Parshas Kedoshim
1. Regarding the command of "מדות ומשקלות" ("measures and weights") (in our parshah)1 — in connection with which the Torah says (after "לא תעשו עול במשפט במדה גו׳ מאזני צדק גו׳" ("You shall not commit injustice in judgment, in measure… honest scales…")) "אני ה׳ אשר הוצאתי אתכם מארץ מצרים" ("I am the L‑rd who took you out of the land of Egypt") — the Rambam brings2 (from Toras Kohanim3): "וכל הכופר במצות מדות ככופר ביציאת מצרים שהיא תחילת הציווי. וכל המקבל עליו מצות מדות הרי זה מודה ביציאת מצרים שהיא גרמה לכל הצוויין" ("Whoever denies the mitzvah of measures is as one who denies the Exodus from Egypt, which was the beginning of the command; and whoever accepts upon himself the mitzvah of measures thereby acknowledges the Exodus from Egypt, which brought about all the commands").
What is the connection of "the mitzvah of measures" specifically to Yetzias Mitzrayim?
The Maggid Mishneh4 explains that "השוקל במדה חסירה הוא כעובר עבירה בסתר . . שהוא כופר בהשגחה . . ויצי״מ היו בה מופתים מחודשים והם מורים על החדוש ועל ההשגחה" ("one who weighs with a deficient measure is like one who commits a sin in secret… for he denies Divine Providence5… and Yetzias Mitzrayim involved unprecedented wonders, and they attest to the creation [of the world] and to Divine Providence").
However, this needs to be understood: theft too is "like one who commits a sin in secret… for he denies Divine Providence," as stated explicitly by our Sages6, that the severity of theft compared to robbery is due to the fact that "כביכול עשה עין של מטה כאילו אינה רואה ואוזן כו׳ אינה שומעת" ("he has, as it were, treated the Eye Above as if it does not see, and the Ear etc. as if it does not hear") — and nevertheless, it is not stated regarding the general prohibition of theft that "whoever denies the (mitzvah of) theft is as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim."
Similarly with the general prohibition of onaah (deceiving) [in which "the mitzvah of measures" too is "נכלל בכלל לא תונו איש את עמיתו" ("included7 in the general category of 'You shall not wrong one another'8")]: its content is that one deceives the other person, and consequently it is (just like "the mitzvah of measures") "like one who commits a sin in secret… for he denies Divine Providence"9. And similarly with many other mitzvos that are sins committed in secret10 — and so the question returns to its place: what is the unique aspect of the mitzvah of measures, that specifically regarding it11 it is said, "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures is as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim"?
2. One also needs to understand the wording of the Rambam — "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures is as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim, which was the beginning of the command; and whoever accepts etc. acknowledges Yetzias Mitzrayim, which brought about all the commands"12:
These words ("which was the beginning of the command," "which brought about all the commands") are not found in Toras Kohanim (the Rambam's source); they are an addition of the Rambam.
This is seemingly puzzling: does the Rambam then need to introduce the novel idea that the greatness of Yetzias Mitzrayim consists in "that it was the beginning of the command… it brought about all the commands"?! The Rambam could have said merely (as in Toras Kohanim) "is as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim"; "acknowledges Yetzias Mitzrayim"?
On the other hand, Yetzias Mitzrayim accomplished so many general matters, and here the Rambam selects specifically this matter — that Yetzias Mitzrayim is "the beginning of the command," "brought about all the commands."
Commentators13 say that the fact that "הכופר במדות . . חשבינן לי׳ ככופר ביצי״מ" ("one who denies [the mitzvah of] measures… we regard him as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim") is "מטעם שהיא תחלת כל הציווים וכל המצות שצוה לנו ה׳ מסתעפים מיצי״מ וא״כ זה הכופר במדות שהוא סעיף מיצי״מ ככופר בה" ("for the reason that it is the beginning of all the commands, and all the mitzvos that G‑d commanded us branch out from Yetzias Mitzrayim; and if so, this one who denies [the mitzvah of] measures, which is a branch of Yetzias Mitzrayim, is as one who denies it").
But seemingly this is forced, because the same point (that "measures" is "a branch of Yetzias Mitzrayim") applies to every command of the Torah14.
