Parshas Vayikra
1. At the close of the sidra, the Torah says that if someone who denied owing money to another and swore a false oath about it confesses and does teshuvah, he must return the money and add a fifth to it — "וחמשתיו יוסף עליו לאשר הוא לו יתננו ביום אשמתו" ("and he shall add its fifth to it; he shall give it to the one to whom it belongs, on the day of his guilt").
Rashi pauses over the words "לאשר הוא לו" ("to the one to whom it belongs") and explains: "למי שהממון שלו" ("to the one who owns the money") — that this fifth (chomesh) must be given to the person to whom the money belongs.
This is not understood: even without Rashi's explanation, one would seemingly know what "to the one to whom it belongs" means. Why must Rashi explain it?
We must also understand why the verse itself needs to add these words: even without them one would seemingly know that the chomesh must be given to the victim of the robbery — to whom else should he give it? So why does the verse need to say these three (four) words?
2. Before the words "to the one who owns the money," Rashi has [in brackets] "לאפוקי בנו ושלוחו. ת"כ" ("to exclude his son and his agent. Toras Kohanim")1 — that from this verse we learn that by giving the money to the victim's son or to his agent (for them to pass it on to the victim), the robber does not discharge his obligation of restitution (until the money reaches the victim himself). According to this, the reason the verse adds the words "to the one to whom it belongs" is understood.
However, from the fact that these words are in brackets, it is understood that there are differences of opinion as to whether these words are part of Rashi's own words (to the point that there are several printings, among them the first printing of Rashi's commentary on the Torah, in which these words do not appear at all). We must therefore understand, according to the version in which these words are not Rashi's: what does the verse add with "to the one to whom it belongs"?
Even according to the version in which these words are Rashi's, it is not understood why he writes them before "to the one who owns the money": with "to the one who owns the money" Rashi explains the meaning of "to the one to whom it belongs," and with "to exclude his son and his agent" he explains the novelty of the verse — what it comes to teach. He should seemingly have first translated the words themselves and only then stated what is newly taught here.
3. The explanation of this is as follows:
The simple reason the robber must add a chomesh is (not so that the victim should receive a fifth more than was taken from him, but) because he committed severe transgressions2 — robbery and a false oath. The Torah therefore penalized him, the robber, requiring him to add a chomesh: were he to return only the principal, he would lose nothing by it. Consequently, had the verse not said "to the one to whom it belongs," one could have thought that he may give the chomesh to someone else as well (or — specifically to G‑d (to the Most High), in Whose Name he swore falsely), as long as he, the robber, gives away an additional fifth.
And although we already find earlier, in Parshas Mishpatim,3 that double payment and four-and-five-fold payment too — though they come as a penalty for the thief — must be paid specifically to the person from whom he stole,4 that is no proof that the chomesh which the one who "וכחש בעמיתו" ("denied to his fellow") must give must also be given to the victim. For from the wording of the verse, "ושלם אותו בראשו וחמישיתיו יוסף עליו" ("he shall repay it in its principal, and add its fifth to it") — indicating that the chomesh is not included in the payment of the principal (unlike double payment and four-and-five-fold payment, which are included together with the payment of the principal: "חמשה גו' ישלם" ("he shall pay five"); "שנים ישלם" ("he shall pay two"); "ישלם שנים" ("he shall pay two")5), but is rather an addition and supplement to the payment of the principal — one could say that the chomesh need not be given specifically to the victim.
4. The mistake one could have made (were it not for the words "to the one to whom it belongs"), that the chomesh need not be given to the victim, arises not only from the verse's wording, "and add its fifth to it" (that it comes as an addition and supplement to the payment), but also from the fact that this obligation comes specifically through the confession of the one who "denied to his fellow" — "כשיכיר בעצמו לשוב בתשובה כו'" ("when he recognizes on his own to return in teshuvah, etc.")5 — and not through witnesses:
Were we to say that the chomesh is a matter of payment which the one who "denied to his fellow" became obligated to pay to the person whose money he denied, then the obligation should not depend on his confession and teshuvah. On the contrary — when he did not confess but was caught through testimony, he should surely be held liable. Indeed, we see this with double payment and four-and-five-fold payment, whose obligation comes specifically through witnesses and not through confession.6
And since the Torah did make the giving of the chomesh depend on his confession and teshuvah, it stands to reason that it is a matter of atonement, like the asham offering,7 and not a matter of payment. And since it is an atonement, he should have to give it to G‑d (like the asham offering), and it would have nothing at all to do with the victim.
