Parshas Va'eira
1. On the pasuk "ומטר לא נתך ארצה" ("and the rain did not reach the earth")1 — which speaks of the halting of the plague of "ברד" ("hail") after Moshe Rabbeinu had prayed about it to the Almighty — Rashi gives two explanations of the words "לא נתך."
One explanation is "לא הגיע" ("it did not reach"), and he adds: "ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ" ("and even those that were in the air did not reach the ground")
[where "לארץ" ("to the ground") is the simple translation of "ארצה," and no proofs at all are needed for it, nor any "מצאתי לו חבר" ("I have found a parallel for it"); not even an explanation that "ארצה is like לארץ,"2 as one finds many times earlier in Scripture, as well as at the beginning of the book of Shemos, "הבאים מצרימה" ("who came to Mitzrayim"), and likewise in Bereishis3]
— meaning that the translation of "נתך" is "הגיע," to reach. And the addition in the pasuk, "(לא נתך) ארצה," means that even the raindrops which at that time were already in the air did not reach the ground. Rashi brings proof for this from the pasuk "ותתך עלינו האלה והשבועה" ("and the curse and the oath have reached us") in Ezra,4 where it means5 "ותגיע עלינו" ("it reached us").
And Rashi gives a second explanation (from Menachem ben Saruk): "לא נתך — לא הוצק לארץ" ("it was not poured onto the ground"), "נתך" being from the term "התכה" and meaning to pour out (it becomes something that exists as a liquid, a thing that pours), because it belongs "בחלק (to the root) כהתוך כסף" ("as silver is melted"),6 (which is) "לשון יציקת מתכת" ("a term for the pouring of metal") — except that here it is "אד"6* (vapor) that became a liquid. And Rashi concludes: "ורואה אני את דבריו" ("and I consider his words correct") (that of the two explanations it is specifically the second that appears more accurate, and the proof is) "כתרגומו" ("as its Targum") (that it agrees with the Targum: the words) "ויצק"7 ("and he poured") (the Targum renders) "ואתיך," (and) "לצקת"8 ("to pour") — "לאתכא." "אף זה" ("so too here") (it means) "לא נתך לארץ — לא הוצק לארץ" (that the rain was not poured out onto the earth).
2. At first glance it would seem that Rashi's two explanations differ only in the literal translation of "נתך": whether it means to reach or to pour.
According to this, however, it is not understood:
a) Why does Rashi quote from the pasuk also the word "לא (נתך)"?
b) Why does Rashi find it necessary to add, with both explanations ("הגיע" and "הוצק"), also the meaning of the general matter of "לא נתך ארצה": with the first explanation — "ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ," and with the second explanation — "לא הוצק לארץ"?
c) The term "התוך" is found [not only with a non-liquid substance, as in "כהתוך כסף," whose meaning is "melted" (dissolved), but] also with a liquid — as in "נתך מים"9 ("the water poured") and "ויתכו כמים"10 ("they poured out like water") — where the meaning is "poured."
It is therefore not understood: since the term "נתך" in our pasuk is stated regarding rain, and regarding rain it is appropriate to say (not that it did not melt, but) that it did not pour, Rashi should have said that the meaning of "ומטר לא נתך" is as in "נתך מים."11 Why does he explain that it derives from the term "כהתוך כסף"?12
d) When Rashi brings two (or more) explanations: (a) it is because each of them contains a certain difficulty that is resolved by the other explanation. (b) He brings first the one that is "first" according to "פשוטו של מקרא" ("the plain meaning of Scripture").
This needs to be understood: (a) Since according to both explanations — both "הגיע" and "הוצק" — there are several examples of the word "נתך" from other pesukim, then seemingly both explanations are smooth. Why, then, is Rashi not satisfied with one explanation, and why does he need both? (b) Since Rashi prefers (רואה אני, "I consider") the second explanation, he should have brought it first!
3. From all the above it is understood that Rashi comes here to explain not only the translation of the word "נתך," but also to resolve a question that arises in the content of the event of "לא נתך," a question on which he dwells:
When rain stops in the ordinary way, it is natural that the raindrops already in the air, which already exist as "מטר" ("rain"), fall all the way to the ground. But here a question arises: Moshe Rabbeinu's prayer was made, and was accepted, right in the midst of the rainfall; and it is self-evident that immediately upon the acceptance of the prayer, at that very moment, the plague of hail and rain in Mitzrayim was also halted. What, then, became of the raindrops13 that were already on their way down?
