SHABBOS - 073a – כלל גדול – פרק שביעי – שבת, עג ע”א

But rather, is it not that the first clause speaks of idolatry and the latter clause of other mitzvos?^[1]

“And one who erred without intent, in other mitzvos”^[2] — what is the case? Where he thought it was permitted fat, and ate it.

דסבור שומן הוא ואכלו - That is, he erred: he thought it was permitted fat and did not intend to eat chelev, and he is liable. Even though according to Rava he is a mis’asek^[3], since he did not intend to eat something forbidden, he is liable, for Shmuel said in Kerisos (ch. 4, 19b): “With forbidden fats and forbidden relations, a mis’asek is liable, for he has derived pleasure”^[4]; but on Shabbos he is exempt, for he derived no pleasure. And this supports Rava’s own view, who said: one who intended to cut something detached and cut something attached is exempt.

“Which is not so on Shabbos”, where he is exempt — where he intended to cut something detached and cut something attached: he is exempt.^[5]

And according to Abaye, “he erred without intent” — what is the case? Where he thought it was saliva, and swallowed it.

ואביי - He would tell you: in truth, in a case like that, even on Shabbos he is liable, for he is not a mis’asek. And what is the case of a mis’asek in other mitzvos who is liable? He thought it was saliva — it was melted chelev — and swallowed it. He did not intend to eat, for saliva is not something one eats but something one swallows, as it is written (Iyov 7:19): “till I swallow my spittle”; and an act of eating came about in his hand, though he had not intended to eat. And its parallel on Shabbos, where he is exempt: he intended to lift something, and an act of cutting came about in his hand.

“Which is not so on Shabbos”, where he is exempt — where he intended to lift something detached and cut something attached: he is exempt.^[6]

But if he intended to cut something detached and cut something attached — he is liable.

It was stated: If he intended to throw two amos and threw four^[7] —

Rava says: He is exempt.

Abaye says: He is liable.

Rava says he is exempt — because he did not intend a throw of four.

Abaye says he is liable — because he did intend a throw in general.

If he thought it was a private domain, and it turned out to be a public domain^[8] —

Rava says: He is exempt.

And Abaye says: He is liable.

Rava says he is exempt — because he did not intend a forbidden throw.

דהא לא איכוין לזריקה דאיסור - For him to be a shogeg, he must be erring about Shabbos or about the melachah^[9]; but this one errs neither about Shabbos nor about the melachos. Rather, he was occupied with something permitted, and a forbidden act came about in his hand.

And Abaye says he is liable — because he did intend a throw in general.

And it is necessary [to state both cases].

וצריכא - For them to dispute in all of them, even though they resemble one another.

For if it had taught us only the first case,

in that one Rava says so, because he did not intend a forbidden cutting;

but where he intended to throw two and threw four — since four cannot be thrown without two,

דארבע בלא תרתי לא מזדריק - And this one, who intended two and threw four, his intention was carried out, since two are included in four; therefore he is not a mis’asek.

say he agrees with Abaye.

And if it had taught us only this case — in this one Rava says so, because he did not intend a throw of four;

דלא איכוין לזריקה דארבע - And less than this, the name “throwing” does not apply to it.

but where he thought it was a private domain and it turned out to be a public domain, where he did intend a throw of four,

אבל כסבור רה"י הוא וכו' - For he intended a complete throw.

say he agrees with Abaye. It is necessary.

We learned: “The primary melachos are forty less one.”

And we discussed it: Why do I need the count?^[10]

And Rabbi Yochanan said: “That if he did them all in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each and every one.”^[11]

Granted according to Abaye, who says that in a case like this he is liable, you find it: where he knew that Shabbos is forbidden and knew the prohibition of the melachos, but erred in the minimum amounts.^[12]

משכחת לה - For this one, from whom the teaching of all the laws of Shabbos was forgotten, and nevertheless it counts for him as deliberate knowledge of Shabbos with error about the melachos^[13], to make him liable for each one: e.g., he knew Shabbos with its prohibitions but erred in the amounts, intending less than the minimum and doing a full minimum — for all of them have a minimum amount.

But according to Rava, who says he is exempt, how do you find it?

אלא לרבא דאמר פטור היכי משכחת לה - That a person should be liable for each and every melachah done in one lapse of awareness, you must necessarily find it with deliberate knowledge of Shabbos and error about the melachos. But here, where all of them were hidden from him, what deliberate knowledge of Shabbos is there? By what is Shabbos distinguished for him from other days?

With deliberate knowledge of Shabbos and error about the melachos.

This works well if he holds like Rabbi Yochanan, who says: once he erred regarding the kares, even though he was deliberate regarding the lav^[14] — you find it where he knew Shabbos by its lav.

But if he holds like Reish Lakish, who says: not until he errs regarding both the lav and the kares — by what did he know Shabbos?

