Parshas Ki Sisa
1. Our parsha relates (that after Aharon told the Jewish people1, "פרקו נזמי הזהב וגו׳ והביאו אלי וגו׳ ויביאו אל אהרן" ("Remove the golden rings… and bring them to me… and they brought them to Aharon")): "ויקח מידם ויצר אותו בחרט ויעשהו עגל מסכה גו׳" ("He took it from their hand, vayatzar oso bacheret, and he made it a molten calf…")2. Rashi explains: "Vayatzar oso bacheret — it can be translated in two ways. The one: vayatzar is an expression of tying, and cheret is an expression of a kerchief, as in "והמטפחות והחריטים" ("and the shawls and the charitim")3, and "ויצר ככרים כסף בשני חריטים" ("he tied two talents of silver in two charitim")4. The second: vayatzar is an expression of form (tzurah), and cheret is a goldsmiths' tool with which they incise and engrave forms in gold, like a scribe's stylus that engraves letters on tablets and ledgers, as in "וכתוב עליו בחרט אנוש" ("and write upon it with the stylus of a man")5. And this is what Onkelos translated, 'וצר יתיה בזיפא' — zifa is an expression of forging; it is a craftsman's tool with which they engrave letters and designs (shekeidim) in gold, called niel in Old French, and with it they forge seals."
We need to understand the following:
a) It is well known, as has been discussed many times, that the rule in Rashi's commentary on the Torah is that wherever he gives two (or more) explanations of a single matter, it is because each explanation has a difficulty that the other does not have. But in our case each of his explanations is, seemingly, understandable and settled in all its details — so what compels him to bring both?
b) Rashi's preface to these explanations, "it can be translated in two ways" — is he coming to teach us how to count?
c) The wording "the one… the second" in such cases is unusual in Rashi's commentary; rather (as [OCR unclear: תומ"י] writes) he says "and some say" or "another explanation."
d) What is the reason he needs two proofs for the first explanation? Moreover, he brings them in reverse order: the proof from Yeshayahu, and afterwards — from Melachim (for the book of Melachim precedes the book of Yeshayahu6)?
e) This proof that he brings from the books of the Prophets (that "cheret is an expression of a kerchief," and from this — that "vayatzar is an expression of tying") he could (and consequently — should) have brought from verses in the Chumash, especially since we have already learned them: in Parshas Mikeitz7, "צרור כספו" ("his bundle of money"), which Rashi explains as "the knot of his money"; and in Parshas Bo8, "צרורות בשמלותם" ("bound up in their garments") [and Rashi explains nothing there9, since he already explained it in Parshas Mikeitz] — which proves that "vayatzar" means tying.
f) Seemingly, the entire continuation, "like a scribe's stylus…" until the end of this comment, is superfluous: what is not understood and requires further explanation in the words "vayatzar (oso) bacheret" after he has already translated and explained them? Rashi's way is to explain only the plain meaning of Scripture — yet here he goes at length to bring an example from "a scribe's stylus that engraves," and to explain Targum Onkelos etc. — all of which are seemingly side matters?
2. The explanation of all this: The reason Rashi does not bring a proof from the above verses of the Chumash is that in them this word is spelled with two reishes — "tzeror kaspo," "tzeroros10 besimlosam" — and that is not a (conclusive) proof for our parsha, where there is only one reish ("vayatzar")11. However, from the verse in Melachim too, one cannot bring a proof that the word "vayatzar" is an expression of tying, since there itself there is no proof (any more than here) that "charitim" are kerchiefs (things to which tying applies), so as to teach us about "vayatzar" that it means tying. Therefore Rashi must first bring the verse in Yeshayahu, "and the shawls and the charitim," which speaks of adornments and in which it is clear that "the charitim" are something similar to "shawls" (since it places them next to each other) — namely, kerchiefs — and from this we learn that "vayatzar," said in connection with "cheret" in our verse, "is an expression of tying."
However, there is still room to say that this is no proof: granted that "charitim" in the plural are kerchiefs, but seemingly "cheret" (in our verse) is not the singular of "charitim" — the plural of "cheret" is "charatim" (with a kamatz under the reish, like chesed–chasadim, cherev–charavos, and others) — and since there is no proof that "cheret" is an expression of a kerchief, consequently we have no indication regarding the word "vayatzar" that it is an expression of tying.
Therefore Rashi brings an additional proof from the verse "he tied two talents of silver in two charitim": there "vayatzar" is said in relation to "charitim" (which are kerchiefs, as is evident from the verse in Yeshayahu that he brought before it12), so "vayatzar is an expression of tying" — and if so, in our verse too that is its meaning (for what difference is there between them?), and from this it follows that "bacheret" in our verse (relates to tying, and we must say that it) is an expression of "kerchief"12. Its plural form is an exception to the rule (as we find similar plurals in the verses — ishah–nashim, bas–banos, and others).
But according to this explanation there is a difficulty in the continuation of the verse: since "vayatzar oso bacheret" means that Aharon placed it — the gold — in a kerchief and tied it, it follows that Aharon did not make the calf; and if so, the following words of the verse, "and he made it a molten calf," do not refer to Aharon, but to "the sorcerers of the eirev rav who came up with them from Egypt," or to Michah, as Rashi explains later13. It turns out that the beginning of the verse, "He took it from their hand, vayatzar oso bacheret," speaks of Aharon — while its end, "and he made it (in the third person, as in the beginning) a molten calf," speaks of someone else14. And although "many verses are brief in their wording"15, not explaining who the doer is, nevertheless it is forced to explain a single continuous verse, as in our case, as speaking of two different parties.
Therefore Rashi gives a second explanation: "vayatzar is an expression of form; cheret is a goldsmiths' tool with which they incise and engrave forms in gold" — for according to this, "and he made it a molten calf" also refers to Aharon.
But according to this explanation too there is a difficulty: later16 it is written, "ואשליכהו באש ויצא העגל הזה" ("I cast it into the fire, and this calf came out") (and Rashi explains: "and I did not know that this calf would come out, and it came out"), which implies that Aharon did not make the calf. And although one could say that this verse — "I cast it… and it came out…" — is brief in its wording, and Scripture did not bother to elaborate on all the details of the matter17, but in truth the calf was made by Aharon, who formed its shape etc. (and Rashi there explains only according to the first explanation here) — nevertheless, the plain flow of the verse (I cast it — and the calf came out) implies that this was something new in Aharon's eyes18. Because of this Rashi is compelled to bring the first explanation, which leaves no room for this difficulty.
