Parshas Tazria
1. On the verse "ושלשים יום ושלשת ימים תשב בדמי טהרה בכל קדש לא תגע גו׳ עד מלאת ימי טהרה" ("And for thirty-three days she shall remain in the blood of purity; she shall not touch anything holy… until the days of her purification are complete")1, Rashi pauses on the word "תשב" (teishev, "she shall remain") and explains: "אין תשב" ("Teishev is nothing other")2 (or: "אין לשון ישיבה" ("the expression yeshivah is nothing other")3) "אלא לשון עכבה" ("than an expression of delay"), like "ותשבו בקדש" ("You remained in Kadesh")4, and "וישב באלוני ממרא" ("He dwelt in the plains of Mamre")5.
The Ramban6 understands that according to Rashi's explanation — "teishev is an expression of delay" — it refers to "בכל קדש לא תגע ואל המקדש לא תבוא" ("she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary"), and with "teishev, an expression of delay" the verse is saying that she should hold herself back from touching holy things and from entering the Sanctuary during the thirty-three days — even though these are "days of purity" with respect to her husband.
Accordingly, we must understand that Rashi brings proof that "teishev is an expression of delay" from the verses "You remained in Kadesh" and "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" because, according to Rashi, the word "yeshivah"*6 there is not an expression of hisyashvus — settling down
[as the word "vayeishev" means in most places — for then there would be no proof from there for the explanation "yeshivah is an expression of delay." On the contrary, "settling down" and "delay" are two opposites: when someone settles in a certain place and becomes a resident (toshav) there, it means that he is found there with permanence, in a settled manner; whereas if someone is found in a place because of some cause that detains him7, that holds him back from leaving — then his being in that place is the very opposite of settledness and permanence: he should have been somewhere else, but he remained there because of a hindrance and delay],
but rather an expression of delay:
When the Jews went out of Egypt, their going out was in order to come "אל ארץ טובה ורחבה" ("to a good and spacious land")8, "אל ארץ נושבת" ("to an inhabited land")9. Their remaining for a period of time (in the desert, and included in this) in Kadesh — "You remained in Kadesh" — was (not a permanent settling, but on the contrary10:) only because, for various reasons, they were held back from coming into Eretz Yisrael, and they had to remain in Kadesh.
The same is true of Avraham Avinu: immediately after the Al-mighty told him "קום התהלך בארץ לארכה ולרחבה" ("Arise, walk through the land, its length and its breadth"), it says "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre." We must say that something detained him there, and the meaning of "vayeishev" there is [not in the sense of settling and permanence11, but] "an expression of delay": Avraham held himself back from walking "through the land, its length and its breadth," and remained in the plains of Mamre.
2. There are commentators12 who understand that "akavah" means remaining (and that the word "teishev" relates to "in the blood of purity": the woman after childbirth remains for the thirty-three days in a state of purity even when she sees blood — similar to someone who settles in a place and becomes a resident there; he is there in a permanent manner, without changes13). According to this, the meaning of "yeshivah" in "You remained in Kadesh" and "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" is: settled.
However, one cannot interpret it this way. For if by the expression "akavah" Rashi meant remaining in a permanent, settled manner, he would not have needed to bring any proofs for this — and certainly not a proof from "You remained in Kadesh," which is in Sefer Devarim: the word yeshivah in the sense of settling appears many, many times in the earlier parshiyos. Moreover: the very first time in the Torah that the word "vayeishev" appears — "וישב בארץ נוד קדמת עדן" ("He settled in the land of Nod, east of Eden")14 — the meaning15 is that Kayin settled16 in the land of Nod17, as the very next verse says: "ויהי בונה עיר" ("and he was building a city").
From the fact that Rashi does need proofs for his explanation "yeshivah is an expression of delay," it is evident that by the expression "akavah" he means "holding oneself back" (in line with the simple meaning of the word "akavah"*17). And since this meaning of "yeshivah" (delay, holding oneself back) is a novelty (unlike most places, where yeshivah means "sitting" or "settling"), Rashi must bring an example and a parallel for this meaning of yeshivah — from "You remained in Kadesh" and "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre"18.
3. We must, however, understand:
a) Why does Rashi need two proofs — "You remained in Kadesh" and "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" — and is not satisfied with one of them?
b) Why does he bring the verse "You remained in Kadesh," which is in Parshas Devarim, before the verse "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre," which appears earlier, in Parshas Lech Lecha?
The explanation is as follows:
Avraham remained in the plains of Mamre (not because of some other factor that compelled him not to walk through the land, its length and its breadth, but) of his own accord. Therefore there is no conclusive proof from there that yeshivah means delay: since it was of his own accord, one could interpret "vayeishev" there in the sense of settling and permanence — that he settled in the plains of Mamre.
