "obligated etc. until he does not know," but only to "the derush beginning Chayav etc." He therefore cites "Derush on Purim."
*) Note also that in this derush (99d) it is explained that the meaning of "until he does not know etc." is that through mesirus nefesh, which is above knowledge (see below, section 11, that the Tzemach Tzedek's intent in citing "Derush on Purim" is also to the level of "not knowing"), one reaches the Essence of the Ein Sof Light, blessed be He, before Whom all are literally equal.
56) See maamar V'Chosavtam 5729, the reason the maamar of this opening from the year 5629 was said in Parshas Eikev — although the verse "V'Chosavtam" is also stated in Parshas Vaeschanan, which precedes Parshas Eikev — because the content of the maamar is connected to Parshas Eikev. See there.
57) Haazinu 32:47. Yerushalmi, Peah 1:1.
Key Lesson
The Purim obligation of "until he does not know" expresses the service of bittul above reason, which reaches the level of G‑d's Essence and gives a Jew the power to transform even "Cursed is Haman" into "Blessed is Mordechai." So too with Torah: the concealment of the "parable" must itself be made into a vessel for G‑dliness. And this Sicha teaches that every word of our Rebbeim, even what seems to be said only in passing, is precise and full of content, if only we toil to find it.