3. Based on the above, we can explain why Rashi writes, as a preface to his explanations, "it can be translated in two ways," and afterwards adds "the one… the second":
When Rashi writes two (or more) explanations — which is because of the difficulty in each of them that is resolved by the other explanation, as above — it is understood (as has been discussed many times) that the explanation brought first is the main one and closer to the plain meaning; that is, the difficulty in the first explanation is lighter than that in the second.
However, it is sometimes possible that they are equally weighted, and neither explanation outweighs the other — and since he can only write them one after the other (and thereby one might mistakenly think that the first is placed first because it is the main one — therefore, to negate this mistake),
Rashi prefaces at the start of his words a general expression that includes and equates both explanations, as in our case — that the verse "can be translated in two ways" — equal and evenly weighted (and consequently it is understood that the order of first and second is only because he cannot bring them both at once).
For in our case it was explained above that the difficulty with the first explanation is that from the continuation of the verse it appears that Aharon made the calf, though it can be resolved, in a forced way, as being due to Scripture's brevity; and just like it is the difficulty with the second explanation, that from the continuation of Scripture later on it is evident that (Aharon) did not make the calf, and this too can be resolved, in a forced way, by the brevity of Scripture's wording — so the two explanations are equally weighted in the plain meaning of Scripture. And this is Rashi's intent in saying, "it can be translated in two ways"19.
Based on this, we will also understand the reason and the precision in his detailing his explanations as "the one… the second": By way of preface — seemingly, why does Rashi write "the one… the second," and not "the first… the second," which is more fitting20 as ordinal numbers21? Because here too his intent is to emphasize that there is no "first" explanation here (that is, in rank), but rather "one" (and there is a second similar to it) of two equal explanations. (That is, the difference between them is that they are two different explanations, but there is no difference in their rank according to the plain meaning of Scripture.)
4. However, there is a difficulty with the second explanation: the word "bacheret" is found once more in Tanach: "and write upon it with the stylus (bacheret) of a man"; and since it states explicitly "and write upon it bacheret," this implies that it is not "a craftsman's tool… with which they incise and engrave forms in gold," but a pen with which letters are written22. (For granted, according to the first explanation, that "cheret is an expression of a kerchief," we find a proof for it from the verses Rashi brought — and we must say that "bacheret (enosh)" is from a different root; but according to the second explanation it is forced to explain that the "bacheret" before us is a third root — neither from the expression "charitim" in the above verses nor from the similar "cheret.") To resolve this difficulty, Rashi continues to explain that "cheret" is not the name of a specific tool22*, but is called so after the action of engraving (and inscribing on something) — therefore, just as the name "cheret" fits "a craftsman's tool… with which they engrave forms in gold," so too the term cheret is possible for "a scribe's stylus that engraves letters on tablets and ledgers." Therefore Rashi also brings the end of the verse, "as in 'and write upon it with the stylus of a man (enosh)'," the precision being in the word "enosh" (an ordinary person — and in Rashi's words there, "enosh — any man, even if he is not wise") and not a craftsman as mentioned before23.
And because "cheret" is not found in the Torah and its meaning is uncertain (as above — it can be given three meanings), and further, since one name serves for a tool for forming a calf and a tool for writing letters — Rashi therefore adds a proof from Targum Onkelos: "And this is what Onkelos translated, 'vetzar yateih bezifa' — zifa is an expression of forging; it is a craftsman's tool with which they engrave letters and designs (shekeidim) in gold, called niel in Old French" — that is, it is a tool that serves both for writing letters and for engraving designs (which is the meaning of "shekeidim" here — as Rashi explains on the verse "שלשה גביעים משוקדים" ("three cups engraved")24 — and not, as people commonly err, that it refers here to the fruit called "almonds" (shekeidim)?! For what has that to do with this);
And so that one should not err in the intent of Targum Onkelos, which translated ("bacheret") as "bezifa" (for this is Rashi's main intent in bringing the Targum), he explains it and says: "and with it they forge (mezayfin) seals," which is why it is called "zifa"; the tool is named after the action done with it — forging — just as above with cheret, which is named after inscribing.
Based on this we can understand why Rashi at the end reverses the order from before, [writing] "letters (and afterwards) and designs" — because forging applies primarily to letters.
5. But, seemingly, this second explanation is not entirely understood: from the content of the verses, even according to the plain meaning of Scripture, the great holiness and righteousness of Aharon is seen and evident — so how can one say that Aharon himself formed the shape of the calf, "and he made it a molten calf" — an idol?!
This will be explained by first noting that this same question can be asked regarding all the Jewish people: a short time before this they stood "לקראת האלקים" ("toward G‑d")25 at Mount Sinai and heard the Ten Commandments, including the command "אנכי ה׳ אלקיך וגו׳ לא תעשה לך פסל וגו׳" ("I am the L‑rd your G‑d… You shall not make for yourself a graven image…")26; "and they saw27 the sounds…" from the four directions of the world, and from heaven and from earth"28 — how is it possible that after all these revelations it would occur to them to make an idol?! And although "the Satan came and confused the world, and showed an image of darkness, gloom and confusion etc."29, it is still very hard to understand that through this there would come so enormous a descent — from the highest extreme to the lowest extreme?
We must therefore say that even according to the plain meaning of Scripture — which is the approach of Rashi's commentary — the matter is understood30 [to such an extent that Rashi did not need to explain it]:
It is stated explicitly in the verse: "וירא העם כי בושש משה לרדת גו׳ עשה לנו אלקים גו׳ כי זה משה האיש אשר העלנו מארץ מצרים לא ידענו מה היה לו" ("The people saw that Moshe delayed in coming down… make us elohim… for this Moshe, the man who brought us up from the land of Egypt — we do not know what has become of him") — that is, they did not request an idol, something to take the place of the Holy One, blessed be He, heaven forbid, but something in the place of Moshe; that is why they emphasized in their claim that "Moshe delayed in coming down from the mountain." And as for their saying "make us elohim," they immediately explained that their intent was not (to something of G‑dliness), but only "that will go before us (in Moshe's place), for this Moshe, the man who brought us up from the land of Egypt — we do not know what has become of him"; as Rashi states explicitly: "who brought us up from the land of Egypt — and he would show us the way by which we should go up; now we need elohim who will go before us." And by this term "elohim"31 they meant as in the verse32 "ואתה תהיה לו לאלקים" ("and you shall be to him as elohim") (as Rashi explains, "as a master and a prince"), or as in the verse33 "ראה נתתיך אלקים לפרעה" ("See, I have made you elohim to Pharaoh") (Rashi: "a judge and a chastiser"). Only afterwards were some of them dragged along in the sin of the Calf until they considered it an actual idol — and it was they who were punished with death.