Therefore Rashi must bring "You remained in Kadesh," where one must interpret yeshivah as an expression of delay. For since their being in Kadesh was contrary to their will to go to Eretz Yisrael*18, one cannot translate there that they settled permanently in Kadesh, and one must interpret yeshivah there as an expression of delay — since it was not "בהעלות הענן" ("when the cloud was lifted"), there could not be "יסעו בני ישראל" ("the Children of Israel would journey"), because "לא יסעו עד יום העלותו" ("they would not journey until the day it was lifted")19.
Only once there is already proof from "You remained in Kadesh" that yeshivah is an expression of delay, does it become reasonable to interpret also the "vayeishev" in the verse "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" as an expression of delay.
This, however, only explains why Rashi is not satisfied with bringing the verse "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" alone. We still need to understand: why is the verse "You remained in Kadesh" — from which it is compelling that yeshivah is an expression of delay — not sufficient, so that Rashi must also bring "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre"?
4. Further in the same verse, Rashi pauses on "בדמי טהרה" (bidmei taharah, "in the blood of purity") and explains: "אעפ״י שרואה טהורה" ("even though she sees [blood], she is pure"). Then he pauses once again on "bidmei taharah" and says: "לא מפיק ה״א, והוא שם דבר כמו טוהר" ("the hei has no mappik, and it is a noun, like tohar, 'purity'").
We must understand:
a) In the explanation "and it is a noun, like tohar," Rashi explains the translation of "bidmei taharah," whereas in his explanation "even though she sees, she is pure" he states the novelty that the verse teaches with "bidmei taharah." The difficulty is: why does Rashi first explain the novelty contained in these words, before we even know their translation?
b) According to the explanation "and it is a noun, like tohar" (that "bidmei taharah" is like "bidmei tohar"), it follows that (not only is the woman pure "even though she sees," but also that) the blood itself is pure, for the verse calls it "blood of purity." Why then does Rashi say (in his first comment) that the novelty of "bidmei taharah" consists in "she is pure" — that the woman is pure "even though she sees"? There is a much greater novelty in "bidmei taharah": that even the blood is pure!
5. Immediately after his explanation of "bidmei taharah" — even before he explains "בכל קדש לא תגע" ("she shall not touch anything holy") — Rashi pauses on the last words of the verse, "ימי טהרה" (yemei taharah), and explains: "מפיק ה״א, ימי טוהר שלה" ("the hei has a mappik: the days of her purity").
This is not understood:
a) This rule — that a word with a mappik hei means "hers" — the student already knows from the earlier parshiyos, beginning from Parshas Bereishis20. So what novelty is Rashi now introducing, that "taharah — with a mappik hei" means "her purity"21?
b) Why does he write his explanation of "yemei taharah" right after his explanation of "bidmei taharah" — before he explains the words "she shall not touch anything holy," which come between them22?
6. Afterwards Rashi explains the words "בכל קדש" ("anything holy") and "לא תגע" ("she shall not touch"), and here too he presents them in a changed order: first he pauses on "lo siga" and explains: "אזהרה לאוכל23 כמו ששנויה ביבמות" ("a warning to one who eats, as taught in Yevamos")24, and afterwards he brings "bechol kodesh" (which comes before "lo siga") and explains: "לרבות את התרומה" ("to include terumah").
The reason for this change of order is25 that the explanation "lo siga — a warning to one who eats" is what compels the explanation "to include terumah"26:
A few verses later27 it says that after the "days of purity" are complete she must bring an offering, and only then does she become pure. But the warning "she shall not touch anything holy etc." (in our verse) applies only "until the days of her purification are complete," i.e., until sunset of the fortieth day. It is therefore understood that the warning "she shall not touch anything holy… until the days of her purification are complete" adds an additional prohibition. That is: after the days of her purification are complete — after sunset, until she brings the atonement offering of her purification — she is forbidden only in some matters of holiness, whereas during the thirty-three days, until the days of her purification are complete, she is forbidden in further matters.
Now, if one were to interpret "lo siga" literally — that she may not touch holy things — one could then assume that the prohibition "until the days of her purification are complete," which is added to the prohibition that she has also later (as long as she has not brought the offering), consists of "she shall not touch": until sunset of the fortieth day she is forbidden even to touch holy things, and afterwards she is forbidden only to eat holy things.
But once Rashi explains "lo siga — a warning to one who eats," meaning that also "until the days of her purification are complete" she is forbidden only to eat holy things, one must necessarily interpret "to include terumah": the prohibition during the thirty-three days that is added relative to the later period consists of eating terumah28, because later — even before she has brought the offering — she is forbidden only to eat kodashim, but not to eat terumah.
We must, however, understand: Where indeed does Rashi derive that "lo siga" means "a warning to one who eats" (because of which one must then interpret "to include terumah")? The simple meaning of "lo siga" is that she should not touch! What compels us29, by way of the plain meaning, to take the word "siga" out of its simple sense30?
