Parshas Metzora
1. In this week's Sidrah there are two sections concerning a woman who sees blood. The first section — "ואשה כי תהיה זבה גו' שבעת ימים תהיה בנדתה גו'" ("And if a woman has a discharge… she shall be in her separation for seven days")1 — states that when she sees blood once, she becomes impure for seven days, and after the seven days have passed (even if she is "שופעת כל שבעה" ("flowing all seven days")2, which means, by implication, that the days of seeing are counted in the tally of the seven days) she must immerse3 and she becomes pure. And a second section — "ואשה כי יזוב גו' ימים רבים בלא עת נדתה גו' וספרה לה שבעת ימים גו' וביום השמיני תקח לה שתי תורים גו'" ("And if a woman has a discharge… many days, not at the time of her separation… she shall count for herself seven days… and on the eighth day she shall take for herself two turtledoves")4 — states that when she sees blood for three days ("many days")5, she must afterwards count seven clean days; that is, the days of seeing are not included in the count of the seven clean days (and if she saw blood in the middle of her days of counting, even on the seventh day close to sunset, she must begin counting the seven clean days anew6), and after the seven clean days she must immerse7 and bring an offering.
On this our Sages say8 — and Rashi cites it in his commentary on the Torah9 — that the law of counting seven clean days and bringing an offering in the case of "a woman who has a discharge… many days" applies only when the discharge is "בלא עת נדתה" ("not at the time of her separation") — meaning, during the eleven days that begin after the days of niddah, which eleven days are called the days of zivah (and if she sees blood then, she is called — and is subject to the laws of — a zavah). But in the days of her niddah, even if she then sees three consecutive days (and even if she flows all seven days10), she needs neither seven clean days nor an offering; she has only the law of a niddah (as the Torah indicates in the first section). Moreover: she does not receive the law of a zavah (so that she would need seven clean days and an offering) unless these three days of seeing all fall within the eleven days of zivah11.
2. Although the section primarily speaks of a zavah of "many days" — three days, in which case she must count seven clean days and bring an offering — nevertheless the Gemara derives12 (from "יהיה לה" ("shall be to her")13 or from "טמאה היא" ("she is impure")14) an additional law: if during these eleven days she sees blood only one day or two days, then (although she does not thereby become a "complete zavah," and consequently does not need seven clean days and an offering, nevertheless) after the day (or two days) of seeing she must keep — count — one pure day "כנגד היום הטמא" ("corresponding to the impure day") (or "corresponding to the two impure days"15) — "שומרת יום כנגד יום" ("one who keeps a day corresponding to a day")16. (She is then called a "zavah ketanah," a minor zavah14; whereas when she sees three days, she is called a "zavah gedolah," a major zavah16, or simply a "zavah"17.)
In the law of "shomeres yom" — where the law is that keeping even part of the day suffices18 — there are two definitions:
a) She must wait with her immersion until the morning; the keeping and counting of part of the day during the preceding night is not sufficient, because the law of counting applies specifically by day1920. Therefore, if she immerses at night, she does not become pure through that immersion, even if she sees nothing during the entire following day21.
b) Even when she immerses in the morning, "מגעה ובעילתה תלויין" ("her touching and her intimacy are in suspense"); consequently, if in the course of the day she sees blood, she becomes impure retroactively, because this seeing combines with, and forms one continuum with, the discharge of the previous day22.
3. Since the law of "shomeres yom keneged yom" is derived from the section that speaks primarily of a "zavah gedolah" (for the beginning of the section is "a woman who has a discharge… many days," and in connection with this comes the instruction of the following verses: "she shall count for herself seven days… and on the eighth day…"), there is reason to say that the law of counting one day after seeing for one day or two days does not come as a separate matter and category in its own right, but is a detail that branches out of the law of counting seven days when she saw "many days"23.
That is: the fact that when she sees for less than three days she must have a keeping is not because the separate seeing in and of itself obligates the keeping, but because it is part of a seeing of three days, which brings her to become a zavah gedolah. Since, when sightings of two more days will combine with it, she will need to count seven clean days, therefore even when the seeing stands by itself, at least the counting of one pure day is required.
The practical halachic difference: If we were to assume that the law of "shomeres yom" is a matter in its own right, then the law would apply even when she saw on the tenth or on the eleventh day, although such a seeing cannot be part of a seeing of three days and cannot bring her to become a zavah gedolah (since the (second or) third day is no longer within the eleven days of zivah and consequently cannot complete the three days). If, however, we learn that her need for keeping one day is because the seeing of one day can lead to zivah gedolah, it would follow that where it cannot lead to zivah gedolah, as when she saw on the tenth or on the eleventh, the obligation of "shomeres yom keneged yom" should consequently not apply either.
