Parshas Beshalach*
1. On the verse1 "אל יצא איש ממקומו ביום השביעי" ("Let no man go out of his place on the seventh day"), our Sages say2 (and Rashi cites this): "These are the two thousand cubits" of the Shabbos boundary (techum Shabbos). That is, from this verse they derived the prohibition*2 against going beyond the boundary of two thousand cubits from the city on Shabbos.
Now, in the laws of techumin, Rabbi Shimon and the Sages disagree at the end of the fourth chapter of tractate Eruvin3. The Mishnah reads: "מי שהחשיך חוץ לתחום אפילו אמה אחת לא יכנס ר"ש אומר אפילו חמש עשרה אמות יכנס שאין המשוחות ממצין את המדות מפני הטועין" ("One for whom it grew dark outside the techum, even by one cubit, may not enter. Rabbi Shimon says: even fifteen cubits, he may enter, because the surveyors do not mark the full measure, on account of those who err"). That is, Rabbi Shimon holds that when they measure and mark the place where the two thousand cubits from the city end, they "do not mark the full measure" by setting the marker at the end of the two thousand cubits; rather, they shorten the measure and bring the marker fifteen cubits inside the boundary — "on account of those who err in the measure, who do not recognize the marker and sometimes walk beyond it and come back without realizing"4. Therefore, one for whom it grew dark outside the techum, if he is within fifteen cubits outside the techum, may enter inside the techum, since in truth he is within the two thousand cubits of the techum.
This reason of Rabbi Shimon is stated in the form of a general rule5 in the last Mishnah of the tractate, at the end of chapter ten: "ר"ש אומר מקום שהתירו לך חכמים משלך נתנו לך שלא התירו לך אלא משום שבות" ("Rabbi Shimon says: Wherever the Sages permitted you something, they gave you of what is yours, for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus [a Rabbinic Shabbos restriction]"). The Gemara6 explains that with this Rabbi Shimon is explaining the reasoning of two laws. "Wherever the Sages permitted you, they gave you of what is yours" refers to the above law of "one for whom it grew dark outside the techum… Rabbi Shimon says: even fifteen cubits, he may enter." About this he explains here that since this is "yours" — "for he is already within his techum" — "they gave you," "he may enter." That is, as long as he is within fifteen cubits he is still within the techum, and therefore they permitted him to enter.
The continuation, "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus," refers to another law, stated explicitly in an earlier Mishnah there in chapter ten7: "קושרין נימא במקדש אבל לא במדינה ואם בתחלה כאן וכאן אסור" ("One may tie a [broken harp] string in the Beis HaMikdash, but not in the country; and [tying it] for the first time is forbidden both here and there"). On this Rabbi Shimon disagrees and says (in a Baraisa cited in the Gemara: "A Levite whose harp string broke ties it; Rabbi Shimon says:") "he loops it [in a bow]." His reason he explains in the Mishnah at the conclusion of the tractate: "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus"; that is (as explained in the Gemara there), "looping, which does not lead to liability for a sin-offering, the Sages permitted; tying, which leads to liability for a sin-offering, the Sages did not permit."
The connection between these two matters Rashi explains8: "This is what Rabbi Shimon is saying to the first Tanna: Although I was lenient regarding one for whom it grew dark outside the techum, I am stringent regarding the harp string; for there, they gave you of what is yours, but here they permitted only a shvus." Tosafos9 writes: "For there it is not a leniency, but rather they gave you of what is yours; and here too they gave you only of what is yours, namely looping, which is a permitted thing." That is to say, in both matters the content of the reasoning is one and the same — "they gave you only of what is yours."
At first glance this is not understood. According to Rashi's approach — what is the connection between these two different laws, because of which Rabbi Shimon needed to inform us that he is stringent in this law even though he was lenient in the other? Would it enter anyone's mind that a leniency in the law of "one for whom it grew dark outside the techum" necessitates a leniency also in the matter of tying in the Beis HaMikdash?!
And according to Tosafos' explanation of Rabbi Shimon's reasoning — that the same reason that necessitates leniency [there] is what decides in favor of stringency here — it is difficult: he should have said only "Wherever the Sages permitted you, they gave you of what is yours," and nothing more, since this also supplies the reason for the stringency regarding the broken harp string. Why then does Rabbi Shimon go on to explain "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus," and is not satisfied with the first, fundamental reason ("they gave you of what is yours")? Especially since the language of the Mishnah is in the style of "a brief statement that includes many matters"10?
It must also be explained: These words of Rabbi Shimon were arranged as the conclusion of a Mishnah that deals with the law of "a sheretz [a creeping creature] found in the Beis HaMikdash, etc." — which seemingly has no connection to them. If so, they should have been stated in direct proximity to one of the above laws, or, if here — at least as a Mishnah by itself11?
2. The explanation of this will be understood by first introducing one of the reasons why "it is a mitzvah to pursue both eruvei chatzeiros and shituf mavo'os"12, namely: "for the sake of his enjoyment, so that he can stroll or bring his food needs, and this is a mitzvah, as it is written, וקראת לשבת עונג ('and you shall call the Shabbos a delight')"13. It is understood that the same applies in our case: for the sake of oneg Shabbos (the delight of Shabbos) it is a mitzvah to be within the techum of the city, so as "to stroll or to bring, etc." throughout the entire area of the city (and in the two thousand cubits outside it, in all its directions). For when his Shabbos resting place is outside its techum, he is very limited in these matters14, and this is the opposite of oneg Shabbos. Accordingly, it may be said that one for whom "it grew dark outside the techum" also bears a measure of obligation15 to enter the city, so that the prohibition of negating the delight [of Shabbos] should not continue throughout the entire twenty-four hours of Shabbos.