7. After Rashi says "to include terumah," he adds: "לפי שזו טבולת יום ארוך, שטבלה לסוף שבעה ואין שמשה מעריב לטהרה עד שקיעת החמה של יום ארבעים שלמחר תביא את כפרת טהרתה" ("because she is a 'long' tevulas yom: she immersed at the end of seven days, yet her sun does not set to make her pure until sunset of the fortieth day, for on the next day she brings the atonement offering of her purification"). That is, her prohibition to eat terumah during the thirty-three days is [not because the impurity of childbirth with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary lasts forty days, but] because her obligation to bring "the atonement offering of her purification," which she can do only on the day after the fortieth day, causes her "sunset" (which purifies her for terumah31) to come only at sunset of the fortieth day (whereas if she were not lacking atonement, she would be permitted to eat terumah right after sunset of the seventh day).
We must understand: in plain terms it would seem that her being forbidden to eat terumah "until the days of her purification are complete" is because the impurity of childbirth with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary is, in and of itself, for forty days — even if she did not need to bring an offering (similar to the seven-day impurity with respect to her husband, which is "like the days of her menstrual separation," even though a niddah does not bring any offering at all). Where does Rashi derive that the prohibition of eating terumah during the thirty-three days is because she must wait until the time when "on the next day she brings the atonement offering of her purification"32?
8. The explanation of all the above:
From the fact that right after the word "teishev" it says "bidmei taharah," it is evident that "teishev (an expression of delay)" relates not only to "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary," but also to "bidmei taharah," which stands right next to "teishev."
On this Rashi explains "bidmei taharah — even though she sees, she is pure," intending thereby to explain [not the novelty in the words "bidmei taharah" by themselves, but] their connection and link to the preceding "teishev": that she [the woman after childbirth, of whom the verse says "teishev"] is held back from becoming impure through her seeing, and she remains "pure."
And afterwards, in his second comment, he explains and translates the words "bidmei taharah" in themselves: "and it is a noun, like tohar," i.e., that (also) the blood itself is pure.
9. However, because of the explanation "and it is a noun, like tohar," the plain meaning of "teishev, an expression of delay" becomes difficult:
The expression "akavah" — holding oneself back from coming into a certain place or state — applies when there is something that should (by its nature) bring about that state, yet nevertheless one holds back and remains in the previous state. When, however, the thing that could bring about the new state is nullified (for whatever reason), the expression "akavah" seemingly does not fit remaining in the previous state; no special "holding back" is needed here at all — there is nothing at all that "demands" leaving the one state and moving into another.
Regarding our matter: if the blood were impure, yet nevertheless did not have the power to make her impure and the woman remained pure, the concept of "teishev — an expression of delay" stated regarding the woman after childbirth would be understandable: it would mean that she is held back from becoming impure from the impure blood. But since during the thirty-three days the blood is pure, it seemingly cannot be said that the woman is "held back" from becoming impure — there is nothing at all that would bring about a state of impurity!
Rashi resolves this difficulty by bringing (in his explanation "teishev is nothing other than an expression of delay") the verse "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre":
From the fact that Avraham remained for a period of time in the plains of Mamre and did not fulfill the command "Arise, walk through the land, its length and its breadth" immediately (as with all the other commands, which he fulfilled with alacrity33), it is understood that this command he had to postpone until later (because of its reason)34.
And from the fact that nevertheless it says there too "vayeishev — an expression of delay," there is proof that whenever there is something that, by its own nature, ought to bring about a different state (even when in the present situation that factor is not actually operative), the expression yeshivah–akavah fits.
Consequently, in our case too: since seeing blood in general brings about impurity, it is fitting to say "teishev (an expression of delay) bidmei taharah" — even though in the thirty-three days themselves the blood is pure.
10. Since the expression akavah applies specifically when there is a certain factor because of which one would have had to enter a new state, and nevertheless one holds back from that change, we would seemingly have to understand that "teishev (an expression of delay)" relates only to "bidmei taharah" (since with regard to the woman's purity for her husband she is held back from becoming impure through her seeing, as above), but not to her impurity with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary, since with respect to these the thirty-three days are days of impurity35 (as stated above in section 7, that in plain terms one would have to understand that the impurity of childbirth with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary lasts forty days).
On this Rashi introduces the novelty "yemei taharah — the hei has a mappik: the days of her purity," meaning thereby36 that these days are her "days of purity" without qualification and without limitation, with respect to all matters, also with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary37. And the fact that "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary, until the days of her purification are complete" is only because of a temporary factor that does not allow her to actually become pure so as to be able to touch holy things and enter the Sanctuary.
Therefore Rashi concludes (in the comment beginning "bechol kodesh"): "because she is a 'long' tevulas yom… for on the next day she brings the atonement offering of her purification." Just as her impurity regarding the eating of kodashim after the days of her purification are complete — before she brings the offering — is only because her obligation to bring the offering holds her back from becoming pure for eating kodashim (but not because she is impure in and of herself38), so too her impurity regarding the eating of terumah during the thirty-three days is (not because she is impure in and of herself at that time, but) because her obligation of "the atonement offering of her purification" holds back and does not allow the sunset of the preceding days (before the sunset of the fortieth day) to purify her for eating terumah39.
