021b – האומר משקלי עלי – פרק חמישי – ערכין, דף כא ע”ב

If he knew, he is discharged (yatza).

לדעת - With knowledge: that he informed the one being atoned for (the owner).

Without knowledge, he is not discharged.

'The burnt offering and peace offerings of so-and-so are upon me': whether with knowledge or without knowledge, is he discharged?^[1]

Shmuel says to you: that baraita speaks of the time of atonement, when the owner was pleased at the time of setting aside.^[2]

כי תניא ההיא - That baraita: meaning that the owner's knowledge is not required at the time of the offering, because he was informed at the time of setting aside and agreed to the matter.

When I say it, I mean at the time of setting aside.

וכי קאמינא - And when I say: meaning that knowledge is required at the time of setting aside. And this is what Shmuel requires: knowledge at setting aside, and not at atonement.

And this disagrees with Ulla.

פליגא דעולא - It disagrees with Ulla: since he (Shmuel) says the opposite.

Ulla said: They did not distinguish between a sin-offering and a burnt offering, except that a sin-offering needs knowledge at setting aside and a burnt offering does not; but at atonement both alike: with knowledge he is discharged, without knowledge he is not discharged.^[3]

שלא לדעת לא יצא - Without knowledge he is not discharged: this shows that in all of them knowledge is required, and the difficulty applies to both of them.

They raise an objection: 'His sin-offering and guilt-offering, his burnt offering and peace offerings, of so-and-so are upon me: with knowledge he is discharged; without knowledge he is not discharged?'^[4]

Shmuel explains it as referring to the time of setting aside; Ulla explains it as referring to the time of atonement.

Rav Pappa said: the two baraitot do not contradict each other: this one speaks of the time of atonement, and that one of the time of setting aside.^[5]

מתנייתא אהדדי לא קשיין - The two baraitot do not contradict each other: the one taught above, 'the burnt offering and peace offerings of so-and-so are upon me, whether with knowledge or without knowledge he is discharged,' and the later one, which teaches that in all of them, without knowledge, he is not discharged. One refers to the time of atonement and one to the time of setting aside, as each of them holds: according to Ulla's view and according to Shmuel's view.

And the Amoraim too do not contradict: Shmuel explains the first (baraita) as referring to the time of atonement, and the second to the time of setting aside.

Ulla explains it the other way. The Amoraim certainly disagree.

Is this obvious?^[6]

What might one think: 'at the time of setting aside' which Shmuel says, 'even at the time of setting aside', even though this first baraita is a refutation of him.

אף בשעת הפרשה - Even at the time of setting aside: that is, knowledge is required both at setting aside and at atonement, even though that first baraita, which teaches that a burnt offering does not need knowledge, refutes him. The Gemara's earlier answer ('Shmuel says to you: that baraita is at the time of atonement, etc.') is not a sound matter; Rav Pappa teaches us the better answer: 'even among the Amoraim they do not contradict, for Shmuel explains the first at the time of atonement', which implies that Shmuel does not require knowledge at atonement. The earlier answer was only a forced resolution.

It teaches us:^[7]

And likewise for women's divorce documents, [the court] compels [the husband], etc.:^[8]

Rav Sheshet said: one who hands over a notice concerning a get, his notice stands.^[9]

Is this obvious?

It is needed: this is the case where they made it and he consented.

דעשאוה - That they made it: afterwards.

ואירצי - And he consented: to give the get; and he did not cancel the notice.

What might one think: he annulled it by annulling it.^[10]

מהו דתימא מסתמא בטלה למודעא - One might think that the notice is by default annulled: Rav Sheshet teaches that it is not, and he derives the reason from the Mishnah, for otherwise it should have taught 'they compel him until he gives'.

It teaches us: otherwise [the Mishnah] would say 'until he gives'; what then is 'until he says'? Until he cancels his notice.^[11]

Hadran: the end of the chapter 'One Who Says My Shekels Are Upon Me'.^[12]

Chapter Six: 'The Appraisal of Orphans' [Property]'.

Mishnah.

