Parshas Beshalach
1. On the pasuk1 "וישב הים לפנות בקר לאיתנו" ("And the sea returned toward morning to its strength"), the Midrash2 says that when G‑d created the sea, He made a condition with it: it must split for the Jewish people when they would need to cross it. And this is what the pasuk means by "the sea returned etc. to its strength" ("לאיתנו" has the same letters as "לתנאו"3) — "לתנאו שהתניתי עמו מתחילה" ("to its condition, which I stipulated with it from the beginning").
But this is not understood. The pasuk "the sea returned etc. to its strength" speaks (not about the splitting of the sea, but the opposite) of how, after "ויבקעו המים" ("and the waters split"), the sea went back to its earlier state, as it was before the Splitting of the Sea. So how can the Midrash say that "returned etc. to its strength" means "to its condition" — to the condition that it should split?
Commentators4 answer that the condition G‑d made with the sea (that it split for the Jewish people) was that if it did not split, it would no longer contain any water [similar to what R. Pinchas ben Yair said to the River Ginai5 (when the river did not want to split for him): "אם אי אתה חולק גוזרני עליך שלא יעברו בך מים לעולם" ("If you do not divide, I decree upon you that water shall never pass through you")].
On this basis they explain the Midrash's statement "the sea returned to its strength — to its condition": the sea's returning "to its strength" came about because it had fulfilled "its condition," for had it not fulfilled the condition, its existence would have ceased.
But this answer6 is seemingly not sufficient:
a) Had the sea not fulfilled the condition, (then beyond having no strength, it) would have had no water in it at all. Yet from the fact that "to its condition" is alluded to in the word "לאיתנו," which means — as Rashi says — "לתקפו" ("to its strength"), it would appear that only the sea's strength is bound up with the condition.
b) The meaning of "(the sea returned etc.) to its condition" is that the sea returned to its condition. According to the above, however, "the sea returned etc. to its strength — to its condition" comes to mean that the sea's return "to its strength" came about through its having earlier fulfilled its condition, and not that the return itself is its condition.
2. On the pasuk "the sea returned toward morning to its strength" there is a maamar in Ohr Torah of the Maggid of Mezritch (which he heard from the Baal Shem Tov7), where he explains the Midrash "לאיתנו — לתנאו." On this basis he explains [the phrase of our Sages "עושין רצונו של מקום" ("they do the will of the Omnipresent")8, and not "they do His word" or "His saying," as well as] the above-mentioned reply of R. Pinchas ben Yair to the River Ginai, "If you do not divide, I decree upon you that water shall never pass through you":
Since G‑d stipulated with the works of Creation9 "שיעשו רצון הצדיקים אף שאינם בטבעם" ("that they do the will of the tzaddikim, even though it is not in their nature"), it follows that "if you do not divide" and do not fulfill the condition, "הרי אתה כלא הי׳ מעולם וכמו שלא נבראו כאן מים ונמצאו שלא יעברו בך מים לעולם" ("you are as if you never existed, and as if no water had been created here, and it thus emerges that water shall never pass through you"). That is, "I decree upon you that water shall never pass through you" means not only that from now on no water will pass through it, but even more: since from the outset it was created on condition that it do the will of the tzaddikim, its entire existence, including its existence until now, depends on the fulfillment of the condition. For if it does not fulfill the "תנאי הנאמר בשעת המאמר" ("condition stated at the time of the Divine utterance"), it is "as if it never existed," because in such a case it was never in existence at all.
