Parshas Shemini
1. The last verse of the sidra is: "להבדיל בין הטמא ובין הטהור ובין החיה הנאכלת ובין החיה אשר לא תאכל" ("To distinguish between the impure and the pure, and between the animal that may be eaten and the animal that may not be eaten"). Rashi (in the second dibbur) comments on "between the impure and the pure" and explains1: "צריך לומר בין חמור לפרה2 והלא כבר מפורשים2* הם, אלא בין טמאה לך לטהורה לך, בין נשחט חציו של קנה לנשחט רובו" ("Is it necessary to say 'between a donkey and a cow'? Surely these are already explained! Rather, between one that is impure for you and one that is pure for you — between one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered and one in which most of it was slaughtered").
Afterwards Rashi comments on "and between the animal that may be eaten" and says1: "צריך לומר בין צבי לערוד והלא כבר מפורשים הם, אלא בין שנולדו בה סימני טריפה כשרה לנולדו בה סימני טריפה פסולה" ("Is it necessary to say 'between a deer and an arod'? Surely these are already explained! Rather, between one in which signs of treifah developed that leave it kosher, and one in which signs of treifah developed that render it invalid").
We need to understand:
a) Among the pure domestic and wild animals (which one may eat), and likewise among the impure domestic and wild animals (which are "may not be eaten"), there are many species — besides the donkey and the cow, the deer and the arod. Why, then, does Rashi say (in the initial supposition) that the verse means specifically these four species?
True, Rashi's commentary here is taken from Toras Kohanim on the verse — but, as has already been discussed many times, Rashi quotes from the commentaries of Chazal only that which pertains to understanding the plain meaning of Scripture, and in the style and (altered) wording that pertains to that3.
b) (Even if it must indeed be specifically these four species,) from where is it compelled that the first half of the verse — "between the impure and the pure" — means "between a donkey and a cow," and the second half of the verse — "between the animal that may be eaten etc." — means "between a deer and an arod"? What implication is there that "impure" and "pure" speak of the donkey and the cow, while "may be eaten" and "may not be eaten" signify the deer and the arod?
c) The same question applies also to Rashi's conclusion that the first half of the verse speaks of "one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered etc.," and the other half of the verse speaks of "signs of treifah developed in it etc.": Where is it implied in "between the impure etc." that it refers to the distinction "between one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered etc.," and where is it evident that "between the animal that may be eaten etc." has anything to do with "signs of treifah developed in it etc."?
2. The explanation of this is as follows: In the first half of the verse it says simply "between the impure and the pure," without mentioning the word chayah (animal), which comes only in the second half of the verse. It is therefore self-understood that the second part of the verse speaks of chayos (wild animals), whereas the first half of the verse speaks of the common case — Scripture speaks of the usual — namely, behemos (domestic animals).
[And although "בהמה בכלל חיה" ("a behemah is included in chayah")4, this does not mean that everywhere the word chayah also includes the species behemah. It means only that the term chayah can also apply to the species behemah, and this is in a case where one must learn it that way. But where it is straightforward to learn that it means only the species chayah and not the species behemah, then behemah is not included in chayah5. So too in our verse, one must assume that "chayah" means only the species chayah. For if chayah here were to include the species behemah as well, the word chayah would then have had to appear right at the beginning of the verse.]
Therefore Rashi writes that in the first half of the verse one would have interpreted "between a donkey and a cow" — two kinds of behemah; and in the other half of the verse — "between a deer and an arod" — two kinds of chayah.
3. Why specifically these four species are chosen — donkey and cow, deer and arod — is understood simply:
The wording of the verse, "להבדיל" ("to distinguish") (between the impure and the pure etc.) — to tell apart — fits only where there is a certain similarity between the things one wishes to separate. Things that are entirely different and have no resemblance at all between them require no distinction between them — in the words of Rashi5*: "שהרי מובדלין וניכרין הם" ("for they are distinct and recognizable").