On this, however, there are three views:
a) The view of Beis Shammai is that even in the case of "הרואה יום אחד עשר" ("one who sees on the eleventh day") she is a "shomeres yom" by Torah law, and therefore she must wait with her immersion until the next morning, just like "one who sees within the eleven days." [The only difference is that if she sees blood after the immersion on the twelfth day, she does not (by Torah law) become impure retroactively (as with one who sees within the eleven days), because the seeing of the twelfth day — which is not within the "days of zivah" — does not combine with the seeing of the day before it]24.
b) Rabbi Yochanan, according to Beis Hillel, holds that one who sees on the eleventh day is not obligated in keeping a day, but one who sees on the tenth is indeed obligated in keeping a day25.
c) The view of Reish Lakish, according to Beis Hillel, is that even one who sees on the tenth does not require keeping a day25.
We need to understand: What is Rabbi Yochanan's reasoning in distinguishing between the tenth and the eleventh? Seemingly, it is one way or the other: if the law of "shomeres yom" applies only to a seeing that can lead to zivah gedolah — then the tenth day, too, should not require a keeping after it; and if the law of "shomeres yom" is a matter in its own right, not connected with the law of "zavah gedolah" — then the eleventh day, too, should require keeping?
4. Since, according to Rabbi Yochanan, one who saw on the tenth does require keeping — although through that seeing she cannot become a zavah gedolah — we must seemingly say that the fact that "one who sees on the eleventh day" does not obligate any keeping is (not because of the reasoning that the "day" against which she must be "shomeres yom" is a "detail" of "zavah gedolah," and the eleventh day is not, but rather) because of some reason that pertains specifically to the eleventh day, on account of which that day is exempt from keeping26.
Moreover: even according to Reish Lakish, in whose view the tenth day also does not require keeping, there is seemingly compelling proof, according to one version in the Gemara, that the law of "shomeres yom" has a definition in its own right and is not connected with the law of "zavah gedolah."
— In explaining the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish there are two versions in the Gemara27:
One version: "ר' יוחנן אמר עשירי כתשיעי מה תשיעי בעי שימור אף עשירי בעי שימור. ריש לקיש אמר עשירי כאחד עשר מה אחד עשר לא בעי שימור אף עשירי לא בעי שימור" ("Rabbi Yochanan said: The tenth is like the ninth — just as the ninth requires keeping, so too the tenth requires keeping. Reish Lakish said: The tenth is like the eleventh — just as the eleventh does not require keeping, so too the tenth does not require keeping"). According to this version, their dispute concerns the definition of the tenth: whether the tenth is (like the ninth, which) requires keeping, or (like the eleventh, which) does not require keeping.
And a second version: "ר' יוחנן אמר הלכה אחד עשר, אחד עשר הוא דלא בעי שימור הא לאחריני עביד שימור. וריש לקיש אמר הלכות אחד עשר, לא אחד עשר בעי שימור ולא שימור לעשירי הוי" ("Rabbi Yochanan said: The halachah (singular) of the eleventh (i.e., the eleventh day differs from the days before it in one halachah): it is the eleventh that does not require keeping, but for others it does serve as keeping. And Reish Lakish said: The halachos (plural) of the eleventh (i.e., the eleventh day differs from the days before it in two halachos): the eleventh neither requires keeping nor does it serve as keeping for the tenth"). According to this version, their dispute concerns the definition of the eleventh day: whether it differs from the days before it only in that it does not require keeping, or also in that it does not serve as keeping.
Now, the precise wording of Reish Lakish's words, according to the second version of the dispute, implies that the reason the tenth day does not require any keeping is because the eleventh day does not serve as keeping for it. This seemingly means that from the standpoint of the definition of the tenth day itself (there is no novelty relative to the previous days, and consequently) keeping would indeed be required — even according to his view, although the seeing of that day cannot bring the woman to become a zavah gedolah.
Accordingly, it emerges that regarding the reason of Beis Hillel, who hold that one who sees on the eleventh day does not need any keeping, there are three explanations: a) According to Reish Lakish in the first version, it is because the eleventh day cannot lead to zavah gedolah. Therefore he says "the tenth is like the eleventh," for the tenth, too — just like the eleventh — cannot lead to zavah gedolah. b) The view of Reish Lakish in the second version is that (even with a seeing that cannot lead to zivah gedolah the law of shomeres yom applies, and) one who sees on the eleventh day does not need keeping because the eleventh day has within it (a halachah) a certain definition by virtue of which it not only "does not require keeping," but also does not serve as "keeping for the tenth." c) The view of Rabbi Yochanan (according to both versions) is that the characteristic of the eleventh day removes from that day only the obligation of keeping, but not the law of serving as keeping for another day.
In truth, however, one cannot learn that the law of shomeres yom is exclusively a matter in its own right, having nothing at all to do with the law of zavah gedolah (besides the fact that there would then be no reason27 why the eleventh day — according to the second version in Reish Lakish's view — should differ from the other days also in the detail of "not serving28 as keeping for others"29):
On the second version, where Reish Lakish says that the eleventh day does not serve as keeping for the tenth, Tosafos30 explains: "כיון דאינו ראוי להצטרף לזיבה גדולה" ("since it is not fit to combine into a major zivah").