5. All this explains why the verse must say "to the one to whom it belongs." Still, a difficulty remains: why must Rashi explain "to the one who owns the money" — how else could one have learned the verse?
Commentators say8 that had Rashi not explained "to the one who owns the money," one would have learned that "to the one to whom it belongs" means that the "טובת הנאה" (tovas hana'ah — the benefit of choosing the recipient) of this payment*8 belongs to the one paying the money. (Similar to Rashi's commentary on "ואיש את קדשיו לו יהיו" ("and a man's holy things shall be his")9 — "מגיד שטובת הנאתן לבעלים" ("this tells that the tovas hana'ah of them belongs to the owners").)
But it is not at all understood: why would one even entertain such an interpretation when it does not at all fit the plain wording of the verse?10
According to the interpretation that "הוא" ("it") refers to (the tovas hana'ah of) the payment (and that "לו" ("to him") means the one paying), the word "לאשר" ("to the one") has no continuity. And since it says "to the one to whom it belongs" — especially "לאשר" (with an added lamed), to the one whose it is — it is obvious that the words refer to the giving of the payment (and they connect to "יתננו" ("he shall give it"), which follows them): he must give the payment to the one to whom the money belongs.
So the difficulty stands: what novelty is Rashi introducing with his explanation, "to the one who owns the money"?
6. The explanation of this is as follows:
In this same parsha,11 a few verses earlier, the Torah calls the owner of the money by the name "עמיתו" ("his fellow") — "and denied to his fellow"; "עשק את עמיתו" ("defrauded his fellow"). It is therefore not understood: why must the verse say three words, "to the one to whom it belongs" (whose intent is not even so clear), when it should have said, as earlier, the single word "לעמיתו" ("to his fellow"), and its intent would have been clear?
Because of this difficulty, one could have made a mistake and read into "to the one to whom it belongs" that the tovas hana'ah of the payment belongs to the one paying it. For although according to this interpretation the word "לאשר" is difficult, according to the interpretation "to the one who owns the money" there is a stronger difficulty: there is no reason to write with lengthy wording whose intent is not clear, when one could write a single word whose intent is clear. One would therefore interpret the verse as follows: (the first law) "ושלם אותו" ("he shall repay it") (in its principal, "and add its fifth to it"). (The second law, that this "he shall repay it"12) "אשר הוא לו" ("which is his") (regarding the tovas hana'ah; therefore) "יתננו" ("he shall give it") (unspecified,13 even to his son or his agent;*13 the only condition is) "ביום אשמתו" ("on the day of his guilt").
And as for the lamed of "לאשר," Rashi's position is that "כן דרך המקראות לכתוב למ"ד יתירה" ("such is the way of Scripture, to write a superfluous lamed").14 It is not an exception, but the way of Scripture.
Rashi must therefore explain that "to the one to whom it belongs" means "to the one who owns the money."15 And the question of why the verse uses such lengthy wording Rashi resolves (according to one version) with his explanation "to exclude his son and his agent": the lengthy wording of the verse is meant to convey the law of "to exclude, etc."
This is why Rashi writes "to exclude his son and his agent" before "to the one who owns the money" — even though "to the one who owns the money" translates the plain meaning of the words "to the one to whom it belongs." For because of the difficulty with this interpretation — why must the verse use such lengthy wording — one would have been forced to read a different interpretation into them. Rashi therefore first states that with its lengthy wording the verse means "to exclude his son and his agent," and only after one knows the explanation of the lengthy wording does the interpretation "to the one who owns the money" have a place.
