Parshas Yisro
1. From the verse in the Ten Commandments,1 "שבת לה' אלקיך" ("a Shabbos unto the L‑rd your G‑d"), the Jerusalem Talmud2 derives: "שבות כה' מה הקב"ה שבת ממאמר אף אתה שבות ממאמר" ("Rest like G‑d: just as the Holy One, blessed be He, rested from utterance, so too you shall rest from utterance"). That is, the Sages decreed that on Shabbos one must refrain from speech concerning matters of work and the like, and they based this on the verse "a Shabbos unto the L‑rd your G‑d" — "rest like G‑d." Just as a person must rest from work, "for in six days G‑d made the heavens... and He rested on the seventh day,"3 so too he must rest from speech, for "the Holy One, blessed be He, rested from utterance."
Further on, the Jerusalem Talmud there states: "מעשה בחסיד אחד" ("It once happened that a certain pious man went out for a stroll in his vineyard on Shabbos, saw a breach there, and thought to fence it after Shabbos. He said: Since I thought of fencing it [on Shabbos], I will never fence it...").4 This means that the attribute of piety ("a chassid") is to be careful even about the thought of work.5
Now, this story is cited in the Jerusalem Talmud6 in continuation of7 the exposition "a Shabbos unto the L‑rd — rest like G‑d." It follows from this8 that care regarding even the thought of work — as an attribute of piety — also belongs to the teaching "rest like G‑d,"
for just as "the revealed worlds (עלמין דאתגליין) were created and live from the revelation of the hidden powers and emanations which were revealed," which, once revealed, "are called by the name 'utterances,' 'the word of G‑d' and 'the breath of His mouth,' like the letters of speech in man, by way of analogy,"
so too "the hidden worlds (עלמין סתימין), which are not revealed, are those that come into being, live and exist from hidden powers and emanations, like the letters of thought in the human soul, by way of analogy"9 —
and on the seventh day He rested from all His work which He had done — also from the hidden worlds.
This requires explanation: Since the central point of the obligation for a person to rest on Shabbos from all his activities — in deed, speech and thought — is that the Holy One, blessed be He, rested from all His work in deed, speech and thought9* — "rest like G‑d" — why do they differ in their prohibition? Doing work is forbidden by Torah law; speech — by Rabbinic decree;10 and care regarding thought is merely an attribute of piety.
2. Now, the reason for the difference between resting from doing work and resting from speech is explained by the Tzemach Tzedek in Ohr HaTorah:10* "The resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, from speech is like resting from deed, since from the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, a deed is made... whereas the speech of man, from which no deed comes into being, is not considered a deed. Therefore we are not commanded by Torah law to rest from speech, but only to rest from deed, etc.11 Nevertheless," in the words of the Prophets it is stated,12 "ודבר דבר" ("nor speaking idle words"), "since, in any event, the resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, was from utterance, as is stated in the Jerusalem Talmud: just as He rested from utterance, so too you shall rest from utterance..."
But seemingly this still lacks explanation: Since by Torah law we are not commanded to rest from speech, because no deed comes into being from a person's speech — that is, there is no equivalence between human speech and "the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, which is considered an actual deed"13 — why did the Sages forbid speech on Shabbos on the grounds of "rest like G‑d"?
3. This will be understood by first introducing what is explained at the conclusion of the book of Tanya regarding care with speech on Shabbos. In its words: "One should also be very careful not to engage in any idle talk, heaven forfend... For in all the mitzvos there is an inner aspect and an outer aspect. The outer aspect of Shabbos is resting from physical work, just as G‑d rested from making the physical heavens and earth. The inner aspect of Shabbos is the concentration in the Shabbos prayers and in Torah study, to cleave to the One G‑d, as it is written, 'a Shabbos unto the L‑rd your G‑d' — and this is the aspect of Zachor ('Remember'). And the aspect of Shamor ('Keep') in its inner dimension is resting from physical speech, just as G‑d rested from the ten utterances by which the physical heavens and earth were created..."