And this is what Rashi resolves: there are two explanations of "לא נתך":
One explanation is "לא הגיע" — that the rain did not reach the ground; that is, as Rashi immediately explains, "ואף אותן שהיו באויר לא הגיעו לארץ," that the rain already in the air was held back there and did not get to the ground.
And for this reason the pasuk uses the words "ומטר לא נתך ארצה," since the term "לא נתך" (לא הגיע) emphasizes that even the rain that was on its way down did not reach the ground.
The second explanation Rashi gives is that "לא נתך ארצה" means "לא הוצק לארץ" — that is, after it had already been transformed in the air into an existence of "rain," already having the property of a pouring liquid, it lost this very property through Moshe's prayer; it was "לא הוצק" — it ceased to be something that pours, meaning that it ceased to exist as "rain."
And with this it is understood why Rashi explains that the "לא נתך" stated of rain derives from the term "כהתוך כסף": just as with silver "כהתוך" means to make liquid, so too here regarding the rain "לא נתך" means that it did not become liquid; it is something that does not pour, and consequently14 it did not pour "לארץ" ("onto the ground").
4. With this it will be understood why Rashi needs both explanations — for each explanation contains a difficulty not present in the other:
According to both explanations of "לא נתך," the halting of the rain came about miraculously — both its remaining suspended, supernaturally, in the air and its ceasing to exist as "rain." There is, however, a difference between the two miracles: in leaving the rain suspended in the air — despite its nature to fall — until a time of rain would come in the land of Mitzrayim, which is very rare, as is understood from Rashi,15 the scope of the miracle (in place and in time) is expressed to a greater degree than in the case where the Almighty suddenly removes the rain from the world.
Consequently, there is a difficulty according to the explanation "לא נתך — לא הגיע": it stands to reason16 that "קוב"ה לא עביד ניסא למגנא" ("the Holy One, blessed be He, does not perform a miracle in vain"), that the Almighty does not perform a miracle for nothing. And since this principle is understood by simple reason, it is therefore also relevant to the plain meaning of Scripture.17 Why, then, was there a need for the greater miracle of (a) keeping the "rain" up on high, (b) for a long time — when the plague could have been stopped through a smaller miracle, that the rain should cease to exist?
Rashi therefore brings the second explanation, "לא נתך — לא הוצק," according to which, as mentioned, it is indeed not a "ניסא למגנא" ("a miracle in vain").
But the second meaning of "נתך" ("melted") is not at all smooth: from the wording of the pasuk, "ומטר לא נתך ארצה," it is implied that there was no event or change in the rain itself (לא הוצק), but only in the manner of its relation to the earth, that it did not pour as far as the ground. By contrast, according to the first explanation, that "לא נתך" means "did not reach," the wording of the pasuk is meant literally.17*
And since the difficulty in the explanation "לא נתך — לא הוצק" stems from its not agreeing with the plain wording of the pasuk, while the difficulty in the explanation "לא נתך — לא הגיע" consists merely of a missing rationale (for ultimately it is not possible to pose as a true question: why did the Almighty stop the plague of hail in this way and not in another way?18 — for there are many actions of the Almighty for which we do not know a reason), Rashi therefore sets down the explanation "נתך — הגיע" as the first and principal explanation.
And since Rashi says "ורואה אני את דבריו" regarding the second explanation, he immediately makes clear that this is (not on account of "פשוטו של מקרא" here, but) on account of "כתרגומו (of) ויצק (which is) ואתיך (and also in the "חלק," the root of the word) לצקת לאתכא," which shows the connection of the two words also at their source, not only in their meaning. This is along the lines of "את השמים ואת הארץ" ("the heavens and the earth") — "ית שמיא וית ארעא."19
5. It has already been said many times that in Rashi's commentary — although it follows the plain meaning of Scripture — there is also the part of Midrash and Halachah in the Torah. From the standpoint of this part too there is a difficulty in the explanation "נתך — הוצק," on account of which Rashi brings, and brings first, the explanation "נתך — הגיע":
The Gemara20 says: "גמירי, (משמיא21) מיהב יהבי משקל לא שקלי" ("we have a tradition: from Heaven they give, but they do not take back") — from Heaven, giving, they give; taking back, they do not take. If something has already been given from Above, that is, it has been created and transformed into an existence within our world, it is not taken back; it is not removed from its existence. And if in an exceptional case (as with the second miracle that occurred to R. Chanina ben Dosa) it is indeed taken back, this then falls into the category of a very wondrous and great miracle.22
According to this the opposite emerges: that the rain was altogether "taken back" and made to cease to exist (according to the second meaning) is in fact a more wondrous and greater miracle than leaving it suspended, supernaturally, in the empty space of the world (according to the first meaning).23 And although from the standpoint of our perspective below it emerges, as said earlier, that in the case of "לא הגיע" a more wondrous miracle is expressed, nevertheless, from the standpoint of Above (where "משקל לא שקלי," "they do not take back"), taking back the rain is more wondrous than leaving it suspended while remaining in its existence.