7. According to this, however, a difficulty remains regarding the reason for the verse's lengthy wording, according to the version in which "to exclude his son and his agent" is not part of Rashi's words.
The explanation of this is that the two versions depend on a dispute among the commentators on Tanach:
There are commentators on Tanach who hold that, for the sake of elegance of expression, a word which has already been used several times is replaced with another expression — even when that expression requires lengthier wording — so as not to use the same word many times.
According to this view, nothing can be learned from the fact that the verse says "to the one to whom it belongs" and not "to his fellow" — because the word "to his fellow" already appears twice, a few verses earlier.
Another view, however, holds that where one can write briefly and save several words, one does so, even in a case where elegance of expression would better suit lengthier wording. According to this view we must say that with "to the one to whom it belongs" the verse means "to exclude his son and his agent."
8. Rashi's commentary on the Torah, although outwardly it is the plain meaning of Scripture, also contains [the part of Remez and Derush, and especially17] the part of Sod, the secret dimension of Torah, and in the words of our Rebbeim,16 "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of Torah").
The Kli Yakar [which is among the works cited in Chassidus] gives as the reason for adding a chomesh, "לפי שהיו מעותיו בטלים אצלו" ("because his money lay idle with him"):18
When a person has money, he does business with it and thereby earns more money. And when money is taken from someone, even if it is later returned to him, the full loss has not yet been made good. So that "והשיב את הגזילה" ("he shall return the stolen item") should be complete, with the victim suffering no loss whatsoever, a chomesh must be added for him (to compensate for the profit that can be earned by doing business with the money).19
Against this explanation there is a question from Tanya:
It is stated in Tanya20 that when a person commits a wrong against another, the one harmed has no cause to be angry at the one who harmed him, because the harm he suffered was decreed upon him from Heaven; even if this person had not done it to him, he would have suffered the damage.
And although punishment comes to the one who caused the harm for inflicting the damage, because he has free choice and could have chosen not to commit the harmful act21 (and the decree would have been carried out in another way — for "הרבה שלוחים למקום" ("the Omnipresent has many messengers")), this is only a reckoning that concerns the one who caused the harm. It has no connection to the one harmed, who would have suffered the harm in any event, because so it was decreed upon him from Above (and had it not been decreed upon him, he would not have been harmed at all, even if the other person had wanted to do him evil. The free choice given to a person relates only to himself, not to another).22
Accordingly a question arises: from the fact that the robber took a certain sum of money from the victim for a period of time, it is clear that so it was decreed from Heaven upon the victim. Consequently, even had the robber not robbed him, the victim would in any case have been missing that sum of money during that time and would not have been able to do business with it. So why should a chomesh be added for him?
The explanation is: the same question applies not only to the chomesh but also to the principal. Since it was decreed from Above that he should be missing the money, and the decree would have come about in actuality even if the robber had done nothing at all — why must it be returned to him?23
[That the robber is obligated to pay is understandable: the Supreme decree was that the money should be missing from the victim, but not that this person should rob it. His act of robbery came about through his own choice — contrary to the Supreme Will, which commanded him not to rob. The question, however, is: why must he give it back to the victim? He could give it elsewhere (similar to a robbery where there is no one "להשיב האשם אליו" ("to whom to return the guilt payment")24) — such as to tzedakah and the like;25 for the decree upon the victim would have come about in actuality in any case, even had the robber not robbed him.]
The simple answer to this is: the fact that the money was taken from the victim is not yet proof that it was decreed upon him to lose the money forever. It may be that it was decreed upon him to lose the money only for a certain time. The clarification of the decree upon the victim — whether he is to lose the money forever or only for a period of time — will be known only from this itself: if the robber returns the stolen item to him, that will be a proof that the decree was to suffer the harm only temporarily; if he does not return the stolen item to him (and not through others either — for "the Omnipresent has many messengers"26), only then will it be known that the decree was that he should lose the money forever.