This requires clarification:
a) To explain the reason for care regarding weekday talk on Shabbos, it would seemingly suffice to state that the aspect of "Shamor in its inner dimension is resting from physical speech." Yet the plain wording in the Tanya implies14 that this is connected with what was said just before it — that the mitzvah of Zachor in its inner dimension is "the concentration in the Shabbos prayers and in Torah study, to cleave to the One G‑d."
b) The Alter Rebbe concludes: "just as G‑d rested from the ten utterances by which the physical heavens and earth were created." Seemingly, for our purpose (resting from speech on Shabbos) only the general point is relevant — "that G‑d rested from the ten utterances." What is added by the fact that through these ten utterances "were created..."?
On the contrary: according to the above — that "therefore we are not commanded by Torah law to rest from speech," since "the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, is considered a deed" — this addition (that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the physical heavens and earth through the utterances) emphasizes the lack of equivalence between Supernal speech and human speech. That is, it is a proof to the contrary!?
c) What is the precise point in his adding: "resting from physical speech, just as G‑d rested... the physical heavens and earth"?
4. The explanation of all this:
Among the three faculties of the soul — thought, speech and deed — the faculty of deed differs from the two faculties of thought and speech. The function of the faculty of deed is to act upon something outside itself; that is, the faculty of deed separates from the person, becomes enclothed in something outside of him and acts upon it.15 Thought and speech, in contrast, function within the person himself — to bring his intellect and emotions to revelation: thought reveals his intellect and emotions to himself, and speech reveals his intellect and emotions to another.16
However, in detail there is a great difference between thought and speech (in their connection to deed). The letters of thought are spiritual and refined and have no connection to deed; therefore the function of thought is only within the person himself, and it is unable to affect another. The letters of speech, by contrast, are physical letters (physical breath that is "formed" into the letters alef, beis, etc., by the five organs of articulation of the mouth, the movement of the lips, and so on), and they are separate from the person; they have a connection and closeness to deed. Therefore speech is able to compel an action,17 as our Sages said18 regarding the prohibition of driving [an animal on Shabbos]. And through the word of a king all the affairs of the country are conducted, as it is written,19 "דבר מלך שלטון" ("the word of a king is power").
Thought, however, has no connection to action. For although a person's decision in his mind brings about his actions, thought — being spiritual — has no connection or "closeness" to his actions.20
5. This difference between thought and speech is also found in halachah.
The Gemara states:21 "It was said: If he muzzled it with his voice" ("when it bent down to eat, he would shout at it"22)... "Rabbi Yochanan said: he is liable" (for transgressing "לא תחסום שור בדישו" — "You shall not muzzle an ox while it is threshing"23) — "the twisting of his mouth is a deed" ("and so it is a prohibition involving a deed, for which one receives lashes"22); "Reish Lakish said: he is exempt — the voice is not a deed."
Tosafos asked:24 "This is puzzling, for in the third chapter of Shevuos Rabbi Yochanan said: Rabbi Yehudah would say in the name of Rabbi Yossi HaGlili: For any prohibition that involves no deed one does not receive lashes, except for one who swears, one who makes a substitution [of a sacrifice], and one who curses his fellow with the Divine Name. Yet Rabbi Yochanan himself says here that the twisting of his lips is a deed; if so, why does he count one who swears, etc., as a prohibition without a deed? One can answer that Rabbi Yochanan says that the twisting of the mouth is a deed only here, because through his speech he performs a deed, for [the animal] goes and threshes without eating, etc."
Seemingly, the Gemara explicitly states Rabbi Yochanan's reason — that "the twisting of his mouth is a deed" — yet according to Tosafos' explanation the liability is not because the twisting of the lips is considered a deed, but because through his speech the animal performs a deed?