From this it is simply understood that the concept of "distinguishing" — both between an impure behemah and a pure one (in the first half of the verse), and between the animal that may be eaten and that which may not be eaten (in the second half of the verse) — applies to such domestic and wild animals as have a certain similarity between them, and therefore the Torah instructs that one should make a distinction between them.
From this it is understood that the example must be a pure behemah (and chayah) for which there exists an impure behemah (and chayah) very similar to it. And if there are several such pairs — it must be the usual case, those that are more common.
Thus, when speaking of a distinction between species of behemah that have a certain similarity to one another, and yet one is impure and the other pure, the two species donkey and cow are the most fitting for this: They are among the most common of domestic animals6, and they have a certain resemblance and commonality between them, and therefore one is exchanged for the other (as in the wording of the Mishnah7: "המחליף פרה בחמור" ("one who exchanges a cow for a donkey") — the Mishnah seized upon this reality because "דברו חכמים בהווה" ("the Sages spoke of the usual case")7*). And regarding this one is warned "to distinguish" — the donkey is impure and the cow8 is pure.
And when speaking of chayos — these are the deer and the arod, because among the chayos that may be eaten, the deer is the most common chayah — as can be seen from the fact that when the verse wishes to say that one may eat a certain behemah in the same manner as a chayah, the example is8* "כצבי וכאיל" ("like the deer and the hart") — and the arod is similar to the deer.
By arod here Rashi means the arod mentioned in Tanach and in the Mishnah9, about which the Rambam says10: "וערוד הוא פרא לימוד מדבר" ("the arod is a wild donkey accustomed to the desert") — it is a chayah that runs swiftly11 like a deer.
Consequently there must also be a resemblance between them in the structure of their bodies (as explained in Chovos HaLevavos12, that G‑d created the bodily structure of every living creature in accordance with the needs of its body). And because the deer and the arod resemble each other (both in their trait of running swiftly12* and) in their appearance, it is therefore necessary to make a distinction specifically between them — "to distinguish"13.
4. This is an explanation of the initial supposition in Rashi's commentary. The explanation of Rashi's commentary in its conclusion: From where does Rashi derive that "impure" and "pure" indicate the distinction of "one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered etc.," and that "the animal that may be eaten etc." indicates the distinction of "signs of treifah developed in it etc."?
The explanation of this is as follows: The term "impure" with regard to the prohibition of eating is found regarding the species of living creatures that are forbidden to be eaten. But species of living creatures that are permitted to be eaten are called only "pure." Even the parts of them that are forbidden to be eaten (a limb from a living animal; blood; the gid hanasheh; and so on) are not called "impure."
The question therefore arises: Since by "to distinguish between the impure and the pure" the verse means (not between a donkey and a cow, but) matters of prohibition and permission within a pure behemah itself — why does it use the terms "impure" and "pure"14?
Therefore Rashi learns "between one that is impure for you and one that is pure for you" — that the impurity and purity here mean impurity and purity in the literal sense, and (not with regard to the animal in itself15, but) in relation to the person, referring to the law stated earlier in the sidra16, that the carcass of a pure behemah renders impure the person who touches it or carries it.
And this is why Rashi explains "between one in which [half] was slaughtered etc.," because what makes the difference whether the animal is "impure" or "pure" is the manner of its death and slaughter: When "half the windpipe was slaughtered," it is as though there had been no shechitah at all — since it is an invalid shechitah, it then has the status of neveilah17, and consequently it conveys impurity; but if "most of it was slaughtered" — a valid shechitah — it does not convey impurity18. The law of "הנוגע בנבלתה יטמא" ("whoever touches its carcass shall be impure") is stated specifically regarding "וכי ימות" ("and if it dies"), not regarding one that was slaughtered19.
However, when it comes to the second half of the verse, where it says "that may be eaten" and "that may not be eaten" — which shows that here it speaks only of the permission and prohibition of eating (not of impurity and purity) — Rashi learns "between one in which signs of treifah developed etc.," because "signs of treifah" relate to the prohibition of eating and not to impurity: Even when "signs of treifah developed in it that render it invalid," provided the shechitah was valid, it does not convey impurity.
