.
Parshas Tetzaveh
1. At the conclusion of the sedra — where it speaks about the Inner Altar, and the verse says, "קודש קדשים הוא לה׳" ("It is holy of holies to the L‑rd") — Rashi pauses on the words "קודש קדשים הוא"1 ("It is holy of holies") and explains: "המזבח מקודש לדברים הללו בלבד ולא לעבודה אחרת" ("The altar is consecrated for these things alone, and not for any other service").2
Simply understood, this Rashi is taken to mean that he wishes to forestall a difficulty here: After all, the golden altar stood in the Heichal — and not in the Kodesh HaKodashim (the Holy of Holies) — and consequently its holiness, too, was not the holiness of the Kodesh HaKodashim. So how can one say of the altar "Kodesh Kodashim"?3
Therefore Rashi explains, "The altar is consecrated for these things": "Kodesh Kodashim" does not mean that the altar possesses the holiness of the Kodesh HaKodashim; rather, the meaning is: "Kodesh" — the holiness of the altar is — for the "Kodashim" (the offerings) enumerated earlier in the parsha.
Since, however, the question then arises: What is novel about this? It is self-evident that the altar is consecrated so that the offerings that must be offered upon it may be brought on it! Therefore Rashi adds "alone, and not for any other service": With "Kodesh Kodashim" the verse does not intend to state the positive obligation contained in this, but rather the negation — that it is consecrated only for the kodashim, and not for any other service.
And although in this, too, there is nothing novel, since this too we already find earlier4 — and explicitly: "לא תעלו עליו קטרת זרה וגו׳" ("You shall not offer upon it foreign incense, etc.") — nevertheless the verse repeats it once more in order to add a further positive command regarding one who offers other offerings upon the Inner Altar, so that he should transgress not only the prohibition "You shall not offer, etc.," but also an additional command (the positive command of "Kodesh Kodashim," for a prohibition implied by a positive command has the status of a positive command).5
2. According to this explanation, however, the following is not understood:
a) From the wording of the verse, "Kodesh Kodashim Hu LaShem" ("It is holy of holies to the L‑rd"), it is implied that the word "Kodashim," too, refers to the altar itself (that the altar is holy of holies to the Almighty). But according to Rashi's explanation, "Kodesh — Kodashim," that the altar is consecrated for "Kodashim," the conclusion of the verse, "to the L‑rd," does not fit smoothly.
b) Since with his explanation "The altar is consecrated, etc." Rashi is explaining the words "Kodesh Kodashim" — that the altar is consecrated only for the kodashim mentioned earlier — Rashi should have written "The altar is consecrated for these kodashim, etc." Why does he depart from this and say "for these things"?
c) Rashi's novel point concerns only the meaning of "Kodesh Kodashim." But that these very words refer to the altar — about which the entire parsha speaks — is a simple matter. So apparently he should have explained only the meaning of "Kodesh Kodashim" ("consecrated for these things, etc."); yet Rashi says "The altar is consecrated, etc." What does he add with the word "the altar"?
3. With regard to the third question, one could apparently answer: There are commentators6 who explain that "Kodesh Kodashim Hu LaShem" refers not to the altar but to Aharon: After all, the verse begins, "וכפר אהרן גו׳" ("And Aharon shall make atonement, etc."), and about him (about Aharon) it concludes, "It is holy of holies to the L‑rd" — as it says in Divrei HaYamim:7 "ויבדל אהרן להקדישו קדש קדשים" ("And Aharon was set apart, to sanctify him as holy of holies").
However, one cannot say that Rashi's intent with "the altar" is to exclude this interpretation8 — because:9
a) According to the plain meaning of Scripture, it is understood even without Rashi's explanation that "Kodesh Kodashim, etc." refers to the altar and not to Aharon,10 for the entire parsha11 here speaks about the altar,12 not about Aharon. "And Aharon shall make atonement, etc." is only one detail among the laws of the altar. There is no place, in the plain meaning of Scripture, for the Torah here, in the parsha of the altar, to explain the virtue of Aharon.13
b) When Rashi says "consecrated for these things, etc." — even without the word "the altar" one already knows that "Kodesh Kodashim" refers to the altar and not to Aharon. So the question returns to its place: What does Rashi intend by adding the word "the altar"?
4. In addition to the above-mentioned points of precision in Rashi's comment in its own place here, there is also a difficulty from other places:
The phrase "Kodesh Kodashim" already appears earlier in the sedra13 in connection with the Outer Altar (whose holiness is, understandably, lesser than the holiness of the Inner Altar), and yet there Rashi does not pause to explain the phrase "Kodesh Kodashim."