The same is found regarding the view of Rabbi Yochanan: The Rambam31 explains Beis Hillel's reason that she does not require keeping as "לפי שהרואה יום אחד עשר לא תהיה לעולם זבה גדולה בראיה הזאת" ("because one who sees on the eleventh day will never be a zavah gedolah through this seeing"); and nevertheless he concludes (in accordance with Rabbi Yochanan): "ודע כי הרואה בעשירי צריכה שימור ואע"פ שאינה זבה גדולה כלל בראיה הזאת" ("Know that one who sees on the tenth requires keeping, even though she is not at all a zavah gedolah through this seeing"). Since the fact that the eleventh day does not require keeping is because she cannot become a zavah gedolah, we must say that the fact that one who sees on the tenth requires keeping (even though she cannot become a zavah gedolah) is because, according to Rabbi Yochanan, there is indeed a connection between the seeing on the tenth day and zivah gedolah.
5. This will be understood by first introducing the dispute32 between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding eating half a measure of a forbidden substance: "ר"י אמר אסור מן התורה כיון דחזי לאצטרופי איסורא קא אכיל, ר"ל אמר מותר מן התורה, אכילה אמר רחמנא וליכא" ("Rabbi Yochanan said: It is forbidden by Torah law — since it is fit to combine, he is eating something forbidden. Reish Lakish said: It is permitted by Torah law — the Merciful One said 'eating,' and there is none").
What is the explanation of their dispute? The Rogatchover explains33: Rabbi Yochanan holds that the measure of a k'zayis (and the like) which the Torah gave is a definition in quantity — that a k'zayis makes up the full measure of the forbidden food that is eaten (and not that the measure creates the definition of a forbidden act of eating). Consequently, if one eats even less than the measure of a forbidden food, since he thereby performs an act of forbidden eating (only the quantity is lacking), it is forbidden by Torah law34. Reish Lakish, however, holds that the measure is a definition in the very essence of "eating"; that is, if one eats less than the measure, it is not called eating at all35 — and therefore half a measure is permitted by Torah law, because "the Merciful One said 'eating,' and there is none."
From this it will also be understood regarding measures of time36, and in our case, regarding the measure of a discharge of three days through which she becomes a zavah gedolah: according to Rabbi Yochanan, the measure of three days is only a definition in quantity. That is to say, consequently, that in terms of quality, the seeing of one day or two days (less than the measure) is of the same quality as the seeing of three days37.
And therefore Rabbi Yochanan holds that the tenth requires keeping and the eleventh does not require keeping:
Regarding the seeing of the eleventh day, it is not applicable to say that it is half a measure (of a three-day discharge). For since in this seeing there is no concept of combining (the seeing cannot combine with the seeing on the day after it (as above, section 3, that even according to Beis Shammai, in whose view the eleventh day, too, requires keeping, the seeing of the twelfth day does not combine with the discharge of the eleventh)), it is a matter in its own right and a complete measure; it has no connection with the seeing of the later days.
In contrast, the seeing on the tenth day, which is fit to combine, is at least part of a three-day discharge (for the law of a shomeres yom is that if she saw on the day of keeping, (even) after her immersion, the seeing combines with the discharge of the previous day, as above, section 2), and this is a half-measure (and of the same quality) of a discharge of "many days" — therefore she requires keeping.
6. And this is the explanation of the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish — according to the first version — whether "the tenth is like the ninth" or "the tenth is like the eleventh":
The ninth day — to which two more days can combine — contains within it (potentially) the complete measure of three days. Furthermore: the seeing is a "דרך הכשרה" ("path of preparation")38 toward the measure of three days (they can be added to it). With the eleventh day there is no concept of combining at all, etc., as explained above in section 5. And the tenth day, to which (at least) one day can combine, contains within it the concept of a half-measure, as above.
Rabbi Yochanan says "the tenth is like the ninth" — that the tenth, which contains (only) a half-measure, is equal to the "ninth," which has a complete measure — because he follows his own view that the Torah's measures are a definition only in quantity. Reish Lakish, on the other hand, compares the "tenth" to the "eleventh" — because in his view, less than the measure is of an entirely different quality39.
7. We still need to understand, however, what the Gemara says in the second version: that the reason Reish Lakish holds that one who sees on the tenth does not require keeping is because the eleventh does not serve as keeping for the tenth. For seemingly, since his reasoning is, as stated explicitly in Tosafos, "since it is not fit to combine into a zivah gedolah," this relates to the definition of the tenth day (its inability to be transformed into a zivah gedolah), and not to the eleventh day?
This will be understood by explaining the definition [of what this effect of the day of seeing upon the following day consists of, on account of which there must be keeping on it] of "shomeres yom keneged yom." It can be explained in two ways (and from this will also emerge a difference in the connection of "shomeres yom" to the law of "zavah gedolah"):
a) The impurity of the day of seeing extends and spreads also into the following day, and therefore that day requires keeping. That is, the next day in and of itself does not cause the keeping; rather, only the spreading of the impurity of the day of seeing into the following day creates the obligation of keeping.
b) The obligation of keeping on the day after the seeing comes from that day itself: the seeing of the previous day has effected something in the following day, such that it, in its own right, becomes obligated in keeping40.