3. One may explain this as follows:
The Gemara15 says that the "לאו דכתב רחמנא במשקלות" ("prohibition that the Merciful One wrote regarding weights") (even though "גזל מעליא הוא" ("it is outright robbery")16) serves — "לעבור עליו משעת עשיי׳" ("to make one liable for transgressing it from the time of making [the measure]"). And as the Rambam rules: "כל מי שמשהה בביתו . . מדה חסרה . . עובר בל״ת" ("Anyone who keeps in his house… a deficient measure… transgresses a negative commandment")17; and similarly regarding the positive commandment the Rambam says18: "מ״ע לצדק המאזנים כו׳ יפה יפה ולדקדק בחשבונן בשעת עשייתן" ("It is a positive commandment to make the scales etc. exactly accurate, and to be precise in their calibration at the time they are made")*. The prohibition of deficient measures and weights does not begin with the loss of one's fellow's money, but immediately with the making (and keeping in one's house) of a deficient measure.
[According to this, one can also understand another novel feature found regarding measures and weights, in the wording of the Rambam19 — "התורה הקפידה על המדות בכל שהוא" ("the Torah was particular regarding measures in any amount whatsoever") ("אע״פ שבשאר גזילות לא הקפידה התורה אלא בפרוטה" ("although with other forms of robbery the Torah was particular only about a perutah")20) — because the prohibition of measures and weights is not (only) the loss of one's fellow's money, but the very existence of the deficient measure.]
One may say that the reason for this is not only that the existence of a deficient measure in the house can lead to a stumbling block21 (it can bring about a loss of one's fellow's money), but also that the very existence of the deficient measure in and of itself22 is a severe prohibition23.
The reasoning behind this:
The difference between measures and weights and other forms of theft and deception is:
With other forms of theft and deception, the thief has only one desire — he performs an action through which he takes his fellow's money;
Whereas with measures and weights there are two (opposite) movements: the very fact that he measures and weighs for his fellow is an expression of a mode of conduct that takes his fellow into account; he performs an action that shows a desire not to wrong his fellow24; and together with this, he makes a "deficient measure" — so that the very same act of measuring should bring about the theft of his fellow's money!
And therefore the Torah forbids the very making (and keeping) of a deficient measure (even when in actuality another person will not be wronged by it, as mentioned above) — because the content of "the mitzvah of measures" is to negate this cunning25 within the person, in relation to himself*25.
4. In light of this explanation of the severity of "the mitzvah of measures," the wording "כל הכופר במצות מדות" ("whoever denies the mitzvah of measures") will also be smoothed out — for seemingly:
According to the above explanation of the Maggid Mishneh (that "one who weighs with a deficient measure… denies Divine Providence"), the wording "whoever is not careful with the mitzvah of measures," or "does not accept it upon himself" (in keeping with the continuation of the Rambam's wording26, "and whoever accepts upon himself etc. acknowledges etc."), and the like27, would seemingly have been more fitting. How does the wording "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures" fit, which means (plainly) that he denies the mitzvah, i.e., he denies that G‑d commanded concerning measures?
Based on the above, one can interpret the wording "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures" — that he denies the special (above-mentioned) content of "the mitzvah of measures." He certainly believes that G‑d forbade stealing his fellow's money; but he denies that G‑d gave a command concerning the very making (and keeping) of a deficient measure28 (even apart from the loss to his fellow's money), on account of the cunning in his heart.
And concerning this the Rambam says29, "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures is as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim" — because the matter of Yetzias Mitzrayim is — according to the Rambam's view — connected with the fact that G‑d punishes for interpersonal matters not only on account of the damage to one's fellow, but on account of the very evil of heart of the one who does the damage, in and of itself. As will be explained.
5. In Hilchos Teshuvah30, the Rambam speaks at length about the "עיקר גדול . . עמוד התורה" ("great principle… pillar of the Torah") — "שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהן לעשות טובה או רעה" ("that the Creator does not compel human beings, nor does He decree upon them to do good or evil")31 — and explains that G‑d's knowledge does not compel man's choice.