And since it is not known what was decreed upon the victim, it is understandable that the robber has no right whatsoever not to return the stolen item to the victim (or even to postpone the return until later) on the claim that his refraining from returning the stolen item will prove that it was decreed from Above that the victim should suffer the harm forever (or for a longer time, until he returns it to him) —
(just as one cannot say that a person should be permitted to harm someone, or to cause a loss to his property, on the claim that this itself will be proof that it was decreed upon him to suffer harm).
This same resolution and answer applies to the chomesh as well: since it is possible, by adding a chomesh for him, that he should suffer no loss at all from the robbery (that he should have not only the principal but also the chomesh that he could have earned had he not been robbed), it may be that the decree to lose the chomesh was only until the time of the return, but not forever.
And this is what Rashi is saying with "to the one who owns the money," meaning thereby (not only that the chomesh must be given to the victim, but also) to explain the reason for it: the proof that it was decreed that the money be taken from him applies only to the past. As regards the future, however, it must be viewed as his own property — "the money is his" — and therefore a chomesh must be added for him, so as to restore his property to him in full.
9. The above is a directive for the overall conduct between one person and another:
When someone has done wrong to another — harmed him, insulted him, and the like — and he realizes that he has committed a wrong, so that he must now ask the other's forgiveness, the yetzer hara comes and argues: The Alter Rebbe says that the other person deserved it, and if I had not done it, someone else would have insulted him — so he did not suffer at all on my account. Why, then, must I go and appease him? True, I committed an injustice, and as the Alter Rebbe says, the one who causes harm is punished for his evil choice; so it is an injustice against G‑d. I must therefore do teshuvah, fast, and say Tehillim. But why must I ask that person's forgiveness?
The answer to this is: by asking forgiveness, one eases, to a certain extent, the pain one has caused the other. Consequently, one has no right to cause him greater pain by not asking his forgiveness — for there is no proof that it was decreed upon him to suffer great pain — and one is obligated to do everything possible to ease the pain of one's fellow.
10. The yetzer hara, however, is clever. It dresses itself in the cloak of a G‑d-fearing person and argues that according to Torah a Jew must think only about G‑d. The Rebbe [the Previous Rebbe] says in many maamarim27 (argues the yetzer hara) that "mishpatim" as well, the rational mitzvos between man and his fellow, such as "do not rob" and the like, must be fulfilled out of kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim (acceptance of the yoke of Heaven's sovereignty), just like the fulfillment of "chukim."
He therefore makes a reckoning: the injustice I committed by insulting that person and causing him pain consists [not in having added something contrary to justice and fairness, but] in having acted contrary to the King's decree. So since I committed a sin against G‑d, I must do teshuvah and ask G‑d to forgive me — but not ask forgiveness from a human being.
And as for what is stated in the Shulchan Aruch, that one must appease one's fellow — since G‑d commanded this, I will fulfill this as well, out of kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim, like all other mitzvos. But who says that I must actually feel bad about having pained my fellow, and that I must seek to appease him?
On the contrary (he argues): the Torah constantly stresses that "אין עוד מלבדו" ("there is nothing else besides Him"), and when one attaches importance to something outside of G‑dliness, that is conduct contrary to the truth. So if it should affect me that I pained another (not as something G‑d commanded, that one may not pain another), and I should go and appease him (not because it says in the Shulchan Aruch that one should do so, but) out of a feeling that I committed an injustice against that person — that is a matter of separation, may G‑d spare us, the opposite of "there is nothing else besides Him"!
It is understood, however, that this claim comes not from the G‑dly soul,28 but from the animal soul, which has dressed itself in a silk coat. His not wanting to appease the other and not caring about it comes not from Torah, but from self-importance.29
True, the Rebbe says that "mishpatim" must be fulfilled just like chukim — but this was not said as a leniency, Heaven forbid, only as a stringency: it is certain and obvious that a Jew may not have bad character traits, and that all matters of justice and fairness between man and his fellow must concern him.30 The Rebbe only adds to this (he does not, Heaven forbid, subtract) that all this must stem from kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim, like chukim,31 which gives it even more "stringency":
Were the fulfillment of mishpatim only out of the obligation of intellect, then, because of the bribe of self-love, for "על כל פשעים תכסה אהבה" ("love covers all transgressions"),32 he could think that the "guilty one" is the other person, and that he himself is in the right.