And even if one were to read in, with difficulty, that Rashi, with his explanation there, "ומה היא קדושתו — כל הנוגע במזבח יקדש כו׳" ("And what is its holiness? — Whatever touches the altar shall become holy, etc."), intends to explain also the phrase "Kodesh Kodashim" — that the "Kodesh" (holiness) of the altar is for "Kodashim," that is, to make holy "whatever touches it"14 —
— nevertheless, further on, in Parshas Bamidbar,14* Rashi says plainly that all the vessels of the Mishkan (which were the load of the sons of Kehas), including "the altars" (the Inner Altar and the Outer Altar), are called "קדש הקדשים" ("holy of holies"), "המקודש בכולן" ("the holiest of them all") (the reason for which is understandable: because they are holier than the curtains and boards, etc. — the load of the sons of Gershon and the sons of Merari).
So it is not understood: What difficulty does Rashi have with the phrase "Kodesh Kodashim" in our verse, stated regarding the Inner Altar, when the phrase already appears even regarding the Outer Altar? Also: [OCR unclear] one can, after all, interpret it as holier than the curtains, etc.?15
5. The explanation of this is as follows:
What is difficult for Rashi in "Kodesh Kodashim Hu" of our verse is (not how it is possible to say "Kodesh Kodashim" of the altar, but on the contrary): Why must the verse say that it is "Kodesh Kodashim"? This is self-evident, all the more so in light of the Outer Altar!
And to this Rashi answers that with the words "Kodesh Kodashim" the verse gives a reason for the prohibition "You shall not offer, etc.": Since it is "Kodesh Kodashim" (among the "Kodashim" themselves it is "Kodesh" — it is holier than other kodashim, even than the Outer Altar), therefore it is consecrated only "for these things" (the ketores and the placing of the blood of the sin-offering of atonement), and one may not perform any other service upon it, so as not to lower it from its holiness.
And therefore Rashi says "for these things" and not "for these kodashim" — because the word "Kodashim" in the verse refers (not to the ketores and the placing of the blood, as one might learn at first glance, but) to the altar, that it is "Kodesh Kodashim."
And therefore Rashi says "The altar is consecrated, etc.," in order to emphasize the novelty the verse achieves by giving the reason "Kodesh Kodashim" for the prohibition "You shall not offer, etc.": This is not merely a reason; rather, the reason is also a defining element in the prohibition "You shall not offer" — that it is connected (not with the offering of foreign ketores, an olah, and so on, but) with the holiness of the altar:15* One may not lower the altar from its holiness.
6. In Rashi there are also "ענינים מופלאים" ("wondrous matters"),16 including from other parts of the Torah. We see this here, in how Rashi's explanation "The altar is consecrated, etc." resolves a difficulty in the halachic part of the Torah. By way of introduction:
The prohibition "לא תוכל לאכול בשעריך מעשר דגנך תירשך ויצהרך" ("You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil")17 is counted in the enumeration of the mitzvos as three separate prohibitions:18 One may not eat, outside Yerushalayim, maaser sheni of grain; maaser sheni of wine; and maaser sheni of oil. And when someone eats maaser sheni of grain, wine and oil (outside Yerushalayim), he incurs lashes three times.19
It is different with the prohibition "את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך" ("You shall not give him your money with neshech, nor give your food with marbis"),20 which is counted21 in the enumeration of the mitzvos as only one prohibition (and were it not a "לאו שניתן להשבון" — a prohibition subject to repayment — and lashes were incurred for it,22 one would incur lashes for it only once).23
And apparently, it should be the opposite: With "the tithe of your grain, your wine and your oil," the word "lo" ("not") is written only once; whereas with neshech and tarbis, "lo" is written twice ("You shall not give him your money with neshech, nor give your food with marbis"). So why is it counted as only one prohibition? The reason for this is stated:24 Because "אי אתה מוצא נשך בלא תרבית ולא תרבית בלא נשך" ("You do not find neshech without tarbis, nor tarbis without neshech"), neshech and tarbis are one matter,25 and consequently the two warnings (the two times "lo") are one command; it is just that the same command is repeated twice to strengthen the matter.26 This accords with the general rule27 regarding negative commands (and similarly regarding positive commands), that when one and the same prohibition appears in the Torah several times, although in transgressing it one transgresses "על אזהרות רבות" ("many warnings"), it counts (in the enumeration of the mitzvos) as one prohibition, because it is the same matter.
7. One could apparently ask about this: It is true that "neshech" and "tarbis," since they cannot exist one without the other, are "חדא מילתא" ("one matter"). However, since the verse also enumerates the particular items prohibited with neshech and tarbis, and they are different — "your money" and "your food" — and of money and food one cannot say "you do not find this one without that one," the prohibition of neshech and tarbis should be divided into two prohibitions: one prohibition on money and one prohibition on food — just as with the prohibition "You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil," which counts as three prohibitions: on grain, on wine, and on oil?