Further on, Tosafos cite the Gemara's question (in tractate Sanhedrin24*) on Rabbi Yochanan's statement that the twisting of the lips is a deed — how can it say that a blasphemer and conspiring witnesses "involve no deed": "But one who muzzled with his voice is liable according to Rabbi Yochanan! (And it answers:) Conspiring witnesses are different, since [their offense] lies in seeing." Tosafos explain that the Gemara's question is not on the law of the blasphemer — for a blasphemer, who does not perform any deed through his speech, cannot be compared to "muzzling with the voice," where through his speech he performs a deed. Rather, the question refers to the law of conspiring witnesses, "for through their speech a deed is done, in that the defendant is made liable."
But seemingly, according to the above reasoning of Tosafos — that the reason muzzling with the voice is considered a deed is (not because of the speech itself, but) because through his speech he performs a deed (and similarly with conspiring witnesses, "the defendant is made liable") — what is the Gemara's answer, "conspiring witnesses are different, since [their offense] lies in seeing" (Rashi explains: the main liability comes about through seeing, since they testify that they saw, and seeing involves no deed25)? True, "seeing involves no deed," but ultimately a deed is done through it — the defendant is made liable. How, then, does this differ from muzzling with the voice, which is considered a deed because a deed is done through his speech?
6. The explanation of this: Tosafos do not mean that a person is punished for a deed done by others (merely because he was its cause and brought it about)
[The reason: lashes are given only when a person transgresses a prohibition through his own deed;*25 therefore in our case, where he did not perform a deed (but only caused the animal to raise its head and thresh without eating), one cannot give the person lashes for the deed done by the animal by reason of his speech].
Rather, their intent is: When a person effects a deed by his speech, then since the deed comes about solely through the person's speech, it is an extension of the speech, a part of it — for it comes from the power of the speech alone. Therefore it is not mere speech; rather, "there is in it (in the speech itself) a deed" — somewhat similar to the deed of a person's agent (especially according to the explanation that only the deed is that of the sender26).
This is also the content of Rabbi Yochanan's words, "the twisting of his mouth is a deed": the fact that the animal is muzzled by the person's voice is the person's own doing. For since his voice comes through "the twisting of his mouth" — a physical action that is close and connected to deed — the action (of the animal) that comes about through it is an extension of the twisting.
Therefore this applies only to speech. But with a deed caused by thought, which is spiritual, the deed is not an extension of the thought and connected to it, for it is entirely separate from it, as explained above. — An example of this is agency, where the agent must be similar to the sender: "מה אתם בני ברית אף שלוחכם" ("just as you are members of the covenant, so must your agent be").26*
Therefore, with conspiring witnesses, "[whose offense] lies in seeing" — although a deed is effected through it, it cannot26** join with the seeing so that it be considered as involving a deed.
7. However, the above difference between thought and speech applies only to man below, whose actions are outside of him; therefore his thought, which is spiritual, is not "adjacent" and connected to them, whereas his speech is.
But with the Holy One, blessed be He, even His thought acts and creates. The difference is only in the manner of creation: from His thought, since it is more concealed, "hidden" — spiritual — worlds were created; and from His speech, since it is more revealed, this physical world was created.27
Accordingly, it is understood that thought in man below bears no resemblance or equivalence to thought as it is with the Holy One, blessed be He, for a person's thought cannot effect anything in another. But a person's speech, since it is able to compel a deed (as explained above in section 4), has a measure of equivalence, so to speak, to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He.
— And although even human speech is not truly like the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He — for "the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, is considered an actual deed, in which and through which the making is done,"*27 whereas a person's speech only causes the deed of another, but does not itself perform a deed — nevertheless there is an equivalence between them with regard to effecting action.28
8. Accordingly, one can explain the reasons for the differences between a person's resting on Shabbos from deed and his resting from speech and thought.
The general reason for resting on Shabbos is stated explicitly in the verse, "כי ששת ימים עשה ה'" ("For in six days G‑d made...")29 — therefore a person must rest from activities of deed. That being so, although the resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, from creating the worlds is in that He rested also from thought and speech, nevertheless, since within the parameters of man thought and speech do not effect deeds, resting from thought and speech is not included in the command to rest from doing work.