11. Based on this we will also understand Rashi's compulsion to interpret "lo siga" as "a warning to one who eats," and the reason he gives this explanation after his explanation "yemei taharah — the days of her purity":
If one were to understand that with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary she is impure for the forty days, then one could interpret "lo siga" literally, that she may not touch holy things. For although we do not find that an impure person is forbidden to touch holy things, one could say that the impurity of childbirth is more severe than other impurities, and the meaning of "lo siga" is literal40.
But once Rashi explains that the thirty-three days are "the days of her purity," and the prohibition "anything holy etc." is only because of a separate factor (and, as Rashi explains further, "bringing the atonement offering of her purification" makes her a tevulas yom), one cannot say that the "akavah" (during the days of purity) should extend also to touching holy things — when even one who is actually impure41 is permitted to do so42. Therefore Rashi interprets it as "a warning to one who eats"43.
12. From the matters of the "wine of Torah" in this Rashi:
From Rashi's wording, "the expression yeshivah is nothing other than an expression of delay," it is implied that Rashi here introduces (not only an additional translation of "yeshivah" — that in addition to the two well-known meanings of yeshivah, "sitting" and "settling," there is a third meaning, "an expression of delay" — but also) that every "yeshivah" is an expression of delay. That is, even where yeshivah means "sitting" or "settling," it is also a matter of "akavah."
The explanation of this:
Regarding the concept of "yeshivah" in its true sense, as it is in its source, i.e., "yeshivah" Above —
for all matters below derive from their source and root Above, "שנשתלשלו מהן" ("from which they evolved")44, as our Sages explain45 the verses "תשים משטרו בארץ" ("Can you establish its dominion on earth?") and "גבוה מעל גבוה שומר וגבוהים עליהם" ("One higher than the high watches, and higher ones are over them")46; and even higher, up to, so to speak, the Holy One, blessed be He — from "the truth of Whose existence" come into being "all existing things"47: of heaven and earth and what is between them, meaning all matters that exist —
we find, so to speak, the expression yeshivah regarding Him "Who has no likeness of a body and is not a body"48. The Tzemach Tzedek49 (whose yom hilula50 is in this month) brings two explanations: One explanation is that yeshivah indicates descent and lowering (similar, l'havdil, to a person here below: when he sits, he is lower than when he stands). According to this, the concept of yeshivah is in the level of the light that fills all worlds (Or HaMemalei), which descends and lowers itself to give life to the worlds. A second explanation he brings from the Rambam51: that yeshivah indicates the absence of change. According to this, the concept of yeshivah is in the level of the light that encompasses all worlds (Or HaSovev), which is above the worlds, and regarding which level it says "אני הוי׳ לא שניתי" ("I, Havayah, have not changed").
These two explanations correspond to the two translations of "yeshivah" in most places: the explanation that yeshivah is a matter of descent and lowering is connected with the meaning of yeshivah as "sitting," for, as mentioned, when a person sits his stature is lowered; and the explanation that yeshivah is the absence of change is connected with the meaning "settling," which indicates permanence and absence of change, as mentioned (section 2).
And here Rashi introduces the novelty "the expression yeshivah is nothing other than an expression of delay": that every yeshivah — not only the descent and lowering of the Or HaMemalei, but even the absence of change of the Or HaSovev — is a matter of akavah. As is known, the explanation of the Rebbe (Rashab), nishmaso Eden52 (whose yom hilula53 is this week — 2 Nissan), is that the entire concept of light, even the light that precedes the tzimtzum (where the true meaning of "I have not changed" is found), comes about through akavah, a holding back.
13. Although the Or HaSovev as well (where the meaning of "yeshivah" is "absence of change") comes about through akavah, this akavah is not similar to the akavah through which the Or HaMemalei is drawn down (where "descent and lowering" is the meaning of "yeshivah"):
The Or HaMemalei comes about through the prior tzimtzum (whose movement of contraction and concealment is the opposite of the movement of revelation). By contrast, the akavah regarding the Or HaSovev, which in general is the light that precedes the tzimtzum, is (not a contraction and concealment, but) the fact that since the revelation of the light from the Essence is by will (רצון — the same letters as צנור, "channel"54) and not, G‑d forbid, by compulsion, it is called a "holding back," as the Rebbe (Rashab), nishmaso Eden, explains at length55.
Rashi alludes to these two modes of akavah by bringing the two verses "You remained in Kadesh" and "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre": the akavah of "You remained in Kadesh," which was by compulsion and contrary to their will to go into Eretz Yisrael (as above, section 3), alludes to the akavah of the revelation of the Or HaMemalei — tzimtzum, the opposite of revelation, as above; and the akavah of "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre," which was by Avraham's will (as above, there), alludes to the akavah — the will — through which the revelation of the light that precedes the tzimtzum comes about.
