שבועות דף יח ע"ב

And we learned [the distinction between the long way and the short way] only with regard to the Mikdash!^[1]

ואנן במקדש תנן - and it should have taught the case of a niddah together with it as well.

Rather, [it is not taught] because they are not similar: the long way here is the short way there, and the long way there is the short way here.

ומשני משום דלא דמו - for the long way here (waiting before withdrawing) is exempt, like the short way there, and the short way here (withdrawing at once) is liable, like the long way there.

Rav Huna the son of Rav Nasan challenged this: Did Abaye really say “he is an anus”^[2] — which shows that we are speaking of a case not near her vest^[3]?

אלמא בשלא סמוך לוסתה - is the case our Mishnah is dealing with. For if it were near her vest, and he erred thinking “I may have relations”, he would be shogeg both on the entry and on the withdrawal, since he should have considered that she might say “I have become tamei”; and if one who is with a forbidden relation with a flaccid organ is liable, then when he withdraws with a flaccid organ he too should be liable, for there is no compulsion here.

But it is Abaye who said “he is liable to two”^[4] — which shows that we are dealing with a case near her vest!

והאמר אביי - above, on our Mishnah: “he is liable to two”; and we can only set that near her vest, with one who is a scholar regarding one [prohibition] and not a scholar regarding the other, as we established above.

When Abaye’s statement was said, it was said in general [and not about our Mishnah].

כי איתמר דאביי - that he is liable to two was said in general, and not on our Mishnah. For our Mishnah, since it distinguishes between withdrawing with a flaccid organ and withdrawing erect, deals with a case not near her vest; therefore if he withdrew with a flaccid organ he is exempt, for he is an anus, and if he withdrew erect he is liable, for he should have withdrawn with little pleasure. And what Abaye said above, “liable to two”, was said in general as a separate ruling, and was said thus: one who is with a pure woman near her vest, and erred thinking “I may have relations”, and she said to him “I have become tamei”, is liable to two; and there is no distinction between withdrawing erect and withdrawing flaccid, for one who is with a forbidden relation with a flaccid organ is also liable, and this man was unwitting from the start regarding both; and it is with one who is a scholar regarding one and not the other, as we established, so that it is not like two olive-sizes of chelev eaten in one lapse of awareness.

Rabbi Yonasan ben Yosei ben Lakonya asked Rabbi Shimon ben Yosei ben Lakonya: The prohibition for one who has relations with a niddah — where is it found in the Torah?

He took a clod of earth and threw it at him: A prohibition for one who has relations with a niddah?! (Vayikra 18:19) “And to a woman in the separation of her impurity you shall not approach”!

שקל קלא - a lump of earth.

פתק ביה - threw it at him.

Rather, [he was asking about] the prohibition for one who is with a pure woman and she says to him “I have become tamei” — that he must not withdraw immediately: from where do we know it?

Chizkiyah said: The verse says (Vayikra 15:24) “and her impurity be upon him” — even at the time of her impurity [he must remain] upon her.

We have found a positive commandment; a negative commandment — from where do we know it?^[5]

Rav Pappa said: The verse says “you shall not approach”; and “you shall not approach” also means “you shall not withdraw”, as it is written (Yeshayahu 65:5): “Who say: Keep to yourself, do not come near me, for I am holier than you”.

קרב אליך - keep to yourself. The scoffers of the generation would say to the prophet: Keep to yourself, do not touch me, lest I make you tamei, for you are holy and I am tamei. קדשתיך means “I would defile you”, as in (Chaggai 2) “If a man carries holy flesh”, and as in (Devarim 22) “lest it become forbidden”.

Our Rabbis taught: (Vayikra 15:31) “And you shall separate the children of Israel from their impurity” — Rabbi Yoshiyah said: From here is a prohibition for the children of Israel that they separate from their wives near their vest.

והזרתם - and you shall separate, as in “and they shall separate themselves”.

אזהרה לישראל וכו' - for next to it is “and of her who is unwell in her niddah”, in that same passage.

And how long [before]?

Rabbah said: An onah.

עונה - it is explained in Maseches Niddah: either a day or a night. If her vest is by day, he separates the whole day, and if her vest is at night, he separates the whole night; so it is explained in Maseches Niddah, perek Ha’ishah (63b).