Accordingly, on the basis of the principle "לא עביד ניסא למגנא," a real difficulty arises on the second explanation: the Almighty does not perform a miracle for nothing, so why was a higher type of miracle needed — taking back the rain — when one could have made do with the smaller miracle of leaving the rain in the air and in its existence?
And this is the reason — according to the part of Halachah in the Torah — that Rashi is not satisfied with the explanation "נתך — הוצק" and must resort to the explanation "נתך — הגיע." Moreover, this explanation is the first (and principal) one.
6. According to this explanation, however (based on the part of Halachah that Rashi's commentary contains), that Rashi is here employing the principle "גמירי משמיא מיהב יהבי משקל לא שקלי," an explanation is required: why is Rashi not satisfied with the first explanation alone, since from the standpoint of the principle "משקל לא שקלי" there was no "ניסא למגנא" in "suspending" the rain?
The explanation of this is: the term "גמירי" ("we have a tradition"), stated with the principle "מיהב יהבי משקל לא שקלי," is found with many laws and matters. There is a question about this:24 does "גמירי" mean that it is a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai — in which case the law where the term "גמירי" appears has the weight and force of a Torah law; or does "גמירי" mean only that it comes by tradition from the Sages — in which case the "גמירי" law has only the force and importance of a Rabbinic matter?
When one accepts that "גמירי" is not a matter of Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, then taking back the rain — "משקל שקלי" ("they take back") — is not so far-fetched, since the principle "משקל לא שקלי" is only a Rabbinic "גמירי"; and accordingly it emerges that in taking back the rain the miracle is not so wondrous, even from the standpoint of Above. In comparison with this, the miracle of "לא הגיע" is more wondrous, and hence a "ניסא למגנא." And because of the difficulty in the first explanation, "לא הגיע," Rashi adds the second explanation, "לא הוצק," according to which the rain was indeed taken away altogether.
However, since there is a view that "גמירי" has the force of a Torah law, according to which "לא הוצק" is certainly more wondrous than "לא הגיע," Rashi therefore does not remain with the second explanation, and brings the explanation that "לא נתך" means "לא הגיע" — and indeed as the first explanation, and especially so, as will be explained below.
And this is the explanation — according to the path of Halachah — of the advantage in each of Rashi's two explanations: according to the view that "גמירי" is akin to a Torah matter, one must learn "לא הגיע"; and according to the view that it is not akin to a Torah matter, there is also reason to learn "לא הוצק."
7. Seemingly, however, one may ask about this:
There is room to distinguish — whether "גמירי" has the force of a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai or only of a Rabbinic law — when "גמירי" is stated regarding the ruling of a law. But in our case, where it has to do with clarifying (a mode of conduct) — that "משמיא מיהב יהבי משקל לא שקלי" — what difference does it make whether the conduct was revealed to Moshe at Sinai or through the Sages? A matter revealed by the Sages also has the full force of certainty. And since even when "גמירי" means (only) a tradition from the Sages this does not at all diminish the force of the principle "משקל לא שקלי," why then should taking back the rain not be as wondrous as if it were a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai?
In truth, however, this is no question:
The concept of a miracle is something contrary to what stands to reason in the human intellect (and so it is also stated explicitly regarding the plagues of Mitzrayim,25 of which we are speaking here). It is therefore understood that the more far-fetched the matter is to the human intellect, the greater the miracle involved.
[To the extent that there is a supposition (an opinion of great Torah authorities) that miracles have a limit and cannot occur in impossibilities — "יש לנמנעות טבע קיים בחוק הבורא" ("impossibilities have a fixed nature in the Creator's law") — since these are utterly far-fetched and contrary to what the intellect compels; but the conclusion is that the Almighty is "נמנע הנמנעות" ("the One for Whom impossibilities are impossible").25*]
Accordingly it is understood that regarding the miracle in "משקל שקלי" it makes a difference whether this conduct is known by a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai or through the Sages.
