Likkutei Sichos Vol. 15 – Bereishis 4
1. On the verse[1] "And Cain brought of the fruit of the ground an offering to G‑d," Rashi focuses on the words "of the fruit of the ground" and explains: "of the inferior. And there is an Aggadah[2] that says it was flax seed."
Rashi's reason for interpreting that Cain brought "of the inferior" is understood simply (as the Re'em[3] explains): otherwise, why would "to Cain and to his offering He did not turn"[4]?[5]
We must understand, however, why Rashi brings the Aggadah that "it was flax seed": what difference does it make for the plain meaning of the verse whether the offering "of the inferior" was flax seed or some other kind of fruit of the ground?
One cannot ask: what proof is there from the plain meaning of the verse that "it was flax seed"[6]? For from the very fact that Rashi cites it in the name of the Aggadah — unlike the interpretation "of the inferior," for which he does not say where he takes it from (although that too is found in the Aggadah[7]) — it is understood that it is indeed not proven from the plain meaning of the verses that he brought flax seed (and its only source is the Aggadah).
But since Rashi brings this Aggadah in his commentary on the Torah, we must say that it is (in Rashi's words[8]) "an Aggadah that settles the words of the verse"; that is, there is a difficulty in the verse which is resolved by the Aggadah that "it was flax seed."
2. In several printings of Rashi's commentary there follows (in parentheses): "Another interpretation: 'of the fruit' — of whatever came to his hand, not good and not choice." Although this interpretation does not appear in the first printings of Rashi's commentary on the Torah[9], it is understood that this second interpretation also has a basis, which is why there are those who include it in Rashi's text.
The reason Rashi is not satisfied with the first interpretation may be this: if we assume that Cain's sin was that he brought "of the inferior," why does the verse say without qualification that he brought "of the fruit of the ground," without specifying "of the inferior" or the like (as the verse immediately specifies regarding Hevel's offering — "of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat"[10])?
Rashi therefore brings another interpretation: that the offering was in fact not "of the inferior," but, in the words of the verse[11], "of the fruit" (unqualified) — "of whatever came to his hand, not good and not choice." His sin lay in this itself: he did not take care to bring of the good and the choice.
According to this, however, there is a difficulty in the other direction. According to the first interpretation, that his offering was "of the inferior," it is understood why "to Cain and to his offering He did not turn": bringing specifically of the inferior is (not only proof that he lacks respect for G‑d, which would demand that the offering be of the good and the choice, but more than that, it is) the opposite of respect — it shows contempt for the One to whom the offering is brought[12].
But how can one say that because he did not make the effort to bring "of the good and of the choice," and was content with an ordinary offering "of whatever came to his hand"[13], G‑d would not accept Cain's offering at all — "to Cain and to his offering He did not turn"?
3. The explanation may be as follows:
Rashi cannot be satisfied with the interpretation "of the inferior," because it is very difficult: in bringing the offering, Cain meant to show gratitude to G‑d — how, then, could he bring specifically "of the inferior"[14], which defeats the whole purpose of the offering?
Moreover: after Cain saw that "to his offering He did not turn," the verse says, "And Cain was very angry, and his face fell." This is puzzling: having brought his offering specifically of the inferior, did he really expect it to be accepted?
We must therefore say that although Cain's offering was such that it did not deserve to be accepted, there was nevertheless room for Cain to err and think that his offering ought to be accepted favorably[15].
This is what Rashi explains in two ways: that the offering was (a) [being "of the inferior"] "flax seed"; (b) [that it was not of the inferior, but] "of whatever came to his hand, not good and not choice" — as will be explained.
4. This will also resolve a question about the order of the verses:
First it says, "And Cain brought … an offering to G‑d"; then the verse continues, "And Hevel, he too brought … and G‑d turned to Hevel …"; and only after that does it say, "But to Cain and to his offering He did not turn, and Cain was angry …" Seemingly, the words "to Cain … He did not turn" should have come right after the account "And Cain brought … an offering to G‑d" (before the Torah tells about Hevel)?
Even if one says that the verse wishes first to relate both offerings being brought and afterwards how they were received, it should first have said "to Cain … He did not turn" and then "and G‑d turned to Hevel"[16], following the order in which they were brought.