On this basis one could answer why it says "the sea returned etc. to its strength," even though had it not split for the Jewish people it would not merely have lacked strength, but would have ceased to exist altogether:
The sea's fulfillment of its condition affects not only its existence from then on (for without fulfilling the condition no water would pass through it any more, as above), but also its existence until that time [although seemingly no change can apply to an existence that has already been. Had it not fulfilled the condition, it would have been nullified "ממציאות הבריאה" ("from the existence of creation")10 (in the manner of "אין"11 ואפס ממש כמו לפני12 ששת ימי בראשית ממש" — "absolute nothingness, exactly as before the Six Days of Creation")13]. Therefore the idea of "to its condition" is alluded to specifically in "לאיתנו" — "to its strength": through fulfilling the condition, not only did the (same) sea continue to exist, but even more: "to its strength" — strength came about also in its earlier existence.14
But this explanation answers only the first question — why it says "to its strength," which shows that the fulfillment of the condition affected only its strength — since here we are speaking (also15) about its past. The wording "to its condition," that it returned to its condition, still remains difficult, as above.
3. The explanation of all the above will be understood by first addressing the difficulty in the word "לאיתנו," because of which the Midrash learns it as "to its condition"16:
From the fact that the pasuk relates "the sea returned etc. to its strength," it is implied that there is something novel here. Seemingly, where is there room to think that the miracle of "וישם את הים לחרבה" ("and He turned the sea into dry land")17 so weakened the nature of the sea that even afterwards it no longer had its earlier strength, so that the pasuk must exclude this by saying "the sea returned etc. to its strength"?
Seemingly one could answer:
Among miracles [including those connected with the Exodus from Egypt] there are18 two types:
a) Where the miracle changed the previous nature — as in the case of "ידו מצורעת כשלג" ("his hand was leprous as snow")19, where even after the miracle the hand remained leprous according to nature, and for it to be "שבה כבשרו" ("restored like his flesh")20 a second miracle was needed to remove the leprosy.21
b) Where the existence newly brought about by the miracle was, even while it lasted, a miraculous matter that has no place in nature — as in the case of the water that "נהפכו לדם" ("was turned to blood"), where even at that time it remained in the essence of water, except that through the miracle the water was in actuality (and outwardly) blood.22 Therefore, when the miracle ceased, the change of water into blood lapsed on its own.23
As it applies to our subject, the miracle of the Splitting of the Sea: were we to learn that through "He turned the sea into dry land" the sea was changed and became an existence of "dry land," then it would emerge that at the time of "the sea returned" it became a new existence. Therefore the pasuk says "the sea returned etc. to its strength": it returned to its earlier might [as Rashi says: "לאיתנו — לתקפו הראשון" ("to its strength — to its original might")24], because even when it was "dry land," it remained (inwardly) a sea.25
But this answer is not sufficient. From the fact that the pasuk relates that the miracle of the Splitting of the Sea came about through "ויולך ה׳ את הים ברוח קדים עזה כל הלילה" ("and G‑d drove back the sea with a strong east wind all the night")26 — [that the waters' standing "כמו נד וכחומה" ("like a mound and like a wall")27 came about through the fact that (the Divine power, vested)28 in (the) "east wind," held it up throughout that entire time] — it is itself understood that the sea did not change in its essence to become dry land. So the question returns to its place: what is the novelty in "the sea returned etc. to its strength"?
Therefore the Midrash learns that "the sea returned etc. to its strength" means that the sea returned [not to its strength from before the Splitting of the Sea (for what would this be teaching us?), but] to the strength that G‑d gave it at the time of Creation, when He stipulated with it that it split for the Jewish people. This strength is far greater — beyond all comparison — than the strength the sea possesses on its own (as will be explained in section 5).
And although the fulfillment of the condition took place at the time of the Splitting of the Sea, the pasuk nevertheless says "the sea returned etc. to its strength," because the strength the sea received at the time of the condition was drawn into it in a revealed way (not at the time of the splitting, but) when it became a sea again (as will be explained in section 6). Specifically through "the sea returned" — having earlier turned into dry land and then become a sea again — did it come "to its strength — to its condition," to the strength that derives from "its condition."
4. To understand this, we must first explain why G‑d had to stipulate with the sea from the outset, at the time of Creation, that it split for the Jewish people.