And although seemingly here too one may wonder as above: how could they say that the calf would be for them a "guide of the way" and a "prince" like Moshe, "the man of G‑d"34, of whom it is said35, "אנכי עומד בין ה׳ וביניכם וגו׳" ("I stand between the L‑rd and you…")? This is not at all comparable to the above, because in this matter there is room to err and think so — for when the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded to make the Mishkan, whose content and purpose is the resting of the Shechinah among the Jewish people, as it says36, "ועשו לי מקדש ושכנתי בתוכם" ("Make Me a Sanctuary and I will dwell among them") — we see that the essence of the Mishkan and Mikdash was the Ark and the two Keruvim, as it says37, "ודברתי אתך מעל הכפורת מבין שני הכרובים אשר על ארון העדות" ("I will speak with you from above the cover, from between the two Keruvim that are upon the Ark of the Testimony"); consequently one could liken the Keruvim to a kind of "intermediary" between the Jewish people and the Holy One, blessed be He.
Especially according to what is stated, "לא תעשון אתי אלקי כסף ואלקי זהב לא תעשו לכם" ("You shall not make with Me gods of silver and gods of gold; you shall not make for yourselves")38, which Rashi explains refers to the Keruvim. Rashi further explains: "Do not say, 'I will make Keruvim in synagogues and study halls as I make in the Eternal House'; therefore it says, 'you shall not make for yourselves'" — and seemingly, for what reason would it occur to anyone to make Keruvim in synagogues and study halls as they were in the Eternal House, to the point that Scripture warns with the wording "you shall not make… gods…"? However, according to the above it is understood: since there is room to regard the Keruvim as a kind of "intermediary" between the Jewish people and the Holy One, blessed be He, it is possible that people would say that such an "intermediary" should also be made in synagogues etc.; and against this the verse comes with its warning.
If so, in our case, which was before the command "you shall not make for yourselves" (for although it was said to Moshe immediately after the Giving of the Torah, nevertheless Moshe had not yet come down from the mountain and had not conveyed the command to them), they did not yet know of the prohibition of making an "intermediary" of gods of gold (and their presence in the Holy of Holies etc. indeed demonstrates the greatness of its virtue39) — therefore the Jewish people wanted to make the calf as such an "intermediary"; and consequently the wonder of how Aharon made the calf is also removed39*.
6. By way of allusion, we can add that this is what is meant and alluded to by the word "enosh," which Rashi also brings in his commentary: the Rambam explains40: "In the days of Enosh, mankind made a great error etc., and Enosh himself41 was among those who erred. And this was their error: they said, since G‑d created these stars and spheres to conduct the world etc., they are worthy of being praised and glorified and accorded honor etc." — that is, their error was that they regarded them as an intermediary that has free choice, although in truth they are nothing but "as an axe in the hand of the one who chops with it"42. So too in our case: they wanted to make the calf into an "intermediary" [indeed, they (the Jewish people and Aharon) certainly knew that such an "intermediary" has no free choice whatsoever (similar to the Keruvim)]43, and from this there developed the sin of actual idolatry among some of the Jewish people — namely, regarding the intermediary as possessing free choice. And this is what Rashi alludes to with the word "enosh": that the sin here is similar to that of Enosh and his generation.
7. Now, according to halachah as well, the above question (how could Aharon, heaven forbid, transgress the prohibition of idolatry) can be resolved. The explanation of the matter: we find explicitly in the verse44 that Aharon told them, "Remove the golden rings… and bring them to me" — he was precise in saying only that they should bring the gold to him, but not that they should give it to him; that is, he revealed his intent that he did not want to acquire the gold so that it be his, and consequently it is understood that he did not acquire the gold (for a person cannot acquire something against his will45); especially since they too had told46 him at the outset47, "make us elohim…" — so it turns out that the gold remained in the ownership of the Jewish people even when Aharon made the calf.
And there is a rule in halachah48: "A person cannot render forbidden something that is not his." Accordingly, Aharon's actions did not render the gold forbidden48* so as to make it an idol, and consequently he also did not transgress the prohibition of idolatry49.
However, seemingly, one can ask on this: the Gemara explains50: "The Merciful One said51, 'ואשריהם תשרפון באש' ('and you shall burn their asheirah trees in fire'); but surely it is an inheritance from their forefathers, and a person cannot render forbidden something that is not his (and Rashi explains: "Now the land and everything attached to it is an inheritance to Israel from their forefathers etc., and the nations who came afterwards could not render them forbidden by bowing to them") etc. Rather, since Israel worshipped the Calf, they revealed their mind that idolatry was acceptable to them, and when the idolaters came, they acted as their agents etc. (The Gemara asks:) But perhaps it was only the Calf that was acceptable to them, and something else was not acceptable to them? (And it answers:) The verse says, 'אלה אלקיך ישראל' ('These are your gods, Israel'), which teaches that they desired many deities etc." We see that since "they revealed their mind that idolatry was acceptable to them" through the Calf, even one who is not the owner can render it forbidden51*. If so, Aharon too seemingly rendered the calf forbidden even though it was not his — for although this was before their saying "These are your gods," the statement merely reveals their mind as it was beforehand?
This will be understood by prefacing what the Rambam writes52: "A Jew who stood a brick upright in order to bow to it, and did not bow to it, and an idolater came and bowed to it — he has rendered it forbidden for benefit, because standing it upright is an act." Seemingly, what does he mean by "because standing it upright is an act"? The Rambam's source is the Gemara53, and there it is explained that the reason it is forbidden for benefit is that "one who stands a brick upright has revealed his mind that idolatry is acceptable to him, and when an idolater comes and worships it, he is acting as his agent" — that is, the "standing upright" is effective because of the "revelation of mind" in it; so why does he state that standing it upright is "an act"? Moreover, this reasoning (that a revelation of mind alone suffices) is the main novelty of the Gemara's conclusion: for according to the initial assumption there, that the possibility of rendering it forbidden through idolatry depends on "the handling of human hands," it relates to the matter of an act — by standing it upright he did an act to it, and thereby "the handling of human hands" took effect on it; whereas according to the Gemara's conclusion that standing it upright is only a revelation of mind that it is acceptable to him, "and not because of an act"54 — from where does the Rambam derive to make it depend, in halachah, on the matter of an "act"55?
