Parshas Bechukosai*
1. On the verse "והשבתי חי' רעה מן הארץ" ("I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land"),1 the Toras Kohanim cites a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon: "Rabbi Yehudah says: He will remove them from the world. Rabbi Shimon says: He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm." The Toras Kohanim then brings a proof for the view of Rabbi Shimon: "And so it says: 'מזמור שיר ליום השבת' ('A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day') — for Him Who causes the harmful ones to cease from the world, causing them to cease so that they do no harm. And so it says:2 'וגר זאב עם כבש . . ונער קטן נוהג בם . . וישעשע יונק על חור פתן' ('The wolf shall dwell with the lamb . . and a small child shall lead them . . and the suckling shall play over the hole of the asp') . . This teaches that a Jewish child will in the future stretch out his hand into the eyeball of the viper, etc."
This is not understood:
a) What is the proof from the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" that "causing the harmful ones to cease" (which will take place in the Future) means "so that they do no harm"? The word "HaShabbos" derives from the term "shevisah" (cessation), exactly like the word "vehishbasi" ("I will cause to cease"). So why is "for the Shabbos day" more of a proof that it means "so that they do no harm" than "I will cause wild beasts to cease"? Just as Rabbi Yehudah explains "vehishbasi" to mean "He will remove them from the world," he could equally interpret the verse "for the Shabbos day" in the same way.
b) On the other hand: in the verse "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, etc."3 it states explicitly that in the Future, too, all the harmful beasts — the wolf, the bear, the lion and the serpent — will exist; it is only that "לא ירעו ולא ישחיתו" ("they shall not harm nor destroy").4 How, then, can Rabbi Yehudah interpret it as "He will remove them from the world"?5
2. The reason of Rabbi Yehudah, who explains that "I will cause wild beasts to cease" means "He will remove them from the world," is explained by the Rogatchover:6 Rabbi Yehudah follows his own reasoning regarding the law of the removal of chametz.
Concerning the manner in which chametz must be removed, there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages:7 "Rabbi Yehudah says: The removal of chametz is only by burning. The Sages say: One may also crumble it and scatter it to the wind or throw it into the sea."
What is the substance of their dispute? When one throws the chametz into the sea (and even when one "scatters it to the wind," only the bond between its parts is undone, etc., but) the existence of the chametz remains as it was. And since regarding chametz it is written,8 "תשביתו שאור מבתיכם" ("You shall cause leaven to cease from your houses"), Rabbi Yehudah holds that by crumbling the chametz and scattering it in the wind, or by throwing it into the sea, one does not fulfill the mitzvah of "you shall cause to cease." For according to Rabbi Yehudah, the meaning of "shevisah" is the nullification of the existence. Therefore he holds that "the removal of chametz is only by burning" — for only through burning the chametz is its existence nullified. (And although even after burning, ashes remain from it, ashes are a new existence;8* the previous existence is no longer there.)
The Sages (and among them Rabbi Shimon), however, hold that the nullification of the form and the quality as well — in the broad sense of form and quality, including also the possibility of eating (and of benefit in general), the category of "יראה לך" ("it shall be seen by you"),9 and the like — is called "shevisah." Therefore they hold that also by "crumbling and scattering to the wind or throwing into the sea" one fulfills the mitzvah of "you shall cause to cease."9*
And this, says the Rogatchover, is also the reason for the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon concerning the meaning of "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land": when a wild beast stops being harmful, only its form is nullified, but its existence remains as before.
[Even if the nature of a wild beast to do harm had been within it from the very beginning of Creation, it would still be understandable that the nullification of this nature is called merely a nullification of the form;10 all the more so, since during the Six Days of Creation the beasts did not do harm, and the nature to do harm came to them only after the sin of the Tree of Knowledge11 — then it is certainly understandable that this nature is merely an external form, and through the nullification of this nature the existence of the beast is not nullified.]
Thus Rabbi Yehudah, who explains that "shevisah" means the nullification of the existence, must hold that "I will cause wild beasts to cease, etc." means "He will remove them from the world." But Rabbi Shimon, in whose view the nullification of the form can also be called "shevisah," explains it as "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm," for this too is called "I will cause to cease."