This is similar to the law:26 "טעה בדבר משנה חוזר" ("one who erred in a matter stated in a Mishnah, [the ruling] is reversed") — because the law of a Mishnah is so well known that erring in it does not enter the category of an error at all.
And it is along the lines of the difference between "שקר" ("falsehood") and "שוא" ("vanity"), which is so called only when it is contrary to what is "גלוי וידוע (at least) לשלשה בני אדם משאר העם" ("revealed and known to three ordinary people"), and it does not suffice that "all the Sages possessing intellect and knowledge"26* know it.
According to this it emerges that if one accepts that "גמירי [משמיא מיהב יהבי משקל לא שקלי]" is known by a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, it is far more obvious than if it is accepted as a matter that is only Rabbinic;27 and consequently, on accepting it as a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, the opposite of this conduct — when "משקל שקלי" — is more far-fetched (intellectually), and the miracle involved is much greater than when saying that it is Rabbinic.
It emerges that, on accepting "גמירי" as a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, the miracle in taking back the rain was much greater.
8. In Rashi's commentary there is also the "יינה של תורה" ("the wine of the Torah").28 Rashi's two explanations mentioned above are thus connected also with a matter in the inner dimension of the Torah, with the concept of teshuvah — as illuminated according to the teachings of Chassidus.
The plague of "hail" (like all the other plagues) came upon Pharaoh on account of the sin of having rebelled against the Almighty and not letting the Jewish people go out of Mitzrayim. But when he said "חטאתי גו' ואני ועמי הרשעים" ("I have sinned... and I and my people are the wicked ones") — confession and regret over the past — and "ואשלחה אתכם ולא תוסיפון לעמוד" ("and I will send you out, and you will stay no longer") — a resolution for the future — this teshuvah of his removed the punishment: "ויחדלו הקולות והברד ומטר לא נתך ארצה" ("and the thunder and the hail ceased, and the rain did not reach the earth").
The question arises here, however: was his teshuvah of such a kind that it brought about that the punishment, the hail, vanished entirely? Since every punishment is a result and consequence of the sin itself29 [as it is written,30 "תיסרך רעתך" ("your evil will chastise you"), that the evil itself is transformed into suffering], therefore, if one accepts that the teshuvah entirely erased the sin, one must also say that the punishment of hail vanished (since its entire existence is nothing more than a result of sin). According to this reasoning one must learn here as in Rashi's second explanation, "לא הוצק," that the rain ceased to exist;
Or one may say that Pharaoh's teshuvah did not have the power to erase and uproot entirely the evil of the sin, and consequently also not the suffering that came from it. However, since in practice he did after all do teshuvah, this sufficed for the punishment of hail to be removed from him in practice — the practical consequences of the sin. According to this reasoning one must accept Rashi's first explanation, "לא הגיע" — that the teshuvah brought about only that the punishment should not reach them, but it remained in its existence.31
9. Wherein lies the doubt whether Pharaoh's teshuvah had the power to erase and entirely nullify the sin (and consequently also the punishment), or not?
Regarding Jews it is clear that their teshuvah entirely erases the sin. The essence of a Jew, even at the time of the sin, is good and holiness;32 and the fact that he commits a transgression, Heaven forbid, is only because "תקפו יצרו הרע" ("his evil inclination overpowered him") to act contrary to his own true will.33 Therefore, as soon as he does teshuvah and resolves no longer to obey the evil inclination, he returns to his true existence (as the meaning of teshuvah is: to return).
And although it is specifically teshuvah from love that brings it about that "נעקר עונו מתחלתו" ("his sin is uprooted from its beginning")34 —
[And that teshuvah has an effect also on the past, although a thing cannot be changed before there exists that which causes the change, since the "cause" must come before the effect, is because:
a) Jews are bound with the Name Havayah,35 and Havayah is "הי' הוה ויהי' כאחד" ("was, is, and will be, as one"),36 and the act of teshuvah renews the bond;37 he therefore stands at that moment where he makes the bond, where past, present and future are as one.
