007b – הכל מעריכין – פרק ראשון – ערכין, דף ז ע”ב

He is merely cutting flesh!^[1]

מחתך בבשר בעלמא הוא - And there is liability only for one who wounds a living being^[2] so that blood comes out.

Rabbah said: It is needed only [to permit] bringing a knife through the public domain.^[3]

And what does he teach us – that we desecrate Shabbos because of a doubt?^[4]

We have [already] learned: One upon whom a collapse fell – in doubt whether he is there or not there, in doubt whether alive or dead, in doubt whether a Canaanite or a Jew – they clear the heap off him!^[5]

You might have said: There, [we desecrate Shabbos] because he had a presumption of life; but here, where it never had a presumption of life from the outset, say no,^[6]

so he teaches us [that we do].

A woman who was executed, etc.:^[7]

But why? They are forbidden in benefit!^[8]

Rav said: When she says, "Give my hair to my daughter."

Had she said, "Give my hand to my daughter," would we give it to her?!^[9]

Rav said: [It speaks] of a wig. The reason is that she said "give"; but had she not said "give," it is her body and becomes forbidden.^[10]

(נהנין בשערה. - (One may benefit from her hair: women whose hair was sparse used to tie the hair of other women to their own, and that is a peah nochris.)^[11]

פיאה - A braid.

בפיאה נכרית - He does not mean her actual hair, but that she had a wig of another woman's hair tied to her own hair [for women whose hair was sparse used to tie the hair of other women to their own, and that is a peah nochris], and she said, "Give it to my daughter." And the Mishnah teaches us that although it is tied to her, since she said "give," she revealed her mind that she does not want it to be like her body, to become forbidden together with her, and it is as if it had been removed during her lifetime.

But Rabbi Yose b'Rabbi Chanina was in doubt about this! For Rabbi Yose b'Rabbi Chanina asked: The hair of righteous women – what is [its law]?^[12]

שער נשים צדקניות - Of an ir hanidachas,^[13] who were not led astray with it – what is [the law]? And Rava said there, in Perek Chelek (Sanhedrin 112a), that he asks about a wig which the righteous woman tied to her hair: is it like her body, and it is saved, or like her property? And we hold (ibid.): The righteous within it go out of it naked, and all their property is burned, as it is written: And you shall gather all its spoil, etc. We see that he was in doubt whether it is like her body or not like her body; so let him resolve it from here, that it is her body, since [our Gemara says] the reason is that she said "give," etc.

And Rava said: It is about a wig that he asks!^[14]

When Rabbi Yose b'Rabbi Chanina asked, it was about [a wig] hanging on a peg; here, where it is attached to her, the reason is that she said "give"; but had she not said "give," it is her body and becomes forbidden.^[15]

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak found this difficult: But [the Mishnah] teaches it parallel to the animal – just as there [it means] its own [hair], so too here, her own [hair]!^[16]

קשיא ליה לר"נ - [Difficult was] that we established our Mishnah as referring to a wig; but [the Mishnah] teaches it parallel to the animal, etc.

Rather, Rav Nachman said: This one – her death forbids her; and that one – its sentence forbids it.^[17]

אלא א"ר נחמן - In truth [it refers] to her actual hair. And as for your difficulty, "They are forbidden in benefit!" – it is no difficulty, for the hair of a dead person is not forbidden in benefit. It is not like the hair of an executed animal, for the woman is forbidden by her death, and hair is not subject to death, since it does not undergo change; but the animal is forbidden by its sentence, as it says in Pesachim, Perek Kol Sha'ah (Pesachim 22b): From the implication of what is said, "The ox shall surely be stoned," do I not know that it is neveilah and forbidden to eat? Why then does the Torah say, "its flesh shall not be eaten"? To tell you that if he slaughtered it after its sentence was decided, it is forbidden. I have only [forbidden] eating; from where [do I know] benefit? etc. Therefore whatever is attached to it at the time of the sentence becomes forbidden with it.

Levi taught [a beraisa] in accordance with Rav; Levi taught [a beraisa] in accordance with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.^[18]

תני לוי כוותיה דרב - Who establishes it as where she said "give," and as referring to a wig.