14. This is also the reason (in the inner dimension of the matters) why Rashi places the verse "You remained in Kadesh" before "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre"
[even though the akavah for the revelation of the light that precedes the tzimtzum (together with the revelation of the light) — which is alluded to in "He dwelt in the plains of Mamre" — came before the tzimtzum, which is alluded to in "You remained in Kadesh"]:
because the reason for the revelation of the light that precedes the tzimtzum [and consequently also for the will for revelation] is the tzimtzum. As the Rebbe, my father-in-law (who became the Nasi on 2 Nissan55), explains at length56, the intent of the revelation of the light that precedes the tzimtzum, and also of the revelation of the infinite light, is so that it can be concealed through the tzimtzum.
15. What advantage and purpose is there in the tzimtzum? It is known57 that it is in order that Jews, through their service in Torah and mitzvos, should transform the darkness of the tzimtzum into light and revelation — "אתהפכא חשוכא לנהורא" ("darkness transformed into light")58.
But in order to be able to transform the darkness into light, one must first arouse within oneself the strength not to be affected by the concealments and hiddenness; and through this one can come to a higher matter — transforming the darkness itself into light59.
This is what Rashi alludes to in his two explanations of "bidmei taharah": the first thing must be "even though she sees, she is pure" — that a person should pay no heed to the "blood" that he sees, and remain pure; and through this one afterwards comes to a higher level — "and it is a noun, like tohar": one transforms the blood itself, so that it too (the blood) becomes pure.
16. And the service of "bidmei taharah" (in both of the above modes), which Jews perform in the time of exile, when one finds oneself in the state of a "long tevulas yom," and consequently "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary" —
this brings about "on the next day she brings the atonement offering of her purification," the revelation of the Future to Come, about which it says60 "ולמחר לקבל שכרם" ("and tomorrow to receive their reward") (which comes, however, specifically through "היום לעשותם" ("today to do them")61), when the service of the offerings ("she brings the atonement offering of her purification") will be in an even higher manner than it was in the time of the Temple — "ושם נעשה לפניך כמצות רצונך" ("and there we will offer before You according to the command of Your will")62 (specifically "there"), in the Third Beis HaMikdash, which will be revealed63 through Moshiach Tzidkeinu, very soon.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Tazria, 5727)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 12:4.
2) Thus in most printings.
3) Thus in the first printing, and in the "wording of Rashi" quoted in the Ramban and in Rabbeinu Bachya here. In Megillah 21a, end: "אין ישיבה."
4) Devarim 1:46.
5) Lech Lecha 13:18.
6) See also Rabbeinu Bachya and the Tur's long commentary here.
*6) For in many places [regarding a stay] the Torah uses expressions such as "vayachanu" ("they encamped") [OCR reads ויתנו], "vayehi" ("and he was"), and the like.
7) See Rashi, Bo 12:41, and in many places.
8) Shemos 3:8.
9) Beshalach 16:35.
10) Based on this, it is better understood why Rashi does not also bring the words "ימים רבים" ("many days") (as in Tractate Megillah, ibid.) — for on the contrary: because of these words one might mistakenly think that "vateshvu" is from the expression of settling and permanence. (Not so in Megillah, ibid., where the intent of "akavah" is as explained by the commentators cited below, section 2.)
11) As for Rashi writing on Vayeira (21:34) "שנתיישב" ("that he settled") — that is to exclude "a guest who visits, travels and goes on," i.e., that he stayed there for a long time, but not the concept of permanence (similar to Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Vayeishev: "Vayeishev" — "to dwell in tranquility").
12) See the Re'em here.
13) See Moreh Nevuchim I, ch. 11 (cited below, section 12).
14) Bereishis 4:16.
15) Even according to the second explanation in Rashi on Bereishis there, "wherever he went, the earth trembled beneath him" — nevertheless Kayin was there in a permanent manner.
16) And according to what Rashi writes there (in his first explanation), "that the eastern side always gives refuge to murderers," one can say that the meaning of "vayeishev" is [not only that he dwelt there permanently, but also] that he came to settledness and tranquility, for by being exiled there the fear of "whoever finds me will kill me" was removed. Compare the above-cited Rashi at the beginning of Parshas Vayeishev: "Vayeishev — Yaakov sought to dwell in tranquility."
17) See also Sanhedrin 37b: "At first it is written, 'I will be a wanderer and an exile,' and in the end it is written, 'He settled in the land of Nod.'" According to what was said in the previous note, it is better understood why the Gemara there quotes "He settled in the land of Nod" — for the Gemara's proof is [not only from the fact that it says "in the land of Nod" and does not also say "na" (wanderer), as Rashi explains there, but] also from the expression "vayeishev."
*17) Although in the language of the Talmud the expression "akavah" is also used for the concept of settling, as in Tractate Megillah, ibid. See also the Rosh, Sukkah ch. 4, sec. 3.
