











Parshas Yisro
1. "ויהי ביום השלישי בהיות הבוקר ויהי קולות וברקים וענן כבד על ההר וקול שופר וגו׳ ויהי קול השופר וגו׳ והאלקים יעננו בקול" ("And it was on the third day, when it was morning, that there were voices and lightning and a heavy cloud upon the mountain and the voice of a shofar, etc.; and the voice of the shofar, etc.; and G‑d answered him with a voice")1 — five voices are mentioned here. On this the Gemara says2 that one who gladdens a chassan merits the Torah "שניתנה בחמשה קולות" ("which was given with five voices"), because in connection with a chassan too there are five voices:3 "קול ששון וקול שמחה, קול חתן וקול כלה, קול אומרים הודו את ה׳ צבאות" ("the voice of joy and the voice of gladness, the voice of the chassan and the voice of the kallah, the voice of those saying, 'Give thanks to the L‑rd of Hosts'").
It is plain that the reason one who gladdens the chassan merits Torah is that Torah and a chassan have a substantive connection with each other, by virtue of their essence and their subject4 (for it does not stand to reason to say that he merits Torah merely because Torah and a chassan happen to be alike in the number of five voices, and that apart from this there is no (inner) bond between them; rather) on the contrary: the fact that Torah and a chassan both have the same number of voices comes as a result of their being alike in their subject.
And as the Alter Rebbe indeed explains,5 the fact that one who gladdens the chassan "זוכה לתורה" ("merits Torah") is "מדה כנגד מדה" ("measure for measure"): Torah too (is called a "chassan" because it) bestows upon the Jewish people, in the manner of the bestowal of a chassan to a kallah.
And the reason the Gemara says "merits the Torah which was given with five voices" (even though this, seemingly, is no more than a side result, as mentioned above) is that the equal number of voices in a chassan and in Torah expresses6 their substantive connection, which comes from their very essence. That is: from the fact that "the Torah was given with five voices," just like the number of voices with a chassan, one sees (not only that Torah and a chassan are both "bestowers" — for which no proofs are needed — but also) that the bestowal of Torah to the Jewish people is of the same kind of bestowal: in the manner of the inner and higher bestowal of a chassan to a kallah, and not like the intellectual bestowal of a teacher to a student and the like — as will be explained below.
Now all matters in Torah are precise, and a matter in Torah is (by way of instruction); so too, what the Gemara says here (not simply "the same number of voices," but) "with five voices" is an instruction and a lesson for our subject.
2. To understand the special virtue expressed in the number of "five voices"7 (in which the special connection and comparison between Torah and a chassan is expressed), one must first explain the concept of a "voice" and its general content.
The substantive meaning of "voice" is: drawing down and revelation. "Voice" means, in general, that something which was previously concealed is drawn forth and revealed8 — similar to the voice of a person, which expresses and reveals his intellect or his emotions, and so on.
And just as a person's voice is measured and matched to the content that is revealed through it [as we see, for example, that the voice expressing a command — a higher and sterner voice — is different, and the voice bringing out an intellectual matter is different, for "דברי*8 חכמים בנחת נשמעים" ("The words of the wise are heard when spoken gently"),9 and the like10] —
so too, above,11 there are various "voices" (modes of drawing down), each different from the other, because each is matched to the matter that is drawn down through it.
From this it is understood that the Torah was given "with five voices" (five modes of drawing down) because in Torah there are five different matters, one higher than the other,12 each of which was drawn down through one of the five kinds of voices.
And this also explains why the wondrousness of Torah is expressed in the fact that the Torah was given with five voices. It is known13 that the general order of the chain of descent [seder hishtalshelus] is divided into four kinds of worlds (which are, by way of example, like the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking*13). And these four divisions exist not only in the worlds that come into being, but also, to make the distinction, in the Name Havayah (from the word mehaveh, "brings into being"14), which brings the worlds into being: there are four letters, which are the source of the four kinds of worlds15 (and in each world, of the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking16).
And since "אסתכל באורייתא וברא עלמא" ("He looked into the Torah and created the world"),17 and everything found in the order and vitality of the worlds exists in Torah and is derived from Torah, it is understood that in Torah too there are (the) four levels (of the Name Havayah).