Accordingly, it may be said that Rabbi Shimon's view in this law stems from a general principle, namely: that an abundance of quantity (with less quality) outweighs greatness of quality (with less quantity)16. For according to the above, Rabbi Shimon's reason for holding "he may enter" (— which is akin to an expression of command and obligation, meaning that he must "enter," and not merely that he is permitted to enter17) is so that he not continue in his prohibition. And although by "entering" he will transgress the prohibition of going outside the techum18 in a manner (of kum va'aseh, active doing) that is more severe than the prohibition of negating oneg Shabbos19 by remaining in his resting place (which is shev v'al ta'aseh, passive inaction20) — nevertheless Rabbi Shimon holds "he may enter," since in this "entering" (into the techum of the city) he commits a prohibition only at the moment of entering, whereas his remaining outside the techum is a prohibition that continues every single moment he is there — and an abundance of quantity, in Rabbi Shimon's view21, outweighs quality.
3. Now, according to the above — that Rabbi Shimon's reason for holding "he may enter" is that an abundance of quantity outweighs quality — the connection will be understood between the two rules he stated as the reasons for the two laws: the rule "Wherever the Sages permitted you, they gave you of what is yours," and the rule "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus."
For of the two ways of repairing the harp, tying and looping, each has a severity that the other lacks. The severity of tying is that it leads to liability for a sin-offering (a severity of quality), whereas looping involves only a Rabbinic prohibition, since it is liable to come undone and is not a permanent knot. However, from this very aspect there is a severity in looping — for since it is not meant to last, he will (presumably) need to repair the harp — to loop it — several times (quantity), which is not so with a permanent knot, where he transgresses the prohibition only once. It follows that the resolution of this question too — whether to tie it or to loop it — depends on deciding whether quantity takes precedence or quality takes precedence.
It follows, then, that once Rabbi Shimon has informed us of his view in the law of "one for whom it grew dark outside the techum — he may enter," namely that quantity is decisive, logic would dictate that in his law of the harp string too he would lean toward permitting specifically tying (which is less in quantity) and not looping (with its abundance of quantity, which is decisive). This supposition Rabbi Shimon rejects by saying "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus." That is to say: although I was lenient regarding the quality of the prohibition of techumin in order not to increase the quantity of the prohibition, nevertheless I am stringent regarding the quality of tying, and I do not permit it in order to lessen the quantity of loopings, because "they permitted you only [specifically when the quality, like the quantity, is] a shvus." In other words, this rule that quantity outweighs quality applies only where both belong to one category of prohibition — the category of Torah prohibition or the category of Rabbinic prohibition22. This is not so in repairing the harp: the abundance of quantity of looping, which is Rabbinic, does not have the power to outweigh the quality of tying, which leads to a Torah prohibition; on the contrary — the quality of the Torah prohibition outweighs the Rabbinic quantity.
— Proof of this is from what the Alter Rebbe writes in his Shulchan Aruch23: "If a dangerously ill person needs meat, we slaughter for him, and we do not say, 'Let us feed him neveilah [meat of an unslaughtered animal], which is only a negative prohibition, and not desecrate Shabbos for him, which is a prohibition punishable by stoning'… whereas with slaughtering he commits only one prohibition, even though it is severe24… But if he needs wine to be heated for him, a Jew should fill it and a non-Jew should heat it… for even so, it will involve only a prohibition of Rabbinic origin," end of quote. It is thus explicit that specifically with the quantity of the prohibition of neveilah, which is a Torah prohibition, its abundance is more severe than the quality of the prohibition (punishable by stoning) of slaughtering on Shabbos; whereas with the prohibition of stam yeinam [wine handled by a non-Jew], which is Rabbinic (and which also takes the form of an abundance of quantity, since he commits a prohibition with each and every drink), the Torah-level quality outweighs the abundance of Rabbinic quantity. —
4. According to the above, the reason is also understood why the passage "Rabbi Shimon says" was arranged as the concluding clause of the Mishnah (belonging with its opening clause) about "a sheretz found in the Beis HaMikdash, etc.," and not as a Mishnah by itself — because the content of the opening clause too deals with the same question: whether quantity (in length of time) is decisive, or quality (in the magnitude of the matter itself) is decisive. The Mishnah reads: "שרץ שנמצא במקדש כהן מוציאו בהמיינו שלא להשהות את הטומאה, דברי ר' יוחנן בן ברוקה. ר' יהודה אומר, בצבת של עץ שלא לרבות את הטומאה" ("A sheretz found in the Beis HaMikdash — a Kohen removes it with his belt, so as not to prolong the impurity; these are the words of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka. Rabbi Yehudah says: with wooden tongs, so as not to increase the impurity"). The reasoning of their dispute is that "one holds that prolonging the impurity (quantity) is the weightier concern, and one holds that spreading the impurity (quality)25 is the weightier concern"26.
5. To explain, by way of derush, the connection between Rabbi Shimon's two rules and the difference between them according to the inner dimension of these matters [and through this an additional reason will be explained for Rabbi Shimon's view that where it is possible to permit him to re-enter the techum, one must permit him]:
It is explained in many places27 that the melachah of carrying out from one domain to another is the essence of all thirty-nine melachos.