3. The term "shevisah" is also found in connection with Shabbos — "וביום השביעי תשבות" ("and on the seventh day you shall cease").12 And indeed we find that regarding the prohibition of work on Shabbos as well (which is connected also with "and on the seventh day you shall cease"13), there is a dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon, in two matters:
a) Regarding "מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה" ("work not needed for its own sake") [i.e., when a person does a forbidden act intentionally, but his reason for it is for the sake of something else. For example, "one who extinguishes the lamp because he fears the gentiles, etc." or "for the sake of a sick person so that he may sleep," whose reason for extinguishing is not related to the lamp itself — because he needs the charcoal — but for the sake of something else14], Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is liable, and Rabbi Shimon holds that he is exempt.15
b) Regarding "דבר שאינו מתכוון" ("an unintended act") [that is, a forbidden act done without intent. For example, when a person pours cold water into a hot metal vessel in order to warm the water: although by doing so he hardens the vessel, which is "the completion of the work of refining," he has no intention whatsoever for that act], Rabbi Yehudah holds that it is forbidden, and Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted.16
The explanation of their disputes: regarding Shabbos, "the Torah forbade purposeful work,"17 and when the intention is lacking [not only in the case of "an unintended act," where he has no intention at all to perform the work, but even in the case of "work not needed for its own sake" — since his reason and intention are for the sake of something else, it follows that with respect to this act, intention is lacking], the form of the work has been nullified. And since regarding Shabbos it is written "and on the seventh day you shall cease," meaning that there must be cessation from work, Rabbi Yehudah — who explains that shevisah is only when the entire existence is nullified — holds that even when one does work not needed for its own sake, and even an unintended act, one does not fulfill "you shall cease," for the essence of the work exists even when the intention is lacking. But Rabbi Shimon, who holds that the nullification of the form is also called shevisah, holds18 that also work not needed for its own sake and an unintended act — since the form of the work is not present in them — already fall within the category of "you shall cease."19
4. Since the meaning of "shevisah" (in the view of Rabbi Yehudah) is the nullification of the very existence, it follows that the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land" states explicitly that in the Time to Come the existence of wild beasts will be nullified. Therefore he cannot interpret it as "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm" (despite what is written, "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, etc."), and must interpret it as "He will remove them from the world."
And since the verse nevertheless states explicitly "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, etc." — that there will indeed be wild beasts in the Future (only they will not do harm) — one must say (according to Rabbi Yehudah) that the two verses speak of two separate periods: first there will be "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, etc.," and afterwards there will be a higher level, in which the existence of the wild beasts will be nullified entirely — "He will remove them from the world."19*
5. Based on the above, we will also understand the proof that the Toras Kohanim brings for the view of Rabbi Shimon from the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day":
At the end of Tractate Tamid, the Mishnah enumerates "the song that the Levites would recite in the Beis HaMikdash" on each of the days of the week: "On the first day they would recite 'לה' הארץ ומלואה תבל ויושבי בה' ('The earth and its fullness are the L‑rd's, the world and those who dwell in it'). On the second they would recite 'גדול ה' ומהולל מאד' ('Great is the L‑rd and highly praised'), etc. On Shabbos they would recite 'A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day.'" And it explains: "A psalm, a song for the Time to Come, for the day that is entirely Shabbos and rest20 for life everlasting."
So it is stated in the Mishnah. But in a Baraisa21 there is a dispute about this: "Rabbi Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Akiva . . On the seventh they would recite 'A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day' — for the day that is entirely Shabbos. Rabbi Nechemiah said: What did the Sages see to differentiate between these chapters?" (Rashi explains: "For on all the six days these chapters are recited on account of the past, and that of Shabbos on account of the future.") Therefore Rabbi Nechemiah explains "on the seventh — on account of the fact that He ceased," i.e., that on Shabbos too, the psalm was recited on account of the past — for the meaning of "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" is (not "for the day that is entirely Shabbos," which will be in the Future, but) on account of Shabbos, when the A-lmighty ceased from work on the Shabbos of Creation.
The Gemara then says: "And they disagree regarding the statement of Rav Ketina, who said: The world will exist for six thousand years and for one [thousand] it will be desolate21* . . Abaye said: Two [thousand] desolate." That is, the dispute between (Rabbi Yehudah in the name of) Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Nechemiah depends on the dispute between Rav Ketina and Abaye: according to Rav Ketina, that in the Future there will be "one [thousand] desolate," one can explain that "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" means "for the day that is entirely Shabbos." However, according to Abaye, that there will be "two [thousand] desolate," one cannot say that "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" refers to the Future, for "for the Shabbos day" is in the singular, while in the Future there will be "two desolate." Accordingly one must say that "for the Shabbos day" means "on account of the fact that He ceased."