[One may illustrate this with the holiness in the period of the addition to Shabbos and Yom Tov, which can be explained in two ways: a) that the holiness of Shabbos and Yom Tov extends into the time adjacent to it, before and after41; b) that in the time of the addition there comes into being a holiness of its own — by virtue of its proximity to Shabbos and Yom Tov.]
If we accept the first way, that the keeping on the following day comes (not as a matter in its own right, but) because of the spreading of the impurity of the seeing of the previous day, it then follows that the connection of the law of "shomeres yom" to the law of "zavah gedolah" (as above, section 3, the proof of this connection) is expressed in the cause of the keeping — in the seeing that spreads into the following day: the fact that the impurity of the seeing of one day spreads also into the following day (so that she must count a pure day) is because the seeing contains such a strong impurity that it can bring her, combined with two more sightings, to zivah gedolah — to counting seven clean days (as above, there).
But according to the second way, that the obligation of keeping on the following day relates to that day in its own right (and not to the spreading of the impurity of the day of seeing), it is logical to say that the connection of "shomeres yom" to "zavah gedolah" is expressed (not in the seeing, but) in the keeping: the keeping of one pure day is a keeping from zivah gedolah. Therefore the law of keeping applies only on such a day when seeing on that very day can lead (if she will also see blood on the following day) to zivah gedolah42.
And these are the two versions in the Gemara regarding the reason Reish Lakish says that one who saw on the tenth does not need any keeping:
The first version in the Gemara holds that the connection of shomeres yom to zavah gedolah concerns the "day of seeing." Accordingly, it follows that the reason she does not need keeping a day when she saw on the tenth is because the tenth does not require keeping.
And the second version holds that the connection of shomeres yom to zavah gedolah concerns the "day of keeping," and therefore it also changes the reason given: the fact that one who saw on the tenth does not require keeping is because the eleventh day does not serve as keeping for the tenth43 — since it is a day in which its impurity cannot bring about zivah gedolah (the same reason for which the eleventh itself requires no keeping — "the eleventh neither requires keeping nor serves as keeping for others").
8. After the above explanation — that according to Beis Hillel all agree that the definition of shomeres yom is connected with the matter of zivah gedolah (also according to Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that the tenth requires keeping, because he follows his own view that half a measure is forbidden by Torah law) — one can continue along this line and say that the fact that Beis Shammai obligate keeping even on the eleventh day is not because they assume that the law of shomeres yom has a definition in its own right, independent of the law of zavah gedolah, but because they hold that even with the seeing of the eleventh day there is a connection with zivah gedolah.
The explanation of this: In many, many disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel we find that the basis of the dispute is that Beis Shammai hold that the "potential" suffices, or that it is the main thing (existence "in potential" suffices and is what determines — without taking into account the state of the "actual" at that moment); and Beis Hillel hold that the main thing is the "actual" (when it already comes "into actuality"; the potential does not suffice). For example:
a) "חלות דבש מאימתי מיטמאות משום משקה, ב"ש אומרים משיהרהר" ("Honeycombs — from when do they become susceptible to impurity as a liquid? Beis Shammai say: From when he thinks [of taking the honey]")4445 (according to another reading46: "משיחרחר" ("from when he smokes out [the bees]")). Beis Hillel say: "משירסק" ("from when he crushes [the combs]"). For Beis Hillel hold that the main determining factor is the "actual" (the thing actually coming to its state and form); therefore it becomes a liquid only "from when he crushes." But Beis Shammai hold that "potential" suffices; therefore they say "from when he thinks" (or at most "from when he smokes out"), for since thereby it already becomes a liquid "in potential," it already becomes susceptible to impurity as a liquid.
b) "מצות חנוכה.. ב"ש אומרים יום ראשון מדליק שמונה מכאן ואילך פוחת והולך, וב"ה אומרים יום ראשון מדליק אחת מכאן ואילך מוסיף והולך" ("The mitzvah of Chanukah… Beis Shammai say: On the first day one lights eight; from then on one progressively decreases. Beis Hillel say: On the first day one lights one; from then on one progressively increases")47. The Gemara explains (according to one opinion): "טעמא דב"ש כנגד ימים הנכנסים וטעמא דב"ה כנגד ימים היוצאין" ("The reason of Beis Shammai is that it corresponds to the days that are coming; the reason of Beis Hillel is that it corresponds to the days that have gone out"). Why does Beis Shammai incline to the reasoning "corresponding to the days that are coming," and Beis Hillel to the reasoning "corresponding to the days that have gone out"? This will be understood according to the above: If we assume that the main thing is the "potential," one must then determine according to the days that are coming, which exist in potential. Therefore Beis Shammai say "on the first day one lights eight; from then on one progressively decreases" — the beginning of the first day includes within it, in potential, eight days; the second — seven; and so on. But if we assume that there must be the actual, one must look at the days that have gone out, which have already been in actuality; and therefore Beis Hillel say "on the first day one lights one; from then on one progressively increases" — for on the first day there is "in actuality" only one day, on the second day two days, and so on48.