5. Among the "wondrous matters" in halachah that are in our Rashi20:
The law is that with a behemah, the shechitah must be of both simanim — the windpipe together with the esophagus; that is, one must slaughter the majority of each of the two simanim. If, however, one slaughtered only half of one of the simanim, even if the second siman was cut through entirely, the shechitah is invalid21.
The question arises: Since in both simanim — both the windpipe and the esophagus — there must specifically be a shechitah of the majority of the siman, why does Rashi mention only one siman: "between one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered etc."22? Seemingly Rashi should have written "siman," a term that would include both the windpipe and the esophagus23?
The explanation of this is: When there is a perforation of any size in the esophagus at the place fit for shechitah, the animal is a neveilah while still alive, and shechitah no longer helps it. Consequently, if one cuts less than the majority of the esophagus, the animal acquires the status of neveilah right at the very beginning of the shechitah24. For as soon as one begins cutting the esophagus, a perforation is already made in it, and through a perforation of any size in the esophagus the animal becomes a neveilah25.
Therefore one cannot say that "to distinguish between the impure and the pure" means "between one in which half the esophagus was slaughtered and one in which most of it was slaughtered." Since the status of "impure" comes immediately with the very first bit of perforation of the esophagus (and the fact that afterwards one continues the shechitah up to "half" neither adds nor detracts), while "pure" applies only with the majority — the term "to distinguish" does not fit this, since between "the slightest bit" and "the majority" there is a great distance26, and the term "to distinguish" — to tell apart — fits specifically with things that are very similar and close.
It is specifically with the windpipe — where, as long as the majority of the windpipe has not been cut through, the animal is still pure and shechitah helps it27, and the impurity present when "half the windpipe was slaughtered" is due to not completing that tiny bit beyond half with a valid shechitah — that the term "to distinguish" applies to this very small difference between impurity and purity.
6. Another halachic matter found in this commentary of Rashi:
There is a rule28: "אי אפשר לצמצם" ("it is impossible to be exact"). Consequently, if half the windpipe was slaughtered, one cannot establish with certainty that it is indeed no more than half; it could be that there was one hair more than half29, only one cannot notice it30. The question arises: Why does the Torah rule "to distinguish between the impure etc." — that where half the windpipe was slaughtered it is impure? It could be that there was a valid shechitah, with one hair more than half, and since this is then already called a majority of the siman, the animal should be pure!
This question, however, can be asked only according to the views31 that hold that the law "ספיקא דאורייתא לחומרא" ("a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently")32 is only Rabbinic; by Torah law a doubt is permitted, and it was the Rabbis who were stringent that a doubt in a Torah law be ruled stringently. One can then ask: How does the Torah say that "half slaughtered" is impure — when the Torah permits it because of the doubt that must arise in such a case, since one cannot determine precisely by human measure whether it is exactly half or one hair more?
Whereas according to the opinions33 that hold that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently by Torah law, the above question does not apply — for since this Torah-level doubt, whether half or most was slaughtered, is ruled stringently by Torah law, it follows that in such a case the Torah rules that in any event it is impure.
7. Regarding Rashi's view (with which we are dealing) on the matter of a doubt in a Torah law — one could seemingly prove from his commentary on the Gemara that he holds that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled leniently by Torah law:
The Gemara34 cites a Baraisa: "שתי קדרות אחת של חולין ואחת של תרומה ולפניהם שתי מדוכות אחת של חולין ואחת של תרומה ונפלו אלו לתוך אלו מותרין" ("Two pots, one of chullin and one of terumah, and before them two mortars, one of chullin and one of terumah, and these fell into those — they are permitted"), because one assumes that "the terumah fell into the terumah and the chullin fell into the chullin." The Gemara there asks: If one were to say that eating terumah (a kezayis within the time of eating half a loaf) is a Torah law, how then can one assume that "the terumah fell into the terumah etc." and therefore one may eat the pot of chullin — it could be that the terumah fell into the pot of chullin!