And with this the wondrous virtue of Torah, expressed in the fact that it "was given with five voices,"18 is understood: together with the four levels of the Name Havayah, of the order of descent, there is in Torah also a fifth matter, which is higher than the Name Havayah (even than the yud of the Name Havayah) — as stated explicitly at the Giving of the Torah (which proceeded in order from above to below): "אנכי" ("I") (the One Who is I, Who "is not grasped in any name and is not alluded to in any letter or stroke at all"19), "הוי׳" (Havayah) (etc.), "אלקיך" ("your G‑d") (your strength20 and your vitality21). And all five matters of Torah, including that which is higher than the Name Havayah, were given here below; this is the meaning of "was given with five voices."
3. Since we have no grasp of spiritual matters, to take them in as they are in themselves, but only through the physical matters that descend from them can we have some kind of conception of their source as well22 — that is, of the spiritual matters — therefore, in order to have a concept of what the four letters of the Name Havayah mean [and through this, of the great wondrousness of the Torah that "was given with five voices," in that this is higher than the Name Havayah, as mentioned above], one can also understand it from the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking here below, which are "כנגד23 ד׳ אותיות שם הוי׳ ב״ה שממנו מושפעים" ("corresponding to the four letters of the Name Havayah, blessed be He, from which they receive their flow").
The difference between "inanimate" and "vegetative" is this: in an inanimate thing one sees only the matter of the body, without any vital movement, even though it too has an inanimate soul, a soul and spiritual vitality;24 with a plant, however, it is already recognizable that it has vitality within it (spiritual vitality, which cannot be felt with the five senses).
And this difference is (in a certain sense) far greater than the difference between "vegetative," on the one hand, and "animal" and "speaking,"25 for the last three categories have a "common side" among them, in that in all of them the spiritual vitality comes to revelation (and the difference is only in the manner of revelation, as will be explained below), whereas in the inanimate there is no revelation of spirituality at all.
Nevertheless, in their general comparison, the vegetative is closer to the inanimate than to the animal and the speaking,26 so much so that when the four levels of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking are divided into the two general categories of "body" and "soul," the vegetative is counted in the category of "body" together with the "inanimate," and not in the category of "soul," to which the animal and the speaking belong.27 And as the name itself says: "vegetative" [tzome'ach] is not "living" [chai]. And to such an extent that until after the Flood one had to eat plants, and it was forbidden to eat animals.28
The explanation of this is: in the category of the animal, (a) the vitality is that of a soul, which is why an animal possesses the power of will29 (in which "soul" is expressed30), and (b) its body too31 is automatically32 affected by the will of the soul, because it is united33 with it,34 to the point that its essence is (not matter, but) soul;35
whereas with a plant, not only does its vitality effect no change in the essence of the body, but the vitality itself is a bodily vitality, for its entire function is only that it makes the body grow and enlarges it.
4. This difference between the vegetative and the animal is expressed (among other things) also in this: the vitality (growth) of a plant depends on its being rooted in a specific place (and if one tears it from its place, the "vegetative" quality it had is "lost"); but an animal, with its vitality, is not subject to this limitation35 of a specific place.
The reason for this is: something "physical" is defined by "place," and since the vitality of a plant is a bodily vitality, as mentioned above, it is therefore defined by a specific place. The "animal," however, since its vitality is spiritual, as mentioned above, is therefore not so defined by place.
5. Just as with the two categories of inanimate and vegetative, although both belong to the category of "body," the difference between them is (in a certain sense) far greater than the difference between the vegetative and the animal (as mentioned above, section 3), so too (and even more so) it is with regard to the two levels of the category of soul, animal and speaking: the speaker is utterly set apart from the animal. For he (man) is the choicest of creatures, and all creatures (including the category of animal) were created for the sake of serving man.36
And just as the point that sets the inanimate apart from all other categories (including the vegetative) is expressed in that one sees only the matter of the body of the inanimate thing (as mentioned above, there), so too at the other extreme: the point that sets the speaking species apart from all creatures (including the category of animal) is that in the speaker the true concept of "soul" and spirituality is evident, as will be explained below.