For it is related in the Midrash28 that a heretic asked Rabbi Akiva: "If it is as you say, that the Holy One, blessed be He, honors the Shabbos, let Him not make winds blow on it, let Him not bring down rain on it, let Him not make grass grow on it." He answered him with an analogy from eruv and carrying: that within a single domain no eruv is needed for carrying — "so too, the entire world is His, etc." At first glance this is puzzling: Rabbi Akiva's answer resolves only the question regarding the melachah of carrying from domain to domain — but surely all the other melachos do not depend on carrying from domain to domain29? We must therefore say that the melachah of carrying is the main point in all the melachos of Shabbos; it is the foundation and root from which branch out all the primary melachos, their derivatives, and the Rabbinic shvusim30. Therefore, since with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He, the concept of carrying from domain to domain is inapplicable (for the entire world is His), the foundation is thereby nullified, and room is thereby made also for the other melachos, which are only branches of the melachah of carrying.
This also explains why tractate Shabbos begins with the matter of the melachah of carrying (even though this melachah is listed last among all the primary melachos in chapter seven, and seemingly Rabbeinu HaKadosh should first have enumerated all the melachos and afterwards explained them in order, as the commentators ask31) — because it is the main point of all thirty-nine melachos.
The explanation of this:
The essence of Shabbos is — "שבת לה'" ("a Shabbos unto G‑d")32. Yom Tov is half for G‑d and half for you33, while Shabbos is entirely for G‑d. That is, the purpose of the mitzvah of resting on Shabbos is "to establish in our souls the belief in the creation of the world"34 — that He, may He be blessed, created the world (in the six days of creation, and on the seventh day He rested and was refreshed), and that likewise even now He constantly creates the world ex nihilo35 (during the six weekdays; and on Shabbos He rests from the speech of the Ten Utterances, and the drawing down of vitality on Shabbos is from the level of thought, as on the Shabbos of creation36). Thus He, may He be blessed, is the sole ruler of the world, and it is entirely under His domain and His individual Divine Providence.
That is to say: although the world was brought into being (the word olam, "world," being related to he'elem, concealment and hiddenness) in such a way that there is room to err that "the world follows its natural course," and that, G‑d forbid, there is no sole Master of the palace — that there are, G‑d forbid, two domains in the world37, a domain of good and holiness and a domain of evil and impurity — through fulfilling the mitzvah of resting on Shabbos, the true belief and knowledge is established that the entire world is one domain, a reshus hayachid (private domain), belonging to the Yachid, the One, of the world38.
Since this is so, it is understood that doing melachah on Shabbos causes: a) a weakening of the above belief; b) a strengthening of the above concealment and error (of two domains, G‑d forbid) — a matter of "carrying out" from the reshus hayachid. It follows that the main point of all thirty-nine melachos is — carrying out from the reshus hayachid.
This is the meaning of Rabbi Akiva's answer, "the entire world is His": since with regard to Him, may He be blessed, no concealment or hiddenness of the true reality is possible — namely, that all matters of the world, even the existence of evil, are a reshus hayachid (and ultimately the truth will be revealed below as well — in the time to come, as stated in the Midrash39: "In the future, a person will go to pick a fig on Shabbos, and it will cry out and say, 'It is Shabbos!'" — that is, the world itself will sense and testify that there is nothing in the world but the One) — therefore the matter of the principal melachah, carrying out, does not apply to Him, may He be blessed, and consequently neither do its branches — the other melachos forbidden on Shabbos, as above.
6. Now, all matters of creation are divided into three general categories, alluded to in the three categories of domains of Shabbos: a) the category of matters of holiness, in which the service is in the manner of "ועשה טוב" ("and do good") — the reshus hayachid (of the Yachid of the world); b) the category of matters of evil and forbidden things ("the mountains of separation"), in which the manner of service is by way of "סור מרע" ("turn away from evil") — the reshus harabim, the public domain (the opposite of the reshus hayachid); c) the category of permissible matters, which are intermediate between mitzvah and prohibition, and in which the service is in one of the two above ways: a) "קדש עצמך במותר לך" ("Sanctify yourself in what is permitted to you")40; b) to elevate them and make them holy through "כל מעשיך לשם שמים" ("All your deeds should be for the sake of Heaven") and "בכל דרכיך דעהו" ("In all your ways, know Him")41. Their counterpart among the domains of Shabbos is a courtyard shared by several residents, or an alleyway, a karmelis and the like, which are domains intermediate between the reshus hayachid and the reshus harabim, and which through eruvei chatzeiros, shituf mavo'os and the like become a reshus hayachid.
Accordingly, it is understood that eruvei techumin and eruvei chatzeiros share one central point: enlarging the domain and techum of the Jewish person (the domain of holiness), which of itself is limited in its quantity, and which through (the service of) making the eruv is enlarged and broadened.
Accordingly, there is seemingly room to connect also the two rules in Rabbi Shimon's words — a) "Wherever the Sages permitted you, they gave you of what is yours," whose content is the matter of techumin; and b) "for they permitted you only what is forbidden as a shvus," whose foundation (that of its subject — all thirty-nine melachos) is, as above, the matter of carrying from domain to domain. Both share one common point, as above.