The reasoning in this is as follows:
The prohibition "You may not eat within your cities, etc." is (not on the general act of eating maaser sheni outside the wall, but) on the eating of maaser of grain, maaser of wine, and maaser of oil. [As is evident from the fact that the verse enumerates "your grain, your wine and your oil" and does not include them together with the phrase "לא תוכל לאכלם" ("You may not eat them").]28 And therefore they are three separate prohibitions.29
In contrast, the prohibition "You shall not give him your money with neshech, nor give your food with marbis" is not on the lending of money and food [for "You shall not give him your money with neshech" means not only money, and "nor give your food with marbis" means not only food; rather, both mean "כל דבר" ("anything")],30 but rather the prohibition is on the general act31 of lending with interest.32 And since, in the prohibited act of lending with interest, it makes no difference whether it comes about through money, through food, or through anything else, it is therefore counted as one prohibition.32
8. According to all the above, it would apparently have to follow, regarding the prohibition "לא תעלו עליו קטורת זרה ועולה ומנחה ונסך לא תסכו עליו" ("You shall not offer upon it foreign incense, nor an olah, nor a mincha, and you shall not pour a libation upon it") — where the verse does not state the prohibition in a general manner, "You shall not offer upon it a foreign offering," but details particulars: ketores, olah, mincha and nesech — that it should be divided into four33 separate prohibitions (like "the tithe of your grain, your wine and your oil").
And even if one were to say, regarding the first three particulars, that since they are all included in "You shall not offer upon it," the prohibition concerns the general act of offering upon the altar and not the offering of ketores, of olah and of mincha —
— nevertheless, regarding "nesech," which is not included in "You shall not offer," but about which it says separately, "לא תסכו עליו" ("You shall not pour upon it"),34 it should surely, apparently, follow that it is a separate prohibition: one prohibition — offering upon the altar; and a second prohibition — pouring libations upon the altar [in the language of the Minchas Chinuch:35 "the eating of the altar" and "the drinking of the altar"].
And in actual fact we see that all those who enumerate the mitzvos — the Rambam,36 the Semag37 (and this also appears to be the view of the Ramban)38 — count it as one prohibition.39 Why?
This is the question posed by the Minchas Chinuch, although etc., and he remains with a "צריך עיון גדול" ("this requires great further study").39* But according to Rashi's explanation, "The altar is consecrated, etc.," it is resolved simply:
As stated, Rashi learns that the verse itself explains the reason for the prohibition of "You shall not offer, etc., you shall not pour, etc.": that this is because the altar is "Kodesh Kodashim"; it is "consecrated for these things alone, and not for any other service."40 So it is understood that the prohibition here consists [not in the particulars — of ketores, olah and mincha, and nesech, or even in the particulars of the eating of the altar and the drinking of the altar — but] in performing upon it a matter for which it is not consecrated. And since in the prohibited act of performing "another service" upon it, it makes no difference whether it is done through ketores or through nesech, it is therefore counted as one prohibition (like the prohibition of lending with interest).
And according to this it will be understood why the verse does not state the prohibition "and not for any other service" explicitly, but rather says it in the words "Kodesh Kodashim," from which one derives — according to Rashi's commentary — "and not for any other service," by way of "מכלל הן אתה שומע לאו" ("from the affirmative you infer the negative"):41
Were the definition of the prohibition that one may not perform other services upon it, there would be room to say that each service is a separate prohibition. But since the definition of the prohibition consists in not altering the "affirmative" — the altar's being "consecrated for these things alone" — it makes no difference through which transgression one lowers42 the altar from its holiness.43
9. From among the matters of "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of the Torah")44 contained in our comment of Rashi:
The difference between the Inner Altar and the Outer Altar is explained in Chassidus:45 The Outer Altar is the level of Malchus of Atzilus as it descends into the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, which is why it stood not in the Heichal but in the courtyard (and in the Beis HaMikdash — in the Azarah). And the Inner Altar is the level of Tiferes of Atzilus, which is too high to descend into Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah, and therefore this altar was in the Heichal.
And this is also the reason why upon the Outer Altar they brought offerings, whereas upon the Inner Altar they only burned ketores (and it was forbidden to bring offerings upon it): for offerings are the matter of birurim, which applies only in the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah (since there evil exists, and therefore one must refine the good from the evil); but in Atzilus birurim are not applicable, since there "לא יגורך רע" ("No evil dwells with You").45 And that which the service upon the Inner Altar did consist of was ketores, whose essence is (not birurim, but) hiskashrus (bonding), from the expression "בחד קטירא אתקטרנא" ("With one bond I am bound")46 — to increase in the bond with the Almighty.