Rabbi Yochanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: Whoever does not separate from his wife near her vest, even if he has sons like the sons of Aharon^[6] — they die, as it is written “And you shall separate the children of Israel from their impurity … and of her who is unwell in her niddah”, and next to it: “After the death”.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Whoever separates from his wife near her vest will have male children, as it is written (Vayikra 11:47) “To distinguish between the impure and the pure”, and next to it: “If a woman conceives and bears a male”.

ולהבדיל כו' - one who separates between tumah and taharah — his wife will bear a male.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: He will have sons fit to issue halachic rulings, as it is written (Vayikra 10:10-11) “To distinguish … and to teach”.

להבדיל ולהורות - it is written in the passage about those who have drunk wine: “and to distinguish between the holy and the profane, between the impure etc.” and “to teach the children of Israel”.

Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: Whoever makes havdalah over wine at the conclusion of Shabbos^[7] will have male children, as it is written “To distinguish between the holy and the profane”, and it is written there “To distinguish between the impure and the pure”, and next to it: “If a woman conceives”.

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Sons fit to issue halachic rulings, as it is written “To distinguish … and to teach”.

Rabbi Binyamin bar Yefes said in the name of Rabbi Elazar: Whoever sanctifies himself at the time of relations will have male children, as it is stated (Vayikra 11:44) “You shall sanctify yourselves and you shall be holy”, and next to it: “If a woman conceives”.

המקדש עצמו בתשמיש - in a modest manner.

“Rabbi Eliezer says: The sheretz, and it was hidden from him, etc.”^[8]

What is the difference between them?

Chizkiyah said: Sheretz and neveilah is the difference between them.^[9] Rabbi Eliezer holds: we require that he know whether he became tamei through a sheretz or through a neveilah; and Rabbi Akiva holds: we do not require that he know, for since he knows that he became tamei at all, he need not [know] whether he became tamei through a sheretz or through a neveilah.

שרץ ונבלה - one tamei through a sheretz or tamei through a neveilah: at the first awareness he knew that he had touched a sheretz or a neveilah, but did not know which of them; he then erred, and that tumah was hidden from him when he ate kodesh.

And so said Ulla: Sheretz and neveilah is the difference between them.

For Ulla raised a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Eliezer and another statement of Rabbi Eliezer, and resolved it:

Did Rabbi Eliezer say that we require that he know whether he became tamei through a sheretz or through a neveilah?

But contrast it: Rabbi Eliezer said: “Whichever way you take it: if he ate chelev he is liable; if he ate nosar he is liable; if he desecrated Shabbos he is liable; if he desecrated Yom Kippur he is liable; if he had relations with his wife a niddah he is liable; if with his sister he is liable!”^[10]

מה נפשך - it is a Mishnah in Kerisos: “Chelev and nosar were before him; he ate one of them unwittingly and does not know which of them it was; or Shabbos and Yom Kippur — he did work on one of them and does not know on which; his wife a niddah and his sister were with him in the house — he erred with one of them and does not know with which: Rabbi Eliezer obligates a chatas and Rabbi Yehoshua exempts. Rabbi Eliezer said: Whichever way you take it, etc.”

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: “It says (Vayikra 4:23) ‘Or if his sin in which he sinned is made known to him’ — until it is made known to you in what he sinned.”

And he resolved it: There, the Merciful One said “in which he sinned … and he shall bring” — any sin at all.

אשר חטא והביא אמר רחמנא - “or if his sin in which he sinned is made known to him … and he shall bring”; and this word בה which Rabbi Yehoshua expounds, Rabbi Eliezer uses later in our sugya for another exposition.

Here, since it is written (Vayikra 5:2) “any impure thing”, why do I need “or the carcass of an impure sheretz”?

Learn from it: we require that he know whether he became tamei through a sheretz or through a neveilah.