Nevertheless, since there is some resemblance and equivalence between human speech and the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He — for human speech too can compel action, as explained above — our Sages, who forbid even matters that resemble Torah prohibitions, added and included resting from speech within "rest like G‑d."
And although the Sages' decree to rest from speech applies (not only to speech that compels a deed, but also) to speech concerning matters of work, weekday matters and the like — and seemingly, how can these be forbidden on the grounds of "rest like G‑d"? —
the answer is that since the partial equivalence of a person's speech to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, stems from the very nature of speech (which, being physical, is connected and close to deed), the Sages forbade speech even when it does not effect a deed, for by its nature it is something capable of bringing about a deed.
[We find an example of this reasoning in halachah (and in the above subject of a prohibition without a deed). Known is the view of the Maggid Mishneh30 (in explaining the Rambam) that a prohibition which can be transgressed through a complete deed — even when it is transgressed without a deed, one receives lashes for it. The later authorities31 wrote that this principle applies only if one transgresses the prohibition (at least) through speech, which is somewhat of a deed; but if there was not even speech — although he has the thought of transgression (for example, one who keeps his chametz on Pesach and wants it to remain) — he does not receive lashes.
The explanation of this may be: Although this speech itself did not cause a deed,32 nevertheless, since speech is "at least somewhat of a deed"33 — in the category of causing a deed — one is rightly punished for it, as it is considered "involving a deed." The thought of transgression, by contrast, which is not in the category of deed at all, does not enter the definition of "involving a deed."
Therefore the Sages decreed resting from speech on the grounds of "rest like G‑d," as explained above.]
But regarding thought, which bears no resemblance at all to His thought, there is no basis to forbid it even rabbinically. However, a "chassid," who acts beyond the letter of the law34 and cleaves to the Holy One, blessed be He, is careful even about the thought of work. For since in actuality the Holy One, blessed be He, rested from thought, then by virtue of cleaving to His ways and attributes — "just as He... so too you..." — he too rests from his thought.35
9. According to all the above, the precise points noted above (section 3) in the words of the Alter Rebbe at the conclusion of the Tanya will be explained.
The Alter Rebbe's intent is: a) to explain the reason for the prohibition "not to engage in any idle talk, heaven forfend"; b) to explain why this applies only to speech and not to thought, which is why he explicitly warned about speech (and not about thought).
Therefore he states precisely that the aspect of Shamor in its inner dimension is "resting from physical speech, just as G‑d rested from the ten utterances by which the physical heavens and earth were created." With this he explains: a) the reason for care with speech: since human speech is physical and therefore able to compel a deed, in this it resembles, so to speak, the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, from which — being "close" to deed — the physical heavens and earth came into being; therefore one must rest "from speech (that is) physical." b) This reason does not apply to thought: thought in a person has no closeness to deed, and therefore it bears no resemblance to the thought of the Holy One, blessed be He, from which (spiritual) worlds were created.
10. Accordingly one can understand, by way of homiletic interpretation, the connection between the conclusion of the book of Tanya and its beginning — in the manner of "נעוץ סופן בתחלתן" ("their end is wedged in their beginning"): "משביעים אותו תהי צדיק" ("He is made to swear: Be righteous...").
For there is the well-known question:36 "How does an oath ('Be righteous...') help the soul with regard to the body and the evil inclination, which is something not so much in its control and which has not yet come into the world?" The Tzemach Tzedek explains37 that through the oath "we draw down and illuminate the part of the soul within the body from the level of its mazal";38 that is, the oath arouses (the hidden powers —) the makifim, the encompassing powers of the person, so that they shine openly within the part of the soul enclothed in the body, and with this power he is able to overcome the body and the evil inclination, etc.39
It follows that at the beginning of the Tanya, too, the connection between speech and deed is emphasized. For the subject there is an oath, which is a "speech" in the category of a "deed," through which the person becomes bound with the "deed" about which he swore,39* to the point that he is compelled to fulfill it40 (similar to what was explained above regarding the word of a king).