For seemingly: since G‑d is the complete Master of the world, it is simply understood that He has the ability and the right over the sea even without having made any prior condition with it.29
The explanation is as follows:
The ultimate purpose of Creation, which was created "בשביל ישראל ובשביל התורה" ("for the sake of the Jewish people and for the sake of the Torah")30, is [not merely to give Jews the possibility of fulfilling Torah and mitzvos, the way one thing serves another while having no share in the matter itself, but] that Jews, through their service in Torah and mitzvos [and similarly through "בכל דרכיך דעהו" ("In all your ways, know Him"), and even through "וכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים" ("Let all your deeds be for the sake of Heaven")31], should make the world itself a dwelling place for G‑d.
And since "a dwelling place for G‑d" means a "דירה לעצמותו" ("a dwelling for His Essence"), like the dwelling of a human king, whose entire essence is found in his dwelling32, the world itself must therefore be such that there can rest in it (also) the level of G‑dliness that is above the Divine light that contracted itself to accord with the worlds (including also the matter of creating the worlds).
For this reason G‑d stipulated with the sea, and likewise "עם כל מה שנברא בששת ימי בראשית" ("with everything created in the Six Days of Creation")33, that when the time comes they should change their nature for the sake of the Jewish people.
Because34 were this condition not there, meaning that creation in itself would allow no room for miracles and changes of nature, it would emerge that a miracle and change of nature, which come from the level of the (encompassing) light that is above the worlds35, would occur in a way that negates creation. Therefore G‑d from the outset created the sea (and similarly all creations) with the condition "שיקרע לפני ישראל" ("that it split before the Jewish people").
The law is that if a condition is stated in accordance with Torah law, not fulfilling it nullifies the entire matter from its root. Here too36 creation was in this manner, that if not, "יתבטלו ממציאות הבריאה" ("they would be nullified from the existence of creation"), to the point that from the outset "לא נבראו" ("they were not created") —
so that the "existence" of the sea itself would "agree"37 to the change of nature.
5. From all the above it is understood that through the condition G‑d stated with the sea (and similarly with all the other creations, at the time of the works of Creation), that it split for the Jewish people, a far greater strength was placed in it than the strength it has by virtue of its coming into being as such (as it would have been without the condition):
When something exists for a certain time and afterward its existence ceases, this is proof that even during the time it existed it was a "weak" existence38, and this weakness was the cause of its later perishing.39
It follows that the world (in itself, that is, as it comes into being from the Ten Utterances) has no true strength, since its entire creation is only for "שית אלפי שנין" ("six thousand years"), and afterward it will cease to exist.40
But through the condition G‑d stipulated with the works of Creation — creating the world in such a way "that they do the will of the tzaddikim, even though it is not in their nature," which shows that the intent "for the sake of the Jewish people," for which the world was created, is the inner dimension of the world itself
[for if "for the sake of the Jewish people" meant merely the way one thing serves another thing that has no connection to it, it could not be said that the very coming-into-being of the works of Creation should be such that the creations act contrary to their nature] —
and since the existence of Jews (because they are "נצר מטעי מעשה ידי" — "the branch of My planting, the work of My hands" — of G‑d) is an eternal existence41, and an existence of thought42, which is the source and cause of (the existence of) speech, therefore, through G‑d's placing into the existence of the works of Creation "that the will of the tzaddikim be fulfilled," there was placed in the creations a strength higher than their existence in themselves, a quality of eternity.43
6. And this is what the Midrash says on the pasuk "the sea returned etc. to its strength" — "to its condition, which I stipulated with it from the beginning":
As long as "He turned the sea into dry land" was in effect, one could think44 that through this miracle its earlier existence was (changed and) nullified, and therefore the strength the sea had received through the condition was not yet revealed.