The appraisal of orphans' property [is announced for] thirty days.^[13]

שום היתומים - The appraisal of orphans' property: the courts that come down to the orphans' property to sell it in order to collect a debt for a creditor; they appraise the land and proclaim for thirty days, 'whoever wishes to buy, let him come and buy'.^[14]

And the appraisal of consecrated property: sixty days.

ושום ההקדש - And the appraisal of consecrated property: the treasurer who sells land of consecrated property.^[15]

And they proclaim in the morning and in the evening:

Gemara

What is different about morning and evening?

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: [it is] at the time of taking out the workers and at the time of bringing them in.^[16]

At the time of taking out the workers, because there are people who want to buy.

He said to the workers: 'Go and survey it for me' - at the time of bringing the workers in.

סיירוה ניהלי - Survey it: see whether it is good.

That he remembers what he said to them.

דנידכר - That he remembers: the owner, at night, [recalls] what he said to the workers in the morning.

Let us go and ask them.

ונישיילינהו - And let us ask them: whether it is good.

It is also taught in a baraita: 'The appraisal of orphans' [property] is thirty days, and the appraisal of consecrated property is sixty days; and they proclaim morning and evening, at the time of taking out the workers and at the time of bringing them in.'^[17]

[The baraita] says: 'The field of so-and-so, by its markers and its boundaries, is so good (in yield), and so is its appraisal.'

כך היא יפה - So good: it yields such-and-such in produce.^[18]

כך היא שומא - So is its appraisal: the court appraised it at such-and-such; and he takes it on condition that he pays the wife or the creditor.

'Whoever wishes to buy, let him come and buy, on condition that he pays the wife her ketubah and the creditor his debt.'^[19]

Why do I need to say 'on condition that he pays the wife her ketubah and the creditor his debt'?

למה לי - Why do I need it: to proclaim 'on condition that he pays', etc.

For some prefer [to buy] with the creditor, who makes a concession for zuzim, and some prefer [to buy] with the wife, who takes [payment] little by little.^[20]

על יד על יד - Little by little: in small amounts. And there is a buyer who prefers to pay the creditor, who makes a concession for zuzim, since he takes broken and short zuzim, which merchants do not mind.

אמר לך שמואל כי תניא ההיא בשעת כפרה - (And the baraita speaks of the time of setting aside.) If you ask: why does Shmuel disagree with Ulla? Let him explain Shmuel's ruling as referring to atonement and the baraita as referring to setting aside, and then he would not disagree with Ulla. One answers: Shmuel holds that his ruling speaks of the time of setting aside, as the Mishnah indicates, since it says that animals of burnt offerings may not be pledged, which is the time of setting aside.

מאי בשעת הפרשה דקאמר שמואל אף בשעת הפרשה - And if you ask: they still disagree, for according to Shmuel knowledge is needed also at setting aside, and certainly at atonement; and according to Ulla it is needed specifically at atonement and not at setting aside. One answers: in the case where they now disagree, they would not in fact disagree. Rabbeinu Yitzchak (Ri) holds that the reasoning of Shmuel and Ulla is as follows. For Shmuel, a person does not want to be atoned for something that is not his own, so an olah and shelamim need knowledge at setting aside; at atonement knowledge is not needed, since laying on of hands does not require his knowledge when they do not come to atone for his sin. But a sin-offering and a guilt-offering come for sin and require confession at laying on of hands, so knowledge is needed at atonement. For Ulla, even for an olah and shelamim the owner wants to fulfil the mitzvah of laying on of hands, so knowledge is needed at atonement; at setting aside knowledge is needed only for a sin-offering, since a person does not want to be atoned for something not his own, while an olah and shelamim, which do not come for atonement, need no knowledge at setting aside.

האי מאן דמסר מודעא אגיטא מודעיה מודעא - (Ruling.) Therefore the custom of the people is to annul every notice that comes together with the notices given at the time of writing the get and at the time of its delivery, because we fear that he may have annulled the get.

מתני' שום היתומים ל' יום - (Mishnah.) If you ask: why does the Mishnah specify orphans? Anyone whose property a court comes to seize, to pay a wife her ketubah or a debt to a creditor, requires a court appraisal of thirty days, as stated in Bava Metzia 35: from when may he eat the produce? From when the appraisal and proclamation are complete; so for everyone whose property is seized a court appraisal is needed. One answers: the Mishnah mentions orphans to teach something new, lest you think that orphans' property is like consecrated property and requires a sixty-day court appraisal; it teaches that they are equal to everyone.