6. The true concept of "spirituality" is being divested of a specific definition through which one could "touch" and grasp the spiritual entity, even with the faculties that are higher than the five senses, which "take in" a physical thing. For although a spiritual thing too has a certain definition that establishes its existence and that separates it from another spiritual thing,37 nevertheless, by virtue of its "spirituality" (and refinement), there is felt in it a "simplicity"38 that is too high to come down into being grasped.39
And this "simplicity" which is felt in a spiritual thing is expressed in several ways, among them:
a) A spiritual thing does not contradict another existence;40 as one sees in subtle and abstract lines of reasoning: the finer and more spiritual the reasonings are, the less they oppose one another.41
b) Because of its spirituality it is drawn higher than itself (as one finds even in the spirituality within the physical — for example, fire, the finest of the four elements,42 which, because it is spiritual,43 has by nature44 "ascent upward"45), because its true function45 is not to remain standing in its own existence, but on the contrary, to go out of its existence and become absorbed in its source above.
7. And this is the explanation of why specifically the speaking species has within it the true essence of soul and spirituality: the advantage of man over the "animal" is the intellect that he possesses46 — and by virtue of this he has the two virtues mentioned above:
(a) Intellect is not defined by, and not subject to, the definition of the nature of the emotions. Therefore, since man possesses intellect,47 he is not compelled to remain in the line toward which he has an inclination in his inborn nature48 (like all other creatures, who cannot change their nature49); rather, he has free choice to select whichever path he wishes.
And this is also the reason that man includes within himself all the kinds that exist in creation [which is why he is called an "עולם קטן" ("a small world")]50 — because he is not limited by definitions.51
(b) The property of intellect to (step away from itself and) draw toward what is higher than itself. In this too lies the principal difference between a person (whose function is intellect) and, to make the distinction, an animal (whose function is emotion): "רוח האדם העולה היא למעלה ורוח הבהמה היורדת היא למטה" ("the spirit of man rises upward and the spirit of the beast descends downward")52 — an animal is drawn to physical matters (matters of "below"), and a person is drawn to what is higher than himself.
8. From the fact that man is a "small world" (as mentioned above, section 7) it is understood that all four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking into which the "great world" is arranged also exist, and stand openly,53 in the small world of man, and not only in his body but also in his soul. And as stated in Chassidus,54 letters are the level of the inanimate in the soul, emotions the vegetative, intellect the animal, and the root of the power of speech the speaker.
The explanation of this is:
The concept of "letters" [osiyos] (from the expression "אתא55 בוקר" ("morning has come")56) is drawing down and revelation. That is, "letters" differ from the other powers of the soul in that all the other powers touch the person himself (like emotions, for example, which characterize the person: whether he is a man of kindness or a person of the line of severity), whereas letters are merely the vessels through which his powers are drawn down and revealed, but they do not touch the person himself.57
And because letters are an external matter, the light of the soul is enclothed in them in a constricted manner and in utter concealment, to the point that no vitality at all is felt in them (openly), not even the vitality of growth — and for this reason they are called "inanimate."
And by virtue of this point, the difference between letters and all the other powers of the soul is far deeper than the distinction among the other powers of the soul themselves. For all the other powers, since they touch and express the person himself, have the light of the soul openly within them (and the difference among them is only in the amount and manner of the revelation, as will be explained below); but the letters, whose whole matter is only drawing down and revelation, are therefore already like an existence removed from the soul
(similar to the inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking of the "great world," where, because of the detail that in the category of the inanimate no vitality whatsoever is visible, its separateness from the other categories is much stronger than the division among the categories of vegetative, animal and speaking themselves, in all of which their vitality is indeed recognizable).
9. The second category, the "vegetative" of the soul — the emotions — although they do touch the soul, as mentioned above, and are therefore not "inanimate things" like the letters (on the contrary, one plainly sees that emotions have great heat and excitement within them), nevertheless the vitality in "emotions" is not equal, and is beyond comparison unequal, to the vitality in "intellect":
For this very fact — that the character of emotions is "hispaalus," excitement (hispaalus from the word peulah, "action"), that the emotions stir up a person and he "goes out" of his state and condition, unlike intellect, where the many concepts a person grasps do not take him out of his condition and he remains calm — is itself a proof that emotions touch not where the soul is by itself, but where the soul already stands in connection with another. And in this consists the excitement of the emotions:
The matters of another, the virtues of the other or the opposite of this, affect a person in such a way that he is drawn to that other thing with an attraction of love, or he flees from it with a feeling of fear.