This is not understood: Rabbi Nechemiah himself says explicitly that his reason for disagreeing with (Rabbi Yehudah in the name of) Rabbi Akiva is "What did the Sages see to differentiate between these chapters?" How, then, does the Gemara give a different reason?
The question is even greater: from the words of Rabbi Nechemiah, "What did the Sages see to differentiate," it is seemingly understood that even if one were to accept the view of Rav Ketina that there will be "one desolate," he would still have to say "on account of the fact that He ceased." How, then, does the Gemara say "And they disagree regarding the statement of Rav Ketina, etc.," implying that Rabbi Nechemiah's reason is that he holds like Abaye, but had he held like Rav Ketina he would indeed have agreed with the view of (Rabbi Yehudah in the name of) Rabbi Akiva in explaining it as "for the day that is entirely Shabbos"?
One must say that with "And they disagree regarding the statement of Rav Ketina, etc." the Gemara means (not to give a different reason for the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Nechemiah, but) to explain the reasoning of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Nechemiah as stated in the Baraisa: the fact that Rabbi Nechemiah is compelled by the question "What did the Sages see to differentiate, etc." to conclude that "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" does not mean "for the day that is entirely Shabbos," while (Rabbi Yehudah in the name of) Rabbi Akiva does not accept this question, is because Rabbi Akiva holds "one desolate" and Rabbi Nechemiah holds "two desolate."
6. This will be understood by first introducing the well-known concept22 that each thousand years of the "six thousand years that the world will exist" is a distinct mode of Divine conduct. And although the Gemara23 divides the six thousand years into three categories — two thousand of chaos, two thousand of Torah, and two thousand of the days of Moshiach — this is in general terms. But in particular, each thousand years (even within each of the two-thousand-year periods themselves — chaos, Torah and the days of Moshiach24) is different from the second thousand years.
From this it is understood also regarding the "two desolate" (according to Abaye), that although in both millennia there will be "desolation," the seventh millennium is nevertheless not the same as the eighth millennium.
Accordingly, it may be said that Rav Ketina and Abaye differ according to the two views of Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon (in the Toras Kohanim): according to the view of Rabbi Shimon, that the meaning of "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land" is "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm" — and this is the only cessation that will take place in the Future (that the wild beasts will always25 exist, and they will not do harm) — it is logical that there will be only "one desolate." However, according to the view of Rabbi Yehudah, that there are two periods as mentioned above — first there will be "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb" (there will be wild beasts, but they will not harm), and afterwards "He will remove them from the world" — there is room to say, and on the contrary it is logical,26 that there will be "two desolate": in the first millennium there will be the desolation of the form — they will exist but they will not do harm — and in the second millennium, "He will remove them from the world."27
7. Accordingly, we will also understand why the question "What did the Sages see to differentiate between these chapters?" applies only if one holds "two desolate":
As stated above (section 2), before the sin of the Tree of Knowledge the beasts did not do harm. From this it is understood that also on the Shabbos of Creation — although it was already after the sin, since the sin had not yet had any actual effect in the world — as our Sages, of blessed memory, say:28 "Although the luminaries were damaged on Erev Shabbos, they were not stricken until the conclusion of Shabbos" — the beasts also did not yet do harm then.
Consequently, the cessation "so that they do no harm" in the Future, "for the day that is entirely Shabbos," is not a new matter that will first come into being in the Future, for also in the past, on the Sha[bbos of Creation . . . ] [OCR unclear]
. . . Therefore one cannot ask "What did the Sages see to differentiate, etc." (that the song of the six days is "on account of the past" and that of Shabbos "on account of the future") — for the matter of "causing them to cease so that they do no harm," which will take place in the Future, also existed in the past, on the Shabbos of Creation.29 However, according to Abaye, that there will be "two desolate," it follows that he accepts the view of Rabbi Yehudah, "He will remove them from the world"; consequently the question "What did the Sages see to differentiate" arises29* — since the matter of "He will remove them from the world" is an entirely new matter, which is connected only with "the future" and has no connection with "(on account of) the past."30
8. Based on the above, it will also be understood why the Toras Kohanim brings a proof from the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" for the view of Rabbi Shimon, "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm":
Since from the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" it is proven (according to the interpretation that it refers to the Future) like the view of Rav Ketina, that there will be "one desolate" — and the dispute between Rav Ketina and Abaye depends, as mentioned above, on the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon — it consequently follows that from the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" (from which it is proven that the "desolation" will be in one thousand years), it is also proven that "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm."31
9. It has already been discussed many times that every Torah portion has a connection to the time when it is read.32 Accordingly it is understood that the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land," which appears in Parshas Bechukosai — which is always read during the days of Sefirah (and close to their conclusion, the festival of Shavuos) — has a connection to the matter of Matan Torah,33 [OCR unclear] — when the days of Sefirah are completed — "תספרו חמשים יום" ("you shall count fifty days").