It can be said that the Rambam's source is the above-mentioned passage of the Gemara, "since Israel worshipped the Calf, they revealed their mind that idolatry was acceptable to them": if we were to say that a mere revelation of mind (without an act) is effective — there is no greater revelation of mind (that idolatry was acceptable to them) than their explicitly revealing their desire, "make us…"; why then did the Gemara need to state "since they worshipped the Calf" and specify that through it "they revealed their mind that idolatry was acceptable to them"?
From this it is proven that the revelation of mind "that idolatry was acceptable to them" must be specifically through an act, and a revelation of mind in another manner does not suffice56, unlike the above suggestion that the revelation of mind merely reveals his thought from beforehand. And this is the precision in the Gemara's wording: "since Israel worshipped the Calf (by an actual deed, for only in this manner is it effective) they revealed their mind that idolatry was acceptable to them." And what the Gemara concludes there, that by saying "These are your gods, Israel" they revealed their mind that other idolatry too was acceptable to them, does not mean that they revealed their mind through the statement itself, but that through this statement they explained their intent in the "act" — that their having "worshipped" the Calf was "acceptable to them" not only regarding the Calf but regarding all other idolatry. And this is the reason of the Rambam, who explained and emphasized: "because standing it upright is an act."
Based on this, another matter that requires explanation is well resolved: the Gemara there asks about one "who stands an egg upright in order to bow to it, and did not bow to it, and an idolater came and bowed to it" — what is the law, is it forbidden or not? "With a brick, its standing upright is noticeable (Rashi explains: "for its width is greater than its thickness, and when it stands upright it appears tall"), but with an egg not; or perhaps there is no difference." Seemingly, if the main thing is the revelation of mind, what difference does it make whether "its standing upright is noticeable" or not — in any case there is a revelation of mind here that idolatry is acceptable to him?
Moreover, the later authorities asked57: it is explicit in the Gemara that even the statement "These are your gods, Israel" contains a revelation of mind that all idolatry was acceptable to them; if so, all the more so this action of "standing an egg upright" (even when its standing upright is not noticeable) should suffice to be a revelation of mind — so what is the doubt here?
But according to the above, it is well understood: the Gemara's inquiry comes after we have established this rule that the revelation of mind must also include an act; one may then inquire whether, if "its standing upright is not noticeable," which is only a "minor act" [although it certainly contains a revelation of mind], it is in the category of an effective act or not; for it is understood that there is room to distinguish between a major act and a minor act58. Nor can one bring proof from their saying "These are your gods, Israel," since there there was also an act joined to this statement, and the speech only explained the act, as above.
Based on this (that only a revelation of mind through an act of the one is what gives the other the power to render forbidden something that is not his), it is understood in our case that according to the law Aharon could not render the calf forbidden, since it was "not his," for at the time of its making they had not yet "worshipped" the calf, and without an act a mere revelation of mind does not suffice for him to be able to render forbidden something that is not his59.
8. Further, it can be said in this matter: according to the ruling of the Rambam60, "that a Jewish person does not render forbidden something that is not his, for his intent is only to cause [the owner] distress," it can be said that a revelation of mind would also not be effective so that we would say that because of it he intends the prohibition; for a revelation of mind is effective only so that he is able to render it forbidden — that is, that there is no impediment to this on the part of the owner — but we still say that he did not intend to render it forbidden.
From this it is understood in our case that certainly the revelation of mind of the Jewish people (even combined with an act) was not effective for the calf to become forbidden through Aharon, since his intent was not to render it forbidden61, for he explicitly told them61*, "חג לה׳ גו׳" ("a festival to the L‑rd…")62.
In addition to all the above, in our case there was no explicit revelation of mind that the calf was acceptable to them (before they worshipped it), for what they said earlier, "make us elohim…," came only because of their error, "for this Moshe… we do not know what has become of him" — if so, this is like a "condition": had they known "what had become" of Moshe, they would not have wanted the calf to be made.
In other words: the reason [the non-owner] renders it forbidden is because he is acting as [the owner's] agent — and obviously Aharon did not accept such an agency.
9. But seemingly there is still room to say that at least Aharon had some connection to the sin of the Calf (idolatry), for even if he himself did not commit idolatry, nevertheless many of the Jewish people stumbled through him in the prohibition of idolatry, and he seemingly transgressed the prohibition "לפני עור לא תתן מכשול" ("Before a blind man do not place a stumbling block")6364; especially according to the view that it is not a general prohibition, but a detail of the very prohibition in which he causes his fellow to stumble65, and consequently he transgressed one detail of the prohibition of idolatry?
The answer is seemingly simple: the Jewish people were commanded regarding the prohibition "Before a blind man do not place a stumbling block" (in Parshas Kedoshim) a long time after the episode of the Calf, or at any rate66 after Moshe came down from the mountain. Consequently, at the time of the making of the Calf this was not forbidden. But this does not seem to be so from Moshe's complaint, "מה עשה לך גו׳" ("What did this people do to you…"); likewise from the fact that Chur rebuked them until he was killed over this; likewise, at Marah they were commanded regarding the laws; and especially Aharon — about whom (and Chur) Moshe said before going up the mountain, "מי בעל דברים יגש אליהם" ("whoever has a matter, let him approach them")67; and more. All of this requires further study.
10. Among the matters of "the wine of the Torah" in Rashi's commentary here:
It is explained in several places68 that the existence of sin (and all the more so a grave sin such as idolatry) comes from the fact that in the subtlest of subtleties there is a source for idolatry in holiness — and the source in holiness for the sin of idolatry, separation from the Oneness of G‑d, is the matter of division that exists within the Torah itself, namely that a single matter can be explained in two ways — to the point that there are "seventy facets to the Torah"69, and in the writings of the Arizal70 it is explained that there are 600,000 interpretations of every matter in the Torah (corresponding to the 600,000 souls) — and from this there developed the possibility and the room for separation from the Oneness of G‑d.
This does not mean, heaven forbid, that this matter in itself gives room for the sin of separation, idolatry, to develop from it, heaven forbid — for the Torah is "His blessed will and wisdom, and the Torah and the Holy One, blessed be He, are entirely one"71, and "He and His wisdom are one"71*; and just as He is a simple oneness, so too is the Torah in all its parts72 entirely complete and simple oneness. Rather, because there are several interpretations in the Torah, the possibility is given to the person learning to turn slightly away (while learning) from the feeling of the simple oneness in the Torah and to feel something of division (and separation) — and this is the source, through many stages of development and descent, of the sin of idolatry, may the Merciful One save us.