And in terms of the revealed Torah:
b) The rule that an action cannot affect the past is stated only when it must accomplish something new. It is different, however, when it merely clarifies and reveals the earlier state; in such a case it is understood that even a later action has authority over the past, since all it accomplishes is to reveal and make clear the past state. And since a Jew is always good and holy, and it is only that at the time of the sin the good was concealed, therefore teshuvah from love succeeds in uprooting the sin retroactively, because38 through it the earlier good and holiness of the Jew is merely clarified and revealed.39
c) It is known regarding every Jew that he will certainly do teshuvah in the end, as it is written,40 "כי לא ידח ממנו נדח" ("that none who is banished be banished from Him"), which is why the law is41 that "לעולם יעסוק אדם" ("a person should always engage") (whoever he may be) in Torah and mitzvos not for their own sake, "שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה" ("for from doing so not for their own sake he comes to do so for their own sake"), certainly.42 Consequently, even at the time of the sin he has the status of "כל העומד לחתוך כחתוך דמי" ("whatever stands to be cut is regarded as cut"),43 and the like — only that it must come about in actuality, in order to nullify the evil in actuality;]
By contrast, "תשובה מיראה" ("teshuvah from fear") helps only "מכאן ואילך" ("from now on"), and even from now on something of the evil of the sin still remains,44 as the Gemara45 says, that with teshuvah from fear willful sins become only like inadvertent sins;
Nevertheless, regarding the time "מכאן ואילך" at least, and regarding the part of the evil (the "זדונות," "willful sins") that is indeed nullified through teshuvah, this is in the manner of complete nullification, in which the evil ceases to exist. For since a Jew, by his very essence, has no connection with evil, and he committed the transgression only because "יצרו הוא שתקפו" ("his inclination overpowered him"), teshuvah therefore brings it about that through "תשש יצרו" ("his inclination being weakened") his essence is revealed,46 and consequently the evil ceases to exist.
10. Since the reason teshuvah has the power to nullify the sin is that he committed the transgression only because "יצרו הוא שתקפו," so that teshuvah must only remove something that had "attached itself" to him, it is understood that with the descendants of Noach, for whom evil is not something that came from outside,47 teshuvah has the power to prevent only the actual execution of the punishment, but not to nullify [the evil of the sin, and consequently also] the existence of the punishment itself.48
This, however, applies to the descendants of Noach after the Giving of the Torah. In the time before the Giving of the Torah, however, when "ובנו בחרת" ("and You chose us")49 had not yet taken effect, there is room to say that the teshuvah of the descendants of Noach too had the power to nullify the existence of evil entirely.
And on this Rashi's two explanations differ:
According to the first explanation it emerges that even before the Giving of the Torah the teshuvah of a descendant of Noach did not have the power to nullify the existence of evil, and he therefore learns "לא הגיע" — the rain merely did not reach the ground, but it remained in its existence;50
And according to the second explanation it emerges that before the Giving of the Torah the teshuvah of a descendant of Noach could indeed nullify the existence of evil, and he therefore learns "לא הוצק," that the rain ceased to exist.
11. Here (as in many other places) one sees how Rashi's commentary contains "ענינים מופלאים" ("wondrous matters"):51 that the two explanations of the words "לא נתך" — which on the surface differ only in the translation of a word — are two different lines of reasoning about the manner in which the rain did not come down (and therefore Rashi also brings the word "לא (נתך)" in his quotation and in his explanation);
And moreover, the explanations touch on laws where the term "גמירי" appears (as in "גמירי מעלין בקודש ולא מורידין," "we have a tradition that one ascends in holiness and does not descend"52), to the point that through them a matter is clarified concerning the manner of the teshuvah of the descendants of Noach before the Giving of the Torah.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Va'eira 5725)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 9:33.
2) Specifically not according to the plain meaning must there be a proof for this, or a statement of the rule "any word, etc." (Yevamos 13b and elsewhere).* And also according to the plain meaning — where another meaning [OCR unclear] is implied, or where there is some difficulty.**
*) To the point that they said (Yevamos ibid., according to the opinion of Beis Shammai), "מי כתיב לחוץ חוצה כתיב" ("Is 'lachutz' written? 'Chutzah' is written"). And also according to Beis Hillel, who answers there, "כיון דכתיב חוצה כמאן דכתיב לחוץ דמי" ("since 'chutzah' is written, it is as if 'lachutz' were written") . . "כל תיבה שצריכה למ"ד בתחלתה כו'" ("any word that requires a lamed at its beginning, etc.") — this is because "שמיבעי להו לכדר"י אמר רב . . שאין קדושין תופסין ביבמה" ("they need it for what R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav . . that betrothal does not take effect with a yevamah"); but were it not for this, they would explain that it does not indicate "to the outside."