This will be understood in light of what is known34 concerning chametz (for regarding chametz, too, it is written "You shall cause leaven to cease from your houses"35 — which is similar to "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land," as mentioned above): on Pesach chametz is forbidden, while on Shavuos not only is chametz permitted, but on the contrary, the two loaves that are offered on Shavuos must specifically be "חמץ תאפינה" ("baked as chametz").
The known explanation of this is that "chametz" alludes to haughtiness and self-elevation, from which all kinds of evil stem. Therefore on Pesach — when one is only at the stage of "the Exodus from Egypt" — one must "flee" from "chametz," to the point that "לא יראה" ("it shall not be seen")35 and "לא ימצא" ("it shall not be found").36 However, on Shavuos, which comes after the service of Sefiras HaOmer — when one has refined all seven attributes of the animal soul — then not only is chametz no contradiction to the service of G‑d, but on the contrary: one even makes a mitzvah out of it. This is in the manner of "ויגבה לבו בדרכי ה'" ("his heart was lifted up in the ways of the L‑rd").37
And since after Sefiras HaOmer one stands in such a state that one can make a mitzvah out of chametz, one must therefore make a mitzvah out of it. For the ultimate elevation is "אתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא" ("the transformation of darkness into light") — that the darkness itself be transformed into light. Therefore on Shavuos there must be "baked as chametz."
And this is also the connection38 between the days of Sefirah and "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land" according to the view of Rabbi Shimon (whose view is the halachah, as will be explained in section 10), "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm" — for in "causing them to cease so that they do no harm" is expressed the great elevation of "the transformation of darkness into light." As he says in the Toras Kohanim: "Rabbi Shimon said: When is the praise of the Omnipresent? When there are no harmful creatures, or when there are harmful creatures and they do no harm?" — meaning that the ultimate elevation and praise is (not the nullification of the "harmful ones," but) that the harmful ones themselves will be transformed to good.
10. Regarding the dispute between Rav Ketina and Abaye (whether there will be "one desolate" or "two desolate"), the Gemara says39 "A Baraisa was taught in accordance with Rav Ketina, etc." From this it is implied39 that the halachah follows Rav Ketina, that there will be one desolate. And since the dispute between Rav Ketina and Abaye depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon (as mentioned above, section 7), it consequently follows that the halachah follows Rabbi Shimon, "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm."
From this we can understand also regarding man's service now — for all the revelations of the Future depend on our actions and service now,40 and the arousal from below must resemble the arousal from Above — that the main point and the completeness of the service must be (not in "fleeing" and separating oneself from the world — "olam" (world) being related to "he'elem" (concealment)41 — but rather, after preparation) in making the world itself, which is full of kelipos and the sitra [achra], into a dwelling for Him, may He be blessed.4243
And through this we will merit the fulfillment of the assurance "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land," the "day that is entirely Shabbos and rest for life everlasting."
(From the sichos of 19 Kislev and Shabbos Parshas Vayeishev 5730)
Notes
*) And the conclusion of Tractate Tamid (section 5 onward).
1) Our parsha, 26:6.
2) Tehillim 92:1.
3) Yeshayahu 11:6-8.
4) Ibid., 9.
5) One cannot answer (as in "Derech HaKodesh" on the Toras Kohanim here) that Rabbi Yehudah holds that the verses in Yeshayahu there were said as a parable about the nations of the world (like the view of the Rambam, Laws of Kings, beginning of ch. 12) — for the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease" (according to Rabbi Yehudah) is more of a "nullification of something from the natural order of the world"* than "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb." According to the Rambam, who holds that in the days of Moshiach nothing will be nullified from the natural order of the world, and the verses in Yeshayahu there are a parable, the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease" must necessarily also be a parable (and all the more so than the verse "The wolf shall dwell with the lamb"), as the commentators on the Rambam there write. And since the Toras Kohanim here holds (also according to Rabbi Yehudah) that "I will cause wild beasts to cease" is meant literally,** then all the more so it holds that the verses in Yeshayahu there are also meant literally.