This is similar to what our Sages said73 on the verse74 "נעשה אדם גו׳" ("Let us make man…"): "When [Moshe] reached this verse etc., he said before Him: Master of the world, why do You give an opening to the heretics? I am astonished! He said to him: Write, and whoever wishes to err will err" — that is, by the Holy One, blessed be He, writing in the Torah a matter of plurality (and division), an opening and a possibility was given to err, [thinking] that there are two authorities, heaven forbid — idolatry75.
On the other hand, this teaching of our Sages also emphasizes that it does not mean that the Torah itself gives room for error, but that the error comes from the person who desires it. As the precise wording of our Sages: "and whoever wishes to err will err" — for if we were to say that the intent is, as it seemingly appears, that the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded him to write ("let us make") even if through this there would be an opening for people, meaning that there is no concern even if someone errs — then what is the meaning of the words "whoever wishes (to err)"? Rather, certainly the intent is to be precise that this error cannot come from the Torah, but only because there is beforehand a person's desire to err.
Rashi alludes to this when he says, "it can be translated in two ways," that is: the possibility of separation and idolatry (the sin of the Calf, which is being discussed here) comes about because "it can be translated (the matter in the Torah) in two ways"; Rashi did not say "it has two ways" — for from the very existence of two interpretations in the Torah there is no room for separation, as above — but because the person learning can "translate it" according to his own understanding, in two ways76, and deviate from the simple oneness in the Torah, the separation of idolatry, may the Merciful One save us, can develop from this.
Based on this, the change of (three) expressions (used in listing two interpretations) and their order in Rashi's commentary is all the more appreciated: in this passage he writes "it can be translated in two ways"; in the following passage (which also contains two interpretations) it says, "and some say (yesh omrim)"; and in the third passage, "another thing (davar acher)" — for in them is alluded the order of descent that comes through division and separation: at first it is only in the manner of "it can be translated in two ways," where the person does not properly feel the oneness in the Torah "and translates it in two ways"; through this there then comes about "yesh omrim" — the "yesh" (the self) of the one saying is felt; until afterwards it becomes an existence separate from G‑dliness ("davar acher" — another thing), idolatry.
This is also the allusion of the two interpretations in Rashi (after the preface that "it can be translated in two ways"): the first interpretation is that he tied the gold in a kerchief — that is, the gold etc. that a person has, he ties up in a kerchief by itself and makes it into an entity; that is, he thinks, "כחי ועוצם ידי עשה לי את החיל הזה" ("My strength and the might of my hand have gotten me this wealth")77 (which is similar to "yesh omrim" mentioned above); and the second interpretation is that he formed the shape of the calf in actuality — he feels himself as a "yesh," an entirely separate existence (similar to "davar acher" mentioned above).
The point of all the above is a deficiency in the acceptance of the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, for if this is complete in a person, he will feel the simple oneness in the Torah as well. Rashi alludes to this in his comment on the words preceding "it can be translated in two ways": "Vayispariku — an expression of unloading a burden"78 — that they regard Torah and mitzvos as a burden, and consequently they cast off this yoke — this is a preface to "translating" the Torah in two ways, and afterwards to the further descents.
Whereas when faith and the acceptance of the yoke are complete, one will not come even to the beginning of the matter. That is why we find79 that the women and the children did not give gold for the calf, for with them faith is at its strongest80, and consequently there was no room among them for idolatry.
It is understood that through strengthening faith and the acceptance of the yoke (in both of which there is no division), the feeling of G‑d's Oneness in all matters is also strengthened, to the point that even when one learns a matter in the Torah that has several interpretations, he feels in this very division81 the true simple oneness.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Ki Sisa 5726 and 5727)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 32:2–3.
2) Ibid., 4.
3) Yeshayahu 3:22.
4) II Melachim 5:23.
5) Yeshayahu 8:1.
6) Bava Basra 14b.
7) 42:35.
8) 12:34.
9) One should not ask that here too Rashi should not explain it at all, since he already explained it in Parshas Mikeitz — for here there are two explanations, which proves that in this verse the meaning is not simple; therefore the question in the main text is only that at least according to this explanation he should have brought a proof from there.
10) "Tzeroros" is not a noun, yet it is written with two reishes (see Rashi, Vayechi 49:19; 49:17).
11) The reason he does not bring a proof from the verse (Re'eh 14:25) "וצרת הכסף בידך" ("and you shall bind up the money in your hand") (and similarly (Yechezkel 5:3) "וצרת אותם בכנפיך" ("and bind them in your skirts")) — is because there too it can be explained according to both explanations (as it is according to halachah — Bava Metzia 47b*).
*) According to what is explained below (section 4), this can be connected with the ruling of the Rambam (Hilchos Maaser Sheni, ch. 4 [halachah number OCR unclear]) "that it has on it a form or writing, as it says, 'and you shall bind (vetzarta) the money'." See also Torah Temimah, Re'eh (ibid.).
12) Although in Yeshayahu Rashi explains, "vehacharitim — its Targum is machchaya, a mold of the womb etc." — he emphasizes there that this is "its Targum" (and not its plain meaning). Likewise, regarding what Rashi writes in Melachim, "bishnei charitim — kinds of garments and kerchiefs, as in 'the shawls and the charitim'; so Menachem grouped it; but Yonasan translated this as paldesin, and the one in the book of Yeshayahu he translated machchaya" — it can be said that "but Yonasan etc." does not mean that Rashi leans more toward that explanation (on the contrary — the explanation "kerchiefs" is in its place and he brings it unqualified, only concluding that "so Menachem grouped it" — and he does not write, "Menachem grouped it etc., but Yonasan etc."); rather, Menachem "grouped it" with what is written in Yeshayahu, whereas Yonasan (whose explanation is a translation) does not group it with Yeshayahu, for "he translated (and not its plain meaning) this as paldesin, and the one in the book of Yeshayahu he translated machchaya." — It can be said that Yonasan follows his own approach: Yonasan translates sedinim (sheets) as paldesin, and therefore he cannot group it with Yeshayahu — since in Yeshayahu sedinim is written afterwards separately.
13) For what Rashi writes, "once he cast it etc.," is only according to the first explanation here, whereas according to the second explanation, that Aharon himself formed the shape of the calf, it is understood that "and he made it a molten calf" refers to Aharon: "vayatzar oso bacheret (he formed it with a craftsman's tool until) he made it a molten calf." As has been discussed many times, in many places Rashi explains a verse according to one of his explanations of the matter elsewhere, because according to the second explanation there, no explanation is needed in this place. Accordingly, it is understood that in a third verse he may explain only according to the second explanation — as in our matter, where later on (32:16) he explains according to the second explanation of "bacheret."