And in this detail — that emotions reach only to the level at which the soul stands in connection with another, unlike intellect, which has to do with the soul as it is in itself — the emotions are closer to letters than to intellect, because both letters and emotions are not bound up with the soul as it is by itself, and (consequently) both have a connection to the "other." (It is only that in letters there is merely the drawing down from the soul, while in emotions the soul is also felt, as it comes into being drawn down.)
And this is similar to the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking in the "great world": the vegetative category, since it has a bodily vitality, therefore belongs together with the inanimate to the category of "body," as mentioned above, and not to the category of "soul," to which the animal and the speaking belong.
And just as the difference between the "vegetative" and the "animal" is that the "vegetative" must stand in a fixed place and the "animal" can move itself to whatever place it wishes (as mentioned above, section 4) — so it is also with regard to "emotions" and "intellect" (the "vegetative" and "animal" of the "small world"):
Emotions in themselves (including also the intellect that pertains to the emotions) have a fixed definition from which they cannot depart: one whose nature is in the line of kindness (love) must, by his emotional nature, remain in that line; it is only that within that line itself there is growth from smallness to greatness — the smaller love grows and later becomes a greater love. And the same is true also in the line of severity, and so on.
It is different with intellect. Not only is intellect itself not so defined in a certain line (and as one sees, a person can also understand a matter that he cannot tolerate, even by the nature of his intellect), but, even more, by virtue of the truth and essence of intellect (that is, the level that is above the intellect pertaining to the emotions) he can effect a change even in the definitions and nature of the emotions.58 And within intellect itself there are many people who are at once wise, understanding and knowing [a chacham, a meivin and a daatan] — unlike with the emotions of kindness, severity, etc. (unless the intellect mixes in59).
10. After all this, however, intellect too is no more than the level of "animal" in the soul of man; and the chief virtue of the category of "speaker" (which is utterly set apart from the category of the animal) is expressed in the (root of the) power of speech in the soul, which is why man is called by the name "speaker" and not by the name "intellectual."60
The explanation of this is:
The "spirituality" and "simplicity" that exist in a person by virtue of his intellect, which gives him the power to go beyond definitions and to be able to choose whichever path he wishes, even one not according to his nature (and even to the point of changing the nature itself), is nevertheless a simplicity still bound up with existence. For even when a person chooses (by virtue of his intellect) something contrary to the nature of his emotions, this comes about because that is what the existence of his understanding obligates.
[And similarly with the second matter in which the "spirituality" of a person is expressed (by virtue of his intellect) — that "the spirit of man rises upward": although by being drawn higher than himself he goes out of his existence, nevertheless, since this comes about because intellect understands the superiority of what is higher than it (for intellect itself compels the conclusion that it is limited and that there are matters above intellect), his "existence" is mixed in that very thing.]
In the "power of speech," however, since a person is not here defined by his own existence and he can speak with another — for this absence of definition is not bound up with the person's existence (since the power to speak with another does not come from his existence obligating him to occupy himself with another, but because the root of the power of speech is in so high a place in the soul, where there is no definition at all, not even the one that separates him from the other) — therefore the truth of the spirituality and simplicity of the soul is expressed in the power of speech.
11. This explanation of the essence and manner of division of the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking (in the "great world" and in the "small world") gives us a certain understanding of the difference among the four worlds — Asiyah, Yetzirah, Beriah and Atzilus:
The first61 beginning of "yesh" [existence] is in the world of Beriah. But since the "ayin" [nothingness] still shines in the world of Beriah, it is felt there that the truth is not the "yesh" but the "ayin" that brings it into being; and because of this feeling it becomes nullified from its selfhood [similar to the category of the animal, whose body is nullified to the soul, to the point that its essence is soul (as mentioned above, section 3), or like the existence of intellect (the animal within man), which is drawn higher than itself and thereby "loses" its own existence].62
And for this reason the "yesh" of Beriah is a "חומר הפשוט" ("simple matter"), which has no form — unlike the "yesh" in Yetzirah and Asiyah, which already has form: in Yetzirah a general form, and in Asiyah a particular form [similar to the vegetative and inanimate, in which their "body" is felt, as mentioned above, there, that in the vegetative too the body is not nullified to its vitality; or like letters and emotions, in which the concept of the "other" is felt] —
but even so, the "simple matter" of Beriah too is a "yesh," and its "simplicity" is merely a simplicity of existence — "simple matter" (similar to the simplicity of intellect, in which the simplicity itself is also an existence, as mentioned above, section 10).