*) In the Ramban here: "That wild beasts will not come into your land, for when there is plenty and abundant good, and the cities are full of people, wild beasts will not come into the settlement." Accordingly, "I will cause wild beasts to cease" is not a nullification of the natural order of the world. (Accordingly we can also understand what the Rambam writes there, "And what is said in Yeshayahu, 'The wolf shall dwell with the lamb, etc.'" — for seemingly, why did he not raise the difficulty from what is said in the Torah, "I will cause wild beasts to cease"? Because this verse can be explained like the Ramban, and there is no need to force it to be said as a parable.) However, from the plain wording of the Toras Kohanim, "He will remove them from the world" (and similarly in the view of Rabbi Shimon, "for Him Who causes the harmful ones to cease from the world") — especially since it changes from the wording of the verse, "the land" — it is implied that the wild beasts will be made to cease from the entire world; if so, this is a "nullification of the natural order of the world."
**) It may be said that the source for the view of the Raavad there, that "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land" is meant literally (see Radvaz there: "This is no objection; just as the other verses are a parable, this too is a parable"), is the exposition of the Toras Kohanim here. See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 26, p. 193.
6) Cited in "Tzafnas Pa'neach" on the Torah, on the verse.
7) Pesachim 21[a] [OCR: "כ"ב"].
8) Bo 12:15.
8*) See Tosafos, s.v. "Ein" (Pesachim 29a, end). Chiddushei HaRashba on Kiddushin (56b). See also Iggeres HaKodesh, sec. 15.
9) See Yerushalmi Pesachim (ch. 2, halachah 1, at its end): "You shall cause to cease, etc. — it shall not be seen" (except that there it is according to Rabbi Yehudah — causing it to cease from being seen entirely).
9*) And this is also the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon concerning chametz over which Pesach has passed (Pesachim 28a, end, and onward), for after Pesach has passed over it, its description has been nullified, but the essence of the chametz remains (Tzafnas Pa'neach, Kuntres HaShlamah, p. 65).
10) Note Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, beginning of ch. 2: "Although this nature in the water was also created and brought into being ex nihilo." His intent (simply*) with "this nature" is to what he wrote before that, "and flow downward according to their way and nature." Concerning this nature he says that it was "created and brought into being ex nihilo" — i.e., a creation in addition to the creation of the water itself (therefore, from the standpoint of the essential nature of the water, it is not precluded that they should stand like a wall — since the nature of flowing (the opposite of standing like a wall) is something additional to them — and consequently, the wonder of the Splitting of the Sea is not like the wonder of creation ex nihilo). Note also the maamar beginning "Nasata LiYerei'echa" 5693 (printed in Sefer HaMaamarim 5701), ch. 2 and onward.
*) In "Pelach HaRimon" (by Rabbi Hillel of Paritch), Vayeira (52c), he explains it differently.
11) Ramban on the Torah (on the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease, etc.").
12) Mishpatim 23:12. Sisa 34:21.
13) Rambam, beginning of Laws of Shabbos. Sefer HaMitzvos, positive mitzvah 154, and Rambam, positive mitzvah 157 [OCR: "לה' ורמב"ם מ"ע קנז" — doubtful].
14) See Shabbos 30a, beginning; 31b.
15) Ibid. 73b, and sources cited there.
16) Ibid. 41b, beginning, and sources cited there.
17) Beitzah 13b (and sources cited there). Chagigah 10b [OCR: "י"ד"], beginning (regarding work not needed for its own sake; see there).
18) That Rabbi Shimon holds that an unintended act is permitted also with regard to all the Torah's prohibitions is because "Shabbos is a paradigm* for the entire Torah" (Ritva, Yoma 34b). As for why this "paradigm" applies only to an unintended act and not to work not needed for its own sake (see Tosafos, Zevachim 92a, and the following note) — it may be said: with an act that is entirely unintended, it is logical that the exemption (stated regarding Shabbos) is (not only because even when one does work without intent he is "ceasing," but also) because there can be no liability for an unintended act (except that had we not found an exemption for an unintended act anywhere, we could not have innovated this reasoning; but once we know that one is exempt on Shabbos, it is logical that the same applies to all prohibitions). However, regarding work not needed for its own sake — since he does it intentionally, only it is not needed for its own sake — it is logical that this exemption was stated only regarding Shabbos, since concerning it is said "you shall cease," and not regarding other prohibitions.