Afterwards, in the continuation of the discussion32, the Rambam asks: "והלא כתוב בתורה ועבדום וענו אותם הרי גזר על המצריים לעשות רע, וכתיב וקם העם הזה וזנה אחרי אלהי נכר הארץ הרי גזר על ישראל לעבוד עכו״ם" ("But is it not written in the Torah33, 'And they shall enslave them and afflict them' — thus He decreed upon the Egyptians to do evil; and it is written34, 'And this people will rise up and stray after the foreign gods of the land' — thus He decreed upon Israel to worship idols"), and answers: "שלא גזר על איש פלוני הידוע שיהי׳ הוא הזונה אלא כל אחד ואחד מאותן הזונים . . אילו לא רצה לעבוד לא הי׳ עובד . . וכן המצריים כל אחד ואחד מאותן המצירים והמריעים לישראל אילו לא רצה להרע להם הרשות בידו שלא גזר על איש ידוע אלא הודיעו שסוף זרעו עתיד להשתעבד בארץ לא להם" ("that He did not decree upon any particular known man that he would be the one to stray; rather, each and every one of those who strayed… had he not wished to worship, he would not have worshipped… And likewise the Egyptians — each and every one of those who oppressed and harmed Israel, had he not wished to harm them, the choice was in his hands, for He did not decree upon a particular known man; rather, He informed him [Avraham] that his descendants would ultimately be enslaved in a land not theirs") [and afterwards he concludes35: "וכבר אמרנו שאין כח באדם לידע היאך ידע הקב״ה דברים העתידין להיות" ("And we have already said36 that man does not have the capacity to know how the Holy One, blessed be He, knows the things that are to come")].
The Raavad37 objects to this and says that if "יאמר הבורא לזונים למה זנית ואני לא הזכרתיך בשם כדי שתאמר שעליך גזרתי יאמרו לו הזונים ועל מי חלה גזרתך על אותן שלא זנו הנה לא נתקיימה גזרתך" ("the Creator should say to those who strayed, 'Why did you stray? I did not mention you by name, that you should say it was upon you that I decreed,' those who strayed would say to Him, 'And upon whom did Your decree fall? Upon those who did not stray? Then Your decree was not fulfilled!'"). And regarding the Egyptians he answers (in his second answer): "כי הבורא אמר וענו אותם והם עבדו בהם בפרך והמיתו מהם וטבעו מהם כענין שנאמר אני קצפתי מעט והם עזרו לרעה לפיכך נתחייבו" ("for the Creator said 'and they shall afflict them,' but they enslaved them with crushing labor, and killed some of them and drowned some of them, as it is said38, 'I was angry a little, and they39 helped for evil' — therefore they became liable").
From the fact that the Rambam does not accept the Raavad's answer, the Rambam's view is understood: that everything the Egyptians did was included in the decree of the Holy One, blessed be He, "and they shall enslave them and afflict them." And regarding the Raavad's question40 (that "those who strayed" can claim to G‑d that through them "Your decree was fulfilled") — one can say, according to what the Alter Rebbe explains in Iggeres HaKodesh41 regarding every one who damages and every one who is damaged, that "על הניזוק כבר נגזר מן השמים" ("upon the injured party it was already decreed from Heaven"), and that the one who damages is "מתחייב בדיני אדם ובדיני שמים" ("liable under the laws of man and the laws of Heaven") is "על רוע בחירתו" ("for the evil of his choice"), because "הרבה שלוחים למקום" ("the Omnipresent has many agents").
That is: although in actuality, after the one who damages has chosen to harm the other, the Heavenly decree is carried out through him, this is not at all a reason to exempt him from punishment, because he did not have to be the agent to carry out the act of damage ("and the Omnipresent has many agents"), and therefore he is punished — "for the evil of his choice."
Similarly in our case: since the decree of the Holy One, blessed be He, "and they shall enslave them and afflict them" could have been carried out through others, "each and every one of those who oppressed and harmed Israel" was punished "for the evil of his choice."
It follows, consequently, that the punishment (the plagues) upon the Egyptians was not on account of the "damage" that the Jews suffered from it
— for upon the Jews it had in any case already been decreed that they should undergo the affliction of "and they shall enslave them and afflict them" —
but rather for "the evil of their choice," for the wickedness of heart42 of the Egyptians, that they chose to be the oppressors of Israel (and consequently the decree was carried out through them)43.