So it is, too, with the two levels of "Outer Altar" and "Inner Altar" within man [for all matters of the Mishkan and Mikdash exist also in the soul of man]:47 The Outer Altar is the level of the external aspect of the heart,48 and there the service of birurim is applicable (and required). The Inner Altar, however, is the level of the inner core of the heart,49 where the matter of birurim is not applicable, and the service that stems from the inner core of the heart is to bind oneself more deeply with the Almighty.
10. In plain terms: A Jew, a soul in a body, must occupy himself not only with Torah study and the fulfillment of mitzvos, but also with permitted matters such as eating and drinking. However, the permitted matters must be as the Mishnah49 says, "וכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים" ("All your deeds shall be for the sake of Heaven"), or higher still50 — "בכל דרכיך דעהו" ("In all your ways, know Him").51
One might think that since he does even the permitted matters "for the sake of Heaven" (and the true meaning of "for the sake of Heaven" is that his intent in doing the permitted matters is entirely for the sake of Heaven, with no other intentions whatsoever mingled in), and all the more so when, in the permitted matters themselves,52 he has "know Him" (knowledge of G‑dliness), he may then perform the physical matters with the inner core of the heart as well. To this we say that despite all this, since they are nevertheless "your deeds" and "your ways" (the deeds and ways of man), they must therefore be done "בלא לב ולב" ("without a heart and a heart"),53 not with both levels in the heart — the external aspect of the heart and the inner core of the heart — but only with the external aspect of the heart; the inner core of the heart must be used only for matters of holiness.54
And here Rashi adds that the definition of the prohibition "You shall not offer upon it an olah and a mincha, etc.," which in the spiritual service of man's soul means that one may not use the inner core of the heart for worldly matters, is: "The altar is consecrated for these things alone, (and consequently) not for any other service." That is, worldly matters (even when they are "for the sake of Heaven," and even in the manner of "know Him") must be so "distant" from the inner core of the heart, to the point that one need not negate them at all — just as one need not negate that a wisdom can be grasped with the hands55 (for the very negating of a certain thing shows that the thing does have some connection, only one must negate it)56 — but rather they should automatically be negated from the inner core of the heart: Because his inner core is "consecrated for these things alone," he is united with Torah and mitzvos in absolute union (in the manner of "alone"), and so he automatically has no connection to anything else — not even to something that is called "service" — because that is "another service."
11. According to the above, it is also understood — in the inner dimension of these matters — why the two warnings "You shall not offer upon it, etc."58 and "You shall not pour upon it"59 are counted in the enumeration of the mitzvos as one prohibition — although (because of the severity of the prohibition)57 "חלקן הכתוב לעבור עליו בשני לאוין" ("Scripture divided them, so that one transgresses it with two prohibitions"):
The differentiation among the mitzvos, the fact that they are numbered as 613, is at the level of mitzvos as they are drawn down in a revealed manner, at which point they are "ארחות הוי׳" ("the paths of the L‑rd"),50 in the plural — "תרי"ג ארחין" ("613 paths"). It is different with the mitzvos as they are from the standpoint of the Commander, the Master of the Will: there they are "אורח צדיקים" ("the path of the righteous"),59 in the singular — "חד ארחא" ("one path").60
There are, however, mitzvos in which, even after they are drawn down into the level of revealed will, the power of the Commander is felt more openly. It may be said that this is the reason why "You shall not offer" and "You shall not pour" are not divided into two separate mitzvos: because even as they are drawn down in a revealed manner, they are connected with the inner core of the heart, where the essence of the soul rests, the level of Yechidah, which is united with Atzmus.
With regard to reward and punishment in the spiritual realm, since spirituality is bound up with revelations, indeed "Scripture divided them, so that one transgresses it with two prohibitions" (which indicates a greater severity in the prohibition, and consequently greater spiritual reward and punishment). But in the count of the mitzvos (which concerns the command itself), and likewise regarding lashes (striking a Jewish body, for a Jewish body is bound up with Atzmus),61 it is only one prohibition — beyond differentiation.
12. Since all matters of the revealed part of the Torah (not only the halachos themselves, but also the methods of study) descend from their counterpart in the inner dimension of the Torah, it is understood from this that the revelation of the Essential Will, beyond differentiation, is drawn down specifically when the negation of worldly matters, from the standpoint of the inner core of the heart in man's service, is in the manner of an automatic consequence —
— just as in the revealed part of the Torah, the fact that "You shall not offer" and "You shall not pour" count as one prohibition stems from the definition of the prohibition being a result of "consecrated for these things alone," as stated above in section 8.