*) The Pnei Yehoshua on Shabbos (42a, beginning) explains (according to the questioner in Shabbos there): "That Rabbi Shimon holds that an unintended act is permitted throughout the Torah is because he derives it by a kal vachomer from Shabbos, which is more stringent." This is not understood, for accordingly he should derive by a kal vachomer from Shabbos also regarding work not needed for its own sake. Especially since both matters (work not needed for its own sake and an unintended act) are derived from "purposeful work" (as he elaborates in the Pnei Yehoshua there). So what is the difference? Therefore, in my humble opinion, it is impossible to learn by a kal vachomer from Shabbos — for Shabbos is different, since the definition of the prohibition of work on it is "you shall cease." Nevertheless, "Shabbos is a paradigm (not a kal vachomer) for the entire Torah" regarding an unintended act, as explained below in the body of the note.
19) Based on what is written in the text, one may say in answer to the question of Tosafos (Shabbos 42a, s.v. "Afilu"; Zevachim there, s.v. "Aval"), who asked, "How could one have thought that an unintended act is equivalent to work not needed for its own sake — what does one have to do with the other?" — since the dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehudah in both laws (work not needed for its own sake and an unintended act) stems from their differing over the meaning of "you shall cease," these two laws are related to each other.* And although the ruling of Shmuel in Zevachim there concerns an unintended act regarding "it shall not be extinguished" (and not Shabbos) — since an unintended act is permitted throughout the Torah because we derive it from Shabbos (as in the previous note), it necessarily follows that he holds that the nullification of the "description" is also called "you shall cease," and therefore also work not needed for its own sake (regarding Shabbos) is exempt. As for the Gemara's conclusion, "Regarding an unintended act he holds like Rabbi Shimon; regarding work not needed for its own sake he holds like Rabbi Yehudah" — although both disputes of Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon depend on the meaning of "you shall cease" — it may be explained in two ways: a) that the exemption for an unintended act stems (not from "you shall cease," but) from a different verse, as in the Pnei Yehoshua, Shabbos (42a, beginning), or because there can be no liability for an unintended act and no verse is needed for it at all (unlike the previous note); b) that the meaning of "you shall cease" according to Shmuel is the nullification of the description, but he holds that with work not needed for its own sake, since he acts intentionally (although his intent is for a different act), it also has the form of work.
*) In a similar way the Pnei Yehoshua there answers that the connection between the two laws (work not needed for its own sake and an unintended act) is that both are derived (according to the questioner) from "purposeful work," and that Rabbi Shimon holds an unintended act is permitted also with regard to all the Torah's prohibitions "because he derives it by a kal vachomer from Shabbos, which is more stringent." But his answer is insufficient, for since the exemption for work not needed for its own sake applies only on Shabbos and not to other prohibitions, it is seemingly proven that the permissibility of an unintended act with regard to other prohibitions stems (not from deriving it from Shabbos, but) from a different verse, and not from "purposeful work." If so, how does (the Gemara in Zevachim there) challenge Shmuel's view that an unintended act is permitted regarding "it shall not be extinguished" from his view that work not needed for its own sake is exempt on Shabbos? One must therefore say as in the body of the note. This all requires further investigation.
19*) Note Maamarei Admur HaZaken 5567, p. 57. Maamarei Admur HaEmtzai, Bamidbar vol. 1, p. 164.
20) However, according to the Bartenura, Tosafos Yom Tov and others, the reading is "menuchah" (without the "and"). See below, the first gloss to note 30.
21) Rosh HaShanah 31a.
21*) On the matter of "desolation" and its details — see Torah Chayim, Bereishis, at the beginning. Ohr HaTorah, Bereishis (30, end of column b). Ohr HaTorah, Vayikra (p. 498, near its end). The Tzemach Tzedek's notes [OCR: "רשימות"] on the verse (Tehillim 92:1) "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" (in "Yahel Ohr" and in the "Addendum" to it (5744 edition — p. 632; p. 720 ff.)). The maamar beginning "Shir HaShirim" (the first) 5626.