Rashi explains the Gemara's question: "ותלינן לקולא בעון מיתה" ("and do we attribute leniently in a sin punishable by death?") — that is, how can one attribute leniently in the case of doubtful terumah, since here we are dealing with the "sin punishable by death" of a non-kohen eating terumah? From these words of Rashi one could seemingly infer that he holds35: Specifically where there is a sin punishable by death is a doubt in a Torah law ruled stringently by Torah law, but in a case where there is no sin punishable by death, a doubt in a Torah law is ruled leniently (by Torah law).
However, we find in many places36 where Rashi says explicitly that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently by Torah law. One must therefore understand that what Rashi adds in the case of the two pots etc. — that one cannot permit the pot of chullin because of the doubt, on account of terumah involving a matter of death — and he does not make do with the general reason that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently — this is due to the reasoning that the pot of chullin has a presumption of permissibility37; and if terumah for a non-kohen were not a prohibition punishable by death, one could then say that the presumption of permissibility of the pot of chullin outweighs the Torah-level doubt — toward the side of permission.
But in a case where the Torah-level doubt has no presumption of permissibility, Rashi holds that a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently by Torah law. And all the more so does Rashi hold this way in our case, regarding half the windpipe slaughtered: for not only is there no presumption of permissibility here, but on the contrary, the animal while alive carries a presumption of prohibition38 — and therefore certainly, when a doubt arises in the shechitah, a doubt in a Torah law is ruled stringently by Torah law39.
8. From the "wine of Torah" that is in this commentary of Rashi:
It has already been discussed several times40 that the name of a sidra relates to all the passages and verses that the sidra contains, down to the last word; that is, the content of the entire sidra is alluded to in its name (and all the more so its conclusion — for "41נעוץ תחלתן בסופן וסופן בתחלתן" ("their beginning is wedged in their end and their end in their beginning")).
One may ask: What connection do the words regarding "to distinguish between the impure and the pure" have with the name "Shemini"? On the contrary: Shemini (eight) is a sacred number42, and on account of the superiority of "Shemini" (also — in the "wine of Torah" — from the word shemen, oil43), this day took "ten crowns." Now, when speaking of such a lofty level, of which it is said "לא יגורך רע" ("evil shall not abide with You")44, how does a matter of impurity come there — so that "distinguishing between the impure and the pure" is required?
The explanation of this is: When it comes to the distinction between impure and pure that consists of only the slightest amount, a hairsbreadth — on account of which it could seem that the impure is actually pure — and nevertheless one is to distinguish between it and the pure, establishing that it is impure and rejecting it — for this one needs a special empowerment, specifically from the lofty level of "Shemini":
When one stands only at the level of the "שבעת ימי הבנין" ("seven days of building")45, the level of hishtalshelus (the ordered chain of descent), it is difficult to sort things out properly and decide in such a doubt where a hair, a hairsbreadth, is involved. On the contrary: the yetzer hara is a "clever one"; he dresses himself in a "silk coat," in a "garment of holiness"46, and argues to the person:
Since everything that G‑d provides to a person is so that the person refine the G‑dly spark found in that thing, how then do you have the right — argues the yetzer hara — not to make use of this food and to reject the G‑dly spark within it? Eh, it is a doubt; perhaps it is actually a forbidden thing — so who tells you to worry about such things! In general — argues the yetzer hara — when one slaughters an animal it is a valid shechitah; most shechitos are valid, so why do you need to worry, and because of this worry reject47 the G‑dly spark in the thing?
When, however, a Jew possesses the level of "Shemini," which transcends hishtalshelus — he has the proper will not to give up, G‑d forbid, even a hair of the Supernal Will, and this will has a firmness that is above the limitations of intellect — then one does not let oneself be deceived by the enticements of the yetzer, because the animal soul cannot conceal the essential will of a Jew (which transcends the hishtalshelus within the soul)48.