The world of Atzilus, however, is actual G‑dliness,63 which is utterly divested of existence, the level of "ayin."
12. Just as in the four worlds of Atzilus, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah — although they (including the spiritual world of Asiyah) are spiritual worlds, nevertheless there is a certain correspondence between the four divisions in the worlds and the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking (not only those in the soul, but even those of the "great world") in the physical —
so too it is in the root and source that brings into being and gives life to (and consequently is far higher than) the four worlds: the four letters of the Name Havayah. In them too there is a resemblance (though, of course, with a superiority that is "beyond comparison") to the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking, which receive their flow from them after a multitude of stages of descent, contractions and lowerings.
From this it is understood that all four letters (including the yud as well) are not yet the true simplicity of the Infinite Light, blessed be He, since they have some connection to the existence of definitions.
And this is the superiority of Torah that is expressed in its having been "given with five voices": this shows that it also contains the fifth level, which is higher than all (four) possible definitions — the true simplicity, which is the essence of Torah as it is united with the Essence of the Infinite Light, blessed be He.
And this also explains why the connection of "chassan" to "Torah" consists in the fact that both have the same number of five voices: because in a chassan too, the power of procreation (for "פרו ורבו" ("be fruitful and multiply") is the ultimate purpose of marriage64) expresses the "power of the Infinite,"65 which is higher than, and abstracted from, the "existence" of the definitions of the four categories mentioned above.
13. However, despite the great superiority of the level of essence and simplicity in Torah, which is higher than the four letters of the Name Havayah, the Torah was nevertheless given "with five voices." That is, at the Giving of the Torah there were given also the levels that pertain to the letters of the Name Havayah, and even more: the fifth and higher level was given together with the other four levels — for the Torah as a whole was given "with five voices."
And the reason for this is: through the four levels of Torah, the four levels of Nefesh, Ruach, Neshamah and Chayah are aroused; and through the essence of Torah, the level of Yechidah is aroused, which is bound up with the "Yachid" [the One Alone] —
and therefore all five levels of Torah were given together,66 so that the level of Yechidah should shine also in the four levels of Nefesh, Ruach, Neshamah and Chayah — the existence of man — through which he has the power to make of the world (which is arranged in the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking) a dwelling place for His very Essence, may He be blessed.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Metzora, 5717.)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 19:16-19.
2) Berachos 6b.
3) Yirmiyah 33:11.
4) See also Chiddushei Aggados of the Maharsha there: "כי נתינתה היא היתה יום שמחת לבו וחתונתו עם ישראל" ("for its giving was the day of the joy of His heart and of His wedding with Israel").
5) Likkutei Torah, Berachah 94a.
6) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 57, the explanation of the saying of our Sages (Pirkei d'Rabbi Eliezer ch. 32), "עשר ברכות . . כנגד עשרה מאמרות" ("Ten blessings . . corresponding to the Ten Utterances") [and similarly in many sayings of our Sages regarding two matters equal in number], that the connection of the "blessings" and the "utterances" comes from their very essence [and this itself is the reason for their equality in number]. And the fact that they said "ten . . corresponding to ten, etc." is because in several matters the way we come to know proceeds from what comes later (the effect) to what comes earlier (the cause). See there at length.
7) See the maamar of the Alter Rebbe (Lehavin Inyan Heh Kolos)* and several explanations on this subject — in Ohr HaTorah of the Tzemach Tzedek on the verse "וכל העם" ("And all the people") (p. 958 ff.), and sources cited there.
*) Maamarei Admur HaZaken 5565, p. 43.
8) See Torah Or 74, beginning of column c; Likkutei Torah, Naso 29, end of column a ff.; and elsewhere. On the approach of philosophy and Kabbalah to these voices in particular, see Moreh Nevuchim II, ch. 33; Avodas HaKodesh part 4, ch. 31 (who challenges him); and elsewhere; Ohr HaTorah of the Tzemach Tzedek mentioned above, and sources cited there.
*8) Koheles 9:17.
9) See the maamar Shoftim 5672; Tik'u 5707, section 3.
10) Similar to what is said: "קול ענות גבורה . . חלושה . . קול ענות" ("the sound of a cry of might . . weakness . . the sound of a cry") (Ki Sisa 32:18).
11) See Tehillim (29:3 ff.) and the words of our Sages there.