And even when he does succeed in setting aside his personal biases and contemplates honestly with himself, at which point he comes to recognize that the fault he sees in the other is his own fault33 — still, intellect as a whole is measured and limited. Consequently, if he fulfills the "mishpatim" only out of the obligation of intellect, their fulfillment will be bounded by the limits of intellect.
The Rebbe therefore says that one must fulfill mishpatim like chukim, in the manner of kabbalas ol malchus Shamayim, for in kabbalas ol there are no limits.
11. "נעוץ סופן בתחלתן" ("their end is wedged in their beginning"),34 as is known —
At the beginning of the sidra it first says "ויק[רא]" ("And He called")… [OCR unclear — the rest of this passage is missing from the source]35 36 37 38
And just as this applies to conduct between man and his fellow from the outset, so it applies also to "he shall return the stolen item," the reconciliation in which he must beg the other's pardon if he "denied to his fellow": the request for forgiveness must be not only out of kabbalas ol, fulfilling a law stated in the Shulchan Aruch, but he must truly feel the sin he committed against the other person, and strive to appease that person.
And when the request for forgiveness is of this kind, it removes more of the pain he caused the other (this being a further reason that it must be specifically in this manner), and consequently, through this, his teshuvah is also better accepted by G‑d.
And great is the virtue of teshuvah, for "ישראל כשיעשו תשובה — מיד" ("when the Jewish people do teshuvah — immediately") [and as the Alter Rebbe adds:39 "תיכף ומיד" ("at once and immediately")] "הן נגאלין" ("they are redeemed"),40 with the coming of Moshiach Tzidkeinu, very speedily, in actual fact.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Vayikra, 5728)
Notes
1) This is also the wording in the Mishnah, Bava Kamma 103a. But in our text of Toras Kohanim here it says "his agent" (and does not mention "his son").
2) Note also Ibn Ezra's commentary on Naso 5:7 ("and when he adds to his sin — not confessing — he shall add a further chomesh") — although in explaining the plain meaning of the word "חמישיתיו" here, Rashi's commentary here differs from him.
3) 21:36; 22:3, 6, 8.
4) [OCR unclear — the note is cut off in the source after a single letter, "ו".]
5) Rashi in our parsha, 5:23.
6) As derived in Bava Kamma 75a. Also according to the plain meaning, the wording "ירשיעון אלקים" ("whom the judges condemn") (Mishpatim 22:8) implies that they condemned him on the testimony of witnesses (see Rashi there). Likewise the wording "המצא תמצא" ("it shall surely be found") (ibid., 22:3) and "ימצא" ("shall be found") (ibid., 6) implies that it was found with him, and not that he confessed on his own.
7) See Rambam, Laws of Robbery 7:8.
8) See Re'em and Sifsei Chachamim here.
*8) Also of the principal — see below, note 12. Likewise, there is no reason to distinguish between them (especially according to the plain meaning). Note further that "tovas hana'ah" here (as in many places) means that he may give it to anyone he wishes (even not to his son or his agent), on condition that they deliver it to the victim.
9) Naso 5:10–11.
10) And it is obvious that because of the reasoning above (that since it is an atonement it has nothing to do with the victim) there is no room to twist the verse and take it out of its plain meaning.
11) In our parsha — for the student has not yet learned the verse "ונתן לאשר אשם לו" ("and he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty") in Parshas Naso (5:7).
12) This resolves "הוא" ("it") and "יתננו" ("he shall give it") — singular wording.
13) Similar to the interpretation of Toras Kohanim on this.