(And similar to what is known49 regarding the matter of teshuvah, that for a doubtful50 sin the teshuvah is harder and deeper than for a certain sin — which is why a sin-offering [costs] a danka (exactly51, or even less52), while a guilt-offering [must be] worth two shekalim53 (two sela'im — 48 dankas53) — so too regarding not coming to a prohibition in the first place: to guard oneself from a doubtful prohibition54, especially such a doubt for which one needs "to distinguish," one must reach the level of "Shemini.")
And this is also the connection of Parshas Shemini to the sidra that follows it — "אשה כי תזריע וילדה זכר" ("When a woman conceives and gives birth to a male")55: By arousing the "Shemini" within the soul, in which there are no changes — and even when, intellectually, the conclusion does not accord with the Supernal Will, one nevertheless stands firm etc. — one then reaches the level of "and gives birth to a male," a "new song" in the masculine form56, which will be in the future Redemption, a redemption that is not followed by exile (above changes), in the true and complete Redemption, with the coming of Moshiach Tzidkeinu, very soon indeed.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Shemini, 5725)
Notes
1) And so it is in Toras Kohanim here.
2) In our text of Toras Kohanim here: "between a cow and a donkey etc. between one in which most of the windpipe was slaughtered and one in which half was slaughtered." Rashi changes the wording of Toras Kohanim and writes "between a donkey and a cow etc. between one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered and one in which most was slaughtered"** — "donkey" and "half" before "cow" and "most" — because the verse says "between the impure (and afterwards) and between the pure."
*) In the Toras Kohanim that was before the Rashba (cited in the Ra'av here): "between a cow and a donkey etc. between one in which half the windpipe was slaughtered (and afterwards) and one in which most was slaughtered."
**) So it is in all the editions of Rashi before us (including the first printing). And in the "Leshon Rashi" [OCR unclear] here: between a cow and a donkey etc. between one in which half was slaughtered etc. and one in which most was slaughtered (see the preceding marginal note).
2*) So it is in all the places I have seen — in Rashi, Toras Kohanim, etc. (and not "meforashim" [OCR unclear]). And see below, section 3 and note 13.
3) See note 2.
4) Rashi on our parsha, 11:2 (from Toras Kohanim on the verse; Chullin 71a).
5) For in many places (Bereishis 1:25–26; Noach 7:14; Vayikra 5:2; and elsewhere) behemah is not included in "chayah."
5*) Kedoshim 20:25.
6) See Mishnah, end of ch. 5 of Bava Kamma: "Any behemah . . . chayah and bird likewise; if so, why does it say 'an ox or a donkey'? Rather, Scripture speaks of the usual case." And see Rashi, Mishpatim 21:33 (and the reason Rashi does not write there that Scripture speaks of the usual case* is because he already said so before this, on verse 28**).
*) And although, as Rashi explains there, "'an ox' — and not a person; 'a donkey' — and not vessels," the reason it says "an ox or a donkey" and not "a behemah or a chayah" (for then too we would learn "a behemah and not a person, a chayah and not vessels") is because Scripture speaks of the usual case.
**) And the reason Rashi needed there to quote the derivation of "'ox' 'ox' from Shabbos," and also the explanation "'an ox' and not a person, 'a donkey' and not vessels," is because wherever "Scripture speaks of the usual case" only one example is stated — the most common example. Since here two examples are stated — ox and donkey — one might think that here it is meant specifically (for it is forced to say that the two examples — ox and donkey — are equal in being "usual"). Therefore the derivation of "'ox' 'ox' from Shabbos" is needed, that "every behemah and chayah is like an ox." And the reason two examples are stated here is in order to exclude a person and vessels — two exclusions. And see Likkutei Sichos vol. 6, p. 138, and the notes there.
7) Bava Metzia 100a.
7*) The wording of the Mishnah — Shabbos 65a; 66b.