11. The three distinctions noted above regarding work on Shabbos, in the style of the teachings of Chassidus:
Our Sages said:41 "חביבים דברי סופרים מדברי תורה" ("The words of the Scribes are more beloved than the words of Torah"). The reason is that the words of Torah are commands from Above which a person is compelled to fulfill; therefore a person's service in fulfilling the mitzvos shows a bond with the Holy One, blessed be He, at the level of carrying out in practice what he was explicitly commanded.
But a person's cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, through the words of the Scribes is more inward. For the fact that he is not satisfied with what the Torah commanded and imposes upon himself fences and safeguards shows that his fulfillment of the mitzvos comes from inner will and delight, and his cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, is more inward.42
Even so, he is still an independent entity, except that his will and desire are in G‑dliness. Higher than this is the level of a chassid, and especially the level of "איזהו חסיד המתחסד עם קונו" ("Who is a chassid? One who acts kindly with his Creator... beyond himself... and gives himself over"),43 that is, he is not an entity for himself at all, and his entire existence is only to bring gratification to his Creator.
Corresponding to these three levels in man's service, there are three such levels Above — in the revelations from Above to below: (a) The level of thought — in which there is no room at all for any existence or for anything outside of it; from this level the hidden worlds came into being, which are nullified within their source.44 (b) The level of speech — which gives room also for a world that in its own perception is an independent entity; however, the manner of its coming into being is that the level of speech descends and is transformed to become the level of deed.45 (For the level of speech in itself — although it gives room for another — its function is the revelation of G‑dliness; and for a world to come into being in which the revelation of G‑dliness is not felt, it must descend and be transformed into the level of deed.) (c) The level of deed, which is the external aspect of the G‑dly power that brings into being — which becomes separate, as it were, and is actually enclothed within the worlds.46
12. Accordingly, one can explain the three distinctions in the laws of resting on Shabbos.
Through a person's union with G‑dliness by way of fulfilling the mitzvos through his own deed and action, which is an external union, he perceives the external aspect of G‑dliness. Therefore he perceives the resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, from actual deed (the external aspect of the resting Above); hence the Torah forbade only doing work.
By virtue of the inner cleaving to G‑dliness that comes through the words of the Scribes, G‑dliness shines for him openly, and he cleaves to the power of speech Above; therefore he perceives also the resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, from the level of speech.
[Another point in this: through cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, "עבד מלך מלך" ("a king's servant is a king"),47 and his speech too ("the word of a king is power") is considered a deed — similar to the saying of our Sages,48 "צדיק גוזר והקב"ה מקיים" ("a tzaddik decrees and the Holy One, blessed be He, fulfills"). Even more, our Sages said:49 "אמירתן של צדיקים מעשה" ("the saying of tzaddikim is a deed").]
And for a "chassid," who is not an entity for himself at all, there shines also the level of thought Above, which gives no room for any existence other than Him. Therefore he is careful even about the thought of work, for by virtue of his cleaving to G‑dliness he perceives the resting of the Holy One, blessed be He, even from the level of thought.50
13. Accordingly it is understood why, at the conclusion of the Tanya, the Alter Rebbe first gives the explanation of the inner dimension of Zachor, that it "is the concentration in prayer... to cleave to the One G‑d." For with this he adds an explanation of why a person must rest from physical speech "just as G‑d rested" (— even though "the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He, is considered a deed"): by virtue of cleaving to the One G‑d, the person perceives the resting Above from the level of speech.
Nevertheless, he warned only about resting from speech and did not warn about resting from thought, for the Torah speaks of the majority, and the cleaving at the level of a chassid applies only to unique individuals.51
(From the sicha of 19 Kislev 5718)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 20:10.
2) Shabbos 15:3. See also Pesikta Rabbasi, ch. 23:3.
3) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the source.]
4) [OCR unclear — the text of this note is missing from the source.]
5) [OCR unclear — the beginning of this note is missing from the source.] ...(after Shabbos) — for then it is comparable to one who fasts on Shabbos because he takes pleasure in it (Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim 288:7; see the Shulchan Aruch there, 2). See below, note 10. This requires further study.