*13) And even to another person, on condition that they deliver it to the victim. The sicha says "even to his son or his agent" because that is what Rashi's commentary is discussing. And as regards agency it is understood that, plainly, one's son and agent are like himself, and all the more so that another person is not.
14) Beshalach 14:28.
15) And the reason Rashi chose this interpretation is that according to the plain meaning it seems more fitting to interpret "הוא לו" ("it is his") as "the money is his" than as the tovas hana'ah of the money. Therefore in Naso (5:10), where no other interpretation is closer to the plain meaning, Rashi at least adds: "and further midrashim, etc." and "a midrash aggadah, etc."
16) For just as among the worlds, the World of Atzilus, alluded to by the word "אף" ("indeed"), is joined specifically to "עשיתיו" ("I have made him") (see Likkutei Torah, Balak 69, end of column c), so too among the four parts of Torah, PaRDeS, which correspond to the four worlds, the Sod part of Torah — Atzilus — is connected to the Pshat part — Asiyah (see Likkutei Torah, Vayikra (5d), which cites there the matter of "אף עשיתיו" regarding the connection of the inner dimension of Torah to Scripture). Note too the order of the sons in the Haggadah of Pesach, which also corresponds to Atzilus, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah: the wise son, the wicked son, etc. (from the sicha of Shabbos Parshas Noach 5725 — Likkutei Sichos, vol. 5, p. 279).
17) Hayom Yom, p. 24.
18) See there as well what he writes as the reason for adding specifically a chomesh. This is seemingly not understood. It may be said (at least as an intellectual exercise, though it is one, etc.): in the laws of penalties, the sum is set (according to several commentators) according to the majority of cases — in the ordinary case (see the commentators on the reason for the thirty-shekel penalty for a slave; Moreh Nevuchim, part 3, ch. 40; Akeidah, gate 46; and elsewhere). Now, here the subject is a deposit, a loan, etc., and an unspecified loan is for thirty days (Makkos 3b), at which point he demands it and the other denies it, etc. That is, ordinarily his money would have been idle for thirty days. Now, the profit from doing business with fifty zuz is that he should have two hundred zuz (Pe'ah 8:9), which is a profit of 150 zuz. This is over the course of a year (see ibid., 8:8, in the commentators; and also charity of gleanings, etc., ordinarily means once a year). If so, in thirty days this is a chomesh (which must be calculated from the outside — Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Bava Kamma 9:6; Rambam, Laws of Robbery 7:7).
Seemingly, the claim that his money lay idle with him is not understood — in the case of a loan, a deposit, and a hired worker's wages. And if you say that the intent is from the moment he denied to his fellow — then this has no connection to the unspecified thirty-day loan. It may be said that this connects to the extension granted by the beis din (after he denied and lost), which is thirty days (see Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of ch. 100, and its commentators).
19) And although the measure of the money's idleness depends on the length of time from the moment of the robbery until the moment of its return (but see the preceding note) — it may be said that the main reason for the obligation of chomesh is on account of atonement, as stated above in the text, and not because he caused his money to lie idle (for "withholding profit" (as opposed to a loss) does not carry such an obligation. Therefore, if he did not swear, or did not confess, he does not add a chomesh). It is only that after he is obligated on account of atonement, the Torah said that this chomesh should be given to the victim, on account of the withheld profit he caused him.*
The same may be said of double payment and four-and-five-fold payment: the main reason for the obligation is a penalty for the thief, but even so he must pay the penalty to the person from whom he stole, because he caused his money to lie idle. (Note Rashi's commentary on Mishpatim (21:37), where the first reason concerns the thief, and the second reason is "שביטלו ממלאכתו" ("that he kept it from its work"). See at length Likkutei Sichos, vol. 16, p. 259 ff.)
*) It may be said that this too is the intent of the Kli Yakar here, in adding "and the matter of the chomesh is, etc." [for from the implication of his wording "and the matter, etc." (and not "and further" or the like) it follows that it comes as a continuation of what precedes it] — that here he comes to explain the main reason for the obligation (and the measure of a chomesh), and the reason "his money lay idle with him" applies only to the fact that the chomesh is given to the victim.