Simply put, one could say that this is because only after "G‑d turned to Hevel"[17] ("fire came down and consumed his offering"[18]) did Cain realize — from the fact that for him "fire did not come down" — that "to his offering He did not turn," and therefore "Cain was angry."
In light of the above, however, one can say that the verse means to hint that the real "(to Cain …) He did not turn" came only after "G‑d turned to Hevel." For when Cain brought his offering there was still room to err and think there was no sin in it, as explained above.
Only after Cain saw that Hevel brought "of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat" (and therefore "G‑d turned …"), while he himself had not done so, did he clearly see that his conduct had not been as it should be — and nevertheless, even then he did not regret it and did nothing to correct his conduct (by bringing a second offering of the good and the choice, or the like). That is why only at that point does the Torah stress the result of this sin: "But to Cain and to his offering He did not turn"[19].
5. As has been discussed many times, Rashi wrote his commentary (also) for a "five-year-old" who is just beginning to learn Scripture[20]. It follows that when Rashi says "it was flax seed" without explaining what distinguishes flax for the better from other "fruit of the ground," it is because the "five-year-old" already knows this.
It is as Rashi explained earlier: on the verse[21] "The name of the first is Pishon," Rashi explains (in his second interpretation) that the river is called Pishon "because it grows flax (pishtan)." From the fact that a river (and the first one at that) is named after the flax it grows, it is understood that flax is a thing of great importance[22].
This explains what Cain had in mind when he brought his offering: in his view, what mattered was the kind of offering brought — a kind that is the good and choice among kinds. That is why he chose flax, which is an important and praiseworthy thing; but within that kind itself, he brought "of the inferior."
And this was the advantage of Hevel's offering: within the kind from which he brought his offering, he chose "of the firstborn (of his flock) and of their fat"[23].
6. But this interpretation is still not understood, whichever way one looks at it: since Cain sought to be particular and bring from a better kind, why did he bring "of the inferior" (of that kind)?
This is not a great difficulty, as the verse goes on to say[24], "Sin crouches at the door, and its desire is toward you": the evil inclination "got involved" here and caused Cain to stumble into sin.
But even in this, it was in the manner of "sin crouches at the door": the evil inclination's control[25] was in the manner of "at the door"[26] — "outside." It could not bring Cain not to bring any offering at all, or at least to bring "of the inferior" among the kinds; it only made him stumble partially — to be content with bringing from a better kind in general, but "of the inferior" within that kind.
To make it smoother still, however, Rashi (according to several versions, as above) brings a second interpretation — "of the fruit, of whatever came to his hand, not good and not choice"[27] — by which it is simply understood why Cain thought G‑d would accept his offering.
[And that "to Cain and to his offering He did not turn" is because even later, after "Hevel brought … of the firstborn of his flock … and G‑d turned …," Cain did not regret it and did not want to correct his conduct.]
But this interpretation too is difficult — even more difficult than the first (so much so that according to most versions it does not appear in Rashi's commentary at all) — since it is not reasonable to say[28] that merely because Cain brought something ordinary and not of the choice, G‑d would not accept his offering at all. One must therefore come back to the earlier interpretation and set it as the first and principal one.
7. From this there emerges — among the "wondrous matters" (concerning halachah) in Rashi's commentary — an explanation of (a precise wording in) the Rambam:
The Rambam[29] rules: "One who wishes to gain merit for himself" should bring "his offering from the finest and most excellent of the kind from which he brings," and cites the verse[30] "All the fat is G‑d's," and as proof: "And Hevel brought … of the firstborn of his flock and of their fat, and G‑d turned …" The precise wording "of the kind from which he brings" implies that "all the fat is G‑d's" refers only to the finest (choicest) of the kind that the person wishes to bring, but not that he must (also) select the best kind that he could bring[31].
[A parallel is found with one who vows an offering[32]: "One who vows without specifying brings of the largest of the kind he vowed." For example: "If he vowed a burnt offering of cattle, he brings an ox" (and not a calf) — the choicest of "the kind he vowed." Yet even a rich man may from the outset vow a cheaper, smaller kind (even a bird burnt offering[33]), to the point that even if he said "I take upon myself a burnt offering" without specifying, and "the custom of the people of the place" is to call a bird burnt offering too an "unspecified burnt offering," he may bring a bird burnt offering.]