**) As for Rashi's bringing a proof for this from the rule "any word, etc." in Parshas Lech Lecha ([OCR unclear: reads "י)"]) and Toldos (28:3) — although he explains nothing of this in earlier pesukim, because of its great simplicity, as stated in the main text — it may be said that the word "הרה" (in Parshas Lech Lecha) could be explained as referring to what is stated above: "ויצא מלך סדום גו'" ("the king of Sedom went out, etc."), (and afterwards) "ויערכו אתם מלחמה בעמק גו' ועמק גו' בארות גו' ויפלו שמה והנשארים הרה" ("they joined battle with them in the valley, etc., and the valley, etc., wells, etc., and they fell there, and those who remained, 'herah'") (on the mountain) — "נסו" ("fled"); and Rashi rejects this explanation. Accordingly, it is better understood why Rashi also quotes the word "נסו." And similarly with "פדנה ארם" and "ביתה בתואל" — that even when the name consists of two words the rule applies, and the heh comes (in the middle of the name!) at the end of the word that should have a lamed at its beginning.
And with this it is better understood why Rashi (in the above, and on Tehillim 9:18) chose the reading of the Bavli — any "תיבה" ("word") — and not that of the Yerushalmi (Yevamos 1:6) and Bereishis Rabbah (50:3 and elsewhere), any "דבר" ("thing").
— And one cannot raise a difficulty from "דבלתימה" (brought as an example of the rule in Yevamos ibid.)! For the name is, seemingly, Almon Divlasayim; but this is not so, for in Scripture (Masei 33:46–47) it says "ויחנו בעלמון דבלתימה ויסעו מעלמון גו'" ("they camped at Almon Divlasaymah and they journeyed from Almon, etc."), with no need for a lamed at its beginning. Rather, the Talmud explains the name as: Almon (that faces, or the like) toward Divlasayim. And we find the city of Beis Divlasayim (Yirmiyahu 48:22), which is adjacent to Divon and Nevo, etc., from which it appears that this is Divlasaymah, and the heh comes in place of the lamed. And note that Almon by itself is also a name (in Eretz Yisroel — Yehoshua 21:18).
3) Noach 11:31; Lech Lecha 12:5; and elsewhere.
4) Daniel 9:11.
5) As explained by R. Saadia Gaon and Rashi there.
6) Yechezkel 22:22. As for why he does not bring a proof from "התיכו עבדיך את הכסף" ("your servants have melted down the silver") (II Melachim 22:9) or "קבוצת כסף . . להנתיך . . והתכתי אתכם . . ונתכתם בתוכה" ("a gathering of silver . . to melt . . and I will melt you . . and you will be melted in it") (Yechezkel ibid., 20–21), which come earlier — it is because the "חלק," the base and root of the word "נתך," is "כהתוך" (Sifsei Chachamim here, in the name of the R"Y). And see the Concordance, that "התוך" is an infinitive form.
6*) See Bereishis 2:6.
7) Vayakhel 36:36, and elsewhere.
8) Pekudei 38:27.
9) II Shmuel 21:14 [as printed; the phrase is at 21:10].
10) Iyov 3:23 [as printed; the phrase is at 3:24] (and see Rashi there).
11) Especially since on Iyov there Rashi explains "לשון נתך ארצה כו'" ("a term of 'nitach artzah,' etc.").
12) One cannot explain that Rashi's intent in "ומטר לא נתך" (from the term "כהתוך כסף," the pouring of metal) is that rain was not poured from the clouds (from the vapor) — for the simple meaning of "ומטר לא נתך ארצה" is that the rain which had already come into existence as rain [and not rain that was going to be formed from the clouds, as R. Avraham son of the Rambam and the Ralbag explain here] did not pour onto the ground.
13) Regarding the hail — there is no choice, as it were, but to nullify its existence (as in Rashi's second explanation regarding the rain). Otherwise, either it would have to be suspended until today, or hail with fire flashing within it, etc., came down later — and both of these are refuted by simple reason.* Regarding rain, however, according to Rashi's first explanation that it is suspended in the air, one can say that it came down after some time.