9. As to why the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel needs to be stated both regarding honeycombs and regarding the Chanukah lights — although in both places the dispute stems from the same reason — one of the explanations of this is:
With honeycombs, in order for the liquid to actually emerge from them (and not remain in potential, as at the time of the thought), an action is required — the act of crushing. With the days of Chanukah, however, the days come "into actuality" automatically49.
Therefore, had this view of Beis Shammai — that "we follow the potential" — been stated only regarding Chanukah, one could not have derived from there that they apply the same reasoning also to honeycombs. For one could have said that the rule applies specifically in such a case — as with Chanukah — where by virtue of the potential the actual is also already "complete," and no action whatsoever is required for it; it is merely lacking time.
So too, conversely: had the above rule been stated only regarding honeycombs, one could not have derived from it regarding the days of Chanukah. One could then have said that the reason Beis Shammai hold regarding honeycombs that we follow the potential is because it is in his power to bring it immediately from potential to actual: at the same time that the one who crushes exists in potential, he can also immediately crush and bring it into actuality. — An analogy to this: "כל הראוי לבילה אין בילה מעכבת בו" ("whatever is fit for mixing, the mixing is not indispensable to it")50. Whereas with the days of Chanukah, since the actual depends on time, and it is not possible that on the earlier day of the potential the actual of the coming days should arrive — we do not follow the potential51.
10. Now that we see that even in matters connected with time Beis Shammai hold that we follow the potential, one may say that the fact that Beis Shammai hold that one who saw on the eleventh day requires keeping is for the same reason — that the eleventh day, too, can "in potential" lead to zivah gedolah.
The fact that in actuality no zivah gedolah can emerge from it is only due to the nature of the days after it, since they are not of the days of zivah; but from the standpoint of the eleventh day itself there is no difference relative to the preceding ten days. Consequently, it possesses everything they possess — the same "potential" of the matter that can lead to zivah gedolah. Therefore Beis Shammai hold that it requires keeping.
And the novelty in the "potential" in the case of one who saw on the eleventh day, relative to the same rule regarding honeycombs and the days of Chanukah (for which reason it cannot be derived from those two disputes), is simply understood:
With honeycombs and the days of Chanukah, the potential can (or will) emerge into actual actuality (it is only that the actual is lacking time or action). Whereas the potential that exists in the eleventh day cannot come to an actual zivah gedolah. And nevertheless Beis Shammai hold that even in such a case the "potential" of the eleventh day obligates keeping, since the lack of actuality is only on account of the days after it (which are not of the days of zivah)52.
11. Although in disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel the halachah follows Beis Hillel53, so much so that the view of Beis Shammai where it conflicts with Beis Hillel is not considered a Mishnah53, this was said only regarding a person's conduct in practical halachah. But since "אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים" ("these and these are the words of the living G‑d")54, and it is a Torah55 of truth56, one can and must derive lessons in the service of G‑d also from the view of Beis Shammai — the importance and effect of the "potential" in and of itself.
And from this we have a lesson regarding the great preciousness of a Jew: Even a Jew who, in terms of his actual, revealed powers, stands at a very low level and state — to the point that, by their own nature (of the powers), his actual powers are not fit to be affected (in his daily conduct) by the power of mesiras nefesh (self-sacrifice) (for the level of "eleven," which transcends the chain of descent (hishtalshelus), remains by itself; it cannot combine with the "days" after it, which are beneath it; it does not affect the other "days") — nevertheless, since the deficiency is only on the part of the revealed powers, while his power of mesiras nefesh is present in every Jew — whoever he may be — in complete perfection (and by its very nature it has the potential to affect the revealed powers), the view of Beis Shammai teaches us that this power of the Jew is ultimately decisive and determines his essence — "אע"ג דאזיל הכא והכא, דיוקני אשתאר בך לעלם" ("although he goes here and there, My image remains in you forever")57.
(From the sichah of 24 Teves — the Hilula of the Alter Rebbe — 5702)
Notes
1) Our Parshah 15:19 ff.
2) See below, note 10.
3) "As it says, 'and they shall wash in water' — this is a general paradigm for every impure person, that he remains in his impurity until he immerses" (Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi'ah 4:3. See also Toras Kohanim, end of our Parshah; Hagahos Maimoniyos on the Rambam, ibid.).
4) Our Parshah 15:25 ff.
5) Toras Kohanim and Rashi on our Parshah, ibid., 25.
6) As it says (ibid., 28), "and afterwards she shall be pure" — one "afterwards"* for all of them, so that no impurity interrupts between them (Niddah 33b, and sources cited there; Toras Kohanim on the verse).