12) With this one can reconcile the above-mentioned saying of our Sages that the Torah was given with five voices with the saying of our Sages (Shemos Rabbah, end of ch. 28; see also Ramban here) that it was with seven voices: for all those are in one "place," the emotions. See also Recanati here.
13) Note also Moreh Nevuchim II, ch. 10.
*13) See at length the maamar Chavivin Yisrael 5696; Eizehu Chacham 5702, section 5; and in many places.
14) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, beginning of ch. 4.
15) Likkutei Torah, Masei 94a, and sources cited there.
16) Tanya ch. 38 (50b). See also Torah Or 3, end of column d ff., and Toras Chaim, Bereishis 19, beginning of column c ff. — the explanation of the connection of the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking to the four letters.
17) Zohar II, 161a-b.
18) See similarly Ohr HaTorah, Yisro, pp. 961-962.
19) Likkutei Torah, Pinchas 80b. See also Zohar III, 256b.
20) Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim, siman 5.
21) See Torah Or, beginning of Parshas Yisro (67b).
22) See Sefer HaSichos 5702, p. 76 ff.; Sefer HaSichos 5703, p. 148 ff.; and elsewhere. See also above, note 6.
23) Tanya, there.
24) Shaar HaYichud VehaEmunah, ch. 1. And on all of the above, see Etz Chaim, at its end.
25) And similarly in the four worlds of Atzilus, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah (which are analogous to the four categories of inanimate, vegetative, animal and speaking, as mentioned above, section 2): regarding Asiyah it is said (Yeshayah 43:7) "אף עשיתיו" ("I have even made him") (which breaks off the subject), because action is a thing separate unto itself (Likkutei Torah, beginning of Parshas Balak, and in many places).
26) This matter too is found in the four worlds of Atzilus, Beriah, Yetzirah and Asiyah; see below, note 62.
27) See Tanya, there (51a). See also the notes of the Rebbe (Rashab), of blessed memory, on Tanya, end of ch. 6 ("Kitzurim VeHaaros," p. 115): "He did not say 'soul' of the inanimate and the vegetative, but of the speaking and the animal he did say 'soul.'"
28) Sanhedrin 59b (cited in Rashi, Noach 9:3). See also Sanhedrin 57a, at the beginning. And even afterward there is the prohibition of a limb and flesh from a living animal, unlike a plant, which one may eat even while it is attached to the ground.
29) See Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, end of ch. 3, and the commentary there.
30) As it is said (Yirmiyah 15:1), "אין נפשי אל העם הזה" ("My soul is not toward this people"), and Rashi explains, "My will."* See also the notes mentioned above, there: "In the inanimate and the vegetative, which have no will or sensation . . it is not called soul." See there.
*) This proof is cited in Torah Or 36b; Kitzurim, there; and in many places in Chassidus. On the precise point of this particular proof, see the note in Sefer HaMaamarim 5709, p. 227.
31) "בלי שום ציווי ואמירה להן" ("Without any command or instruction to them") (Tanya, beginning of ch. 23).
32) See Torah Or 13, end of column c, and in many places.
33) This is the difference between the nullification of the body to the soul and the nullification of a chariot to its rider: the chariot, being a thing separate from the rider (only that it is nullified to him), needs the rider to steer it, whereas the limbs of the body, being united with the soul, [OCR unclear] automatically to the will of the soul (the maamar Kol Machlokes [OCR unclear]).
34) As is known (the maamar Ki Imcha 5700, ch. 2, and in many places), soul and body, relative to each other, are essence and existence. Note also the fact that a living creature carries itself* and does not feel itself (see the maamar Yechayeinu MiYomayim 5701, ch. 2).
*) Shabbos 94a. And even according to the view of the Rabbis there (and this is the halachah — Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, siman 308, section 80) that one who carries out a domesticated animal, wild animal or bird is liable, that is because they let themselves drop, meaning that they make themselves heavy so as to slip out of the hand of the one carrying them (Rashi there); but this has no bearing on their soul.
35) Unlike the limitation of "adnei hasadeh" (Kilayim ch. 8, halachah 5). See also Etz Chaim, Shaar 42, at the beginning, that it is intermediate "between the vegetative and the animal."
36) As our Sages said (Mishnah, end of Kiddushin), "לא נבראו אלא לשמשני" ("They were created only to serve me") (and it lists there beasts and birds).
37) See Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 2:5-6.