Levi taught in accordance with Rav: A woman who is going out to be executed and said, "Give my hair to my daughter" – they give it; if she died, they do not give it, because the dead is forbidden in benefit.

מתה - And she did not say "give" – they do not give, etc.

מת אסור בהנאה - As it is written: And Miriam died there, and "there" is derived from "there" [said] of the eglah arufah,^[19] in Maseches Avodah Zarah, Perek Ein Ma'amidin (Avodah Zarah 29b).

That is obvious!^[20]

פשיטא - That for this reason they do not give – because the dead is forbidden in benefit! Rather, it surely means this: the adornments of the dead, such as a wig, are forbidden in benefit. And that is why it teaches this "because" – since it wishes to reveal about it that it does not speak of her actual hair.

Rather, [it means:] the adornments of the dead are forbidden in benefit.^[21]

It was taught in accordance with Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: A woman who died – one may benefit from her hair; an animal that was executed – it is forbidden in benefit.

בהמה שנהרגה אסורה בהנאה - Even its hair.

And what is the difference between this and that?

This one – her death forbids her; and that one – its sentence forbids it.

Chapter Two – Ein Ne'erachin^[22]

Mishnah

One may not be valued for less than a sela, nor for more than fifty sela'im.^[23]

מתני' אין נערכין פחות מסלע - That even a poor man who vows, [being judged] by his means, may not give less than a sela.

ולא יותר על חמשים - For this is the largest of the valuations written in the passage.

How so?

If he gave a sela and [then] became rich, he gives nothing [more];

נתן סלע - A man of twenty, whose value is fifty, who was poor and gave a sela for his value, since a poor man is judged by his means; and [when] he became rich he is exempt.

[if he gave] less than a sela and became rich, he gives fifty sela'im.

נותן חמשים - For with the first payment he did not discharge his valuation, and his valuation is still upon him; and a poor man who valued himself and became rich before payment gives the value of a rich man, as we learn later in Perek Hesseg Yad (Arachin 17b).

If he had five sela'im in his hand – Rabbi Meir says: He gives only one; and the Sages say: He gives all of them.^[24]

היו בידיו חמש סלעים - A poor man of twenty who valued himself and had five sela'im.

One may not be valued for less than a sela, nor for more than fifty sela'im.

Gemara

One may not be valued for less than a sela^[25] – from where do we know this?

As it is written: (Vayikra 27) And every valuation of yours shall be by the holy shekel – all valuations that you value shall not be less than a shekel.^[26]

Nor for more than fifty sela'im – as it is written: fifty.^[27]

If he had five in his hand, etc.:^[28]

What is Rabbi Meir's reason?

It is written "fifty," and it is written "shekel" – either fifty or a shekel.^[29]

And the Rabbanan?

That [verse] comes [to teach] that all valuations that you value shall not be less than a shekel;

גמ' ההוא לכל ערכין שאתה מעריך הוא דאתא - That even the poorest of the poor may not give less; but where he has more, he gives, as it is written: according to what he can afford.

Where he has [more], the verse says: (Vayikra 27) According to what the hand of the vower can afford – and his hand can afford it.^[30]

And Rabbi Meir?

That [verse] comes [to teach]: the hand of the vower, and not the hand of the one vowed about.^[31]

יד הנודר ולא יד הנידר - That a poor man who valued a rich man gives the value of a poor man.

And the Rabbanan? Do you not learn from it by implication that where his hand can afford it, we take from him?^[32]

לאו ממילא שמעינן מינה כו' - Although the verse comes for this – and not the hand of the one vowed about – nevertheless "according to what he can afford" is written, and by implication you learn that where his hand can afford it, we take from him.

Rav Adda bar Ahavah said: If he had five sela'im in his hand, and said, "My value is upon me," and then said again, "My value is upon me," and he gave four to the second and one to the first, he has discharged both of them.^[33]

ונתן ד' לשניה - By the kohen's assessment^[34] he discharged both; and even according to the Rabbanan, since he gave to the second first.

What is the reason?

A later creditor who went ahead and collected – what he collected, he collected.^[35]

מה שגבה גבה - Therefore, when he gives to the first, he gives her all that he has; and regarding the second, one cannot say, "Why did he not give all five?" – because at the time he gave to the second he was obligated to the first, for even what he gave her [the second] is not hers.