[Especially since the common denominator between techumin and shvus is expressed also in the (quantity and quality of the) differences of opinion regarding their laws. Regarding techumin there are three views42: a) even two thousand cubits is a Torah prohibition; b) twelve mil is a Torah prohibition and two thousand cubits is Rabbinic; c) the entire prohibition of techumin is Rabbinic. And the same differences of opinion exist with regard to shvus43: a) all matters of shvus are from the Torah, for the Torah said "תשבות" ("you shall rest")44, but it was entrusted to the Sages; b) there are shvusim that are from the Torah (and the Sages explained them) and there are those that are Rabbinic; c) all matters of shvus are Rabbinic, and the verse "you shall rest" is merely an asmachta (scriptural allusion).]
7. However, in truth there is a great difference44* between the prohibition of techumin and the prohibition of melachah on Shabbos, to the point that they are even opposites:
The prohibition of melachah on Shabbos means that by doing melachah one desecrates (mechallel) the Shabbos — he makes a void (chalal) and an empty space in the Shabbos, and consequently its holiness is profaned. That is, through melachah on Shabbos he brings something undesirable into it — "he brings kelipah into Shabbos." The prohibition of going outside the techum45, however, is not that he brings a mundane matter into Shabbos; on the contrary, he takes the Shabbos out to the place of the kelipos46. For in every Jew, even in a complete ignoramus, the light of the holiness of Shabbos shines47, and when he goes outside the techum (of holiness), he takes with him48 the holiness of Shabbos as well, to the place of the kelipos49.
[This case is not comparable to the matter of adding to Shabbos before and after it (adding to Shabbos in time — and seemingly, why not say that likewise there is an addition to Shabbos in space, by going outside the techum?). For there the Torah commanded (and thereby gave the power) to add from the time of the weekday (which is near the time of Shabbos) and to transform it into holiness; whereas here, in going outside the techum, this is not so. And since this place is outside the boundary of holiness — a place of the kelipos — it is forbidden to bring the holiness of Shabbos into it.]
Since this is so, it is understood that the prohibition of going outside the techum continues the entire time he remains there (that is, the prohibition of going outside the techum is not due to the act of going out itself, but due to the result brought about thereby — that he is outside the techum, in a place where he is bound and tied in the hands of the kelipos). This provides an additional reason and explanation [OCR unclear: the source reads "ומבואר בתוס׳"; rendered by context] for Rabbi Shimon's view — "he may enter" — that if he is permitted to re-enter the techum, he must enter, so that his stay in the place of the kelipos should not be prolonged50.
8. In all the above, as in all the laws and matters of the Torah, there is a lesson also for a person's Divine service in general:
The essential existence of a Jew is his G‑dly soul51, which is "truly a part of G‑d above"52. Therefore, just as the Holy One, blessed be He, in His glory and His essence, is exalted beyond all comparison above every root and source of the coming-into-being of the worlds — to the point that the Ten Utterances with which the world was created are called, relative to "the King," "ordinary words"53 — so too the Jew, of himself, is above all matters of the world. But the Torah commanded54: "ששת ימים תעבוד ועשית כל מלאכתך" ("Six days shall you labor and do all your work")55. In this too he resembles his Creator: just as G‑d, may He be blessed, contracted Himself in order to bring the worlds into being, so too, l'havdil, he — "Adam" (from the phrase "אדמה לעליון", "I will liken myself to the Most High") — was created in such a way that he must contract himself and occupy himself with worldly matters56.
It is all the more understood, then, that the occupation of Jews with mundane and worldly matters is a contraction and lowering, while their essential being is at the level of Shabbos — cessation and rest from mundane activities. Consequently, the two laws of Shabbos (the prohibition of doing melachah and the prohibition of going outside the techum) contain a lesson for the overall conduct of every Jew (also during the weekdays), since his essence is Shabbos:
The prohibition of "doing melachah on Shabbos," in terms of a person's conduct, means bringing worldly matters and mundane activities into his mind and intellect (for the intellect, mochin, is the level of Shabbos57). Although he was commanded "and do all your work," he should occupy only his external faculties in this activity, but not his inner and loftier faculties, for all of them (the lofty faculties) must be dedicated to Torah and Divine service. As the verse58 says, "יגיע כפיך כי תאכל" ("When you eat the labor of your hands") — the labor of your hands specifically, but not the labor of the mind and heart59.
When a person brings mundane activities into his mind and intellect (the level of Shabbos within him), a void and empty space is made in them (as explained above regarding the meaning of desecrating Shabbos — making a void in Shabbos), [empty] of G‑dly feeling. For were he to know and feel the truth — that only G‑d's blessing brings wealth, and the business is only a vessel for G‑d's blessing (as it is written60, "וברכך ה' אלקיך בכל אשר תעשה" ("And G‑d your L‑rd will bless you in all that you do")) — he would not immerse his head in the business, in various schemes and contrivances that are of no benefit (since it is G‑d's blessing that brings wealth). On the contrary, these many dealings of his, which distract him from matters of Torah and Divine service, are what prevent and hinder him from being a fitting vessel for G‑d's blessing61.
Now, even one who does not bring his business into his "Shabbos" must know that there is yet another warning: "the prohibition of going outside the techum." That is, "on Shabbos" (in the time that belongs to Torah and mitzvos), even with his external faculties he is forbidden to go outside the techum — he is forbidden to go out with his feet (his external faculties) beyond the realm of Torah and mitzvos. For the Torah must be "arranged in all 248 limbs"62; and similarly during the time of prayer, doing a mitzvah, and so on.