But when "the sea returned" took place [and in the manner of "returned etc. to its strength," which in the plain meaning is that it remained in its essence (as above, section 3), and even so its very existence allowed room to do G‑d's will, contrary to its nature], then it came "to its strength — to its condition," to the strength drawn into it through the "condition," which is higher than its existence in itself, as above.
(From the maamar and sicha of Shabbos Parshas Beshalach, 5729.)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 14:26.
2) Bereishis Rabbah 5:5. Shemos Rabbah 21:6. Zohar II, 198b.
3) Baal HaTurim on the pasuk.
4) Yedei Moshe on Bereishis Rabbah, ibid.
5) Chullin 7a. See also HaYom Yom, p. 20 (from the maamar of the Maggid cited below, section 2), that the dividing of the River Ginai is like the Splitting of the Sea. See also Chullin, ibid.: "like Moshe and the sixty myriads."
6) One can still raise a difficulty with the answer of the holy Ohr HaChaim (on the pasuk) to the above question.
7) HaYom Yom, ibid.
8) Berachos 35b.
9) See Bereishis Rabbah, ibid. (and similarly in the Zohar, ibid.): "Not with the sea alone did the Holy One, blessed be He, make a condition, but with everything created in the Six Days of Creation." See also Ohr HaTorah.
10) The wording of the Ohr Torah, ibid.
11) The wording of the Alter Rebbe at the beginning of Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah (regarding "if the letters were to depart for an instant, G‑d forbid, and return to their source"). See also the next note.
12) The explanation of this may be as follows: If the creations (after coming into being) were an existence unto themselves, G‑d forbid (like a craftsman who makes a vessel — the error of the deniers cited in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, beginning of ch. 2), then even though by their view too it is understood that the Holy One, blessed be He, has the power to make them "absolute nothingness" [for when some existence is nullified through the action of a person, the nullification concerns only the form of the thing. But regarding the Holy One, blessed be He, it is understood (see Moreh Nevuchim II:17) by their view too that just as it is in His ability to bring from nothing to something, so too it is in His ability to make from something to nothing (even if the existence of creation were, G‑d forbid, an existence unto itself)], nevertheless, since on its own its existence would remain even now, and its nullification is due to another power, then even though after its nullification it is "absolute nothingness," it is still not as before the Six Days of Creation, when it had no existence from the outset.*
But since the entire existence of creation, even while it exists, is only by virtue of the Divine power that constantly brings it into being, and when that power departs its existence ceases on its own, then (after the power departs) it has no existence at all, exactly as before the Six Days of Creation. (Similar to a stone that travels upward because of the force etc., where after the force departs, the stone remains as it was at first.**) This requires further study. See also Moreh Nevuchim I:69.
*) Even more: even if we say, by their view too, that the coming-into-being of creation from the outset is only for the limited time of six thousand years, and after that time it will cease on its own (which shows that even while it exists it is not a true existence — see below, section 5), nevertheless, if (this existence, at any rate, which is not true) were an existence in its own right, G‑d forbid (not needing to be constantly renewed by the Creator), then even after it ceases — although the cessation will happen on its own — some "existence" of its existence still remains, and it is not exactly as before the Six Days of Creation.
**) Even more: in the analogy of throwing a stone, it can still be said afterward that at first it traveled upward. But in the thing the analogy illustrates, since time itself is also a created existence (see Derech Mitzvosecha, Mitzvas Haamanas Elokus, ch. 1, and elsewhere), when (the utterance through which it exists among) the Ten Utterances departs, time too will cease, so that no trace etc. at all will remain. This requires further study.
13) It may be said that the manner of the sea's nullification had it not fulfilled its condition [and similarly, the manner of the nullification of creation as a whole had the Jewish people not accepted the Torah (Shabbos 88a; Avodah Zarah 3a)] goes further than the manner of nullification in "if the letters were to depart for an instant, G‑d forbid," in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, ibid. Regarding the departure of the letters, until the moment the letters depart there was existence (an existence according to Torah, through the Ten Utterances by which the world was created), and the nullification is only from then on (except that the manner of the nullification from then on is as if it never existed at all, as explained in the previous note). In our case, however, since the coming-into-being from the outset was on condition, when the condition is not fulfilled the thing is nullified retroactively. See also below, note 36.