He knew it through techumin, and according to Rabbi Akiva.^[15]

MISHNAH

The primary melachos are forty less one:^[16] one who sows, plows, reaps, binds sheaves, threshes, winnows, selects, grinds, sifts, kneads and bakes; one who shears the wool, whitens it, combs it, dyes it, spins, stretches the warp, makes two heddle-loops, weaves two threads, and severs two threads; one who ties and unties; sews two stitches; tears in order to sew [two stitches]; traps a deer, slaughters it, flays it, salts it, tans its hide, scrapes it and cuts it; writes two letters, and erases in order to write two letters; builds and demolishes; extinguishes and kindles; strikes with a hammer; carries out from one domain to another. These are the primary melachos, forty less one.

מתני' הזורה - With a winnowing fork, into the wind.

הבורר - Removing refuse by hand.

המרקד - With a sieve. And in the Gemara it challenges: these are all one, for all three are done to separate refuse from food.

האופה - This was not in the Mishkan, for it applies only to bread, and bread has no place in the work of the Mishkan; but all the earlier ones took place with the herbs for the dyes of techeiles, argaman and tola’as shani. And in the Gemara it asks why the Tanna left out cooking, which was done with the herbs, and stated baking. And the minimum for these is the size of a dried fig^[17], except plowing, which is any amount — later, in Perek HaBoneh (103a).

הגוזז צמר - And all the other melachos [that follow] apply to the wool used in the work of the Mishkan.

המלבנו - Washes it in the river.

המנפצו - carpir in the vernacular (to tease fibre or cloth apart into its threads).

המיסך - ordir (to warp: to set out the warp threads for weaving).

בתי נירין - lices (heddles): he put two threads into the heddle-loop. And for shearing, whitening and all the rest, their minimum amounts are explained later, in Perek HaOreg.

הפוצע - He severs: sometimes there is too much in the two threads, and he severs some of it and thins them as needed. And all these, from stretching the warp onward until tying and untying, pertain to the curtains [of the Mishkan]; and later it explains what tying and what untying there was.

ותופר וקורע - This was in the curtains.

על מנת לתפור - Sometimes the hole is round and he cannot sew it neatly unless he tears it, as explained in the Gemara; but tearing not in order to sew was not in the Mishkan.

הצד את הצבי - And all the work on its hide was done with the techashim, for the Mishkan [was covered] with their hides.^[18]

המולחו - For the hide.

ממחקו - Scrapes off its hair.

מחתכו - Trims it and cuts it into straps and sandals.

כותב ומוחק - Later (103b) it explains what need there was for them in the Mishkan: they marked the beams of the Mishkan to know which was each one’s pair, writing a letter on this one and a letter on that one; and erasing — sometimes he made a mistake.

מכבה ומבעיר - With the fire under the cauldron of herbs.

מכה בפטיש - This is the finishing of every work, for a craftsman strikes with a mallet on the anvil to smooth it at the finish of the work; and our Mishnah too makes him liable for it only at the completion of a work.^[19]

אלא לאו רישא בע"ז וסיפא בשאר מצות - Ri finds it difficult: let it set the whole [beraisa] in other mitzvos. And what is “which is not so in other mitzvos”? E.g., he slaughtered and sprinkled [the blood] outside^[20], where he is liable only once, as Abaye said in Perek Echad Dinei Mamonos (Sanhedrin 34b): “‘There you shall do’ — Scripture made them one act”; and Rabbi Abahu too, who disagrees, agrees that according to Rabbi Yishmael for slaughtering and sprinkling, and according to Rabbi Akiva for offering up and sprinkling, he is liable only once, since they come from one verse. And “he erred without intent” would be, e.g., where he intended to slaughter an animal of chullin and needed one of chullin, and it turned out to be of kodashim; and its parallel on Shabbos: he intended to cut something detached and it turned out to be attached, and he needed only the detached, where he is exempt because we require meleches machsheves. And one may answer: we cannot explain it so, for it implies that he is exempt on Shabbos because he erred without intent, whereas in such a case even if he intended this attached item and it turned out to be another attached item he is exempt, for that is not meleches machsheves. Nor can it be set where his intention was carried out — e.g., he needed to cut what he cut, only he thought it detached and it turned out to be attached — that cannot be said, for in such a case, if he is exempt regarding Shabbos from “whereby he sinned”, he is also exempt regarding [slaughter] outside. But it is still difficult: let it set the whole in other mitzvos, e.g., one who was lain with by a male and lay with a male, or lay with an animal and brought an animal upon himself, where both for Abaye and for Rabbi Abahu, according to Rabbi Akiva, he is liable only once. And then “he erred without intent” fits well: on Shabbos he is exempt by “whereby he sinned”, even where his intention was carried out, while with forbidden relations he is not exempt, for he derived pleasure.

העושה שני בתי נירין - One must explain why [the Tanna] specified a minimum here, and with weaving, severing, sewing and writing, more than with the rest.