20) Igeres HaKodesh, ch. 25.
21) See also Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah, end of ch. 6.
22) Nevertheless, regarding the bestowal of good it was said (Bava Kamma 92b): "חמרא למרי' טיבותא לשקיי'" ("the wine belongs to its owner, but the thanks go to the one who pours it"). The reason is that since the messenger has free choice, one must thank him (Derech Mitzvosecha 6b). This is also the reason we were commanded to honor father and mother as a rational mitzvah — because they have free choice (maamar "Mayim Rabbim" 5717 (Sefer HaMaamarim Meluket, vol. 1, p. 54), sec. 4, and elsewhere; Likkutei Sichos, Yisro 5752). This does not contradict what is written here (from Igeres HaKodesh), for the bestowal of good differs from the bestowal of the opposite of good in two ways:
a) In the opposite of good as well, the one causing harm is liable under human law for his evil choice (Igeres HaKodesh, ibid.). But it is understood that to hold him liable (and punish him) under human law falls upon "judges (and officers)," and certainly not upon the injured party, who is personally involved and whose heart may grow hot (the law of the blood-avenger being different). By contrast, regarding reward and good, the recipient of the good is like all Jews, who must praise the one who bestows good for his good choice. On the contrary: since he received the good from him, he must thank him more than the others.
b) In the bestowal of good, the messenger (sometimes) adds to the bestowal from Above (and it is possible to add — as the prayer of a tzaddik on one's behalf, or his blessing and the like, is effective) — see Tosafos (s.v. "Chamra"), Bava Kamma, ibid. (And what is written in Derech Mitzvosecha follows Rashi's interpretation.) Perhaps it can be interpreted this way also in Derech Mitzvosecha, based on the precise wording and change of wording there: "for there is no, etc., choice at all to bestow this way or that, etc. And what is written, etc., 'thanks', etc., means that, etc., he has free choice" (from the notes of the Rebbe, shlita).
23) One cannot say that the obligation to return the stolen item is because as long as he has not returned the stolen item to its owner "עונו גלוי ונזכר" ("his sin is revealed and remembered") (Rashi's wording, Yevamos (22b), s.v. "Hashta" — regarding one who has relations with a forbidden woman and fathers a mamzer from her): a) For that it would suffice for him to remove the stolen item from his possession (similar to Bava Kamma 109a). b) Even when the stolen item no longer exists he is obligated to pay, whereas "his sin is revealed and remembered" applies only "as long as the mamzer exists" (Rashi, ibid.).
Nor can one say that even after the above there remains a remembrance of his sin, because the loss that reached the victim through him remains — for a loss is not a tangible reality, the kind of reality that is recognized ([OCR unclear: "עוץ"]).
24) Naso 5:8.
25) See Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, end of ch. 366.
26) Therefore, even if he does not know whom he sinned against "so that he might return it to him or ask him to forgive him," "אי אפשר לו שישוב בתשובה גמורה" ("it is impossible for him to return in complete teshuvah") (Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 4:3) — even though if he does not know, it is impossible for him to return the stolen item — because since "the Omnipresent has many messengers" and his loss may be made up in another way (a found object and the like), there is no proof at all that it was decreed upon him to lose forever.* That being so, it emerges that the victim's money is in his hands, and therefore his teshuvah is not complete teshuvah.
*) In general, all this is known only to Heaven. For [there are many ways of making up the loss — including also the cancellation of some other loss (decreed upon the victim); and conversely — even when he finds a found object and the like,] it may be said that the found object did not come to make up the loss, but belonged to him regardless.
It is also possible that the making up of the loss will occur after the robber's death, and that even the profit he could have earned during the whole time will be made up — from which there is proof that in truth no loss was decreed upon the victim at all, and the robber has died with the victim's money in his hands. This is obvious.