8) One may add that it uses "cow" specifically (and not "ox") because an ox is mostly for plowing and not for slaughter (Bava Basra 92a). And even if we say this rule applies also to the cow, since they too are used for plowing — the main plowing is done with oxen, as is seen by observation. And see Rashi, Vayishlach 32:15.
8*) Devarim 12:15; 15:22; and elsewhere (12:22).
9) Iyov 39:5; Kilayim, end of ch. 8; and elsewhere. But it is obvious that Rashi does not mean the "arod" mentioned in Berachos 33a — for that arod (not only has no resemblance to a deer, but) is not a "chayah" at all, but a kind of snake (a creeping creature).
10) In the Commentary on the Mishnah, Kilayim there. (But in Rav Kafich's translation: arod — a wild donkey (!). And so it is in the Targum (Yirmiyahu 2:24): "a wild donkey accustomed to the desert" — "like an arodah." And see the Aruch, entry arod, and elsewhere.)
11) Note the Aruch HaShalem, entry arod, that in Arabic arod means swift-running (though he cites this there in explaining the arod of Berachos mentioned above). And see Yirmiyahu there, which concludes: "All who seek her will not tire," and Rashi explains: they will not be able to catch it. — However, according to Rashi there, it is implied that the "wild donkey accustomed to the desert" is not the arod (for Rashi explains it in several places as a wild donkey).
12) Shaar HaBitachon, ch. 3 (near the end).
12*) Whereas the hart is so only when it is a "fawn" (young — Rashi, Shir HaShirim 2:9).
13) Therefore the question Rashi asks here* on the explanation "between a donkey and a cow," "between a deer and an arod" is [not that the concept of "distinguishing" does not apply to them, but] "surely these are already explained" (above, 11:3 ff.); and Rashi holds that "to distinguish between the impure and the pure and between the animal that may be eaten etc." teaches something new that was not explained previously**.
*) Whereas Rashi's question in Parshas Kedoshim (20:25) is "for they are distinct and recognizable." This also clarifies why specifically in Parshas Kedoshim Rashi adds "and how great is the difference between most and half? A hairsbreadth" (although in Toras Kohanim this is stated here too) — for since what invalidated the explanation "between a cow and a donkey" there is that they are distinct and recognizable, he needed to point out that the explanation "between one in which most was slaughtered etc." fits the term "distinguishing," for "a hairsbreadth" is not distinct and recognizable.
**) And although before this he explains "to distinguish — not merely learning it, but that you should know, recognize and be expert in them" — if the intent of the verse were only to teach "that you should know etc.," it should have said "This is the law of the behemah . . . and to distinguish between behemah and bird etc." or the like. Nevertheless, from the fact that it says "This (i.e., what was said before this) is the law of the behemah etc. to distinguish," it is proven that "to distinguish" refers (not only to "between the impure etc." but) also to "the law of the behemah and the bird etc." that precedes it. Therefore he explains "that you should know and recognize etc."
14) Especially since at the end of the verse it says "that may be eaten etc. may not be eaten."
15) Note the Sifrei Zuta (cited in Yalkut, Chukas) on the verse "one who touches a dead body": one who touches a dead body is impure, but the dead body itself is not impure. And it seems more likely to me that the intent here is literal: "impure for you" — through you (through your actions — that you slaughtered only half).
16) 11:39–40.
17) See Rashi, Toldos 26:3: "and slaughter properly, so that you do not feed me neveilah." And see also Chullin 32, end of side a; Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 3:18 (and Kesef Mishneh there); Hilchos Avos HaTumos 1:2; Tur Yoreh De'ah, end of siman 27.
18) See Rashbam on 11:39. And see Ramban and the commentators on Rashi, verse 26.