*) This is the reading of the Ran and the Ma'adanei Yom Tov (on the Rosh, Niddah ch. 10, sec. 6), and others. So too in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, in his introduction to Hilchos Niddah.
7) Targum Yonasan (15:28). See also above, note 3.
8) Toras Kohanim here, on verse 25; Niddah 72b, end, ff.
9) On verse 25.
10) Tur, Yoreh De'ah sec. 183; the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, introduction to Hilchos Niddah. See also Rambam, ibid. 6:2.
11) See Niddah 73a and Rashi there; Rambam, ibid., halachah 16.
12) Niddah, ibid. So too in Toras Kohanim, ibid.
13) Verse 26 — according to our reading (Niddah, ibid.).
14) Verse 25 — according to the reading of the Ran on the Rif, ch. 2 of Shevuos (sec. 1088). Cited also in Ma'adanei Yom Tov, ibid. So too in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch, ibid.
15) Rambam, ibid., halachos 9 and 10.
16) Rambam, ibid., halachah 6. See also Niddah 30a; 38a.
17) Rambam, ibid.
18) Rabbeinu Yonah on Berachos ch. 5, s.v. "Banos."
19) Mishnah, end of Tractate Niddah. Rambam, ibid., halachos 9 and 10.
20) Megillah 20a, end, ff.
21) Mishnah, ibid. Rambam, ibid., halachah 12.
22) Mishnah, ibid. Rambam, ibid., halachos 13 and 14.
23) Accordingly, it is all the more understandable why one who sees one day or two days is called a "zavah ketanah" (minor zavah): for the reason she must count one pure day is (not a matter in its own right, but) because the law of a (major) zavah has taken effect in her, except that so long as she has not seen three days, the matter of zivah in her is not complete — it is in a "minor" state.
24) Mishnah, ibid.
25) Niddah 72b.
26) One cannot say, however, that the reason is that the twelfth day, since it is not of the days of zivah, does not serve as keeping. For (a) according to this, even when she saw on the tenth and on the eleventh, she would not require keeping by Torah law (as is the view of Rav Sheshes — Niddah 54a), whereas we rule like Rav Ashi (Niddah, ibid.) that she requires keeping (Bi'urei HaMaharshal on the Smag, cited in the commentaries on the Tur, ibid.; see there)*. (b) From Reish Lakish's statement, "just as the eleventh does not require keeping, etc." (and Rabbi Yochanan does not dispute him on this, but only holds that "the tenth is like the ninth"), and especially according to the second version, in which Rabbi Yochanan himself says "it is the eleventh that does not require keeping, etc.," it is evident that this is a definition in the eleventh and not in the twelfth.
*) Although, with difficulty, one could say that since the eleventh day (is of the days of zivah and) serves as keeping, and when she saw on the tenth she immediately became obligated in keeping a pure day — even if she later saw on the eleventh, she requires keeping on the twelfth, because the obligation has not been removed from her.
27) In Rashi on Niddah 72b (see also Tosafos HaRosh there): the "Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai" refers to the eleventh day, and the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish is whether the "halachah" is only that it does not require keeping, or also that it does not serve as keeping for the tenth. But in Tosafos there, s.v. "R. Yochanan" (and so too in the Rambam, Hilchos Issurei Bi'ah 6:3), the "Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai" is that the days of zivah are eleven days, and the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the eleventh day is "by mere reasoning." Even according to the explanation of Tosafos HaRosh there — from the fact that he asks, "From the verses of Rabbi Akiva we do not learn whether it requires keeping or whether it serves as keeping for others," and answers, "According to Rabbi Akiva we learn them from reasoning" — it is somewhat implied that according to the second version there, the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish in reasoning (according to Rabbi Akiva) concerns the definition of the eleventh day — "whether it requires keeping or serves as keeping for others."
28) Whereas the fact that it differs in not requiring keeping — one could explain, at least with difficulty (see above, note 26), that it is a definition in the twelfth.
29) Also: from the fact that Reish Lakish says, "nor does it serve as keeping for the tenth" [and not "nor does it serve as keeping for others" (in the words of Rabbi Yochanan, "but for others it does serve as keeping")], it is evident that even according to the second version, that it is a definition in the eleventh, it is specifically for the tenth that it does not serve as keeping; but when she saw on the ninth and the tenth, it does serve as keeping for the ninth. See also above, note 26.
30) Ibid., s.v. mentioned above.
31) In his Commentary on the Mishnah, end of Tractate Niddah.
32) Yoma 74a.
33) See Mefaneach Tzefunos, end of p. 185 ff., and sources cited there.
34) Accordingly, it is simply understood (see also what is cited in Sdei Chemed, Kelalim, Ma'areches Ches, Kelal 4) why even according to Rabbi Yochanan, lifting without setting down is permitted on Shabbos — although it is "fit to combine," since if he later sets it down he will become liable. For the reasoning "since it is fit to combine" is a proof that half a measure is of the same quality as a complete measure — "he is eating something forbidden"; but lifting without setting down is not a matter of carrying out at all.