At the time he gave to the second, he was obligated to the first; at the time he gave to the first, he had nothing more.^[36]

Tosfos

אין נערכין פחות מסלע וכו' - Less than a sela and became rich – not exactly less than a sela; rather, even if he gave the whole valuation except for one sela, we roll the whole upon him.^[37]

ההוא יד הנודר ולא יד הנידר - And if you ask: what reason would there be to include the one vowed about, that a verse was needed to exclude [him]? One can answer: since the verse writes ("fifty") (Vayikra 27) And every valuation of yours shall be by the holy shekel – that no valuation be less than a shekel – and we find a valuation of fifty, it would have entered our mind that this rule of [judging by] means we know by reasoning, and we would follow the one vowed about. The verse "according to what the hand of the vower can afford" teaches us that we do not follow the one vowed about.^[38]

בעידנא דיהיב לראשון לית ליה - It is puzzling: at the time he vowed to the first he had five sela'im; how then is he exempt when he gave them one? Have we not learned in Perek Hesseg Yad (later, 17b): [If] he was rich – meaning at the time of the vow – and became poor – when he came to pay the kohen – or poor – when he vowed and gave nothing – and became rich, he gives the value of a rich man? And Rabbeinu says^[39] that the case later on is specifically where the kohen assessed him while he was still rich, and therefore when he becomes poor he still gives a rich man's value; but if he vowed when rich and was not assessed, and became poor, he gives a poor man's value. And in our sugya it is so: he gave four to the second – the kohen first assessed him for the second, and then assessed him for the first, and by his [assessment] he gave one for the first; therefore he is exempt from it, since he was not assessed for it while the five sela'im were in his hand.