38) See the maamar Lulav VaAravah 5659, that the main form of the soul's powers comes through their being enclothed in the limbs of the body. And although one must say that the powers in themselves also have some form (for the soul as it is above also has comprehension and excitement of the emotions), "in truth the matter is wondrous to us, and we do not know at all how there is a form of powers there and in what way they exist. That there should be some form in a spiritual thing entirely abstracted from matter and garment — this we do not understand at all, how it could be there, and in what way the form there exists." And from what is cited in the next note it is understood that even the form of the powers after their enclothement in the limbs of the body is not a complete form.
39) See the letter of the Previous Rebbe (printed at the end of Kuntres HaAvodah, p. 54): "the spiritual is not defined by a partition of stones . . by sights of colors . . by tastes of sweetness . . if so, in all three kinds of love there are found matters that resemble one another." Seemingly: the differences among the three kinds of love are spiritual definitions, so what proof is there, from the spiritual not being defined by the definitions of "matter and form," that within the three kinds of love there are branches that resemble one another? Rather, it must be that by virtue of the simplicity of the spiritual, although each of the three kinds of love is defined in its own subject, nevertheless it must be said that it also includes the other kinds. This requires further study.
40) In addition to the fact that several spiritual things exist in one place (see Likkutei Torah, Nitzavim 49a; the maamar Ki Chelek 5694 (5711), ch. 6; Kuntres Limud HaChassidus, ch. 17 ff.) — though from this there is no real proof, for this inclusion is (not in their very essence, only) in that they are found and rest in the same place — in addition, even in their very essence they are not so defined and formed, as in the previous note.
41) See the maamar Shelach 5672.
42) Note what is explained in many places, that among the four elements — fire, air, water and earth — the element of fire corresponds to the category of the speaker (Toras Chaim, Bereishis 19c; and in the maamar Noach 5666 (beginning of p. 115), that in Tanya, beginning of ch. 9, [OCR unclear] this view, which is the view of Etz Chaim, Shaar Drushei ABYA, ch. 1) and to the world of Atzilus (Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 4d; Ohr HaTorah, Yisro, p. 826; the maamar Zeh HaYom 5660; and VeHar Sinai 5662, near its beginning).
43) See also Bamidbar Rabbah 14:12; Tanya, there. And according to what is said in the text, that this nature comes from its spirituality, it may be said that this is also why the Alter Rebbe is precise in Tanya, there, "that the light of the fire desires by nature, etc.": for although the matter of fire too is spiritual (relative to water, air and earth), this spirituality does not resemble the spirituality of the light of the fire. He therefore specifies that what desires to separate from the wick and cleave to its root is (primarily) the light of the fire.
44) The maamar Kevod Malchuscha 5661.
45) See there, that what is said in Tanya, there, "it desires by its nature," implies that its nature of ascent is [not (like something added to it) because it senses the superiority of its source, but rather] that by virtue of the very essence of the spirituality (the state of non-existence) within it, it wishes to be in a state of complete non-existence. It requires study whether this can be reconciled with what is cited in many places, that everything is drawn to its root, and therefore earth falls down, etc., and fire rises up, etc. Perhaps this is the difference between the matter of fire and its light.
46) See Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah 4:8; the maamar Vayavo Amalek 5709, end of ch. 1 ff. (based on the Rambam's Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah), and in many places. This is also implied in Tanya ch. 38 (51, end of column a). See below, section 10, that the chief advantage of man (in which he is distinct from the animal) lies in the (root of the) power of speech within him, which is why he is called "speaker." And in Torah Or 3, end of column d: "and in the speaker there is added, beyond them all, the rational soul, the speaking soul."
47) In Likkutei Torah, Emor (38b), that the power of choice in man comes from the indwelling of the Infinite Light within him [which is higher than the level of Chochmah, Binah and Daas — see there, column a]. But from what is explained there, that the indwelling of the Infinite Light is specifically in the world of Tikkun, it is understood that this pertains to intellect (enclothed in intellect?), for Tikkun is chiefly intellect [mochin]. See also Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah, beginning of ch. 5 (cited in Likkutei Torah, there), that he by himself knows, etc., and does whatever he desires. See also Tanya, there: "the speaker, who possesses intellect and choice." See also Toras Chaim, Toldos 17b ff. And see at length the maamar Min HaMeitzar 5660 and the maamar following it.