The explanation of this is as follows:
Within the inner core of the heart itself there are two levels:62
a) "הארת נקודת הלב" ("the radiance of the point of the heart") — and in general terms, the level of Chayah — which still has a connection with the revealed powers. At this level, although it is higher than the service of birurim, worldly matters (which one must refine) nevertheless have some standing, and one must negate them.
b) "עצמיות נקודת הלב" ("the essence of the point of the heart") — and in general terms, the level of Yechidah — which has no connection at all with the revealed powers, and consequently worldly matters are negated there automatically.
And this is the explanation of why the Essential Will that is beyond differentiation is revealed specifically when worldly matters are negated automatically:
As long as worldly matters still have some standing for a person and he must negate them, this is proof that only the level of Chayah has been revealed in him, which is not yet united in absolute union with Atzmus.
It is specifically when all matters other than G‑dliness are, for him, in the category of "another service," and negated automatically, because of the revelation of the level of Yechidah (in which there are no inclinations, etc.),63 that he arrives at the revelation of the Essential Will, for the Yechidah is united with the "Yachid" (the One) — "חבוקה ודבוקה בך כו׳ יחידה לייחדך" ("Embraced and cleaving to You, etc., the singular one who proclaims Your Oneness").64
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Tetzaveh, 5725.)
Notes
1) So it is in the first printing. It is also cited this way in the Re'em.
2) Our parsha, 30:6.
3) But the plain meaning of the text compels the difference between the holiness of "Kodesh" and the holiness of "Kodesh HaKodashim." And it says, "והבדילה הפרוכת לכם בין הקודש ובין קדש הקדשים" ("The curtain shall separate for you between the Holy and the Holy of Holies") (Terumah 26:33). This is so to such an extent that even the Kohen Gadol is forbidden to enter it except on Yom Kippur and under special conditions (beginning of Parshas Acharei and Rashi's commentary there; see also Rashi above, 29:30).
4) Our parsha, 30:9.
5) See Rashi's commentary, Shemini 11:3.
6) Malbim on the verse.
7) I, 26:13.
8) Or: to exclude the interpretation (Divrei Shaul, cited in Torah Sheleimah on the verse) that "Kodesh HaKodashim Hu" refers to Yom Kippur — "אחת בשנה" ("once a year").
9) Additionally: According to the interpretation that "Kodesh Kodashim" refers to Aharon, one must say that "Kodesh Kodashim" refers to the holiness of the Kohen Gadol, for "אין עבודת יוהכ"פ כשרה אלא בו" ("The Yom Kippur service is valid only through him") (Rashi above, 29:30); yet, simply understood, "And Aharon was set apart, etc., he and his sons forever" refers to all the sons of Aharon who were set apart for the priesthood, as the continuation of the verses indicates (Divrei HaYamim, ibid., 14), in contrast to the sons of Moshe, who "נקראו על שבט הלוי" ("were called among the tribe of Levi"). See also Rashi, Korach 16:3 and 5. Likewise regarding Yom Kippur (see the preceding note), we do not find in Scripture that it is called "Kodesh Kodashim."
10) And also in this verse itself, the meaning of "קרנותיו" ("its horns") is the horns of the altar, and likewise "עליו" ("upon it") refers to the altar.
11) As it begins, "ועשית מזבח" ("And you shall make an altar") — similar to "ועשו ארון" ("And they shall make an Ark") (Terumah 25:10), and with all of "the Tent of Meeting and its vessels."
12) Or the virtue of Yom Kippur, for the whole matter of Yom Kippur is mentioned here only incidentally, in connection with the laws of the altar. This is especially so since the verse says only "once a year" and does not specify its time.
13) 29:37. See also Parshas Tisa, 30:29: "והיו קדש קדשים" ("And they shall be holy of holies"), which refers to all the vessels of the Mishkan (including the altar of the olah and the laver, which were in the courtyard of the Mishkan).
14) It is a great strain to interpret this way, for besides the fact that in our parsha there, Rashi quotes (according to most printings, unlike the first printing) only "והי׳ המזבח קדש" ("And the altar shall be holy") and does not quote "Kodashim" (and in Parshas Tisa there he places his explanation (according to all printings) on "וקדשת אותם" ("And you shall sanctify them")) — had Rashi's intent been that "(Kodesh) Kodashim" refers not to the altar itself (but only that it is holy in order to sanctify whatever touches it), Rashi should have written this explicitly. This is especially so since the plain meaning of his words (in Parshas Tisa there), "משיחה זו מקדשתם להיות קדש קדשים" ("This anointing sanctifies them to be holy of holies"), implies that "Kodesh Kodashim" refers to the vessels themselves (and his explanation "And what is their holiness? Whatever touches, etc." is to explain how their holiness is expressed — for otherwise, what is the novelty in the verse? (Compare what is explained below, section 5.)).
14*) 4:4. See also Rashi there, verse 16.