22) Ramban and Bachya on the Torah — Bereishis 2:3. And elsewhere.
23) Sanhedrin 97a, end.
24) See the above-cited Ramban.
25) One cannot say that Rabbi Shimon also holds that afterwards "He will remove them from the world," and only that he holds that the meaning of "I will cause wild beasts to cease" is "He will cause them to cease so that they do no harm" (and this verse speaks of the time before "He will remove them, etc.") because he follows his own reasoning in the meaning of "shevisah" (as stated in the text) — for on the contrary: in Rabbi Shimon's view the elevation and "the praise of the Omnipresent" is "when there are harmful creatures and they do no harm" (as stated explicitly in the Toras Kohanim there).
26) But it is not compelling, for it is possible that both matters will be in the same thousand years. See the following note, and notes 30 and 31.
27) Note what is known (Responsa of the Rashba, vol. 1, sec. 9; Kad HaKemach, beginning of Shemini; and at length — [OCR unclear: the rest of this note is missing in the source]).
28) [OCR unclear: the text of this note is missing in the source.]
29) Nevertheless, the "causing them to cease so that they do no harm" that will be "on the day that is entirely Shabbos" has an advantage over the cessation on the "Shabbos of Creation" after the sin of the Tree of Knowledge [which is why (Rabbi Yehudah in the name of) Rabbi Akiva holds "for the day that is entirely Shabbos" and not "on account of the fact that He ceased"] — for the cessation of the harmful creatures on the Shabbos of Creation was only temporary, whereas "I will cause wild beasts to cease" of the Future means that evil will be nullified entirely and transformed into good. Moreover: the "causing them to cease so that they do no harm" of the Future is loftier even than the state at the beginning of Creation before the sin. For [in addition to the fact that, since originally they did not have the nature to do harm, there is no distinction between wolf and lamb — there are no harmful beasts in the world at all, whereas in the Future "there are harmful (beasts) and they do no harm"] at the beginning of Creation, since kelipos existed in the world, by virtue of which the matter of sin was possible (see the maamar beginning "V'Atem HaDeveikim" 5686 (5701), ch. 5), there was consequently some possibility and room for the beasts to be able to do harm — through the sin. However, in the Future, when "ואת רוח הטומאה אעביר מן הארץ" ("and I will remove the spirit of impurity from the land"), they will be refined completely (see similarly the maamar "V'Atem HaDeveikim" there, regarding the superiority of the bodies in the Future over the body of Adam, even as it was before the sin).
29*) But one cannot prove from this that Rabbi Yehudah in the name of Rabbi Akiva and the Tanna of the Mishnah (end of Tractate Tamid) hold like Rabbi Shimon in the Mechilta [sic] — for it may be said that they hold like Rabbi Yehudah, "He will remove them from the world" (see the following note), but that they are not concerned with the question "What did the Sages see to differentiate" (as in the first gloss to the following note).
30) Based on what is written in the text, it is resolved why Rabbi Nechemiah needed the reasoning "What did the Sages see to differentiate" — for seemingly, according to the view of "two desolate," one must necessarily say that "for the Shabbos day" ("day" — singular) does not refer to the Future (as stated in Sanhedrin there: "A Baraisa was taught in accordance with Rav Ketina . . and it says, 'A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day'"). If so, why did Rabbi Nechemiah need the above reasoning "What did they see, etc."? Because even according to Rabbi Yehudah of the Toras Kohanim, it is possible that both matters ("The wolf shall dwell, etc." and "He will remove them from the world") will be in the same thousand years. Accordingly, it may be said even according to Rabbi Yehudah that "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day" refers to the Future.* Therefore Rabbi Nechemiah needed the reasoning "What did they see, etc.": since he holds like Rabbi Yehudah, "He will remove them from the world" — even if we say that both modes of conduct will be in the same thousand years,** since "He will remove them, etc." is a novelty that did not exist on the Shabbos of Creation, as explained in the text — "What did the Sages see to differentiate."