בשעת הוצאת פועלים ובשעת הכנסת פועלים - (Explanation: 'at the time of taking out the workers' from their work, and 'at the time of bringing them in' to work. This is not the order of the Mishnah, which says morning and evening, and Rav Yehuda explains evening first and then morning. One answers that this is the natural order: since the owner does not want to interrupt his workers' labour, he does not tell them to survey the field in the morning, for then why would he wait until evening to ask them? So Rav Yehuda had to explain that at the time they leave their work he says to them 'survey it', since then they are not stopped from their work; and the next day, when he remembers what he said to them at night, he goes to ask them. Therefore one cannot explain the reverse, namely at the time they are taken out from home and enter their work, and at the time they are brought home and leave their work, for that is not the practice, as we explained. Moreover the wording of the book does not fit that explanation. Tosafot elaborates at length, and cites the case in Bava Metzia 83 (the one who hires workers): Rav Asi said that a worker, at his entry to work, is his own, and at his exit, belongs to the employer.)

כך היא יפה - (For the purpose of the yield of grain and fruit: so-and-so is its valuation, at such-and-such a sum. And if the lender wants to keep it at the sum the court appraised, there is no need to proclaim; rather we establish it in the lender's hand immediately.)

Notes

1. 1. The case: someone declares that a burnt offering and peace offerings for a specific other person (the owner) are upon him, so he takes on the offerings for another. The question is whether the owner must know of it for it to discharge him (yatza).
2. 2. Hafrashah (setting aside) is the moment the animal is designated for the offering; kapparah (atonement) is the moment it is offered on the owner's behalf.
3. 3. Ulla's rule, quoted here: a sin-offering needs the owner's knowledge at setting aside, a burnt offering does not; at atonement both need knowledge. Shmuel and Ulla disagree about which time requires knowledge.
4. 4. A baraita raised as an objection: it groups the sin-offering and guilt-offering with the burnt offering and peace offerings, and requires the owner's knowledge for all four.
5. 5. The two baraitot: one says that with knowledge the owner is discharged in the case of olah and shelamim; the other says that in all cases, without knowledge, he is not discharged. Rav Pappa reconciles them by time.
6. 6. 'Is this obvious?' - the Gemara's stock objection that a point seems self-evident; it prepares the next question.
7. 7. 'It teaches us' - the formula introducing the new point the Gemara adds: Shmuel requires knowledge at both times.
8. 8. The Mishnah in Gittin: for a woman's divorce document the court compels the husband to give it. The 'etc.' refers to the rest of that Mishnah.
9. 9. A notice (modaa) is a written declaration annulling or protesting a document. Here it means a notice handed over together with the get.
10. 10. 'What might one think' - the Gemara's way of raising a possible misreading of the ruling before rejecting it.
11. 11. The Gemara asks why the Mishnah says 'until he gives' rather than 'until he says'; 'until he says' means until he cancels his notice.
12. 12. Hadran: the formula at the end of a chapter, naming the chapter and returning to its study.
13. 13. A court appraisal (shuma) is an official valuation before land is sold to pay a debt. The Mishnah sets thirty days for orphans and sixty for consecrated property.
14. 14. 'Courts that come down to the property' - courts that seize a debtor's property and sell it to pay a creditor.
15. 15. The gizbar is the treasurer responsible for Temple property. Hekdesh is property dedicated to the Temple.
16. 16. Rav Yehuda's two times: when the workers are sent out from their work and when they are brought back in to it. The Tosafot at the foot discuss why this order is used.
17. 17. 'It is also so taught' - a baraita that repeats the Mishnah's rule with its two proclamation times, supporting Rav Yehuda's explanation.
18. 18. A field's valuation is stated by its yield: how much grain or produce it gives.
19. 19. A ketubah is the sum a husband commits to pay his wife. The buyer undertakes that this sum is paid out of the purchase.
20. 20. A zuz is a small silver coin. Rashi explains that a creditor who takes broken and short zuzim makes a concession, since merchants do not mind such coins.