15) It is plain that in this regard one cannot distinguish between "Kodesh Kodashim" and "Kodesh HaKodashim."
15*) At first glance one could ask: a) Since the prohibition in all of them is because they are "another service" — foreign to the altar — why is "זרה" ("foreign") stated specifically regarding the ketores? It should have said "foreign" after "nesech" or before "ketores"! b) Why did the verse need to detail — ketores (foreign), olah and mincha and nesech? It could have said briefly, "You shall not make foreign offerings upon it" (or the like), which would match what is said regarding the Outer Altar: "And this is what you shall do, etc., lambs, etc., and a tenth, etc., and a libation, etc."
However, Rashi already answered these questions in his commentary on the preceding verse, where he wrote: "לא תעלו עליו — על מזבח זה. קטרת זרה — שום קטורת של נדבה כולן זרות לו חוץ מזו. ועולה ומנחה — ולא עולה ומנחה, עולה של בהמה ועוף ומנחה היא של לחם" ("You shall not offer upon it — upon this altar. Foreign incense — any incense of a voluntary offering; all are foreign to it except for this one. And an olah and a mincha — and not an olah and a mincha; an olah is of animal or fowl, and a mincha is of bread"). For at first glance, what does Rashi teach us by all this? And why did he also quote "You shall not offer," when he explains only "upon it"? And why did he not explain what an olah and a mincha are — when they were mentioned before this? And there are further questions.
Rashi's intent (at least in brief) is: "You shall not offer upon it — upon this altar. Foreign ketores" (and there is a difficulty: if it is foreign, it is certainly forbidden everywhere. He answers that, on the contrary, it is holy, but it is a voluntary offering, and therefore) "they are foreign to it." But then there is a difficulty, for in that case everything listed in the verse is "foreign." He answers that the word "foreign" refers (not to the reason for the prohibition, but) to the ketores itself: Since there is a ketores that may be offered upon it, the verse had to specify "foreign ketores." This is also why the verse does not include "ketores" together with olah and mincha, for they differ: The prohibition regarding ketores is specifically in the case of "foreign," whereas "olah and mincha" have no permitted aspect. And since it must detail ketores (spices) separately, it likewise details the other kinds* separately: olah** (animal and fowl), mincha (bread), and nesech.
*) And it does not detail a chatas, etc., because it is not a separate kind. And its prohibition is simple — all the more so than an olah.
**) There is another point in this: Since regarding "olah" too it says (above, 29:18), "והקטרת" ("And you shall burn it"), and likewise, conversely, regarding "ketores" too it says here, "You shall not offer" — therefore he explains that "olah" is only of animal and fowl.
16) Shelah, in his Maseches Shevuos (161a).
17) Re'eh 12:17.
18) In the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 9, and in negative commands 141–143. (According to the Ramban (on Shoresh 9) — one prohibition.)
19) Kerisos, end of 4b. Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 9, negative command 143, and in Hilchos Maaser Sheni 2:5.
20) Behar 25:37.
21) In the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos, negative command 235.
22) See Rambam, Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh 4:3.
23) See Sefer HaMitzvos, above, Shoresh 9: "ומה שביארו שהוא חייב אחת על הכל נמנה אותו מצוה אחת" ("And that which they explained, that he is liable once for all of it, we count as one mitzvah").
24) Sefer HaMitzvos, above, negative command 235 (Bava Metzia 60b).
25) Similar to "שעטנז לא יעלה עליך" ("Shaatnez shall not come upon you") and "לא תלבש שעטנז" ("You shall not wear shaatnez") (Kedoshim 19:19; Seitzei 22:11): although they are distinct acts, nevertheless, since wearing is impossible without placing upon oneself, the placing is not counted as a separate prohibition and one does not receive lashes for it (Megillas Esther on Shoresh 9, s.v. "נראה לי שהנכון כדברי הרב שאין לוקין כו׳" ("It seems to me that the correct view is that of the Rav, that one does not receive lashes, etc.")).
26) Similar to "לא תפאר אחריך" ("You shall not glean after you") and "לא תעולל אחריך" ("You shall not pick the small clusters after you") (Seitzei 24:20–21), which are one prohibition, only that "האזהרה נכפלת במלות מתחלפות" ("the warning is doubled in varied words") (Rambam, in the above-mentioned Shoresh).
27) See at length in the above-mentioned Shoresh.
28) Makkos, beginning of 18a. Kerisos, there and onward. Rambam in Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 9 and negative command 143, and in Hilchos Maaser Sheni, there.