6. Seemingly, one can add to this, prefacing:
The above explanation of the Rambam regarding the decree of "and they shall enslave them and afflict them" is seemingly a sufficient answer only regarding the Egyptians, since every individual Egyptian had the choice not to oppress the Jews, and the decree would have been carried out through others;
But regarding Pharaoh king of Egypt [about whom the Rambam speaks in an earlier halachah44, that "חטא מעצמו תחלה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו" ("he sinned of his own accord at first and harmed the Jews who dwelt in his land"), and afterwards his punishment was "למנוע התשובה ממנו עד שנפרע ממנו" ("to withhold repentance from him until retribution was exacted from him")] — one cannot answer this way, because the decree of the Holy One, blessed be He, "and they shall enslave them and afflict them" had to be carried out by the king of the country, who would decree upon his people to enslave the Jews45. It follows that, from the standpoint of the decree "and they shall enslave them and afflict them," Pharaoh (at least) was compelled to enslave the Jews46.
One must therefore say that although the decree had to be carried out by Pharaoh — nevertheless, since Pharaoh did it not in order to fulfill the decree of the Holy One, blessed be He, "and they shall enslave them and afflict them," but because of the wickedness of his heart, he was punished "for the evil of his choice"47.
[This is similar to how a person is punished for the evil of his choice, even though "הקב״ה יודע כל מה שיהי׳" ("the Holy One, blessed be He, knows all that will be")48, because the fact that a person chooses evil is not due to the knowledge of the Holy One, blessed be He, but due to his own choice49.]
It follows that regarding Pharaoh, for whom the decree "and they shall enslave them and afflict them" was set up from the outset to be carried out through him, his punishment in its entirety50 is connected with the wickedness of his heart51.
7. Based on the above regarding the content of the prohibition of "the mitzvah of measures," one can explain why the Rambam selects specifically the aspect of Yetzias Mitzrayim "that it was the beginning of the command" — because with this he indicates the special severity of "the mitzvah of measures" compared with other prohibitions of theft etc.:
The reason the Torah specifically forbade the very making (and keeping) of a deficient measure is that the cunning in a person's heart is the root and beginning of all other matters of theft.
The beginning of theft and deception lies in this: before he has fallen so low as to want to steal from another — while he still measures and weighs for his fellow with a proper reckoning — he only (imprecisely) mixes in dishonesty, measuring with a deficient measure. And afterwards he descends from one level to the next, down to deception and theft, in which there is from the outset only one desire — to take his fellow's money unlawfully.
And therefore, in comparing "the mitzvah of measures" with "Yetzias Mitzrayim" (on account of the point they share, as explained above in sections 4–5), the Rambam emphasizes the aspect of Yetzias Mitzrayim "that it was the beginning of the command," to bring out that we are speaking here about matters that are a "beginning": the mitzvah of measures, which is the "beginning" of the commands concerning theft and deception, has within it the same "quality" as "the beginning of the command" of the entire Torah — Yetzias Mitzrayim.
8. On a deeper level (and in the manner of mussar), one can add that "the beginning of the command" — the foundation of the entire Torah — is connected with carefulness in "the mitzvah of measures."
And as is also alluded to in the words of the Midrash52, that "על עון זה (בשביל משקלות) בא עמלק" ("because of this sin (on account of weights) Amalek came") [as is learned from the fact that the Torah juxtaposes (in Parshas Teitzei) the section of Amalek to the section of weights ("לא יהי׳ לך אבן ואבן גו׳ איפה ואיפה גו׳" ("You shall not have diverse weights… diverse measures…")53) — for Amalek came "בדרך בצאתכם ממצרים" ("on the way, when you went out of Egypt")54, in the days of preparation for the Giving of the Torah, because Amalek is "ראשית גוים" ("the first of the nations")55, the root and beginning of all matters of opposition to Torah].
Seemingly: what is so "terrible" about the sin of weights, to the point that because of it there should be "ויבא עמלק" ("And Amalek came")56?
From this itself it is proven that the sin of weights affects the observance of the entire Torah.
9. The explanation of this:
Jews are, after all, "בנים אתם לה׳ אלקיכם" ("You are children of the L‑rd your G‑d")57, "חלק ה׳ עמו" ("His people are G‑d's portion")58. How is it possible that the evil inclination should be able to persuade a Jew to commit a sin? The answer to this is — the sin of weights: The evil inclination does not come to a Jew from the outset telling him to rebel against the Holy One, blessed be He; rather, "היום אומר לו" ("today it tells him")59 etc. — it tries to make a deficiency in his "measure." It agrees that one must conduct oneself (in general) with a "measure," according to the measures and limits of the Shulchan Aruch; it argues, however, that it does not matter if the measure is "deficient" (especially if it is only a minute deficiency).