18) Note: (a) Rashi on Shemos 2:15 (in several printings): "He dwelt in the land of Midian — he lingered there, like 'Yaakov dwelt'"; Mishpatim 24:14 (and see the Re'em there): "Wait here for us — linger etc." (but in several printings: "and linger"); Balak 22:8: "Vayeishvu — an expression of lingering." (b) The expression yeshivah in several verses (before "You remained in Kadesh") where the meaning is seemingly an expression of delay (such as: "Let the maiden remain with us a year or ten [months]" (Chayei Sarah 24:55); "Remain a widow in your father's house until [my son] grows up" (Vayeishev 38:11); and others). This is not the place to elaborate.
*18) One cannot raise a difficulty from "בדד ישב מחוץ למחנה מושבו" ("he shall dwell alone; outside the camp shall be his dwelling") — Tazria 13:46 (where his permanent place is outside the camp, even though this is contrary to his will) — for since it is possible that he will remain in his impurity all his days, the expression of permanence applies to it (unlike "You remained in Kadesh," where it was clear that they would enter the Land). As for why Rashi does not bring a proof from "וישב מחוץ לאהלו שבעת ימים" ("he shall dwell outside his tent seven days") (Metzora 14:8) — since the Torah from the outset fixed his being outside his tent for a set time (no less than seven days), one can say that it is a matter of permanence. Whereas in "You remained in Kadesh," the length of their stay there depended on "when the cloud was lifted," so it is not permanence.
*) Note (with regard to halachah) the discussion regarding the law of mezuzah in a sukkah (Yoma 10a).
19) End of Parshas Pekudei.
20) 1:24–25; 3:6; and elsewhere. It is so obvious that Rashi did not need to explain it there at all.
21) One cannot, however, ask why Rashi needs to explain "bidmei taharah — the hei has no mappik, and it is a noun, like tohar" (although it is obvious that without a mappik hei it is a noun) — for with this he teaches that the blood itself is also pure, as explained in the text.
22) One cannot say (along the lines of the Divrei David) that he juxtaposes his explanation of "yemei taharah" to his explanation of "bidmei taharah" in order to prove, through the difference between the first "taharah" and the second (the first without a mappik hei and the second with a mappik hei), that "dmei taharah" is a noun — for even if "yemei taharah" were not written, the plain meaning of the verse is that without a mappik hei it is a noun.
23) Thus in the first printing and others. In several printings: "a warning to one who eats, etc., as taught in Yevamos." See below, note 43.
24) 75a.
25) In the Gur Aryeh here: "For one does not explain the inclusion (kol) before the main subject of the verse." But seemingly this rule applies only when the inclusion follows from the explanation of the main subject of the verse [as in (Rashi, Shemini 11:42): "goes on its belly — this is the snake… 'all' that goes — to include… goes on four — this is the scorpion; 'all' — to include…"], whereas here the explanation "a warning to one who eats" is, simply, unrelated to the inclusion "kol." Therefore also earlier (12:2) Rashi first explains "כי תזריע — to include etc." and only afterwards explains the main subject of the verse, "כימי נדת דותה תטמא — like the order of all etc."
26) The Sifsei Chachamim here says that the reason Rashi reverses the order is that "to include terumah" is the proof for his explanation "a warning to one who eats" — since a tevul yom is permitted to touch terumah. However: a) regarding kodashim as well, the warning (even before immersion) concerns only eating* (see Rashi above 7:21, 29). b) If the proof for his explanation "a warning to one who eats" is from his explanation "to include terumah," then on the contrary, for this very reason he should have put the explanation "to include terumah" first [especially since the words "bechol kodesh" come before "lo siga"], since the whole proof for explaining "a warning to one who eats" comes only after he explains "to include terumah."
*) As for a tevul yom being forbidden to touch kodashim because he renders them impure — this applies to terumah as well. See the first gloss to note 43.
27) 12:7. And in Rashi there: "And she shall be purified — implying that until now she is called impure."
28) As in Yevamos 74b: "Here regarding terumah, here regarding kodashim."
29) Seemingly, since touching is a preparation for eating, one could say that the warning about this is phrased as touching — like the prohibition of eating meat and milk, which is stated in the language "לא תבשל" ("do not cook") (Mishpatim 23:19 and Rashi there), since cooking is a preparation for eating (as explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, p. 144). However, it is understood that nevertheless proof is needed in order to explain that "lo siga" is "a warning to one who eats" (as in Mishpatim there, where in order to explain that "do not cook" is a prohibition of eating, Rashi brings a proof from "it is written in three places in the Torah," and also prefaces his explanation with "a calf and a lamb are also included in 'kid,'" as explained in Likkutei Sichos, ibid.).
30) Seemingly one could say that Rashi's intent in concluding "as taught in Yevamos" [although it is not his way to cite the sources of his explanations — and especially since in this very verse, in his explanation "to include terumah," he does not cite Yevamos (75b; 75a, beginning), for it is extremely forced to say that "as taught in Yevamos" refers also to what follows it] is that the proof for explaining "a warning to one who eats" is from what is stated in Yevamos there: "it compares holy things to the Sanctuary." However, this is not so. For if Rashi's proof were "it compares holy things to the Sanctuary," he would have written this explicitly, since matters of hekesh (comparison) are not really within the plain meaning. We must therefore say that the proof for explaining "a warning to one who eats" is so simple, even for a five-year-old (studying Scripture), that Rashi did not need to explain it at all (as below, section 11). And what he writes, "as taught in Yevamos," is to resolve why the verse expressed a prohibition of eating without mentioning eating, in the language of touching, as below, note 43.