48) See the Rambam's Eight Chapters, beginning of ch. 8; Lechem Mishneh, Hilchos Teshuvah, there, halachah 4; Toras Chaim, there, 17a; Shaar HaBechirah of the Mitteler Rebbe, end of ch. 7.
49) Seemingly one could say that this is because the nature in an animal is a complete form, unlike man, who is only (in the language of the Rambam, there) "prepared for a virtue or a deficiency." But (a) since in man too the predisposition is such that he inclines toward this [to the extent that because of this predisposition he is called wicked in Scripture (see Tehillim 58:4: "זורו רשעים מרחם" ("The wicked are estranged from the womb"))], he needs a special power to be able to choose against his inclination. (b) The very fact that the predisposition in man is not a complete form comes from [his root in the level (of [OCR unclear]) that is above defined form (as explained in Toras Chaim, there)] the root of the power of choice within him.
50) See Bereishis Rabbah ch. 8 and [OCR unclear]; Koheles Rabbah ch. 1; and at length, Avos d'Rabbi Nosson, end of ch. 31.
51) Likkutei Torah, Emor 36c ff., and elsewhere.
52) Koheles 3:21. And note the maamar Shechorah Ani 5702: "The animal has never seen the heavens and does not know that there are heavens."
53) Unlike the levels of the vegetative and the inanimate. See the maamar Lehavin Inyan . . HaNekudim Hema, etc., of the Alter Rebbe (Maamarei Admur HaZaken 5568, p. 114; also a separate kuntres, Brooklyn 5731), near its end.
54) [OCR unclear] 4a ff.; Likkutei Torah, Chukas 58a; Torah Or, Bereishis 19d ff.; the maamar Chavivin Yisrael 5696; Eizehu Chacham 5702, ch. 5.
55) Yeshayah 21:12.
56) Torah Or 42b, and elsewhere.
57) This is why they are called "garments" (see at length the glosses of the Rebbe (Rashab) on Torah Or, the maamar Pasach Eliyahu (Kehos, 5741), at the beginning; the maamar VeHaEven HaZos 5673 (in Hemshech 5672, vol. 1); and in many places).
58) See Derech Mitzvosecha 84a; Ohr HaTorah, Mishpatim, p. 1134 (and there, that this is the level of Beriah).
59) Note the Sifri on the verse "ואהבת" ("And you shall love") (Va'eschanan 6:5): "אין אהבה במקום יראה ויראה במקום אהבה אלא במדת הקב״ה בלבד" ("There is no love in the place of fear and fear in the place of love except in the attribute of the Holy One, blessed be He, alone").
60) See Sefer HaMaamarim 5628, p. 166; Hemshech VeChachah 5637, ch. 22; Torah Sheleimah, p. 245. Sometimes it is explained that he is called "speaker" because speech is the beginning of man's superiority (the maamar BaChodesh HaShlishi 5702, ch. 4).
61) On all this see the maamar Tzaaku 5688, and in many places.
62) See the letter of the Previous Rebbe (in the name of his father, the Rebbe Rashab) about the Alter Rebbe's niggun of four stanzas (printed in "HaTamim" vol. 5, p. 61 [243]; his Igros Kodesh vol. 2, p. 213 ff.), that the reason the third stanza leads not to the second but to the fourth is that "the world of Beriah is closer in its connection to the world of Atzilus than to the world of Yetzirah." And there (p. 63 [244]; Igros Kodesh, p. 217), that the practical outcome of the third stanza is in the manner of negation and abstraction.
63) Tanya, beginning of ch. 49.
64) To such an extent that this is why the blessing Shehecheyanu is not recited with the marriage blessings (gloss of the Maharsha on Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah, siman 28, Shach, sub-paragraph 5). See Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 118 (end), and the notes there.
65) Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 40a.
66) It may similarly be said that this is because when the revelation is of Yechidah (and Yachid), everything is revealed all at once. See the maamar Lehavin Inyan Klei HaNekudim Hema, etc. (mentioned above, note 53).
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that the Torah was given to us not only in the four levels that parallel the letters of the Name Havayah, but also in its very Essence, above all definition, which is the meaning of "with five voices." Because all five were given together, the Yechidah of the soul shines into a person's ordinary faculties, and this gives every Jew the power to make this world, with its four categories of existence, a dwelling place for G‑d's very Essence.