This needs to be understood: "All the fat is G‑d's" would seem to include also the fat and choicest of the kinds that one can bring. Why is it said that "all the fat is G‑d's" means only "of the kind from which he brings"[34]?
In light of the above, it can be said that the Rambam derives this[35] from the offerings of Cain and Hevel, which he cites in the halachah as proof for this law in general (as above):
Hevel brought his offering from the choicest ("of the firstborn … and of their fat") within the kind of the flock, and did not take care to bring from a more important kind (cattle)[36]; Cain, on the other hand, chose from a choice kind, flax — yet "G‑d turned to Hevel (specifically) … but to Cain … He did not turn (at all)." This proves that "all the fat is G‑d's" obliges one to bring "from the finest and most excellent of the kind from which he brings," but not from the most excellent kind.
8. But this itself needs to be understood: what is the reason — wherein lies the superiority of an offering "from the finest and most excellent of the kind" over an offering from the choicest of the kinds?
The explanation may be as follows:
The point of "all the fat is G‑d's" is that through it a person acknowledges that "the earth and its fullness are G‑d's"[37] — that everything belongs to G‑d — and therefore he gives G‑d of the (first[38] and) best of what he owns[39].
Since "the earth and its fullness are G‑d's" includes everything in the world, both fine and excellent kinds and ordinary kinds, etc., "all the fat is G‑d's" is not something that relates only to the excellent kinds —
for then it would not express the recognition of G‑d's ownership of each and every[40] kind in creation [and it would also follow that one who has no excellent kinds cannot fulfill "all the fat is G‑d's"[41]] —
rather, the obligation is to give G‑d "from the finest and most excellent of the kind" — of whatever kind the Jew wishes to give — and by this he shows that each and every thing he has belongs to G‑d.
9. In light of the above, we will also understand the inner reason why Cain did not choose his offering from "the choicest of the kind" (but only a choice kind — flax):
The Alter Rebbe explains in Likkutei Torah[42] that Cain's offering of flax seed is like the white linen (flax) garments of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, which allude to "the World of Unity"[43]. The unity of linen (whose growth is in the manner of "a single stalk from each seed"[44]) is not "unity out of separateness" [like the four species of the lulav, whose unity is only that they "grow in brotherhood" and the like, while "their actual growth is divided and separate"], but a matter of "singular in essence"[45].
Since Cain[46] wanted to draw down the level of "singular" (yachid), which is above the division into particulars, it did not matter to him to bring "the choicest of the kind," which brings out that there is division (choice, ordinary, inferior); and since G‑d is the Owner of every kind in the world (as explained in section 8), he brought the choicest —
Nevertheless, this was not as intended[47]. For the intended perfection is not so much the feeling of G‑d's unity at the level of "singular," which requires being "divested" of worldly matters (and then it follows that when one descends into the world, one is torn away from His unity), but the level of "one" (echad)[48], which requires giving G‑d "the finest and most excellent of the kind from which he brings," as explained at length above.
10. This is also the lesson for each person's avodah: how careful one must be about hiddur mitzvah, beautifying a mitzvah[49].
If Cain, who stood at the level of feeling "singular" (flax), nevertheless, since he lacked the hiddur of bringing the choicest (of the kind), afterwards fell low: instead of Hevel's offering bringing him (as "the jealousy of scholars increases wisdom"[50]) to add to his own offering (until it would have both qualities: both an excellent kind (flax) and the choicest of that kind), he fell, G‑d spare us, into jealousy, until "Cain rose up against Hevel …"[51] —
how much more so for each one of us: one must constantly "climb" higher and higher in the service of G‑d (like one climbing a mountain, who, should he stop even for a moment, could, G‑d spare us, fall), and constantly add in hiddur mitzvah, so that every matter of holiness is "of the beautiful and the good," and further, "of the finest and most excellent."
And when a Jew gives his best to G‑d, G‑d repays him with every good, material and spiritual, from His full, open, holy and generous hand.
(From talks of Shabbos Parshas Bereishis 5735 and Simchas Torah 5730)