Notes

1. 1. This continues the sugya from the previous amud [Arachin 7a]. Shmuel taught that if a woman sat on the birthstool and died on Shabbos, one brings a knife, cuts open her belly and takes out the child. The Gemara asked: That is obvious – what [forbidden labor] is he doing? Now it explains: he is merely cutting the flesh of a corpse.
2. 2. Chovel – wounding a living creature so that blood comes out is a derivative of the melachah of slaughtering and is forbidden on Shabbos. Cutting the flesh of a dead body is not wounding at all.
3. 3. Carrying an object into or through the public domain is a Torah-level melachah. Shmuel teaches that one may bring the knife through the public domain, desecrating Shabbos, even though it is uncertain whether the baby is alive.
4. 4. The question assumes that a doubtful danger to life already overrides Shabbos, as a Mishnah states explicitly; so what does Shmuel add?
5. 5. The Mishnah in Yoma [Yoma 83a]: the heap is cleared off him on Shabbos, even though every side is in doubt.
6. 6. Chezkas chayim – a presumption of life. The man under the rubble was known to be alive beforehand; the fetus was never established as a living being in its own right, so one might have thought that Shabbos is not desecrated for it.
7. 7. The Gemara returns to the Mishnah [Arachin 7a]: a woman executed by beis din – one may benefit from her hair; an animal executed by beis din – it is forbidden in benefit.
8. 8. A corpse is forbidden in benefit (see Rashi below). Her hair is part of her body, so why is it permitted?
9. 9. That is, her words cannot remove a part of her own body from the prohibition on benefit from the dead.
10. 10. A peah nochris is the hair of another woman tied to her own. While attached it counts as her body, but by saying "give" she showed that she does not want it treated as her body.
11. 11. This parenthetical comment explains the Mishnah's words "one may benefit from her hair" [Arachin 7a]; its words recur in brackets inside Rashi ד"ה בפיאה נכרית.
12. 12. Rabbi Yose b'Rabbi Chanina – an Amora of Eretz Yisrael, a disciple of Rabbi Yochanan. His question is recorded in Sanhedrin [Sanhedrin 112a] regarding an ir hanidachas.
13. 13. Ir hanidachas – a city most of whose inhabitants worshipped idols. Its sinners are executed and all its spoil is burned [Devarim 13:17], even the property of the righteous within it.
14. 14. Rava – one of the great Amoraim of Bavel. According to him Rabbi Yose was in doubt about a wig, whereas Rav takes it as plain that, without "give," it is like her body.
15. 15. Sichta – a peg. Rabbi Yose's doubt concerned a wig hanging on a peg, not on the woman; while it is attached to her hair it is certainly like her body.
16. 16. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak – a Babylonian Amora of the fourth generation. The Mishnah parallels the woman with the animal, and for the animal it means its own hair; so too for the woman.
17. 17. "Rav Nachman" here is Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak. A person becomes forbidden only by death, and hair is not subject to death; but an ox condemned to stoning becomes forbidden from the moment its sentence is decided [Pesachim 22b], so whatever is attached to it then is forbidden with it.
18. 18. Levi – Levi bar Sisi, a disciple of Rebbi who compiled beraisos. He taught two beraisos: one supporting Rav and one supporting Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak.
19. 19. Of Miriam it says, "And Miriam died there" [Bamidbar 20:1], and of the eglah arufah, "and they shall break its neck there" [Devarim 21:4]. Just as the eglah arufah is forbidden in benefit, so is a corpse.
20. 20. That is: it is obvious that a corpse is forbidden in benefit; why does the beraisa need to spell out the reason?
21. 21. Shinuyei hames – the adornments attached to the dead, such as a wig. The beraisa teaches that these are forbidden, which shows that it speaks of a wig and not her own hair, as Rav said.
22. 22. Here begins the second chapter, Ein Ne'erachin, which deals with minimum and maximum measures in arachin and in other laws.
23. 23. Arachin – one who says "My value is upon me" gives the Temple treasury a sum fixed by the Torah according to age and sex [Vayikra 27:1–8]. A poor man is judged by hesseg yad, what he can afford, but never less than a sela. The largest valuation is fifty.
24. 24. A poor man whose value is fifty has five sela'im: according to Rabbi Meir one sela suffices; according to the Sages he gives all he has.
25. 25. The Gemara returns to the opening clause of the Mishnah: even the poorest of the poor cannot discharge his valuation with less than a sela. It asks for the source.
26. 26. The verse is [Vayikra 27:25]. The holy shekel is a sela, four dinarim. "Every valuation of yours" – every valuation, even a poor man's.
27. 27. "Fifty shekels of silver" [Vayikra 27:3] – the value of a male from twenty to sixty, the largest of the valuations.
28. 28. The Gemara returns to the last clause of the Mishnah: a poor man who has five sela'im – Rabbi Meir says he gives one; the Sages say all five.
29. 29. That is, the Torah set only two amounts – fifty for the rich and a shekel for the poor – and nothing in between.
30. 30. The verse [Vayikra 27:8]: "According to what the vower can afford, the kohen shall value him" – the kohen assesses by his means, so one who has five gives five.
31. 31. The noder is the one who vows ("the value of so-and-so is upon me"); the nidar is the person whose value was vowed. A poor man who valued a rich man pays according to his own means, not the rich man's.
32. 32. That is, from the very words "according to what he can afford" we learn that we collect according to his means; no other verse is needed.
33. 33. Rav Adda bar Ahavah – a Babylonian Amora, a disciple of Rav. The case: a poor man vowed two valuations, one after the other.
34. 34. By the kohen's assessment – the valuation is fixed when the vower stands before the kohen, who assesses him by his means [Vayikra 27:8].
35. 35. A later creditor who collected first – although the earlier creditor had the prior lien, what he has already collected is not taken from him. So too the second valuation, paid first, keeps its four sela'im.
36. 36. That is, when he paid the first he had only one sela left, and a poor man gives what he has. The sugya continues on the next amud [Arachin 8a] with the reverse case: four to the first and one to the second.
37. 37. "We roll the whole upon him" – if he paid all of the valuation but one sela and then became rich, he owes the full value of a rich man, since the earlier payment counts for nothing.
38. 38. Tosfos ask why a verse is needed to exclude the nidar, and answer: since the Torah set a minimum and a valuation of fifty, one would have thought that the rule of means is known by reasoning and follows the nidar.
39. 39. Rabbeinu – the teacher of the Tosafist. In his view, one who became poor still gives a rich man's value only if the kohen assessed him while rich; here the kohen assessed him for the first only after he had paid four to the second.