14) See similarly Ohr HaTorah, Vaeschanan, end of p. 415 ff.
15) But it is plain that even according to this explanation, "the sea returned etc. to its strength" also includes its existence from then on (and not only the strength of its existence up to the time of the splitting). Therefore "to its strength" is stated with "the sea returned," even though the strength regarding the past came about at the time the condition was fulfilled and not when it "returned."
16) In the commentary of Maharzav (on Shemos Rabbah, ibid.): "for it should have said 'and the sea returned etc. to its former state' or 'to its might'; it must therefore be expounding etc." But one can go further, as in the text: in the plain sense this word (even had it said "to its might" or the like) is entirely superfluous.
17) Our parsha, 14:21.
18) See at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 175 ff., and the notes there.
19) Shemos 4:6.
20) Ibid., 7.
21) As is also evident from Rashi (Shabbos 96a; Rashi on the Torah, ibid. See also Shemos Rabbah 3:13): from here we learn that the measure of good comes more quickly than the measure of punishment.
22) To the point that "a vat full of water . . . the Jew drinks water and the Egyptian blood, and when he took from a Jew for money (specifically) he would drink water" (Shemos Rabbah 9:10).
23) Therefore we do not find that they needed to empty the ponds and all their gatherings of water, and in wood and stone, after the plague.
24) According to what is said in the text, we can better appreciate why Rashi adds "הראשון" ("original") — although "לאיתנו" means (only) "to its strength"* — for with this he explains the novelty in "(returned etc.) to its strength," as in the text.
*) But one cannot say that Rashi's intent in adding the word "original" is to explain the phrase "returned etc. to its strength" — for (besides the fact that this is understood even without Rashi's commentary) Rashi cites before his comment only the word "לאיתנו."
25) And all the more so from a change that reverts to its original state (which even before it has reverted is not a change) (Sukkah 30b; Bava Kamma 96b) — even though an action is needed for it to revert to its original state.
26) Our parsha, 14:21. — From this it is evident that "were G‑d to stop the wind for an instant, the waters would return and flow downward, as is their way and nature" (Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, ch. 2).
According to what is said above in the text, we can understand why the Alter Rebbe needed to prove this from the fact that G‑d drove the sea with a strong east wind all the night (that were G‑d to stop the wind for an instant (at night), the waters would return etc.), and did not prove it from what actually happened, that after the wind stopped the sea returned to its strength. For "the sea returned" is not such a proof, since one could say (but for the precise wording "to its strength") that this happened through an action (a miracle), and not that the innovation lapsed on its own.
27) The wording of the Alter Rebbe in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, ibid. It may be said that there is a great novelty here. First, a preface. There is seemingly a difficulty: in the Targum, Rashi and others on the pasuk (our parsha, 15:8), "כמו נד" is explained as "like a wall." Accordingly: a) it is redundant to say "like a mound and like a wall"; b) what does the "and" of "and like a wall" add? c) immediately afterward he says "and they would not stand like a wall," without mentioning "mound."
One can explain that the Alter Rebbe's intent is to emphasize (in explaining the verses) that these are two matters: first they stood "like a mound" (a heap and gathering — see Rashi — the change was only in this, but they were still "flowing," like water in a vessel), and afterward also "like a wall" (which needs no vessel). This also makes the continuation in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah more understandable: "and were etc. the waters would return and flow" (the end of "the flowing mound," and it goes without saying that the later change would end) "and would not stand like a wall" (a greater change, and therefore this is) "without doubt." — This interpretation of the verse bears on the content explained in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah: that even the order of the Splitting of the Sea was "natural," from one stage to the next, unlike the creation of something from nothing.