*) And it requires further study to reconcile this with Tosafos s.v. "Keivan," Yoma 74a, beginning.
35) Therefore Reish Lakish agrees where one intends to complete [the measure] (Yerushalmi, Terumos 6:1), for since his intention is to eat a complete measure, this is an act of eating (eating a k'zayis), only that (for now) he has done only half of it with this act.
36) In Responsa Chacham Tzvi (sec. 86) he writes that the reason half a measure is not forbidden by Torah law with regard to "bal yera'eh" and "bal yimatzei" is because the Torah prohibition of half a measure applies only [to matters of eating, "for which we have a verse," or] to a prohibition that comes about through an action (even if it is not a matter of eating), for through his action he gives it significance, and therefore we say of it, "it is fit to combine." And in the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim, Kuntres Acharon to sec. 442) he writes of this that it is "a correct reason." Accordingly, regarding measures of time, the concept of half a measure does not apply. But in our case this is not so — for the Torah itself gives this seeing significance (since it obligates keeping a day, etc.). Compare "its prohibition gives it significance" (Bechoros 10a).
**) See the Alter Rebbe's Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim sec. 340, par. 4; Choshen Mishpat, Hilchos Gezeilah U'Geneivah, par. 1) regarding the prohibition of half a measure in writing (on Shabbos) and in theft. See also Kuntres Acharon to Orach Chaim sec. 302. (And it requires further study in Responsa Tzemach Tzedek, Yoreh De'ah, end of sec. 66, and in Sha'ar HaMiluim, end of sec. 3, par. 3.)
37) The Tzlach (Pesachim 44a) writes that regarding prohibitions dependent on time, such as chametz on Pesach and Yom Kippur, if one ate half a measure at the end of the time of the prohibition — when there is no time left to complete the measure — there is no Torah prohibition, since it is not "fit to combine." Accordingly, in our case as well, since the seeing on the tenth is not fit to combine into a three-day discharge (for the twelfth day is not of the days of zivah), the concept of half a measure seemingly does not apply here. But according to what was explained above (from the Rogatchover), that Rabbi Yochanan's reason is that even the smallest amount of the measure is of the same essence as the complete measure, one may say that "since it is fit to combine" is (not a reason and a condition, but) a proof that the essence of the prohibition exists even in less than the measure (similar to what the Pri Megadim writes in his introduction to Hilchos Basar VeChalav — in his second explanation). Accordingly, even when eating half a measure at the end of the time of the prohibition, the concept of "since it is fit to combine" applies. For since, had another half-measure now been combined with it, it would be a complete measure, this is proof that the "name" of the prohibition applies even to less than the measure. This accords with the view of several Acharonim who disagree with the Tzlach (listed in Sdei Chemed, ibid., Kelal 10). Note that the Alter Rebbe cites in the Kuntres Acharon to Hilchos Pesach, ibid., the reason of the Chacham Tzvi, and not the reason of the Sha'agas Aryeh (sec. 81).
38) Similar to what is said regarding shechitah — see Rashi, Chullin 20b, s.v. "Vechi"; above, p. 70, note 24.
39) In the Yerushalmi, Terumos, ibid.: "And Reish Lakish agrees regarding Yom Kippur." Some explain (Gilyon HaShas and Tziyon Yerushalayim on the Yerushalmi there — cited also in Sdei Chemed, ibid., end of Kelal 4) that although in the Bavli (Yoma 73b) it is stated that even regarding Yom Kippur Reish Lakish holds that the prohibition of half a measure is only Rabbinic, this does not contradict the view of the Yerushalmi. For our Talmud speaks of less than a k'zayis, and since it is not a measure for anything, it is not eating; whereas the Yerushalmi speaks of one who eats a k'zayis, and since regarding other prohibitions it counts as eating, Reish Lakish agrees that on Yom Kippur, too, it is forbidden by Torah law — although the measure for Yom Kippur is a large date (koseves).
Accordingly, one may ask: Since one who saw on the tenth requires immersion (even according to Reish Lakish), this seeing has the status of a measure (with regard to the impurity of that day itself). If so, even according to Reish Lakish it has the same quality as three days (similar to a k'zayis on Yom Kippur, which, since it is eating with regard to other prohibitions, is forbidden by Torah law on Yom Kippur too)?
However, the plain sense of the discussion in the Bavli (ibid.) implies that the dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding Yom Kippur applies also to a k'zayis.
(Note what the Alter Rebbe writes (Orach Chaim sec. 618, par. 13): "We first feed him less than a koseves." From the fact that he does not mention any preference to feed him less than a k'zayis in order to be lenient according to Reish Lakish, it is somewhat evident that there is no practical difference in this. For according to Rabbi Yochanan (and also according to Reish Lakish — in the view of the Yerushalmi*), even less than a k'zayis is forbidden, while according to Reish Lakish even a k'zayis is permitted.)