A kind of example of this: "לוה רשע ולא ישלם" ("the wicked man borrows and does not repay") — (and then) "וצדיק" ("and the Righteous One") (the Holy One, blessed be He, the Omnipresent) "חונן ונותן" ("is gracious and gives") to the lender (see the commentators on Avos 2:10).
27) Maamar "Lema'an Da'as" 5690 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 1), sec. 5. "Havayah Li B'Ozrai" 5691 (5687) (in Sefer HaMaamarim, ibid.), sec. 3. Sefer HaMaamarim Yiddish, p. 46. And elsewhere.
28) See Yoma 86a: "חטאתי לאלקי" ("I have sinned against my G‑d") (this version — of Ein Yaakov — is cited as law in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 606; whereas in Rambam (Laws of Teshuvah, end of ch. 2) it is "לה' אלקי" ("against the L‑rd my G‑d")) "ישראל ופלוני" ("of Israel, and against so-and-so").
29) See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, ch. 606, end of sec. 2: "להכניע א"ע" ("to humble himself").
30) See Rambam, Shemonah Perakim, ch. 6, that the virtue of one who "conquers his inclination" applies only in the matter of chukim. In contrast, regarding evils that are bad even according to intellect, one should not desire them at all. See there at length.
31) For even the revulsion from evils that stems from intellect must be in the manner of kabbalas ol, in order to fulfill the Supreme Will, for it is His will that we refine our souls and find these things repulsive.
32) Mishlei 17:12 — even over these "transgressions," which are rebellions (Yoma 36b; Shevuos 12b), love covers.
33) As in the Baal Shem Tov's interpretation of the verse (Yirmiyahu 2:19) "תיסרך רעתך" ("your evil shall chasten you"): the evil one sees in another is "your evil" — his own evil. See similarly Likkutei Torah, Behaaloscha 33, end of column a.
34) Sefer Yetzirah 1:7.
35) See Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshas Vayikra. See also the end of the maamar "Vayikra" 5670 (in Hemshech 5672, vol. 2). On this basis, Rashi's statement "אבל לנביאי האומות כו'" ("but to the prophets of the nations, etc.") becomes clearer (for seemingly, why would one even think that the calling, which is an "expression of affection," also applied to the prophets of the nations): since the calling stems from a level above [OCR unclear: "מהו׳"], on this level "כחשיכה כאורה" ("darkness is like light"), "אח עשו ליעקב" ("Esav is Yaakov's brother") — both alike. Nevertheless — "ואוהב את יעקב ואת עשו שנאתי" ("I loved Yaakov, and Esav I hated").
36) Tanya, end of ch. 41.
37) Except that this itself must also be in order to fulfill the Creator's will (for it is the Supreme Will that the service should also involve comprehension and feeling). This is the meaning of "לכל דברות כו' קדמה קריאה" ("every utterance, etc., was preceded by a calling"), that even the "utterances" — comprehension and feeling — are preceded and founded upon "ויקרא" ("And He called") — kabbalas ol. So too in matters between man and his fellow: although they must involve feeling, etc., this itself must stem from kabbalas ol, as in note 31 above. This also makes clearer why the end of the sidra as well (although it discusses matters between man and his fellow) is called "Vayikra."
38) Avos 2:10.
39) Igeres HaTeshuvah, end of ch. 1. The addition of "תיכף" ("at once") to "מיד" ("immediately") — see Taanis (19b), "What is their 'immediately'?, etc."; Rashi, s.v. "Miyad," Shabbos 69a; whereas regarding "תיכף," according to what is written in Zevachim 33a; Tosafos, s.v. "Kol" (Sotah 39a); Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, ch. 166.
40) Rambam, Laws of Teshuvah 7:5.
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that one who has wronged another may not excuse himself by saying the harm was decreed from Above, or by claiming piously that only his relationship with G‑d matters: he must do all he can to restore what was lost and ease the other's pain. Between one person and another, a Jew must genuinely feel the wrong and seek to appease the one he hurt, with the unbounded commitment of kabbalas ol.