19) Chullin there; Rambam, Hilchos Avos HaTumos 2:6; Tur there. In Toras Kohanim, Shemini (11:39) and in Chullin (74a, and sources cited there) this law is derived from the words (Shemini there) "of the behemah." Since this derivation is not cited in Rashi's commentary on the Torah, one could seemingly prove that according to the plain meaning, the slaughter of a treifah does not remove it from neveilah status. But this is not so. On the contrary, one can say that according to the plain meaning no derivation is needed for this at all. This can be explained in two ways: a) The plain sense of the wording "and if it dies" excludes one that was slaughtered. This is unlike the carcass of an impure behemah: since death is not stated regarding it, it conveys impurity even when slaughtered. As the Rashbam writes (whose commentary follows the plain meaning; see Rashbam at the beginning of Vayeshev) on verse 39 (except that for him this was not so clear, and therefore he also needed "and the Sages expounded"). And so wrote the commentators on Rashi, verse 26. b) The meaning of "neveilah" — according to Rashi's approach — is specifically when it died by itself; whereas one that was slaughtered (even when it is a treifah) is not called by the name neveilah* (and not only does it lack the prohibition of neveilah; and so it is implied from Rashi's wording in Toldos there: "so that you do not feed me neveilah"). However, this applies specifically to a pure behemah and not to an impure one, since the concept of shechitah does not apply to it at all (unlike a treifah, which had the status of shechitah before it became treifah (see Toras Kohanim there; Chullin 72, beginning of side b)).
*) Therefore it is not forbidden to eat on account of neveilah. (Whereas according to the first way — that it does not convey impurity only because it says "and if it dies" — one can say that the reason it lacks the neveilah prohibition is because a prohibition does not take effect upon an existing prohibition.)
20) Another halachic point in our Rashi: according to his explanation, one understands why at the beginning of the verse it says "between the impure" and afterwards "and between the pure," while at the end of the verse it says "that may be eaten" and afterwards "that may not be eaten." For with shechitah, the presumption is "impure," and likewise at its beginning (with the first bit — for only at its end does it become clear that it was the manner of its preparation), and only after one knows for certain that most was slaughtered is it "pure" (see Chullin 9a: "it stands in its presumption of prohibition until it is known to you how it was slaughtered"; and in the Baraisa there: "it is neveilah and conveys impurity through carrying"; and see Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 1:12; Shach, Yoreh De'ah 25:1). Whereas when signs of treifah developed in it, as long as we do not know that they are invalidating signs of treifah, it stands in its presumption of permissibility (Chullin there) — "may be eaten"; and only after we know for certain that invalidating signs of treifah developed in it — "may not be eaten." (And according to this, the wording "may not be eaten," in the future tense, is also clarified.)
21) Chullin 27a ff.; Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 1:16; Yoreh De'ah 21:1–2.
22) Especially since the distinction between the impure and the pure came about through slaughtering one more hairsbreadth (beyond half) of the second siman; if so, Rashi should seemingly have written "between one in which [half] of the esophagus was slaughtered etc." — for the windpipe is normally slaughtered first (Rashi, Chullin 32b).
23) As Rashi himself writes in Parshas Kedoshim: "siman."
24) Except that when one slaughters most of it, it does not become neveilah through the perforation made at the beginning of the shechitah — for this is the manner of its preparation (see Rashi, Chullin 20b, s.v. "Vechi"; and see also there 19b, s.v. "Shechitan").
25) Rambam there, 3:10 and 19.
26) And although the impurity resulting from the perforation of the esophagus (made by the beginning of the shechitah) occurs only when most was not slaughtered, and the difference between half and most is a hairsbreadth — nevertheless, since when half is slaughtered the impurity results from the perforation at the beginning of the shechitah (because in this case the perforation made at the beginning of the shechitah is not the manner of its preparation), the law of impurity derives (not from the majority not having been completed, but) from the slightest perforation.
27) Rambam there, halachah 7.
28) Chullin 28b, and sources cited there.
29) In Chullin 29a: "we require a majority visible to the eyes," and Rashi there: "that is, a complete majority that is discernible." But according to the plain meaning, from the wording "to distinguish" it is proven that the difference between "half" and "most" is a hairsbreadth, as stated explicitly in Rashi, Parshas Kedoshim. And see Pri Megadim, Mishbetzos Zahav, Yoreh De'ah 21:2, that Rashi's explanation in Chullin there "does not stand thus in the conclusion."