29) In the Rambam, in the above-mentioned Shoresh: "ואותן הלאוין שביארו שהוא חייב על כל אחד ואחד, הם שמנו כל דבר מהם מצוה בפני עצמה" ("And those prohibitions for which they explained that he is liable for each one are those of which we counted each item as a mitzvah of its own"). Apparently his intent is that from the fact that they explained that he is liable for each one, we know that the prohibition is on the particular items, as is written in the Rambam there: "ידענו שהם שמות הרבה" ("We know that they are many names").
30) Bava Metzia, there and onward. Rambam, Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, beginning of chapter 4.
31) In contrast, regarding "You may not eat within your cities the tithe of your grain, your wine and your oil," it may be said that the prohibition applies only to these three species. See Minchas Chinuch, end of mitzvah 457, who is in doubt about this.
32) Accordingly, the question of the Lechem Mishneh (Hilchos Malveh VeLoveh, there) is answered: "איך למד רבינו מזכרים אלו (שיש איסור נשך באוכל ורבית בכסף) דנשך ותרבית אחד" ("How did our master derive from these references (that there is a prohibition of neshech with food and of ribis with money) that neshech and tarbis are one?") — for if the prohibition of neshech applied only to money and the prohibition of ribis only to food, one would necessarily have to say that they are two different prohibitions (also in the enumeration of the mitzvos), as in the text above.
It may be said that this is also why, after the Rambam writes, "שנאמר את כספך . . כל דבר אשר ישך" ("As it says, 'Your money . . . anything that is lent with interest'"), he adds, "ולמה נקרא שמו נשך מפני שהוא נושך כו׳" ("And why is it called neshech? Because it bites, etc."), and only afterward concludes (the matter that "נשך ומרבית אחד הוא" ("neshech and marbis are one")), "ולמה חלקן הכתוב כו׳" ("And why did Scripture divide them, etc.") — for although the two prohibitions of neshech and marbis both apply to "anything," one could still say that they are two different prohibitions because of the "neshech" and the "marbis." He therefore adds that it is called neshech "מפני שהוא נושך שמצער את חבירו ואוכל את בשרו" ("because it bites, for he pains his fellow and eats his flesh"), from which it is understood that there cannot be neshech without tarbis, nor tarbis without neshech.
33) Or at least [OCR unclear] prohibitions, for since "olah and mincha" is a distinct kind (having no permitted aspect as ketores does — see above, note 15*), it is as if the verse had repeated "and not an olah, etc." Accordingly, one can explain what Rashi wrote, "And an olah and a mincha — and not an olah and a mincha": that is, as if it were written once more, "and not."33*
33*) In the Re'em and Sifsei Chachamim here: Rashi's intent is "שמלת לא דרישא דקרא משמש גם על עולה ומנחה" ("that the word 'not' at the beginning of the verse serves also for olah and mincha"). But according to this it is not understood: a) What does this teach us? b) In that case Rashi should have said, "And you shall not offer upon it an olah and a mincha."
34) Especially since it says "lo" ("not") once more regarding it.
35) Mitzvah 104.
36) Negative command 82. See also Hilchos Klei HaMikdash 2:11.
37) Prohibitions, section 295.
38) For in his glosses and in the negative commands according to the Ramban's view (at the end of the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos), he does not disagree with the Rambam on this.
39) The Ralbag, in his commentary on the Torah on this verse, counts them as two prohibitions, cites the Rambam's view, and concludes: "ודעתו רחבה מדעתנו" ("His understanding is broader than ours").
39*) Ibid. — Other works dealing with this are noted in Bris Moshe on the Semag, there.
40) Note the wording of the Rambam in Hilchos Klei HaMikdash, there: "מזבח הזהב . . מקטירין הקטרת . . ואין מקריבין עליו דבר אחר ואם הקטיר כו׳" ("The golden altar . . . the incense is burned . . . and nothing else is offered upon it; and if one burned, etc.") (and here he does detail particulars).
41) Rashi above, Yisro 20:12.
42) It may further be said in Halachah — according to the plain meaning and according to this comment of Rashi: a) Foreign ketores, an olah, etc., offered upon the Inner Altar have the law of having been offered in a place that is not consecrated (especially since Rashi emphasizes "alone"). Apparently this is the reasoning of the initial assumption in Zevachim (end of 59b). And it may be said that this also holds according to the conclusion there, based on what is written in the Shitah Mekubetzes there, "דירדו אלא כו׳" [OCR unclear].
b) From here comes a clarification of the inquiry whether Kodshei Kodashim also contain the holiness of Kodashim Kalim (with a practical difference for one who vows regarding the holiness of Kodashim Kalim (assuming the consideration of "follow the language of people" does not apply here), and the like). In any case, it remains in doubt whether a Kohen has the holiness of a Levi (since priesthood is included in Levite status [OCR unclear]), and all the more so whether terumas maaser has the holiness of maaser.
One could elaborate on all this, but this is not the place.