6) See Pnei Moshe there.
7) As is also evident in Pesikta Rabbasi (there), which expounded on the verse "a Shabbos unto the L‑rd your G‑d": Rabbi Aibo said: Rest from thought. Rabbi Berachyah said: It once happened that a certain pious man...
8) In the Babylonian Talmud as well (Shabbos 150b) the "story of a certain pious man..." is cited — that he was careful even in thought (see Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha; Chochmas Shlomo, Shabbos there; Taz, Orach Chaim 307:14; and elsewhere). However, in the Babylonian Talmud the "story of a certain pious man" is cited in continuation of the Mishnah "One may not wait at the [Shabbos] boundary..." (and not in connection with resting from speech) (see the Gemara there), while in the Jerusalem Talmud it comes in continuation of the prohibition of speech. For in the Babylonian Talmud resting from thought is an additional precaution concerning work, whereas according to the Jerusalem Talmud the content of both matters — resting from speech and care in thought — is one: "rest like G‑d."
9) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 11. (According to what is explained there, several questions are understood, and one can reconcile the dispute between the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim I, end of ch. 65) and the Ramban (Bereishis 1:3), and the Ibn Ezra (there). See also Bachya there.)
9*) It is known that on Shabbos He, in His goodness, renews the work of creation from the level of thought, and rests only from deed and speech (Likkutei Torah, Devarim 66c, and elsewhere). But one must say that this does not refer to the [level of] deed within thought (through which the hidden worlds were created — see Iggeres HaKodesh, end of ch. 19). Compare the manner in which the worlds receive their vitality on Rosh Hashanah (see Siddur, Shaar HaTekios, 246c) that falls on Shabbos. This is not the place to elaborate.
10) This is why "people for whom telling news... is a pleasure are permitted to tell it on Shabbos" (Rema, Orach Chaim 307:1; Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe there, 2). In Shirei Korban on the Jerusalem Talmud there: "The Rambam wrote: Although it is explicitly written 'from pursuing your affairs and speaking idle words,' he prefers to derive it from the Torah" — and not that it is forbidden by Torah law. See Torah Temimah here. (But see Tosafos, Shabbos 113a, s.v. "VeDabber." And see the discussion regarding the prohibition of business dealings in Sdei Chemed, Divrei Chachamim, end of section 1 (vol. 9, p. 3758 ff.).)
10*) Ohr HaTorah, Shemos, vol. 7, end of p. 2702 ff. See also Ohr HaTorah, Bereishis, p. 50, in the gloss.
11) In Ohr HaTorah, Bereishis there, he concludes differently: it is only by Rabbinic decree, that your speech on Shabbos should not be like your speech on weekdays.
12) Isaiah, there [58:13].
13) Ohr HaTorah, Shemos there. See also Bereishis Rabbah 44:22 (cited in Ohr HaTorah there): The utterance of the Holy One, blessed be He, is (considered) a deed.
14) Especially since regarding "the outer aspect of Shabbos" he explains only the aspect of Shamor — "resting from physical work" — and not the aspect of Zachor, "a positive Torah commandment to sanctify the Shabbos day with words" (Rambam, beginning of ch. 29 of Hilchos Shabbos; Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim, beginning of 271).
15) As is known regarding "אף עשיתיו" ("I have even made it") — "even the interruption" (Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshas Balak, and elsewhere).
16) Torah Or 3a; Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 53a; and elsewhere.
17) See the maamar "Vayedaber... BeMidbar Sinai," Hemshech 5666 (p. 231): from speech below, too, some coming-into-being can result, etc.; see there.
18) Avodah Zarah 15a. (See Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe 266:4; Shabbos 153b ff.) See also Jerusalem Talmud, Kilayim (8:2). See below in the text, section 5. — But the statement in Temurah (3b), "his speech effected a deed," refers only to "making [something] from unconsecrated into consecrated" (Rashi there).
19) Koheles 8:4.