14) One cannot say that according to this explanation in Rashi, the meaning of "and he made it…" is (as the Kli Yakar explains — and similarly the Ohr HaChaim) "since he engaged in melting the gold, Scripture regards him as if he made it," because (a) in the plain meaning of Scripture, saying that "Scripture regards him etc." is a novelty, and Rashi would have needed to write it explicitly (similar to Rashi, Lech Lecha 12:5); (b) what Rashi writes, "the sorcerers of the eirev rav came etc. and made it" (unlike regarding Michah, where he writes, "and the calf came out"), fits neither this explanation nor that one (of our verse). It is worth noting that also according to halachah, "an evil thought — the Holy One, blessed be He, does not join it to deed" (Kiddushin 40a; Yerushalmi Pe'ah 1:1; Zohar I 25b, II 150b, III 307a). And although a thought of idolatry the Holy One, blessed be He, does join to deed (Kiddushin ibid.) — in our case, according to all opinions, his thought was not, heaven forbid, for idolatry (but rather — for good); only his action — his engaging in melting the gold — afterwards brought about idolatry (see below, section 9).
15) Rashi, Vayechi 48:2. See there, 1.
16) 32:24.
17) And indeed this must be said according to the second explanation of our verse (but see below, note 39*) — and Rashi did not need to explain this (according to the second explanation) because it is self-understood (see above, note 13). See Maskil LeDovid there.
18) As for what the Re'em writes, "that out of his fear of Moshe he uttered a falsehood" — the commentators have already wondered at it.
19) According to what was explained above, that Rashi cannot bring a proof from "tzeror kaspo," "tzeroros besimlosam," it will also be understood why Rashi does not lean decisively toward the first explanation more than the second, even though until now "vayatzar" has appeared in the Chumash only in the sense of the first explanation (for sometimes Rashi explains on the spot according to what has been learned until then, and afterwards changes (anew) the explanation according to the additional learning — see above p. 135 ff., where he reverses the order of his explanations etc.).
Likewise (according to his practice of sometimes supporting an explanation on the spot from subsequent verses — even though it could be explained differently according to what has been learned until then), he does not explain that he does not decide in favor of the first explanation because later on the second explanation is also found.
20) See Rashi, Bereishis (1:5): "It should have written 'the first day,' as it writes for the other days, second, third, fourth; why did it write 'one' etc."
21) For every word in Rashi's commentary is precise. It is worth noting the responsa of the Rema (end of §128): "Perhaps Rashi composed it in another language, only that it became established among the Jewish people in the Holy Tongue so that it be understood everywhere" — he wrote "perhaps," and it also seems that he retracted after the questioner answered him (§129), "and heaven forbid to mention that Rashi's commentary was not composed in the Holy Tongue," for in the subsequent responsum (§130) the Rema quotes the questioner's wording (including these words) and responds to every single detail, yet regarding this detail he writes nothing. Furthermore and most importantly: well known are the words of the Shelah concerning the wondrous matters in Rashi's commentary, and likewise what the Chida writes in Shem HaGedolim, part 1, entry "Rashi," that he wrote his commentary with allusions to the esoteric (sod) etc. And more.
22) Since in his answer he brings the verse, Rashi need not preface it in the question, for his style in most places is to negate the questions implicitly through his explanation. On the contrary: where Rashi spells out the question — that requires explanation.
22*) A tool with which forms are engraved is not the tool with which letters are written.
23) Only that in Yeshayahu what matters is the reading and publicizing after the writing — therefore Rashi there explains only with regard to reading.
24) Terumah 25:33.
25) Yisro 19:17.
26) Ibid. 20:2, 4.
27) Ibid., 15, and Rashi there.
28) Rashi ibid., 2.
29) Rashi on our parsha, 32:1.
30) On what follows (until the end of the section), see the commentators on the Chumash.
31) What Rashi writes, "they desired many deities," is also along these lines [all the more so since even regarding the Talmud, the Maharsha in Chiddushei Aggados on Sanhedrin (63a) explains that "deities" in this teaching is not literal] — and see the Re'em here.
32) Shemos 4:16.
33) Va'eira 7:1.
34) Beginning of Parshas Berachah; Tehillim 90:1.
35) Va'eschanan 5:5.
36) Terumah 25:8.
37) Ibid., 22.
38) Yisro 20:20.
39) Although they had not yet been commanded to make the Ark and the Keruvim, nevertheless it simply appears that such a matter was understood to them. Therefore: (a) we do not find that they wondered at the making of the Keruvim, and that "from between them… I will speak with you." (b) The command "you shall not make," mentioned above, came before the command to make the Keruvim. (c) And most importantly — Rashi already explained that they knew they would be commanded to make the Mishkan etc. (Terumah 26:15).
39*) Based on this, it can be said that also according to the second explanation in Rashi one can explain "and I did not know that this calf would come out" (see above, note 17), the precision being in the word "this" (which seemingly is superfluous) — i.e., I did not know that from this would come out a matter of idolatry (such a calf) — similar to the explanation of the Gur Aryeh and the Maskil LeDovid on the verse.
40) Beginning of Hilchos Avodah Zarah.
41) The source for this is Shabbos 118b (according to the reading of the Ein Yaakov, etc.; see Dikdukei Sofrim there), where "the generation" is omitted. See Rashi there. Apparently the "young typesetter" of Rashi's commentary on the Gemara, seeing the reading "like the generation of Enosh," wished to "correct" it and omitted the word "like Enosh" that was quoted from the Gemara, and he made the beginning of Rashi's comment, "the generation of Enosh," into a quotation of the words of the Gemara, and broke it up on the spot — for in the Gemara it must read "like the generation." Rather, [Rashi] explains that the intent is his generation. And in the allusion here too one can explain it so. [Parts of this note are garbled in the OCR.] The intent of the Rambam in this addition, it can be said, is to show the magnitude of the error and how widespread it was. Note Moreh Nevuchim (II:47); the Ramban on the Torah, Bereishis (5:6).
42) See the first sicha on Parshas Yisro, Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 65.
43) See Sefer HaMitzvos of the Tzemach Tzedek, mitzvah of milah, ch. 3. Well known is the discussion regarding saying "Machnisei Rachamim." This is not so regarding Moshe (and likewise the saying of our Sages that one who has a sick person should go to a sage etc. (Bava Basra 116a)) — see responsa Chasam Sofer, Orach Chaim §116.
44) 32:2.