28) But not that the wind itself accomplished this (as the Ramban writes, our parsha, 14:26). The wind was needed (a) in order to mislead the Egyptians (Ramban, ibid.); (b) because specifically through the east wind the revelation of the level of "קדמונו של עולם" ("the Ancient One of the world") was drawn down, and only from that level could the Splitting of the Sea come about (see the maamar beginning Vayolech Hashem 5666, and elsewhere). — However, the explanation in Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah implies (like other Torah commentators — Rashbam and others) that the strong east wind (and this resolves the Ramban's question) brought about the splitting etc.
And what he proves from "and were etc. the waters would return etc.," that the same applies to the creation of heaven and earth, "that if the power of the Creator were to depart from the creation, G‑d forbid, the creation would revert to absolute nothingness" — this is because even according to the interpretation that the splitting came through the wind, the wind brought about a change in the nature of the water, that it be "like a wall of stones." On this basis it is (simply) understood why the Alter Rebbe adds "and like a wall" and "and they would not stand like a wall." For from "the waters would return and flow" alone, that is, the change of "like a flowing mound" (see the previous note), there is no proof for the creation of heaven and earth: that although they have become existences, nevertheless when the power of the Creator departs the creations would be absolute nothingness. [See also the well-known discussion on the meaning of "that the nature present in water" (that it stands, or that it flows?), and see the letter on this, printed in Likkutei Biurim on Tanya (by R. Y. Korf); Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah with an anthology of commentaries etc., ibid., p. 130. See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 189, note 10.]
29) In Moreh Nevuchim II:29 (see also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Avos 5:6; Bachya on the pasuk "to its strength," and others), the condition is needed because "עולם כמנהגו הולך" ("the world follows its course"), and it cannot be that nature should change after the works of Creation, or that a new will should arise after they were so established. But [besides the fact that according to the Rambam's explanation (Moreh Nevuchim III:20) of "for My thoughts are not your thoughts," even if miracles arose later this would not be a change of will, G‑d forbid, as the Tosafos Yom Tov writes on Avos, ibid. (see there in the Tosafos Yom Tov, that these words of the Rambam (on the reason the conditions were needed) are not according to his own view)], to remove the difficulty of a change of will, it would suffice to conclude that the matter of the splitting of the sea is present in the Six Days of Creation, and it would not need to be a condition in the creation of the sea.
30) Cited in Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 159, note 62.
31) Mishlei 3:6. Avos 2:2 [as printed; probably 2:12]. On the superiority of "In all your ways, know Him" over "Let all your deeds be for the sake of Heaven," see at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, pp. 907, 932.
32) The maamar beginning Yom Tov Shel Rosh Hashanah 5666, near its beginning, and elsewhere.
33) Bereishis Rabbah 5:5. See also Zohar II, 198b.
34) See similarly the Tosafos Yom Tov on Avos cited above, that the conditions are meant to show that everything was created only for the sake of the Jewish people.
35) See the maamar beginning HaChodesh HaZeh 5666, and elsewhere.
36) Seemingly one could ask: with "one who says 'on condition,'" the condition is only a revelation that if it is not fulfilled the matter was not done from the outset. But with the creation of heaven and earth, since they were already created and until now actually existed, how can they be nullified retroactively through the failure of the condition?
But this is not so. For even with "one who says 'on condition,'" the condition is not merely a clarification; rather, the failure of the condition is what causes the matter to be nullified retroactively (see Rambam, Hilchos Gerushin 8:22, and Maggid Mishneh there).
The same applies to the law that "a sage uproots the vow from its root," where "the essential uprooting is from now on, for it was forbidden until now," and even so the sage's release uproots the vow from its root, and now "it emerges that it was never forbidden" (Rosh, Nedarim 52b).