9. Now, the last Mishnah of tractate Eruvin is about the law of a sheretz found in the Beis HaMikdash. This means that even after fulfilling all the lessons of tractates Shabbos and Eruvin — with his mind resting from melachah, and with care that on "Shabbos" his "feet" too remain within the techum — nevertheless it is still possible that a sheretz will be found in his Sanctuary. For the impurity of a sheretz is not an impurity that issues from one's own body, but one that comes from outside; and since the world has not yet been refined, the world's materiality makes it possible for a sheretz to be found in his Sanctuary, even though on his own part he has no connection to it.
And although the impurity does not come from him, and seemingly he is not to blame for it, nevertheless all agree that he is obligated to remove it from the Sanctuary. They disagree only about the manner. One view is "to remove it with his belt" — that is, to remove the impurity immediately, through a mode of service of engaging with it and enclothing oneself in it63 (at least with one's garments); and although "one who wrestles with a filthy person becomes soiled himself"64, it is worthwhile, so as not to prolong the impurity. The other view is that the service must be to take care not to touch the sheretz even with one's garments, and to search for "wooden tongs" and remove it with them — in the words of Tanya, "he should act as if he does not know, etc." and "he needs a set time and an opportune moment, etc."65 — so as not to increase the impurity and not to become soiled by it, even though this will delay the rectification.
In any case, and especially now66, when we are close to the coming of Moshiach, and "all the appointed times [for the redemption] have already passed, and the matter depends only on teshuvah," and teshuvah is accomplished "in one moment and in one instant," and teshuvah out of love transforms the impure into pure67 — it is obvious that it is the privilege and the duty of every single person to eradicate the spirit of impurity from the land through spreading the wellsprings68 outward69, and so to bring near and hasten the "coming of the Master" [Moshiach], very soon indeed.
(From the sichos of 20 Menachem Av 5722)
Notes
*) And the conclusion (siyum) of tractate Eruvin.
1) Our Parshah, 16:29.
2) Eruvin 51a.
*2) See below, end of section 6.
3) Ibid. 52b.
4) Rashi there, s.v. "Mipnei."
5) See Maharsha at the end of Eruvin, that this is "a rule in all the laws of tractate Eruvin."
6) 105a.
7) 102b.
8) Ibid. 105a, s.v. "Koshrah."
9) Ibid., s.v. "Amar R. Shimon." The Rambam writes likewise in his Commentary on the Mishnah there.
10) The Rambam's Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah.
11) The division of the mishnayos is precise. Besides the fact that the division of the mishnayos bears on several derivations based on the rules of the opening clause (reisha) and the concluding clause (seifa), etc., the number of mishnayos too is precise and even has halachic bearing, according to what the Chelkas Mechokek writes (Even HaEzer, siman 38, se'if katan 40) regarding one who betroths a woman on condition that "I know how to learn [Mishnah]": that it may be said that three mishnayos suffice (and are required) (in line with the view of the Tur regarding the condition "that I know how to read [Scripture]," where three verses suffice). And see tractate Kilayim, chapter 7, which is one Mishnah yet is marked with two numbers — "Mishnah 4 and 5" (and see the commentary Hon Ashir by the author of Mishnas Chassidim (cited in Tosafos Anshei Shem on the Mishnah), who explained this according to the hidden dimension of the Torah). It may be said that for the above law (of "on condition that I know how to learn") this Mishnah counts as two mishnayos.
12) Tur (and Shulchan Aruch), beginning of siman 395.
13) Perishah, Orach Chaim, beginning of siman 395. See also Beis Yosef there.
14) It is understood that he is far more limited than one who has no eruvei chatzeiros, etc., since he is outside the city, and obviously this is not a state of delight, etc. See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 249, end of se'if 2: "When he is not in a safe settled place, he has no oneg Shabbos at all."
15) But it is not a complete obligation; rather, it is a "mitzvah" (as with eruvei chatzeiros. See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there, that "if he is in a place that is not a safe settlement, he is permitted to go from there, etc.," and it does not say that he is obligated (or: that he must) go, etc.). Therefore it does not override a complete prohibition of techumin, except where "they gave you of what is yours"*, as below.
*) This is not contradicted by the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there, that the prohibition of walking three parsa'os on Erev Shabbos is set aside for the sake of oneg Shabbos — for there the prohibition of walking, etc., is itself due to oneg Shabbos (so that he can prepare his Shabbos needs). If he is not in a safe settled place, he has no oneg Shabbos, and therefore the walking in such a case does not negate the delight; on the contrary, specifically through it he will have delight. [The OCR interleaved the end of this note with note 19; the two have been separated by sense.]
16) See at length in the sefer Lekach Tov by R. Yosef Engel, sections 15–16. And see below, Sicha 1 on Parshas Bechukosai, section 6 ff.
17) Even without this, one must say that there is a need and a benefit in his entering, for otherwise why would they permit him (the prohibition of) entering (see below, note 18)? Especially since there is room to say that it is doubtful whether he is within the techum, according to the first explanation in Rashi (Eruvin 52b) that it is "not precisely fifteen cubits," so that the measure here is not exact. And even according to the alternative explanation, the Meiri writes: "Their error sometimes reaches up to fifteen cubits… and it turns out that many techumin extend fifteen cubits beyond the marked techum," and nevertheless they always permitted him to enter fifteen cubits.