*) Accordingly it is simply understood that there is no contradiction between Rabbi Yehudah in Tractate Rosh HaShanah and Rabbi Yehudah in the Toras Kohanim there (in addition to what may be said, that in Tractate Rosh HaShanah Rabbi Yehudah says it in the name of Rabbi Akiva, and he himself does not hold so). (Accordingly, the fact that Rabbi Yehudah in the name of Rabbi Akiva is not concerned with the question "What did the Sages see to differentiate" is also according to the basis (see the second gloss below) of Abaye's reasoning. (Note Rashi there, s.v. "Ukamiflegi": "Rabbi Nechemiah does not hold like Rav Ketina," and he does not write that Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Nechemiah disagree regarding Rav Ketina and Abaye.)) Note also the two readings in the Mishnah at the end of Tractate Tamid: "Shabbos menuchah" or "Shabbos u'menuchah" (with a vav): if we say that the Tanna of the Mishnah holds like Rabbi Shimon — without the vav; and if we say that he holds like Rabbi Yehudah — with the vav. This is readily understood.
**) What is said, "And they disagree regarding the statement of Rav Ketina, etc." — the intent is to the basic reasoning of Rav Ketina and Abaye. See also notes 27 and 31.
31) Although even according to Rabbi Yehudah one can say "one desolate" (as in the previous note), it is logical (for the Tanna of the Toras Kohanim) that if there will be two modes of conduct, they will be in two millennia. This is similar to all the "six thousand years that the world will exist" — and on the contrary: the changes of the six thousand years are all within the framework of the natural order of the world, and nevertheless each one is a separate "day" (of the Holy One, blessed be He); all the more so the change of "causing them to cease from the world," which must be a separate day (for "so that they do no harm" was the natural order of the world on the Shabbos of Creation).
32) See Shelah, Torah Shebichsav section, beginning of Vayeishev (cited in Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 129, note 1).
33) For the reason for the Counting of the Omer is the yearning to receive the Torah (Aggadah cited in the Ran, end of Pesachim; cited above, p. 125, note 51). In addition to the connection that all the Torah portions read during the days of Sefirah have with Matan Torah, Parshas Bechukosai has a special connection with Matan Torah, for "Ezra instituted for Israel that they should read the curses in Toras Kohanim before Atzeres" (Megillah 31b), and "Bechukosai" — the name of the entire portion — means Torah (Toras Kohanim, cited in Rashi, on the verse).
34) See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 266 ff., and the sources cited there.
35) Bo 13:7.
36) Ibid. 12:19.
37) Divrei HaYamim II 17:6. See the maamar beginning "Shalosh HaOnah" [OCR: "ש' העונה"], ch. 10 (233 (234), beginning of column a): "He should have nobility of spirit and loftiness of soul in matters of Torah and good deeds, etc." Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar (15c). And elsewhere.
38) See Yahel Ohr by the Tzemach Tzedek on the verse "A psalm, a song for the Shabbos day."
39) See the commentators on the Tur, Orach Chayim, beginning of sec. 442 [OCR: "גו"כ" — likely "נו"כ"].
40) Tanya, beginning of ch. 36 [OCR: "רפל"ו" — doubtful; possibly ch. 37].
41) Likkutei Torah, Shelach 37d [OCR: "לו, ד"]. The maamar beginning "Al Gid Shis" [OCR], at its beginning. And elsewhere.
42) Tanya, ch. 36. See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 22 ff.; p. 128, note 40.
43) Note that Parshas Bechukosai — in which the verse "I will cause wild beasts to cease from the land" is stated, from which verse (according to Rabbi Shimon) this lesson derives — is read in many years (as in this year . . . [OCR unclear] . . .) of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, for on this day there is (a revelation of) the inner dimension of the Torah (see the maamar beginning "U'Sefartem" 5690 [OCR]). Note also what is explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 794 [OCR], regarding the connection of the verse "עד הגל הזה" ("unto this heap") to Lag BaOmer: the lesson of this verse is that even worldly matters, down to the matters in the house of Lavan the Aramean, must be made into vessels for G‑dliness. As is known, the teaching of the Baal Shem Tov on the verse "עזוב תעזוב עמו" ("you shall surely help him") ("Hayom Yom," p. 23, and elsewhere): not by breaking it, etc. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said (Zohar III, 71b): "In his days the people of the world will not need this [OCR unclear] . . . Rabbi Yose: The righteous protect the world in their lifetime, and after their passing more than in their lifetime."
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that the highest perfection is not the removal of evil but its transformation: "when there are harmful creatures and they do no harm." So too in our service, the goal is not to flee from the world but, after proper preparation, to transform the world itself, with all its concealment, into a dwelling for G‑d — like the chametz that is forbidden on Pesach yet becomes a mitzvah on Shavuos.