הקושר והמתיר - It needs study whether one is liable for untying not in order to tie, or not. And from the fact that it does not teach it, the way it teaches “erasing in order to write”, nothing can be inferred, for likewise it does not teach demolishing in order to build, and in Perek Bameh Madlikin (above, 31b) we say explicitly that we require demolishing in order to build. And according to what Rashi explained in the Gemara (74b) — that if two knots happened next to each other on two adjacent threads, he unties one and leaves one — it implies that he is liable without intending to tie; but the word kitra does not imply his explanation. Rabbeinu Chananel, however, explained — and so it is implied in the Yerushalmi — that when a thread broke in two places and was knotted, they untie the two knots, throw away the middle piece, and tie the two ends to each other again, so there is only one knot; and accordingly it implies that untying must be in order to tie. And why it is not taught with untying and with demolishing, I explained in Perek 2 (31b, s.v. וסותר).

Notes

1. 1. The Gemara is analysing the beraisa (72b) that lists where Shabbos is stricter than other mitzvos and where other mitzvos are stricter than Shabbos. It now proposes that the first clause speaks of avodah zarah, and the latter clause of the rest of the mitzvos.
2. 2. “Erring without intent” means he did not intend the forbidden act at all, but something else that is permitted. In other prohibitions, such as eating chelev, he still brings a chatas; on Shabbos he is exempt — “which is not so on Shabbos.” The Gemara asks what case the clause means.
3. 3. A mis’asek does a forbidden act while intending something else entirely, unlike a shogeg, who intends the act but does not know it is forbidden. On Shabbos a mis’asek is exempt, because the Torah forbids only meleches machsheves, purposeful work.
4. 4. Chelev is certain fats of a domestic animal, forbidden under penalty of kares. With eating and forbidden relations the person has enjoyed the act itself, so even an unintended act brings a chatas.
5. 5. Cutting a plant still attached to the ground is the melachah of reaping, while cutting something already detached is permitted. Rava holds that one who meant to cut a detached item and cut an attached one is a mis’asek, and exempt on Shabbos.
6. 6. For Abaye, the mis’asek exemption on Shabbos applies only when he did not intend any act of cutting at all, e.g. he meant only to lift. If he meant to cut and did cut, he is a shogeg and liable, even though he thought the item was detached.
7. 7. Throwing an object four amos in the public domain is a melachah (derived from carrying out); less than four amos is no melachah. Here he intended a throw of two amos, which is permitted, and it went four.
8. 8. He threw four amos thinking he was in a private domain, where throwing is permitted, and it turned out to be a public domain, where throwing four amos is a melachah.
9. 9. A shogeg who brings a chatas either forgot that it was Shabbos, or knew it was Shabbos but did not know this work is forbidden. This thrower knew both; he erred only about the place.
10. 10. The Mishnah below lists the melachos one by one and then states their number. The Gemara (69a) asked what the number adds, since the list itself shows how many there are.
11. 11. He’elem echad, one lapse of awareness: all the acts were done before he realized his error. The count teaches that here he brings a separate chatas for each melachah, up to thirty-nine.
12. 12. Each melachah has a minimum amount for liability. One who knows every melachah is forbidden, but intends to do less than the minimum and does a full measure, is a shogeg about each melachah. For Abaye he is liable, so the case of thirty-nine chata’os is found.
13. 13. Zedon Shabbos, shigegas melachos: he knew it was Shabbos but did not know these labors were forbidden, so each melachah is a separate sin needing its own chatas. If he forgot it was Shabbos, one chatas covers the whole Shabbos.
14. 14. Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish (Shabbos 69a) differ on what counts as erring for a chatas: Rabbi Yochanan says it is enough that he did not know the act carries kares, even if he knew of the lav; Reish Lakish requires that he know neither.
15. 15. Techumin is the Shabbos limit of 2000 amos beyond one’s place. Rabbi Akiva holds it is a Torah prohibition, a lav without kares; so one who knows only that knows Shabbos, while erring about all the melachos.
16. 16. Avos melachos: the thirty-nine categories of work forbidden on Shabbos, learned from the labors done in building the Mishkan. Labors that resemble them are toldos, derivatives, and carry the same liability.
17. 17. A dried fig (gerogeres) is the standard measure of food for liability on Shabbos.
18. 18. The tachash was an animal whose hides formed one of the coverings of the Mishkan (Shemos 26:14). Its trapping, slaughter and hide-work are the source of the melachos from trapping to cutting.
19. 19. Makeh bapatish, the “hammer blow”: any act that completes a vessel or a piece of work, even a small one, is a melachah under this heading.
20. 20. Shechutei chutz: slaughtering or offering a sacrifice outside the Beis HaMikdash, forbidden under kares. Tosfos asks whether the “other mitzvos” clause could mean this, where slaughtering and sprinkling outside together bring only one chatas.