Accordingly, although the seeing of the tenth is a measure with regard to impurity, it is not a measure (in quality) with regard to keeping — similar to a k'zayis, which is not eating with regard to Yom Kippur, although it is eating with regard to other prohibitions.
*) For the Yerushalmi speaks (also) of less than a k'zayis, as is the plain sense of the wording, "And Reish Lakish agrees (if one ate that same amount**) regarding Yom Kippur" — that the prohibition on Yom Kippur differs from the other prohibitions of the Torah because of Yom Kippur (and not because of a change in the measure), and it is forbidden even in less than the measure.
**) Although one could force the wording and explain it as "if one ate half a measure," the statement referring to each case according to its own measure.
40) One may say that this is the subject of the dispute between Rav Sheshes and Rav Ashi (Niddah 54a — cited above, note 26). According to the first way, since the law of shomeres yom is due to the spreading of the seeing (and does not pertain to the day of keeping in itself), the impurity can spread even into days that are not of the days of zivah. Whereas according to the second way, that the law of keeping is a definition in the day of keeping, one may say that since the law of keeping was stated in the section "a woman who has a discharge… not at the time of her separation," it applies only in the eleven days of zivah. (See also note 42.)
41) This is also implied by the plain sense of the parable in the Mechilta (Yisro 20:8): "We add from the mundane to the holy — a parable of a wolf that preys before and behind." Accordingly, it will be understood what the parable teaches us. — See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 16, p. 231 ff.
42) Rabbi Yochanan, too, holds (according to the second version) that the law of shomeres yom means keeping from zivah gedolah. And the reason he holds that the eleventh serves as keeping for the tenth is because in his view a discharge of two days is also of the same quality as a discharge of three days (as above, section 5); thus the keeping on the eleventh (when she saw on the tenth) is keeping from something that pertains to zivah gedolah. [Accordingly, the reason of Rav Sheshes according to Rabbi Yochanan for why she does not require keeping on the twelfth when she saw on the tenth and the eleventh is (not only because the law of keeping applies specifically to a day that is one of the days of zivah (as in note 40), but also) because the keeping of a pure day means keeping from zivah gedolah.] As for the view of Rav Ashi according to Rabbi Yochanan, that she requires keeping on the twelfth when she saw on the tenth and the eleventh — one may say that Rav Ashi holds like the first version; or one may say as in the marginal note to note 26.
43) Whereas when she saw on the ninth and the tenth, it serves as keeping for the ninth. (See above, note 29.)
44) Uktzin 3:1.
45) The reading of some, in the commentary of Rav Hai Gaon, the Rash, the Rosh, and others.
46) The Aruch, the Rambam, and others. So too in the printed editions.
47) Shabbos 21b.
48) For further examples of disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel stemming from this reason (and the "necessity" of stating each of them) — see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 10, p. 70 ff.; the Hadran on the Six Orders of the Mishnah (Sefer HaSichos 5748, vol. 2, p. 645 ff.).
49) And even to the extent of "there is maturity in the grave" [OCR unclear] (Kesubos 38b, end).
50) Yevamos 104b.
51) This same necessity applies also to the words of Beis Hillel, that we do not follow the potential.
52) But conversely, there is an advantage in the "potential" of the eleventh day over the "potential" of Chanukah (and similarly of "honeycombs"), for which reason the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel must also be stated regarding "the mitzvah of Chanukah" (and "honeycombs") — in addition to the novelty in their dispute there regarding the view of Beis Hillel: Since the "potential" of the eleventh day will not come into actuality, and nevertheless Beis Shammai hold that the eleventh requires keeping, it must be that the definition of "we follow the potential" here is because of the potential in its own right [since the eleventh day, by its own nature, can lead to zivah gedolah (like all the days of zivah), it therefore requires keeping]. Whereas regarding the days of Chanukah, the fact that on the first day one lights eight is (not because of the first day itself, but) because it includes in potential all the days that are coming; and since lighting eight is on account of the subsequent days, one could have said that since on the first day these days have not yet come into actuality, we do not follow the potential.
53) Berachos 36b, beginning; and sources cited there.
54) Eruvin 13b.
55) From the term "instruction" (Zohar III, 53b).
56) Especially since in the Future to Come the halachah will follow Beis Shammai (see Midrash Shmuel on Avos 5:19; [OCR unclear] Torah Or 17b; Likkutei Torah, discourse beginning "Vayikach Korach," end of ch. 4).
57) See Zohar I, 244b, end, ff.; II, 117a. See also the discourse beginning "Yehi Havayah Elokeinu Imanu," 5710, ch. 23.
Key Lesson
Every Jew, however low his revealed powers may be, possesses in full perfection the power of mesiras nefesh, which by its nature can affect his everyday conduct. Just as Beis Shammai teach that potential in itself is decisive, so too this inner power ultimately determines who a Jew truly is — and we must never despair of any Jew, ourselves included.