45) And even according to what the Nimukei Yosef writes on Bava Metzia (10a) (on what is said in the Gemara there, "since he fell [on it], he revealed his mind that he wants to acquire it by falling; he does not want to acquire it through four cubits"): "and this, since it is an enactment of the Sages, we listen to him when he says 'I do not want the enactment of the Sages' in a case like this" (so that even where he explicitly reveals his mind that "he does not want it," nevertheless, if it were a Torah-level acquisition, he would acquire it against his will) — the Chasam Sofer has written (Choshen Mishpat §313; Chiddushim on Even HaEzer §166; and so in the responsa of R. Akiva Eiger, Mahadura Tinyana §96) "that this was said only of one who wants to acquire this thing now through some acquisition etc., but if he has no intent to acquire at all, it was not said that he acquires against his will" (see the answer of the Mishneh LaMelech (Hilchos Zechiyah U'Matanah 2:9) to the contradiction between the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat §268:1), that we do not say "since he fell, he revealed his mind etc.," and what it rules (§275:21) according to the view of the Ramah, that "since he intended to acquire them only through building, he did not acquire it in this way" (and see Pischei Teshuvah §268 there)). It is understood that according to this, there is also no contradiction with what it rules regarding one who hoes in the property of a convert (§275:25). And according to this, the question of the Rashba (cited in the Shitah Mekubetzes, Bava Metzia ibid.), from the discussion of hoeing in the property of a convert, against the view that in a Torah-level acquisition it is effective even without intent, is resolved*.
*) A certain scholar remarked that what is written here in the name of the Chasam Sofer (and R. Akiva Eiger), and that according to this the question of the Rashba in the Shitah Mekubetzes is resolved — is also written in the responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Choshen Mishpat §230 and Even HaEzer §159. But in Piskei Dinim, Orach Chaim §448, he seemingly gives a different answer.
46) Ibid., 1.
47) Only afterwards was there on their part, "and they gave it to me" (32:24). And although the Nimukei Yosef writes on Bava Basra (41a), and the Rashba in his Chiddushim on Gittin (20a), and the Ritva on Yevamos (52b) and on Bava Basra (ibid.), that where another person's mind transfers ownership one acquires even without intent — the Ketzos HaChoshen (§275:25) distinguishes "that this is only without intent; but if he intended not to acquire, he certainly does not acquire against his will." It requires study whether this reasoning of the Ketzos applies only where he did not intend to acquire at all, whereas if he intended to acquire through another acquisition, then even though he explicitly intended not to acquire through this acquisition, he acquires against his will, as in note 45 above. This is not the place to elaborate.
48) Avodah Zarah 53b, and in several places.
48*) And although according to most poskim (cited in the Encyclopedia Talmudis, entry "Davar She'eino Shelo"), through an act (of the one transgressing the prohibition) one can indeed render forbidden something that is not his (and in our case Aharon did perform an act) — nevertheless, according to many poskim (cited there), this is only with a non-Jew, but regarding a Jew we say that he did not intend the prohibition. One cannot ask: if so, why do we need to connect it with the law that "a person cannot render forbidden something that is not his" (for if he does not intend the prohibition, it automatically did not become an idol, and he did not transgress the making) — because this reasoning, that he did not intend the prohibition, is said only in connection with the law that "a person cannot render forbidden something that is not his." This is not the place to elaborate.
49) And although regardless, the Mishnah rules anonymously (Avodah Zarah 51b — and so the Rambam (Hilchos Avodah Zarah 7:4) and the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah §139:1)) like R. Akiva (and not like R. Yishmael — cited in the Gemara there*), that "an idol of a non-Jew is forbidden immediately, and that of a Jew is not forbidden until it is worshipped," and here they had not yet worshipped the calf at the time Aharon made it — nevertheless it is proven in the Gemara (ibid. 52a) that even according to R. Akiva, "from the time of making, it stands in sin… and in curse," for otherwise the Gemara would have needed to explain why R. Akiva needs these verses from which R. Yishmael derives that "from the time of making" etc., as the Gemara explains regarding the verses from which R. Yishmael learns that "an idol of a non-Jew is not forbidden until it is worshipped, and that of a Jew is forbidden immediately." And so it must be said also according to the plain meaning, for it is explicit in the Ten Commandments, "You shall not make for yourself a graven image…" [and the reason the Talmud brings other verses is that in them it is more explicit etc., as is easily understood].
*) In explaining the basis of the dispute between R. Akiva and R. Yishmael, it can be said, according to what was explained in Chag HaPesach — Biurim — the Hadran on Tractate Pesachim (11 Nissan 5732), a general basis for their disputes: according to R. Akiva, the main thing in mitzvos and obligations etc. is how it is from the standpoint of the "ownership" of the Holy One, blessed be He, and according to R. Yishmael the main thing is how it is from the standpoint of the "ownership" of the Jewish people (see there at length). Similarly it can be said in our case: from the standpoint of (the command itself of) the Holy One, blessed be He, the prohibition of idolatry is more severe for the Jewish people, for "you are children to the L‑rd your G‑d," as is understood. This excludes the Jewish people's connection to idolatry all the more, and consequently a stronger action is needed for a Jew to bring about the existence of an idol. Whereas from the standpoint of (the action of) the person, the harm and loss of transgressing the prohibition of idolatry is greater for the Jewish people (for that very reason — that the Holy One, blessed be He, distanced them from it more), and consequently even a light action by a Jew suffices to make it an idol; and this is easily understood.
50) Avodah Zarah 53b.
51) Re'eh 12:2.
51*) Seemingly, since the Gemara did not distinguish in this, it implies that this applies also where one could say that he did not intend the prohibition — for then too, if (the owner) revealed his mind that it is acceptable to him, we do not say that (the transgressor) did not intend the prohibition. And so writes the Yad Avraham (Yoreh De'ah §4:4), based on Tosafos (Bava Kamma 71a), that where he revealed his mind we do not say that he intends to cause distress. But see below, the beginning of section 8.
52) Hilchos Avodah Zarah 8:3.
53) Avodah Zarah 46a; 53b.
54) Rashi there, s.v. "levenah."
55) It is obvious that one cannot say that the Rambam's intent in "because standing it upright is an act" is that through standing it upright the revelation of mind becomes noticeable.