Even more: it even agrees that the Jew should have an "אבן שלימה וצדק" ("full and honest weight")60; it argues, however, that in addition to the "full weight," he should have another weight that is not full — "אבן ואבן גו׳ איפה ואיפה גדולה וקטנה" ("diverse weights… diverse measures, a large and a small")61. It argues that Jews have two "measures": regarding matters of the soul, a person's spiritual matters — there it truly matters that the "measure" be exactly according to the measures and limits of the Shulchan Aruch; but when it comes to matters of the body, a person's material needs — there one may adjust the "measure" so that it accords with the "measures" of the ways of the world,
until, as mentioned above, "(היום אומר לו עשה כך כי עד ש)אומר לו עבוד ע״ז" ("(today it tells him, 'Do this,' until) it tells him, 'Worship idols'").
And therefore the sin of weights is connected with "And Amalek came"62 — because the beginning of the "coming" of (the kelipah of) Amalek into a Jew is not a movement of open rebellion against G‑d, but rather that it casts in doubts — "Amalek" is numerically equivalent to safek (doubt)63 [as is alluded to in the fact that "And Amalek came" was connected with the sin of the Jews — "נסותם את ה׳ לאמר היש ה׳ בקרבנו אם אין" ("their testing G‑d, saying, 'Is G‑d among us or not?'")64 — a matter of doubt].
And doubt — the lack of firmness of faith (which permeates all parts of a person equally) — is "the first of the nations," the root and beginning of all bad things.
And therefore, through being careful with measures and weights — having only one single "full and honest measure" for all of a person's matters — one is brought to the fulfillment of the entire Torah; and in the wording of the Rambam: "whoever accepts upon himself the mitzvah of measures thereby acknowledges Yetzias Mitzrayim, which brought about all the commands."
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Vayeshev 5746, and Purim 5722)
Notes
1) 19:35–36.
2) Laws of Theft, end of ch. 6. Copied in the Tur, Choshen Mishpat 231, and in the Shulchan Aruch there (sec. 19) in abbreviated wording. — However, in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, Laws of Measures and Weights, section [OCR unclear], he omitted it (even though he brings (there, sec. 15) "the punishment for measures is severe etc.," which is brought at the beginning of the halachah in the Rambam here) — but at the beginning of the Laws of Interest (sec. 2) he brought (from Toras Kohanim, Behar 25:38; Rambam, Laws of Lender and Borrower 4:2; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 160:2) that "whoever lends with interest is as if he denies… and Yetzias Mitzrayim." This is not the place to elaborate.
3) On our parshah, there [except that Toras Kohanim prefaces: "על תנאי כך הוצאתי אתכם . . שתקבלו עליכם מצות מדות" ("On this condition I took you out… that you accept upon yourselves the mitzvah of measures") (and Korban Aharon there explains that this is the reason that "whoever denies the mitzvah of measures denies Yetzias Mitzrayim"; see there). The reason the Rambam omitted it (even though he brought it in his Sefer HaMitzvos, positive mitzvah 208) can be said to be that this matter ("on this condition I took you out") is found with many other mitzvos, and it is not a matter unique to "the mitzvah of measures." See Toras Kohanim on Shemini cited in note 11. Below, note 14].
4) And copied in the Beis Yosef on the Tur there. See also Perishah there; Sma on the Shulchan Aruch there, subsection 35; and elsewhere.
5) See also Kli Yakar, Teitzei 25:13; and elsewhere.
6) Bava Kamma 79b.
7) Wording of the Chinuch, mitzvah 259. Note that in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch "the mitzvah of measures" was included in the Laws of Overcharging and Mistaken Purchase (unlike in the Rambam, where they were included in the Laws of Theft*, and overcharging etc. — in the Laws of Sales).
*) See Rambam there, halachah 2: "that one who measures… steals" (and the Chinuch, mitzvah 258, adds "without doubt"; and in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat there, end of sec. 2: "actually steals"). See Kiryas Sefer (by the Mabit) on the Rambam there; Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 258, subsection 3; and elsewhere. This is not the place to elaborate.
8) Behar 25:17.
9) Which is why it says there "ויראת מאלקיך" ("and you shall fear your G‑d"), as Rashi explains there.