31) As with every tevul yom, who is impure for terumah until his sun sets, as Rashi explains above 11:32.
32) The practical difference between the two approaches: if we were to say that "days of purity" applies only with respect to her husband and not with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary, she would need another immersion (for terumah) at the end of her days of purity, since the immersion she performed at the end of seven days was within her days of impurity (with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary). Whereas according to the explanation that she is a long tevulas yom, she does not need immersion (see Niddah 71b; and even according to Beis Shammai it is only because "she diverted her mind from terumah," as Rashi explains there).
33) See Rashi, Vayeira 22:3.
34) Perhaps one can say it is because (as the verse continues) "ויבן שם מזבח לה׳" ("and he built there an altar to G‑d") — unqualified and permanent, not on account of an event or a temporary intention, as earlier, when it was "to G‑d Who had appeared to him" or "and he called in the name of G‑d" (Lech Lecha 12:7–8). And in the Ramban, Lech Lecha 13:18: he was not commanded to do this immediately.
35) In the Ramban, Rabbeinu Bachya and the Tur's long commentary here: "even though they are days of purity with respect to the husband." But since with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary they are days of impurity, the expression akavah does not fit the matter of "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary" on account of their being days of purity with respect to the husband.
36) Based on this, it is better understood why Rashi quotes the words "yemei taharah" from the verse — for [in addition to needing to emphasize that he means the "taharah" joined to "yemei," and not the one joined to "bidmei"] his intent is to explain that the days are pure. (And similarly in his explanation of "bidmei taharah," his intent is to explain [not that "taharah" without a mappik hei is a noun — that is obvious — but] that the blood is pure, as above, section 4.)
37) One can say that Rashi's intent in his explanation "the days of her purity" is to negate — according to the plain meaning of Scripture — [not the explanation "days of purity" with respect to the husband, for then Rashi should have emphasized this explicitly rather than being satisfied with writing "days of purity" without qualification, but] the explanation of the Gemara (Yevamos 75b), "once her days of purity are complete": since the words "until the days of her purification are complete" come right next to "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary," it would seemingly be reasonable that with "until the days of her purification are complete" the verse comes to emphasize her impurity during these days (that since she does not become pure until her days are complete, therefore "she shall not touch anything holy etc."). To negate this explanation he explains "the days of her purity," and the connection of "until the days of her purification are complete" to "she shall not touch anything holy etc." is that this explains the verse "teishev (an expression of delay)": even though they are her days of purity (with respect to all matters*), nevertheless she shall not touch anything holy etc.
*) Rashi did not need to specify this, for according to the explanation "days of purity" it is self-understood that they are days of purity also with respect to holy things and the Sanctuary, for (in addition to the fact that their being called "days of purity" without qualification shows that this is with respect to all matters) their being "days of purity" with respect to her husband has no connection to "she shall not touch anything holy, nor come into the Sanctuary etc."
38) Note that also in the way of halachah there is a line of reasoning (see the Rogatchover's Tzafnas Pa'aneach, Laws of Nezirus 9:9, cited in Mefa'ne'ach Tzefunos p. 196) that the impurity of one who lacks atonement is [not "because he bears the status of prohibition, he therefore brings an offering to make him fit," but on the contrary] "he bears the status of prohibition because he must bring an offering." One can say that this is why Rashi is precise (12:7) in saying "implying that until now she is called impure," and not "impure," as in the language of the Talmud (Yevamos 74b, and sources cited there). See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 26, p. 82 ff.
39) According to this explanation of Rashi, it emerges that the sunset of a woman after childbirth is not like the sunset of every tevul yom (even one lacking atonement): the purification of every tevul yom depends on the sunset itself, whereas here, at sunset of the fortieth day comes the time when she is able to bring her atonement (and although she cannot actually offer it until the next day, this hindrance — that she cannot offer at night — is a side matter, an external obstacle that lies upon it). See also the Tzlach at the beginning of Tractate Berachos (s.v. "Kedatanya uva hashemesh").
40) Similar to "do not cook": had it been written only once, we would explain that the intent is a prohibition of cooking — even though a prohibition of cooking [especially of something that is not forbidden even to eat] is an extremely great novelty (see Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 147 ff.).
41) Seemingly one could ask: even according to the explanation that the prohibition "she shall not touch anything holy etc." is because she is a tevulas yom, one could still say that the impurity of childbirth is so severe that even after her immersion (as long as she has not become completely pure, since her sun has not yet set) she is forbidden to touch holy things. However, this is not so. For the plain wording "days of purity" shows that during these days she is completely pure of the impurity of childbirth, and the prohibition "she shall not touch" is not because, as long as her sun has not set, some of her previous impurity remains in her, but because the obligation to bring an offering is what creates the prohibition in her (see above, notes 38 and 39).