43) Hayom Yom, p. 24.
44) Torah Chaim, Shemos, s.v. "ועשו לי מקדש" (443a ff. — at length). Derech Mitzvosecha 86b.
45) Tehillim 5:5. — This refers to the world of Atzilus (see Likkutei Torah, Bamidbar 3c, and sources cited there).
46) Idra Zuta (Zohar III, 288a).
47) As understood from the saying of our Sages (cited in Likkutei Sichos, vol. 3, p. 906), "בתוכו לא נאמר אלא בתוכם בתוך כל אחד ואחד מישראל" ("It does not say 'within it' but 'within them' — within each and every Jew"). See Torah Chaim, there (443a), that the plural "within them" refers to the two levels in the heart of every Jew: the inner core of the heart and the external aspect of the heart.
48) Torah Chaim, there and onward. Derech Mitzvosecha, there. See also Likkutei Torah, Sukkos 78d; Shemini Atzeres 86d; and elsewhere.
49) Avos 2:2.
50) See at length Likkutei Sichos, vol. 3, pp. 907, 932.
51) Mishlei 3:6.
52) As in the words of the verse (Mishlei, there), "In all your ways." See Rambam, Hilchos Deos, beginning of chapter 5: "כשם שהחכם ניכר בחכמתו כו׳ כן צריך שיהי׳ ניכר (ה"חכם") במעשיו כו׳" ("Just as the wise man is recognizable by his wisdom, etc., so too he (the 'wise man') must be recognizable by his deeds, etc."), meaning that in the deeds themselves [in all ten categories* enumerated there] the "wise man" within him should be recognizable, for the true meaning of wisdom is knowledge of G‑dliness — "know Him."**
*) Corresponding to the ten powers in man, which descend (Tanya, beginning of chapter 3) from the ten Sefiros.
**) Based on what is explained in Likkutei Sichos, there, p. 932, that the service of "In all your ways, know Him" expresses the true concept of the unity that "אין עוד" ("there is nothing else"), it may be said that the meaning of "the wise man is recognizable, etc., by his deeds, etc." is the feeling that "הוא לבדו הוא ואין זולתו" ("He alone exists, and there is nothing besides Him") (see Tanya, chapter 35, in the gloss).
53) The language of the verse, Divrei HaYamim I, 12:33. See the maamar "כי עמך הסליחה" 5709, chapter 7.
54) See at length the maamar "וירד" 5662 and the maamar "בראשית ברא" 5705 (chapter 30): the refinement of permitted matters reaches only the level of "levush malchus," and only through the mitzvos is the level of "keser malchus" drawn down (see also Torah Or 91, end of side b; Shaarei Orah 64a). And since the root of souls is in the Essence (the level of keser malchus), their service (from the standpoint of the inner core of the heart) must be primarily not in the refinement of permitted matters but in Torah and mitzvos.
Nevertheless, the service of birurim is also necessary [the level of the Outer Altar, from which specifically they would bring glowing coals and place them on the Inner Altar (Rambam, Hilchos Temidin U'Musafin 2:4)], for this is a preliminary through which the soul afterward ascends to its actual true root (see Ohr HaTorah, Shemini Atzeres, p. 1806).
55) Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, chapter 9 (86b).
56) Along the lines of the well-known principle (see the maamar "תכלית חכמה" 5689, chapter 2) that knowledge by negation applies specifically to the level of Sovev, and not to the Essence of the Ein Sof light. See Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, there: "לא שייך כלל לומר בו שאי אפשר להשיגו" ("It is not at all applicable to say of Him that He cannot be grasped"). See there.
57) See the Rambam's Sefer HaMitzvos, Shoresh 9: "וכדי שיודע ג"כ שזה הענין עון גדול מאד אחר שבאו בו אזהרה אחר אזהרה" ("And also so that it be known that this matter is a very great sin, since warning upon warning came regarding it").
58) Tehillim 25:14.
59) Mishlei 4:18.
60) Idra Rabba (Zohar III, 129a). Cited and explained in the maamar "תקעו" 5691, chapter 7 (Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 1, 125a); the maamar "הוי׳ יחתו מריביו" 5707, chapter 4.
61) Toras Shalom, pp. 11, 120.
62) See at length Likkutei Torah, Seitzei 36a.
63) See the maamar of Parshas Vayakhel-Pekudei 5670, near the end.
64) The text of the liturgy, in the Hoshanos.
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that the inner core of a Jew's heart must be consecrated to Torah and mitzvos alone. Even permitted matters done for the sake of Heaven belong to the outer aspect of the heart, while the innermost point of the heart should be so united with G‑d that worldly matters simply have no place there and need no negating. It is precisely then that the Essential Will, beyond all differentiation, is revealed.