10) See Bava Metzia 61b: "Why did the Merciful One write Yetzias Mitzrayim regarding interest (see the next note)… regarding tzitzis… regarding weights? The Holy One, blessed be He, said: I am the One who discerned etc." (and so it is there regarding creeping creatures). Note also the category of mitzvos that are "a matter entrusted to the heart," regarding which it says "and you shall fear your G‑d" (Rashi on our parshah 19:14; there, 32; Behar there; and elsewhere). And elsewhere. — See Gevuras Hashem by the Maharal, end of ch. 5.
11) Similarly regarding interest (cited in note 2). This is not the place to elaborate. — Note also Toras Kohanim, Shemini (11:45): "וכל הכופר בעול מצוה כופר ביצי״מ" ("whoever denies the yoke of a mitzvah denies Yetzias Mitzrayim") (although it speaks there of creeping creatures).
12) See Perishah there for the reason for the change in the Rambam's wording ("the beginning of the command," "it brought about all the commands"). Also — he begins "ככופר" ("is as one who denies")* and concludes "מודה" ("acknowledges")**. This is not the place to elaborate.
*) But in Toras Kohanim there: "כופר" ("denies"). See Yalkut Shinuyei Nuschaos in the Rambam, Frankel edition.
**) And in Kiryas Sefer: "כמודה" ("is as one who acknowledges").
13) Perishah there (except that his intent in this is not to resolve the superfluous wording of the Rambam, but the change in the Rambam's wording, as in the previous note). See Korban Aharon cited in note 3.
14) As is also alluded to in the fact that the beginning of the Ten Commandments, which are the root of all Torah and mitzvos, is "אנכי ה׳ אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים" ("I am the L‑rd your G‑d who took you out of the land of Egypt").
15) Bava Metzia there, at the beginning of the page.
16) Bava Metzia there. See Maggid Mishneh on the Rambam there, halachah 2. And see the sources cited in the gloss to note 7.
17) There, halachah 3. And in the Maggid Mishneh there — that it is learned from the above Gemara, "to make one liable for transgressing it from the time of making" (and so it is in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat there, sec. 3, and in the source references in the margin). Minchas Chinuch there (subsection 3) asks that seemingly "they are two matters: for the making one transgresses on one count, and for the keeping one transgresses on another count." See there. The later authorities have debated this. This is not the place to elaborate.
18) There, beginning of ch. 8. See Bach on the Tur, Choshen Mishpat there, at the beginning of the siman.
*) According to this, what the Rambam writes in continuation of this, "וכן במדת קרקע צריך לדקדק בחשבון כו׳" ("and likewise in land measurement one must be precise in the calculation etc."), refers to the making of the measures. Note that the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there (sec. 1) brings it in continuation of "one who weighs for his fellow etc. transgresses a negative commandment" (and changes from the Rambam's wording "במדת הקרקע" and writes "למדידת הקרקע"). This is not the place to elaborate.
19) There, 8:7. Brought in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there, end of sec. 1; there, beginning of sec. 2.
20) Wording of the Chinuch there. And so it is also in the Tur, Choshen Mishpat there. See the discussion in Minchas Chinuch there, subsection 2 (and he concludes that less than a perutah's worth is forbidden only because of chatzi shiur [a partial measure]. But the plain meaning of the wording "the Torah was particular… in any amount whatsoever" implies that this is the measure. See also Bach on the Tur there. This is not the place to elaborate).
21) See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Laws of Overcharging etc., section [OCR unclear]: "שאסרה התורה להשהות מדה חסרה בביתו . . שלא יבואו לרמות בה" ("that the Torah forbade keeping a deficient measure in one's house… lest they come to cheat with it") (and see Kuntres Acharon to the Laws of Robbery and Theft, subsection 2 — that this is the Rambam's intent in ch. 8 there). See the next note.
22) In Minchas Chinuch (mitzvah 602; and similarly in Chasdei David HaShalem on the Tosefta, Bava Basra 6:4): "that the negative commandment applies only if he keeps it in order to cheat," whereas "to make the measure into a chamber pot for urine" is forbidden only rabbinically, out of the concern "lest he come etc." And so it is explicit in the Rashbam, Bava Basra (89b, end of the page), that the prohibition regarding the chamber pot etc. is not Biblical.