42) This is not comparable to "do not cook," which, had there not been a compelling proof from its being written in three places, we would explain as a prohibition of cooking, even though it is an extremely great novelty (as in note 40). For in our case, if we were to say that in the days of purity [when no impurity of childbirth remains on her at all, and it is only that the time of her atonement has not yet come, as in the previous note] she is forbidden to touch holy things, this would be (not only a novelty, but also) contrary to reason, since even one who is actually impure is permitted to do so.
43) As for Rashi writing "as taught in Yevamos" — even though the proof for the explanation "a warning to one who eats" is from the plain meaning of Scripture — it is in order to resolve the following: although touching is a preparation for eating, nevertheless the verse should have said "לא תאכל" ("she shall not eat"); why does it say "she shall not touch"? On this he answers "as taught in Yevamos": that there is a prohibition also in touching*, only that the "warning" in the verse is for one who eats** (but this question is not so strong in the way of plain meaning, and therefore Rashi does not write the answer explicitly). One can say that what Rashi writes (according to several printings), "a warning to one who eats, etc.," refers (not to the derivation of this — "it compares holy things to the Sanctuary" — but) to what is stated in Yevamos there: "And the reason the verse expressed it in the language of touching is to say: touching is like eating."
*) For a tevul yom disqualifies terumah by Torah law (Shabbos 14b; note Rashi, Shemini 11:32, "he is impure for terumah" — and not "for eating terumah").
**) Similar to rabbinic laws that are alluded to in the Torah — in the way of the plain meaning of Scripture — as Rashi explains regarding the manna and regarding meat and milk (see Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, p. 208 and the notes there).
44) Wording of the Tanya, beginning of ch. 3.
45) Bereishis Rabbah 10:6. Likkutei Torah, Shelach 41c.
46) Note Yalkut Yirmiyahu, remez 259 — regarding a lion (explained in the Tzemach Tzedek's Reshimos on Eichah, p. 26 (Or HaTorah, Nach vol. 2, p. [OCR unclear]); see also Or HaTorah on Yirmiyahu, p. 1423); the maamar beginning "Tik'u" 5694 (Kuntres 82; Sefer HaMaamarim 5711), ch. 3 (regarding a rooster); and elsewhere.
47) Rambam, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, at the beginning.
48) The piyut "Yigdal." See also the Shelah, Shaar HaOsiyos (58b); Likkutei Torah, לג"פ, at the beginning (Or HaTorah, Bereishis vol. 6, p. 1023, end of col. a ff.); Or HaTorah, Balak, p. 976.
49) Sefer HaChakirah, p. 80, end of col. b ff.
50) 13 Nissan 5626.
51) Moreh Nevuchim I, ch. 11.
52) Toras Shalom, p. 147.
53) In the year 5680. Note that this year (5730) marks fifty years since his passing. See Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 86, second gloss to note 1.
54) Meorei Or, letter Dalet, at its end. See also Torah Or, Beshalach (61c).
55) See at length the introduction to Kuntres Beis Nissan 5710 (Kuntres 76; printed also in Likkutei Sichos vol. 12, p. 146) and the notes there.
56) Hemshech תהר"ש 5704 [OCR doubtful], ch. 9; ch. 1.
57) See also the Hemshech cited there, ch. 9, and in many places. See also above, pp. 44–45.
58) Similar to "You remained in Kadesh," where through the journeys of the Ark and of Israel in the desert they subdued the kelipos (Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshas Naso, and in many places). Only this corresponds to the first mode in "bidmei taharah," described below, as is understood from what is explained in Likkutei Torah there.
59) These two modes are similar to the two explanations of "בלילה ההוא נדדה שנת המלך" ("On that night the king's sleep was disturbed"); see above, there, p. 42 ff.
60) Eruvin 22a. Rashi, end of Parshas Va'eschanan. In Rashi there: "to take." See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 29, p. 43 ff.
61) Eruvin, ibid.; Rashi, ibid. See also Tanya, beginning of ch. 37.
62) Text of the Musaf prayer. See at length Hemshech VeKachah 5637, end of ch. 19 ff.
63) See Rashi and Tosafos (Sukkah 41a, end): "It will be revealed and will come from heaven." This is based on Tanchuma, Noach 11; Zohar I, 28a; and elsewhere. (In the Rambam, Laws of Kings, beginning of ch. 11 and at its end (based on Vayikra Rabbah 9:6 and elsewhere): that Moshiach builds the Beis HaMikdash.)
Key Lesson
In exile we resemble the "long tevulas yom" — pure in essence, yet not yet able to approach the holy. The service begins with "even though she sees, she is pure": refusing to be affected by the concealments around us; it then rises to "the blood itself is pure," transforming the darkness itself into light. Through this "today to do them," we bring about "tomorrow" — the Third Beis HaMikdash, through Moshiach, very soon.