18) For even according to Rabbi Shimon there is a prohibition involved — not only according to those who hold that where one went outside the techum deliberately, Rabbi Shimon agrees that he may not enter (Rabbeinu Yehonasan and others, there), but even according to what is explained in the Yerushalmi (Eruvin, end of chapter 4; and so writes the Rashba (cited in Beis Yosef, beginning of siman 405) and the Meiri, and others), that even if he went out [deliberately] he may enter — certainly it is forbidden to go out in the first place, even according to Rabbi Shimon.
19) And even if the prohibition of going outside the techum were not a more severe prohibition, [still] "they permitted for the sake of delight only things that are forbidden because they are a weekday manner of conduct, etc., for when he takes delight in them there is a matter of oneg Shabbos here and not a weekday manner; but all other prohibitions, etc., even the decrees that the Sages decreed as a safeguard for them, obviously we do not set them aside for the mitzvah of delight, for it would be a mitzvah that comes through a transgression, etc." (Kuntres Acharon to the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, siman 301, se'if katan 2; and see siman 242, se'if 9, in the Kuntres Acharon, se'if katan 5). Also according to the view of the Magen Avraham (there, siman 301, se'if katan 4), it is more plausible to say (as is evident from the Kuntres Acharon there) that we set aside only the prohibitions derived from the verse "אם תשיב וגו' ממצוא חפצך" ("If you restrain… from pursuing your affairs") (Yeshayahu 58:13). And see below, note 22.
However, in Otzar HaGeonim — Teshuvos (Shabbos 151b, section 464 (cited in Hagahos Daas Shalom, Orach Chaim, siman 266, on Magen Avraham, se'if katan 7)), it states: "A Jew who is on the road and Shabbos overtakes him, and he fears for his life from bandits, etc. — if he has an animal to ride, riding is better than going on foot on Shabbos, for riding is a kind of delight and going on foot is a kind of affliction." Yet riding on Shabbos is a full-fledged shvus (Beitzah 30b [as in the OCR]; the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, beginning of siman 339). This, however, is not in accordance with the view of the poskim (see there in Magen Avraham, and the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 266, se'if 7, and Hagahos Daas Shalom there).
Perhaps it may be said: since there the case involves danger to life, it may be said that he holds (in that responsum) that Shabbos is "permitted" outright in a case of danger to life (see the views on this in Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Orach Chaim, siman 38; and see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 328, se'if 13), and therefore the prohibition of riding is of no concern to us; on the other hand, if he takes delight, he thereby fulfills the mitzvah of oneg Shabbos even in a case of danger to life.
20) See Mishnah Zevachim 40a; Eruvin 100a, end; below, note 26. And see below, note 22.
21) It may be said that the Sages too do not disagree in essence with the principle that an abundance of quantity outweighs quality; rather, they hold* that the surveyors did mark the full measure. This is also implied by the fact that the poskim, in the laws of measuring the techumin, nowhere mention that the marker is brought in fifteen cubits; we must say this is because they rule like the first Tanna against Rabbi Shimon (Rambam, Laws of Shabbos 27:11; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, beginning of siman 405), who does not hold so.
*) Or along the lines of what was explained above in note 17.
22) And regarding one for whom it grew dark outside the techum, etc. — even if you say that oneg Shabbos is from the Torah (see the views on this in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, beginning of siman 242) and that techumin are Rabbinic (see below, section 6; especially since here it is not a complete prohibition of techumin, for "they gave you of what is yours"), seemingly the Torah mitzvah of oneg Shabbos applies only to eating and drinking (see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch there (from Sifra, Emor, ch. 12; Sifrei, Bamidbar 146): "And 'a holy convocation' — the Sages explained, etc., to delight it with the delight of eating and drinking"; and see also the Kuntres Acharon, se'if katan 1. See also siman 288, se'if 3, that one who fasts because of a dream, although "it is a delight for him, etc., has nullified the essence of oneg Shabbos"). And the Mishnah of "one for whom it grew dark" obviously speaks even where he has food to eat, etc., in which case he does not nullify the Torah-level delight.
See also above, note 15, that it is not a complete obligation, and therefore it does not override a complete prohibition of techumin*.
*) According to the above, it may be said that this is the reason of the Alter Rebbe (see above, note 19) that they did not permit a Rabbinic prohibition for the sake of oneg Shabbos (and seemingly this is so even if oneg Shabbos is from the Torah): because he is speaking there of delight a) that is not of eating, and consequently is not from the Torah, and a Rabbinic delight does not override a Rabbinic prohibition (see Pri Megadim, Orach Chaim, Mishbetzos Zahav, siman 214, se'if katan 1); b) that is not a (complete) obligation, and therefore does not override a (complete) Rabbinic prohibition. And if we say that the Alter Rebbe refers also to the delight of eating, and even if it is from the Torah — seemingly this follows what is written in Responsa Tzemach Tzedek (Orach Chaim, siman 36; and see the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 446, se'if 5) in the name of the Ran, that the Sages upheld their words in a case of shev v'al ta'aseh even where it is not a shvus of a negative and positive commandment. But "if we say that the words of the Ran are not so compelling" (the language of the Tzemach Tzedek there), seemingly it is permitted to transgress a Rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a Torah-level delight (along the lines of what is written in the Pri Megadim there).
23) Orach Chaim, siman 328, se'if 16.