However [in addition to the fact that according to the Alter Rebbe (cited in the previous note), this concern is (according to the Rambam) the reason of the verse (and in the Chinuch there it is implied that the chamber pot etc. is forbidden Biblically), also] in the Rashbam one can interpret his intent in what he writes, "the verse only warned… when he prepared it in order to measure with it," that the reason is (not because it is forbidden only when "he keeps it in order to cheat," but) because the vessel must bear the name "measure," whereas a chamber pot, which is filthy etc., does not bear the name "measure" (and it is forbidden only rabbinically, because "sometimes he washes it and removes its filth" — Rashbam there).
23) See also Bachaye on our parshah 19:35 (and there, that it is akin to the punishment for evil traits of the heart and evil thoughts, even though one did not carry them out in practice. See further in the text). Note also Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 258 (subsection 3): "perhaps the making or the keeping is even worse" (than "that he weighed for his fellow").
24) Note Kesef HaKodashim on the Shulchan Aruch there, sec. 1 (based on the Sma there), that the severity of the prohibition of measures and weights is because people relied on his trustworthiness. See there at length.
25) Note that from the verse (our parshah 19:36) "והין צדק" ("and an honest hin") it is derived "שלא ידבר אחד בפה ואחד בלב" ("that one should not say one thing with the mouth and another in the heart") (Bava Metzia 49a) — which is the content of "the mitzvah of measures," as in the text.
*25) See Bachaye cited in note 23.
26) And he changes from the wording of Toras Kohanim, "שכל המודה במצות מדות" ("for whoever acknowledges the mitzvah of measures").
27) Similar to the Rambam's wording (Laws of Lender and Borrower, there) regarding interest, "וכל הלוה ומלוה ברבית כו׳" ("and whoever borrows and lends with interest etc.") (although in Toras Kohanim, Behar there: "whoever denies the mitzvah of interest").
28) Because "the mitzvah of measures" refers mainly to the making, which is "מאזני צדק גו׳ יהי׳ לכם" ("You shall have honest scales…") (our parshah there; and similarly Teitzei 25:15) — and not to the act of measuring.
29) According to this, one can say that this is the difference between the two clauses in the Rambam in this halachah — (a) "the punishment for measures is severe etc." between him and his fellow; (b) "and whoever denies the mitzvah of measures etc.": the first clause refers mainly to one who weighs for his fellow with a deficient measure, the sin toward his fellow; and the second clause — to "one who denies the mitzvah of measures," the making of the measure etc., which is a matter within the person himself, as in the text (in addition to the fact that the sin of "as one who denies Yetzias Mitzrayim" is a matter within the person himself).
30) Chs. 5–6.
31) Wording of the Rambam there, 5:3.
32) End of ch. 6. See also the Rambam's Shemoneh Perakim, ch. 8.
33) Lech 15:13.
34) Vayelech 31:16.
35) See Lechem Mishneh there, that the Rambam's intent in this (that His knowledge does not compel) is that this question is also resolved through this explanation. See below, note 49.
Several later authorities (Hagahos Turei Even on the Rambam; Or Same'ach; and others) asked that seemingly this is not comparable to the matter of knowledge, for here it already came as a decree, in the statement to Avraham, and the knowledge of the prophets does compel.
One can answer according to the words of the Rambam (Laws of the Foundations of the Torah 10:4; and also in the Commentary on the Mishnah, in the Introduction, s.v. "The second part," regarding the prophet) that "דברי הפורענות שהנביא אומר" ("words of calamity that the prophet says") may not be fulfilled, because "the Holy One, blessed be He, is slow to anger… and it is possible that they repented etc." Thus in our case, the statement to Avraham, "and they shall enslave them and afflict them," does not necessarily mean that it will be so in actuality (and it is only like His knowledge, which does not compel choice), as explained in the sichah of Pesach Sheni 5744. This is not the place to elaborate.
36) There, end of ch. 5. See also Shemoneh Perakim there.
37) See also Ramban (and Bachaye) on Lech (there, 14). And elsewhere.
38) Zechariah 1:15.
39) So it is in the Raavad. In the verse: "והמה".
40) See Ramban (and Bachaye) there.
41) Beginning of ch. 25 (138b). — See also Hagahos HaYaavetz on Shemoneh Perakim there.