30) Tosafos s.v. "Lefi" (Chullin 28b): "One can prove from here that the halachah is that by human hands it is possible to be exact." But the Rambam (Hilchos Rotzeach 9:8) writes: "for it is impossible to be exact, even by human hands" (and see Rashi, Zevachim 38, beginning of side b).
31) See the sources noted in Sdei Chemed, Kelalim, letter samech, rule 10 (vol. 3, p. 1196 — Kehot edition).
32) Beitzah 3b.
33) See the sources noted in Sdei Chemed there. And so is the view of the Tzemach Tzedek in his Responsa, Yoreh De'ah, siman 71.
34) Pesachim 44a.
35) In line with the approach of the Rambam, Hilchos Tumas Meis, end of ch. 9 (see Kesef Mishneh there).
36) Yevamos 88b, s.v. "Heichi Dami"; Kiddushin 73a, s.v. "Ve'iba'is Eima"; Chullin 22, end of side a, s.v. "Itzterich Kra Lemaitei." And see Malei HaRo'im, entry "Safeika De'oraisa"; Sdei Chemed there.
37) See the Responsa of the Tzemach Tzedek there, at the end, that in the case of the Baraisa there, too, there is a presumption of permissibility.
38) Chullin 9a; Rambam, Hilchos Shechitah 1:13; Yoreh De'ah 25 (and Shach there, 1).
39) See also above, p. 24–5 [OCR unclear].
40) Sefer Yetzirah 1:7.
41) Responsa of the Rashba, vol. 1, siman 9; Kli Yakar, beginning of Shemini. And explained at length in the maamar beginning "Vayehi Bayom HaShemini" 5704 (ch. 10–11) and 5705, and elsewhere.
42) Commentary of the [OCR unclear: הדי"מ] — cited in Or HaTorah, Shemini Atzeres, p. 1817.
43) Rashi, beginning of Shemini (from Seder Olam Rabbah ch. 7).
44) Tehillim 5:5. And see Bamidbar Rabbah (12:3) and Tanchuma (Naso 23), that on that day the harmful spirits ceased from the world.
45) Tanya, beginning of ch. 3. And see Meorei Or, letter yud, 8; letter beis, 10.
46) See Hayom Yom, p. 64.
47) See Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim (6:4), that separating oneself from forbidden things is like cruelty toward the G‑dly spark within them.
48) Similar to what is explained in Tanya ch. 19 and in the maamar series of the day of the Hilula (Basi LeGani 5710), ch. 4, that in matters touching the essence of the soul, (the spirit of folly of) the animal soul is unable to conceal. And see also Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, p. 1202, and the notes there.
49) Rabbeinu Yonah, Berachos 1b, s.v. "Veha De'amrinan." And see the Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chayim 603.
50) The approach of Tosafos s.v. "Mikelal" — Kerisos 10b.
51) The approach of Rashi and Tosafos, Zevachim 48a.
52) Zevachim there.
53) For a Torah sela is four zuz (Kiddushin 11b), and a danka is one sixth of a zuz.
54) That is why it is said: "touched etc. a doubtful niddah" (Sanhedrin 103a, and Rashi there (unlike Bava Metzia 107a; this is not the place to elaborate)).
55) See Or HaTorah, beginning of Tazria.
56) Tosafos s.v. "Hachi Garsinan Venomar" — Pesachim 116b.
Key Lesson
The Torah demands that we distinguish even where the difference between forbidden and permitted is only a hairsbreadth, and the yetzer hara often argues for leniency in the guise of holiness. The strength to stand firm in such fine doubts comes from the level of "Shemini" in the soul, an essential will to fulfill G‑d's Will that is above the limits of intellect. This in turn brings the true and complete Redemption, a "new song" that will never be followed by exile.