24) But from this alone one cannot prove that the Alter Rebbe holds that quantity takes precedence (even when both are of one category), since he added there two more reasons for this law. However, in Tanya (Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 7) he writes plainly: "Even one who has not transgressed a sin punishable by kareis, but only other light sins — nevertheless, since they blemish… through the multitude of sins there can be a blemish as with a single prohibition that carries kareis or death… see there… a great many light and thin partitions obscure like one partition, and more."
25) In Lekach Tov, section 16, he describes the content of the dispute as "whether length of time outweighs quantity." But it is understood that although "spreading impurity" is in general a matter of quantity, relative to length of time (which involves no spreading of the impurity), "spreading impurity" is a matter of quality (for something is added to the impurity — actually defiling others).
26) Gemara there. In the Yerushalmi (end of Eruvin) the dispute is attributed to an additional reason (see there in Korban HaEdah and Pnei Moshe, that this does not negate the reason of the Bavli, and so is implied by the language of the Yerushalmi there): whether kum va'aseh (active doing) is preferable or shev v'al ta'aseh (passive inaction) is preferable (see the commentaries Korban HaEdah and Pnei Moshe there; and see Bavli 100a, end). According to this view too, the connection between the opening and concluding clauses can be explained on the basis of what was explained above (section 2) regarding the severity of the prohibition of going outside the techum (quality) compared to the prohibition of negating delight — that it (going outside the techum) is kum va'aseh. If so, it may be said that according to the Yerushalmi, Rabbi Shimon's reason is (in addition to the reason that an abundance of quantity outweighs quality) that kum va'aseh is preferable, and this would follow on from (the dispute in the opening clause and) the view of Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, who likewise holds that kum va'aseh is preferable.
It may be said that according to the Bavli, the connection between the opening and concluding clauses is not only in the matter of the decisiveness of an abundance of quantity, but also in the category of quality. For according to the Bavli, Rabbi Shimon's reason is that an abundance of quantity outweighs the quality of kum va'aseh; and in the opening clause too, the abundance of quantity of prolonging the impurity outweighs (not only the quality of spreading the impurity but also) the quality of kum va'aseh.
27) Torah Or 99d. Likkutei Torah, Tazria 21c. Maamar "Matzah Zu" 5640, ch. 57.
28) Bereishis Rabbah 11:5. And see Shemos Rabbah 30:9.
29) This question is also raised by the Yefeh To'ar (on Shemos Rabbah there) and the Maharzu on Bereishis Rabbah there. Their answers require careful study, since [what they say] is not mentioned at all in the answer [OCR unclear].
30) Accordingly, it is understood why he answered him with an analogy from eruv and carrying below — for the fact that carrying is the general principle of the melachah of Shabbos applies not only with regard to the Holy One, blessed be He (as the Yefeh To'ar and the Maharzu explain there), but also with regard to the Shabbos melachah of man below.
31) Tosafos, beginning of tractate Shabbos. The Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah there.
32) Yisro 26:10 [as in the OCR; likely 20:10]. And see our Parshah 15:23–25. And see Rashi, Behar 25:2.
33) Pesachim 68b. The Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, siman 599, se'if 10. And see Rambam, Laws of Yom Tov 6:19; Tur and Shulchan Aruch there, se'if 1.
34) Chinuch, mitzvah 32.
35) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, at the beginning.
36) Likkutei Torah, Shabbos Shuvah 66c. Maamar "Tov Ta'am" 5703, ch. 15.
37) See Bereishis Rabbah 8:8.
38) See Tanya, end of ch. 33. Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar 15a.
39) Midrash Tehillim, 73. Yalkut Shimoni, Yirmeyahu, remez 315.
40) Yevamos 20a. Sifrei, Re'eh 14:21. And see Tanya, ch. 30 (39a), that it is a Torah obligation. And see Kuntres U'Maayan, maamar 1, ch. 1, and the notes there.
41) Avos 2:2 [as in the OCR; likely 2:12]. Mishlei 3:6. Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, siman 231.
42) See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, beginning of siman 397, and the sources cited in Torah Shleimah, Miluim 39, Beshalach, p. 336.
43) See Rambam, Laws of Shabbos, beginning of ch. 21, and Maggid Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh there. And see Ramban, Vayikra 23:24.
44) Mishpatim 23:12. Tisa 34:21.
44*) See Shaar HaMitzvos of the Arizal, on our Parshah. Shaar HaKavanos, Shabbos, before Derush 1.
45) Accordingly, the connection between the conclusion of this tractate and its beginning* is understood: "An alleyway that is, etc." deals with carrying from domain to domain, the content of all thirty-nine melachos (as explained above in the text), and the conclusion of the tractate too concerns a law that relates to all the melachos (not to techumin).
*) The later authorities have already noted (regarding the custom of connecting, in a "Hadran," the end of a tractate with its beginning) Berachos 10a, beginning, and Tosafos there. And see the sefer Vayomer Berachah. Note also Sefer Yetzirah 1:7: "Their end is embedded in their beginning, and their beginning in their end."
46) On all this, see Taamei HaMitzvos of R. Chaim Vital, Parshas Beshalach; the Siddur of the Arizal, Kavanas Eruv; Or HaTorah, Bereishis (vol. 3), 474b.
47) Tanya, ch. 46.
48) The reason for the prohibition against one who went outside the techum re-entering the techum may be said to be that he thereby brings something of the kelipos with him into the city. And the reason, according to the Midrash, is that "every matter of Shabbos is doubled" (Midrash Tehillim 92:1). Likkutei Torah, at its beginning. And see Shabbos 96b.