20) See Hemshech 5666 there (p. 232), that even the fact that thought causes action in the person himself comes about through the chain of descent of the power of speech.
21) Bava Metzia 90b; Sanhedrin 65b.
22) Rashi, Bava Metzia there.
23) Teitzei 25:4.
24) There, s.v. "Rabbi Yochanan said"; Sanhedrin there, s.v. "Hoil"; Shevuos 21a, s.v. "Chutz MiNishba." See also Chiddushei HaRamban, Bava Metzia there; Nimukei Yosef there; Chiddushei HaRashba, Shevuos there.
24*) There.
25) Thus Rashi explains. But the Ramban (in Milchamos Hashem on Sanhedrin there) writes: What is "[their offense] lies in seeing"? Surely their speech caused it, and not their seeing — for they never saw the death they claimed, since they are conspiring witnesses! (He has a different reading, like the Rif, etc.) According to Rashi, likewise, ... "[their offense] lies in seeing" — conspiring witnesses receive lashes for the falsehood in the matter of seeing. [OCR partly unclear.]
*25) See Shabbos (153b): that he performs a deed with his body.
26) See Lekach Tov (by Rabbi Yosef Engel), at its beginning.
26*) Kiddushin 41a.
26**) For it is a chalos (legal effect) so powerful that it can nullify reality (regarding Erachin — Erachin 1:3, and the like).
27) In the language of Kabbalah and Chassidus (see above in the text, section 1): from thought the hidden worlds were created, and from speech the revealed worlds (Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 11; Torah Or 69d, 71a; Likkutei Torah, Balak 67c ff.; Shabbos Shuvah 66b; and elsewhere).
*27) Cited above in notes *10 and 13.
28) See all this at length in Hemshech 5666 there. There it explains that this is why it says "כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם" ("For My thoughts are not your thoughts"), because in speech there is some resemblance; see there. See also Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 17c–d; Ohr HaTorah, Bamidbar, p. 95 ff.
29) See above, section 1 and note 9*.
30) Hilchos Sechirus, ch. 10, halachah 2.
31) Noda BeYehudah, Mahadura Tinyana, Orach Chaim, end of siman 70. Melo HaRo'im, entry "a prohibition without a deed," section 8.
32) According to several later authorities (cited in Sdei Chemed (vol. 2), Maareches Lamed, Klal 12), the Maggid Mishneh too holds (like Tosafos' distinction) that speech through which a deed is done is required. But see Sdei Chemed (there), who proves from the wording of the Maggid Mishneh himself that he does not hold of this distinction.
33) Noda BeYehudah there.
34) See Niddah 17a and Tosafos there, s.v. "Sorfan." — But there are several levels of "chassid," up to what is explained in the Tikkunim (cited in Tanya, end of ch. 10): "Who is a chassid? One who acts kindly with his Creator..." See below, note 43.
35) Similar to what is explained in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 4, p. 161 ff., regarding "ובו תדבקון" ("and to Him you shall cleave"), which is the command to cleave to the Holy One, blessed be He, and therefore one bestows kindness... just as the Holy One, blessed be He, did (even bestowing kindness... in a manner in which He was not, of Himself, obligated). One may say that since "and to Him you shall cleave" is in the form of a command, it is not the ultimate truth of cleaving (see Likkutei Sichos there, p. 62 and note 56). Therefore, as a result of this cleaving, he (only) "bestows kindness..." — a matter in which there is room (even from the standpoint of the person's own existence) to resemble the Holy One, blessed be He. But the cleaving at the level of a chassid is in a manner of complete self-nullification, and by virtue of this cleaving he conducts himself "just as the Holy One, blessed be He, did" even in matters in which, from the standpoint of his own existence, there is no room to resemble Him.
36) Kitzurim VeHe'aros LeTanya, p. 48 ff.
37) There, p. 50. See there at length for further explanations.
38) There, beginning of p. 52.