56) The explanation of this, it can be said: a revelation of mind is effective because then [the non-Jew] is like his agent, as is precise in the Gemara's wording, "and when an idolater comes and worships it, he is acting as his agent." But this is not a complete agency, since "there is no agent for a matter of transgression" (and well known is the discussion whether we say this also with a non-Jewish agent; further, idolatry is one of the seven Noahide commandments, and so the principle of "the words of the master [versus the words of the student]" applies etc.), and most poskim hold (and this is also the view of the Alter Rebbe in his Shulchan Aruch (§448:10 and elsewhere)) that there is no agency for non-Jews even when the agent and the sender are non-Jews (or apostates) (see Yad Avraham there). Therefore there must first be proof of a strong desire etc., so that afterwards it becomes a kind of agency; and therefore there must specifically be an act, which shows the strength of his desire (to the point that he performs an act).
57) Binyan Shlomo (by R. Shlomo Kluger) on the Rambam there.
58) As those who distinguish between a major act and a minimal act regarding the view of those Amoraim (Chullin 40b) that even where (the one performing the prohibition) performed an act, one cannot render forbidden something that is not his (Rabbeinu Chananel, cited in the Rosh and the Ran (there), and in the Maggid Mishneh, Hilchos Shechitah 2:21; and in Mishmeres HaBayis of the Rashba, Bayis 1. Some explain Rashi this way (s.v. "Ein Adam" — Chullin there)). This is not the place to elaborate.
59) And although they brought him the gold — it is proven from the Gemara that this is not a sufficient act, for otherwise why does it say "that they worshipped" — it should have said "that they brought the gold" (though one could say that it states the stronger point; but this is forced — for those who brought it were "all the people," whereas those who worshipped were only some). The explanation of this, it can be said: a gold ring is not fit for the idol they requested; moreover, they explicitly excluded this: "make…," that is, it still lacks an act (the idol is not yet in existence).
60) Hilchos Shechitah 2:21, from Chullin 41a. See above, note 48[*], that this is the view of many poskim.
61) And although his intent was not to cause them distress — the meaning is not that it must specifically be "he intends to cause distress," but any side intent that is not for the prohibition; especially according to what is written in the Simlah Chadashah (§4:11) and the Tevuos Shor (§19), that the entire matter of "he intends to cause distress" depends on the judgment of the halachic authority — certainly, if it can be attributed to another matter, we attribute it; and the expression "he intends to cause distress" is used because it is a general reason applicable in all cases (whereas other reasons each depend on the particular event). In our case his intent was to put them off (as Rashi explains on our parsha, 32:5; see also Rashi there, 2).
61*) Our parsha, 32:5.
62) Unlike the case of the Yad Avraham (see above, note 51*).
63) Kedoshim 19:14.
64) And although this prohibition applies only where "he stands on the two sides of the river" (Avodah Zarah 6b), "for if he did not give it to him, he could not take it" (Rashi there, s.v. "dekayma"), in our case too it was similar, for without Aharon they would not have made the calf, as is evident from the fact that "the people gathered against Aharon" specifically.
65) Responsa Tzafnas Pa'aneach (Jerusalem 5725), §5, and sources cited there. It can be said that this depends on the views (see Minchas Chinuch, mitzvah 232, and the glosses there; it has already been noted from Zohar III 85a; Rambam, Hilchos Talmud Torah 6:14, and the Ra'avad there) as to whether one who places a stumbling block before a blind person — literally — transgresses this prohibition. For according to this view (that the verse singled out and explained — according to the rule that a verse does not depart from its plain meaning — one manner of the prohibition), it comes "to divide" regarding all prohibitions (though it differs from "kindling [on Shabbos] came out to divide" — for here it is to particularize and not to divide), and it is a detail in each matter separately. [Or one can say the opposite: since the verse singled it out, this proves that it is a matter in itself; and one who hands wine to a nazir — this is a detail of "before a blind man" and not of nazir.] Whereas according to the view that one does not transgress in this manner — it is a general prohibition.
66) According to the view of [OCR unclear: ר"צ — possibly R. Akiva] (Sotah 37b) that "general rules and details were said at Sinai."
67) Mishpatim 24:14.
68) See the maamar beginning "Al Kein Yomru HaMoshlim," 5691 (Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 1, p. 382 ff.).
69) Bamidbar Rabbah 13:16; Zohar I 46b; III 20a, 216a, 223a.
70) Shaar HaGilgulim, Introduction 17; Shaar Ruach HaKodesh, on the yichudim at the graves of tzaddikim, Introduction 3; Likkutei Maharchu (of blessed memory) at the end of Shaar Maamarei Razal of the Arizal.
71) Tanya, ch. 4.
71*) Ibid., ch. 2.
72) See Torah Chaim, Noach, maamar "Vayehi Kol HaAretz Safah Echas," ch. 27 ff. — the matter of division that comes specifically from simplicity.
73) Bereishis Rabbah 8:8.
74) Bereishis 1:26.
75) These two matters are one matter, except that "let us make man…" is the giving of room for error in creation, while the division in the interpretations of the Torah is the giving of room for error in the Torah.
76) The word "(two) panim" (literally, "faces") is precise — for this matter is still within the Torah, on the level of panim.
77) Eikev 8:17. And in the Semag, negative commandment 64: "a warning that a person should not become haughty with what the Creator has graced him, whether in wealth, in beauty or in wisdom; rather he should be very humble and lowly before the L‑rd G‑d and people, and thank his Creator who graced him with this virtue etc."
78) It is worth noting that this speaks of golden rings, and it is known [the verse] "a golden ring in the snout [of a swine]…" (Avos beginning of ch. 6; Rashi, Mishlei 11:22; and see Zohar I 110a); and in Rashi, "unloading a burden" (unqualified) — and well known is the teaching of the Baal Shem Tov on the verse "כי תראה גו׳ משאו גו׳" ("When you see… his burden…") (Hayom Yom, p. 23).
79) Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer ch. 45, cited in Rashi (Megillah 22b) and in the Tur, Orach Chaim §417. See Rashi on our parsha, 32:2. It is also evident from Rashi (Pinchas 26:64), "but upon the women the decree of the spies was not decreed, because they cherished the Land," although "from when they made the Calf this decree arose in thought" (Rashi, Shelach 14:33) — it is evident that even on account of the sin of the Calf this decree did not arise in thought regarding the women.
80) See Ohr HaTorah, Tisa, p. 1985 ff.
81) See Torah Chaim cited in note 72.
Key Lesson
This Sicha shows that Rashi's "it can be translated in two ways" teaches that both explanations of "vayatzar oso bacheret" are equally weighted, and that Aharon, by both explanation and halachah, did not commit idolatry. On a deeper level, the multiplicity of interpretations in Torah can lead to separation from G‑d only when a person's acceptance of the yoke of Heaven is weak; when faith and kabbalas ol are complete, one senses the simple Oneness of G‑d even within the many interpretations of the Torah.