And Rabbi Akiva — since …

אלמא שלא בסמוך לוסתה עסקינן - Rashi explained: for if it were near her vest, since one who is with [a forbidden relation] with a flaccid organ is liable, when he withdraws with a flaccid organ he too is liable. His explanation implies that he is liable to two even when he withdraws with a flaccid organ, and therefore, although he is liable for the entry, he is liable for the withdrawal as well. So too he explained shortly after, on “when Abaye’s statement was said, it was said in general”, that it is a separate ruling, said thus: one who is with a pure woman near her vest, and erred thinking “I may have relations”, and she said to him “I have become tamei”, is liable to two, and there is no distinction between withdrawing erect and withdrawing flaccid. It seems that this is his view: since he came to her near her vest, from the start he erred on both the entry and the withdrawal, and when she told him “I have become tamei”, that is an awareness dividing the error of entry from the error of withdrawal; and the time of withdrawal counts as an error even though at that time he knows he is now with a niddah, since it came to him through the entry. But it is difficult: above it is implied that liability to two is found only with one who is a scholar regarding one and not the other, while by this explanation it is found with one who is a scholar regarding both, e.g. where he withdrew flaccid. One may answer that it was set with a scholar regarding one and not the other because [that Gemara] holds that one who is with [her] flaccid is exempt, so he is liable to two only where he withdrew immediately; and what Rashi mentioned here, “with a scholar regarding one and not the other, as we established”, he explained so because of withdrawing erect. But it is difficult, for in Maseches Shabbos at the end of perek Hazorek (Shabbos 102a), on what we learned, “This is the rule: all who are liable to chatas offerings are not liable unless the beginning and end [of the act] are unwitting”^[11], it is proven that if he threw a stone and remembered after it left his hand, he is exempt, even though at first it left his hand unwittingly and he could no longer bring it back. It seems rather that he infers from Abaye’s calling him an anus that we are dealing with a case not near her vest; for if it were near her vest, he could not be called an anus, since he was negligent at the time of entry, and he would be exempt only because it is one error, everything having come through the first error. And if you ask: what forced Abaye to set the Mishnah not at the time of her vest and to exempt him completely where he withdrew flaccid? Let him set it near her vest and apply the Mishnah’s “exempt” to the withdrawal. One may answer that the wording of the Mishnah implies to him that he is completely exempt where he did not withdraw immediately.

אמר קרא ותהי נדתה עליו - He expounds “upon him”, but he does not expound ותהי, for that is needed for what is expounded in perek Hacholetz (Yevamos 49b), that even at the time of her niddah, kiddushin takes effect with her.^[12]

לא תעשה מנ"ל - for one is liable to a chatas only if the sin carries a negative commandment, just as with Pesach and milah.

Notes

1. 1. Rabbah bar Chanan objected to Abaye (18a): according to you, the case of a niddah also has a distinction between a “long way” and a “short way” (withdrawing after waiting, or at once), yet the Mishnah teaches that distinction only for tumah in the Mikdash.
2. 2. An anus is one who transgresses through circumstances beyond his control, with no negligence at all; he is exempt from a korban. A shogeg, by contrast, should have been careful and so brings a chatas.
3. 3. A vest is the set time at which a woman regularly expects her period. Near that time a husband must separate from her, so one who is with her then is negligent and cannot be called an anus.
4. 4. Abaye ruled earlier (18a) that such a man brings two chatas offerings, one for entering and one for withdrawing. A chatas is owed only by a shogeg, which fits only a case near her vest.
5. 5. A chatas is brought only for a negative commandment whose deliberate violation carries kares (see Tosfos). So a positive commandment alone is not enough; a lav against withdrawing is needed.
6. 6. Nadav and Avihu, the sons of Aharon, died when they brought a strange fire. The passage of “After the death of the two sons of Aharon” (Vayikra 16:1) stands right after the laws of niddah.
7. 7. Havdalah is the blessing said at the end of Shabbos distinguishing between holy and profane. The preferred way is to say it over a cup of wine.
8. 8. The Mishnah (14b): Rabbi Eliezer learns from “or the carcass of a sheretz … and it is hidden from him” (Vayikra 5:2) that the korban is owed for forgetting the tumah, not for forgetting the Mikdash; Rabbi Akiva learns the same from “and it is hidden from him, and he is tamei”. Since both agree in law, the Gemara asks what difference there is between them.
9. 9. A korban oleh v’yored for entering the Mikdash or eating kodashim while tamei is owed only when he knew of his tumah at first, then forgot it when he entered or ate, and learned of it at the end.
10. 10. Nosar is meat of a korban left past its permitted time. The case: he ate a piece that was either chelev or nosar, and does not know which. Rabbi Eliezer obligates a chatas since he certainly sinned; Rabbi Yehoshua exempts him until he knows what his sin was.
11. 11. A chatas is owed only when the act was unwitting from beginning to end; if he became aware in the middle, he is exempt.
12. 12. Although relations with a niddah carry kares, kiddushin still takes effect with her, unlike the other arayos.