49) On the basis of what is explained in the text, one can answer the question of the Maharsha (Kesubos 7a, s.v. "Mitoch"; see also Chiddushei Rabbi Akiva Eiger, Pesachim 93b, on Tosafos, s.v. "VeRav"): why was the prohibition of techumin not permitted for the sake of food preparation (ochel nefesh), just as other melachos were permitted? The later authorities answered that since it is written (Bo 12:16), "כל מלאכה לא יעשה בהם אך אשר יאכל לכל נפש" ("No work shall be done on them, except what is eaten by every person") — that is, the Torah permitted melachah for the sake of food preparation — one cannot derive from this [a permission for] techumin, which are not in the category of melachah (Responsa Chasam Sofer, Orach Chaim, siman 149; Responsa Mercheshes, Orach Chaim, siman 10; and see Mordechai, Kiddushin, siman 568). But seemingly it still requires explanation: in what way is the prohibition of techumin different from the prohibition of melachah? According to what is explained in the text, that the content of the prohibition of techumin differs from that of the prohibition of melachah, it is understood.
50) This also clarifies the wording of the Mishnah, "one for whom it grew dark outside the techum": for seemingly, since he acquired his Shabbos resting place in that location, then for one on whom it grew dark there, it is not outside the techum; on the contrary, this is his techum — so it should have said "outside the techum of the city"? According to what is explained in the text, the wording "outside the techum" (unqualified) is understood — "outside the techum" of holiness.
51) Although for Beinonim (and all the more so for those below the level of Beinonim) the animal soul "is the person himself" (Tanya, ch. 29), this is only externally; but inwardly and in truth, every Jew, even the lowest of the low, is ready to give up his life for the sanctification of G‑d's Name (ibid., ch. 16), for his G‑dly soul is his true existence (and see Iggeres HaKodesh, section 6; Kuntres U'Maayan, maamar 6). Therefore every single person is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of "Love your fellow as yourself," at every time and in every place — even though true love and brotherhood are possible only when one makes his soul the main thing (Tanya, ch. 32).
52) Tanya, beginning of ch. 2.
53) Zohar III, 149b. And see Likkutei Torah, Parshas Acharei. And elsewhere.
54) A Mechilta cited in the Derashos of R. Yehoshua Ibn Shuib, Parshas Vayeshev, and in the sefer Minchah Belulah. And in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai (Yisro 20:9): "Just as Israel were commanded regarding the positive commandment of Shabbos, so were they commanded regarding work." On this basis the saying of our Sages in Bereishis Rabbah 16:5 is understood simply (and in this it differs from the Sifrei, Eikev, on the verse "ולעבדו בכל לבבכם" ("and to serve Him with all your heart")). See also Avos deRabbi Nasan, ch. 11; Ramban, Vayikra 25:3; Kuntres U'Maayan, maamar 19. Accordingly, the expression "permitted" in Chullin (54b; and see Rashi and Tosafos there) is resolved.
55) Yisro 20:9.
56) And his service of his Maker too is through contracting himself, etc. (see Tanya, ch. 49).
57) See Likkutei Torah, end of Parshas Beshalach.
58) Tehillim 128:2.
59) Likkutei Torah, Shelach 42d; Chukas 66c; and elsewhere.
60) Devarim 15:8 [as in the OCR; likely 15:18].
61) On all this, see the Introduction to Derech Chaim; Sefer HaMitzvos of the Tzemach Tzedek, the mitzvah of the shaving of the metzora, at its end (106b); Kuntres U'Maayan, maamarim 17 and 25; and elsewhere.
62) Eruvin 54a. Tanya, ch. 36.
63) See the maamar "Tik'u" 5667 (Hemshech 5666, p. 348 ff.) and elsewhere, that specifically through refinement by way of enclothing is a dwelling place in the lower realms made — but the meaning of "enclothing" is not the same everywhere; this is not the place to elaborate. And see Tanya, beginning of ch. 37, that "the ultimate perfection of the days of Moshiach and the Resurrection of the Dead (that is, the dwelling place in the lower realms explained in the preceding chapter) depends on our deeds, etc.," and that this is accomplished mainly through fulfilling the mitzvos (which is by way of enclothing (unlike Torah; see Likkutei Torah, Re'eh 20a; maamar "Vayomer Moshe" 5704, ch. 20)).
64) Tanya, ch. 28 (35b).
65) Tanya, ibid.; end of ch. 26; and elsewhere. See there.
66) See the letter of the Rebbe Rashab (Kuntres U'Maayan, p. 22), that now there is no order and gradation in the manner of the refinements and rectifications, and "whatever we find that needs rectification, we must strive [to rectify] with tremendous strength."
67) Tanya, end of ch. 7.
68) See Iggeres HaKodesh, chapters 9–14.
69) See Likkutei Sichos, vol. 10, Sicha 1 on Parshas Vayishlach, that even while engaged in the "outward," one should fix in his heart that all this is the fulfillment of the intention of the One who sent him, and consequently he and all his affairs — even his garments — are bound to the Sender.
Key Lesson
A Jew's essence is Shabbos: his mind and inner faculties belong to Torah and Divine service, and even his "feet" — his outer faculties — should not stray beyond the bounds of holiness at times devoted to Torah and mitzvos. And when impurity from outside appears in one's "Sanctuary," it must be removed without delay; especially now, close to the coming of Moshiach, every Jew has the privilege and duty to spread the wellsprings of Chassidus outward and so hasten the Redemption.