37) See similarly Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 11, note 40 (regarding the transformation of the lands of the nations into Eretz Yisrael), that it matters that the nations also agree to it. See also Toras Shalom, p. 70, and in the note there: "that the sparks of Tohu should also agree." See also the law that a gentile's idol can be nullified specifically by a gentile (Mishnah — Avodah Zarah 52b); and an independent existence is [OCR unclear] separateness and idolatry (Tanya, ch. 22).
38) Therefore rivers that cease once in a seven-year cycle (shemitah)* are invalid for the waters of purification, for the existence of the water is not (of) living [water], but "מכזבין" ("failing") (Parah 8:9).
*) As for the reason that those which cease "for many years, more than seven" are not "failing" waters (Rambam, Hilchos Parah 6:2; see Tosafos Yom Tov on the Mishnah there), it may be said: since the entire existence of the world is "failing" (for it lasts only six thousand years), we must say that the verse's "living waters" means "living" relative to creation itself. And since each shemitah is a period unto itself (see the commentators on why the "release of the King" comes once in seven years), the cessation "for many years, more than seven" is not called "failing" relative to the endurance within creation. (Similarly it may be said according to the interpretation (Rav, Rash and Rosh on the Mishnah there) that those which cease once in a Yovel are called living waters, for the Yovel is "forever" (as our Sages say on the pasuk "and he shall serve him forever" — Mishpatim 21:6; Kiddushin, end of 15a; Rashi on the pasuk).)
39) See Sefer HaChakirah of the Tzemach Tzedek, 4a; 104a ff. The second maamar beginning Ein Aroch 5694 (in Sefer HaMaamarim 5711), ch. 30. The maamar beginning Tiku 5707, at its beginning. And elsewhere.
40) The maamar beginning HaOmnam Yeshev 5643, section 4. Kol HaShoneh Halachos 5667. Tiku 5694 (5711), near its end. And others.
Elsewhere it is explained in a different way, that they are as strong as the day they were created, and only by the will of the Creator will they cease after six thousand years (Sefer HaChakirah, ibid., 3b ff.; 101b ff.; the maamar Ein Aroch, ibid.; Tiku, ibid.). However, the power of Ein Sof within the creations (which brings about eternity in them, that they be as strong as the day they were created) "is external to them and does not unite with them" (the maamar beginning Tzohar Taaseh 5673 (in Hemshech 5672). See also at length Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 98, note 21) [for an unlimited power cannot be vested in a limited thing; in the words of the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim II, Introduction, 12): "for every power spread through a body is finite, since the body is finite"].
And in themselves (that is, as they come into being from the Ten Utterances vested within them) they are perishable, as explained in Likkutei Sichos, ibid.
41) See Sanhedrin, beginning of chapter Chelek.
42) For the Jewish people (specifically) arose in thought (Bereishis Rabbah, at its beginning).
43) And although miraculous conduct comes from the level of the encompassing light that is above the worlds, as above, section 5, and from the level of the encompassing light eternity exists in the creations even without the condition (see above, note 40), it may be said: since the coming-into-being of the creations was on condition "that they do the will of the tzaddikim, even though it is not in their nature," this matter [although in one detail it is more encompassing than the power of Ein Sof that makes them as strong as the day they were created, which is why it comes as an overriding of nature (see the maamar beginning HaChodesh HaZeh 5666, and elsewhere), nevertheless, since it is a condition within the coming-into-being] relates to the existence of the creations themselves. To put it another way (in the wording of the Rambam in the above Introduction): the power that sustains the limited creation for unlimited time, even though it be vested within it, unlike the power that holds the water up like a wall.
44) See also Ohr HaChaim here.
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that the sea's true strength lay not in its own nature but in the condition, set at Creation, that it yield to G‑d's will for the sake of the Jewish people. So too, the whole world was made for the Jewish people and their service, and when a creation sets aside its own nature to do G‑d's will, it does not lose itself but reaches a strength far beyond its own, touching eternity.