39) And in keeping with the interpretation (there, p. 57) of "משביעים אותו" ("He is made to swear") — from the expression "ומשביע לכל חי רצון" ("and You satisfy every living thing with favor"); that is, the oath "satiates" the person with the powers he needs for the battle with the evil inclination, etc.
39*) As our Sages said (see above, section 5): "except for one who swears..." Although there it speaks of an oath that he would eat, and he did not eat — nevertheless, through the oath he at least becomes bound (with the deed). In the language of halachah: "its prohibition (that of the oath) gives it significance (with regard to the act of eating)" — Bechoros 10a. See Tzafnas Paneach, Klalim, under that entry.
40) See Likkutei Torah, Shemini Atzeres 83, end of column b ff. And similar to the matter of making a covenant — see Torah Or 13c; Likkutei Torah, Nitzavim 45b; and elsewhere.
41) Jerusalem Talmud, Berachos 1:4; Sanhedrin 1:4; Avodah Zarah 2:7. Shir HaShirim Rabbah on the verse (1:2) "For your love is better than wine" (2).
42) See Likkutei Torah, Mattos (85a), that through the fine points of the Scribes "great love" (ahavah rabbah) is aroused; see there.
43) Zohar II, 114b; Zohar III, 222b; Introduction to Tikkunei Zohar 1, end of column b. See also Tanya, ch. 10.
44) See Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah there; Torah Or 91a; Likkutei Torah, Balak and Shabbos Shuvah there; and elsewhere.
45) See Hemshech 5666 there.
46) As is known, the three worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah are the level of "dwellings" (Torah Or 75b; Likkutei Torah, Balak there; see at length Ohr HaTorah, Va'eschanan, p. 217 ff.; and elsewhere).
47) Tanchuma, Tzav 13 (cited in Rashi, Behaaloscha 12:8); Sifri, Devarim 6; Bereishis Rabbah 16:3 (and in Shevuos 46b: "a king's servant is like a king").
48) See Shabbos 59b; Kesubos 103b; Sotah 12a; Tanchuma, Vayeira 19.
49) Midrash Lekach Tov, Chayei Sarah 23:12.
50) In Likkutei Torah, Shabbos Shuvah (66c) and elsewhere it is explained that the reason that on Shabbos "speech is forbidden, contemplation is permitted" is because on Shabbos the Holy One, blessed be He, rests from the level of speech, and the worlds receive their vitality from the level of thought (the world of Beriah); therefore contemplation is permitted. This does not contradict what is explained in the text, for it is understood that there is resting at all levels, including the level of thought (see Likkutei Torah there (in parentheses): "and the hidden worlds are elevated further..."; and see Likkutei Torah, Emor (maamar "Es Shabsosai"), Torah Chaim, maamar "Zachor Es Yom HaShabbos," and elsewhere, that there is a lower Shabbos and a higher Shabbos..., see there). However, in man below only the resting at the level of speech, which is the source of his vitality, is felt; only for a "chassid" is the resting from the level of thought felt as well. See also above, note 9*.
51) One may say that the Alter Rebbe's first giving the explanation of the inner dimension of Zachor is relevant also to the manner of care with speech: only through cleaving to G‑d ("to cleave to the One G‑d") can care with speech be complete ("any idle talk").*
*) Compare what is explained in Kuntres Etz HaChaim (ch. 7 ff.), that for the service of the "lower unity" (yichuda tata'ah) to be as it should, it must stem from the feeling of the "higher unity" (yichuda ila'ah) (see Torah Or 60c, that Shamor and Zachor are the levels of the lower unity and the higher unity), even though the true service of the higher unity applies only to unique individuals.
Key Lesson
A person's speech, being physical, is close to deed and can bring about real effects — and so it resembles, in a small way, G‑d's creative speech; this is why the Sages had us rest from mundane talk on Shabbos. The deeper a person's bond with G‑d, the more of G‑d's own Shabbos rest he senses: the Torah asks rest from deeds, the Sages add rest from speech, and the true chassid, wholly devoted to his Creator, rests even from thoughts of weekday matters.