42) Note that the manner of the enslavement too was akin to the deceit of "measures" — as our Sages say (Sotah 11b, beginning of the side) in explaining "פרך" ("crushing labor") — "פה רך" ("a soft mouth"): "they drew them with words and with wages until they accustomed them to the labor" (Rashi there). See note 51.
43) And although according to the above Iggeres HaKodesh this applies also to every one who damages and the like (see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 15ff.) — it is not comparable to Egypt, where there was an explicit decree and nevertheless they were punished etc.
44) 6:3. Likewise in Shemoneh Perakim there.
45) Except that each one of the Egyptians (as an individual) had the choice not to obey Pharaoh ("דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין" ("the words of the Master and the words of the student — whose words does one obey?") — Kiddushin 42b, and the sources cited there).
46) One cannot answer that since Egypt was not mentioned in the decree at the Covenant between the Parts (see Hagahos HaYaavetz there), there was consequently no necessity that it be fulfilled through Pharaoh king of Egypt — for (Pharaoh ruled over the whole world — Mechilta, Beshalach 14:5, and elsewhere; and mainly) once the Children of Israel went into exile in the land of Egypt, it was necessary that it be through him.
47) See also Ramban (and Bachaye) on Lech there: "כאשר תצא הגזירה על פי נביא . . והרג אותו לשנאה . . יש עליו העונש כי הוא לחטא נתכוון" ("when the decree goes forth by the word of a prophet… and he killed him out of hatred… the punishment is upon him, for he intended to sin") (and in the continuation of his words, regarding Nebuchadnezzar, who heard from the prophets etc.). — And Tosafos Yom Tov on Avos (2:6, at its end) answers, based on the Ramban's question (there) on the Rambam regarding the Egyptians, that "he did not act in order to fulfill the word of the Holy One, blessed be He, but rather the wickedness of his heart led him to it." Note also Sotah 9b: "כי אזל מיהא בתר ישוותי׳ אזל" ("in any case, when he went, he went after what was right in his own eyes"). See below, note 49.
48) Wording of the Rambam, ch. 5 there.
49) And one can say that this is why the Rambam adds (at the end), "and we have already said that man does not have the capacity etc.," whose intent (as the Lechem Mishneh explains, as above, note 35) is that this is a further answer to this question — in order to answer the question regarding Pharaoh.
50) Unlike each individual Egyptian, where at least the fact that the Jews were harmed through him (specifically) is (only) due to his choice.
51) Note that regarding Pharaoh too we find "cunning," as with "measures" — as our Sages say (Sotah 11a): "they brought a brick mold and hung it on Pharaoh's neck, and whenever one of Israel said, 'I am delicate,' they said to him, 'Are you more delicate than Pharaoh?'" See above, note 42.
52) Cited in Tosafos, s.v. "Ve'eima" — Kiddushin 33b. See Tanchuma, Teitzei 8; Pesikta deRav Kahana, Parshas Zachor (and Pesikta Rabbasi, section "Mini Efrayim"); Rashi on Teitzei 25:17.
53) There, 13ff.
54) There, 17.
55) Balak 24:20.
56) See Kli Yakar (cited in note 5) and Tzafnas Pa'neach on the Torah, end of Beshalach — the connection between them in terms of the denial of Divine Providence. See there.
57) Re'eh 14:1.
58) Haazinu 32:9.
59) Shabbos 105b. And as my father-in-law, the Rebbe, explains (Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim vol. 1, 37a; and elsewhere), that the intent of this is that it "agrees" even to the person's Torah and mitzvos.
60) Wording of the verse — Teitzei 25:15.
61) There, 13–14. See at length Kli Yakar there.
62) Note that Amalek "knows its Master and intends to rebel against Him" (wording of our Sages — cited in many places regarding Amalek (Tanna Devei Eliyahu 83, end of col. 4; Sefer HaMaamarim 5562, p. 171ff.; Derech Mitzvosecha 95a; and elsewhere). See Likkutei Sichos vol. [OCR unclear], p. 193, note 38, and the sources cited there).
63) Sefer HaMaamarim [OCR unclear], p. 294. And elsewhere.
64) Beshalach 17:7. See Rashi there, 8.
Key Lesson
The evil inclination never begins with open rebellion; it begins with a slightly "deficient measure" — a looser standard for material matters alongside a full one for spiritual matters — and from there descends step by step. Keeping one single, honest measure for every area of life keeps out the doubt of Amalek and brings a person to the fulfillment of the entire Torah.