*) In Berachos (54b) it is stated that the hail too did not reach the ground and that it came down in the days of Yehoshua — that is, it was suspended in the air for forty-one years (and moved from the air of the land of Mitzrayim to the air of Eretz Yisroel, and there it came down). It is understood that this is not a teaching according to the plain meaning.
14) Even so, "ארצה" must be stated — although its existence was nullified in the air — because the reason for its nullification ("לא נתך — לא הוצק") is so that it should not reach the ground.
(Perhaps this is why Rashi concludes "אף זה לא נתך לארץ לא הוצק לארץ" — seemingly superfluous — in order to emphasize that the reason for its nullification relates to the ground.)
But this explanation is forced, and therefore Rashi's first explanation is needed, as below in section 4.
15) Vayigash 46:10. See also Eikev 11:10.
16) See Derashos HaRan, Drush 8, introduction [OCR unclear: "האי"] — cited in Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, p. 966; see there. See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, pp. 124–125.
17) See also Likkutei Sichos ibid., note 15.
17*) In addition: according to the explanation "לא הגיע," the reason is understood for the change in Scripture's wording, in that regarding the hail it says "ויחדלו הקולות והברד" ("the thunder and the hail ceased"), and regarding the rain it says "לא נתך ארצה" — because the existence of (the thunder and) the hail was nullified (see above, note 13), whereas the rain remained in its existence and only "לא נתך (הגיע) ארצה" ("did not reach the ground"). And the fact that the term "חדל" is stated (9:34) regarding the rain as well is because in Pharaoh's seeing, what mattered was that it ceased from the land; and therefore it says "חדל המטר והברד והקולות" ("the rain and the hail and the thunder ceased"), all alike. In the preceding pasuk, however, which is Scripture's account of what actually happened, it emphasizes "ויחדלו הקולות והברד ומטר לא נתך ארצה," since only the existence of the thunder and the hail was nullified.
18) Only for the differences between one plague and another must there be a reason. Accordingly it is understood why Rashi (on our parsha, 8:27) adds "כמו שמתו הצפרדעים" ("as the frogs died"). And see Rashi on Bo (10:19), s.v. "לא."
19) Bereishis 1:1.
20) Taanis 25a. See also Shemos Rabbah 52:3, and the sources cited there.
21) So it is cited in Torah Ohr 66, beginning of col. c; the maamar beginning Gedolim Maasei Tzaddikim 5685, ch. 7; and elsewhere in Chassidic teachings. Similarly in Matnos Kehunah on Shemos Rabbah ibid. And it follows the reading of the Ein Yaakov and the Bach there.
22) See Rashi on our parsha (9:24 [printed "כ, כד"]; ibid., 32). See also Rashi on 7:12.
23) See also Bartenura on the Torah.
24) See Shu"t Klalim 3:47 (vol. 1, p. 164, Kehot edition) [title as printed].
25) See our parsha 8:15, 18, and elsewhere.
25*) See Responsa of the Rashba, sec. 418 — cited in Sefer HaChakirah of the Tzemach Tzedek, p. 68 ff.; see there.
26) Kesubos 84b, and the sources cited there. Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, beginning of sec. 25. See also Hilchos Talmud Torah of the Alter Rebbe 2:1.
26*) Rambam, Hilchos Shevuos, end of ch. 5. See also Radbaz there.
27) For although all matters revealed by the Sages are afterwards also like a "דבר משנה" ("a matter stated in a Mishnah") regarding the law "טעה בדבר משנה חוזר" (see Sanhedrin 33a; Choshen Mishpat ibid.; Hilchos Talmud Torah ibid.), nevertheless they are not as obvious as a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai. This is as in the time of the Amoraim with "טעה בדבר משנה (an actual Mishnah) חוזר" — which applies in all six orders of the Mishnah, yet in four orders they would not err at all, unlike in Zeraim and Taharos (note from Likkutei HaShas of the Arizal on Chagigah (13b) a reason according to Kabbalah), in which they were not expert (Rabbeinu Tam in the introduction to Sefer HaYashar; and so it is implied in Rashi, Chullin 110, end of side b (s.v. "דתנן"), and elsewhere. And also according to Tosafos there, one must say that they differ in understanding the reasons of the Mishnayos, as is explicit in Berachos (20a), and consequently also in the halachic conclusion. See what is cited in Sdei Chemed, Pe'as HaSadeh, Klalim 1, end of sec. 21).
28) HaYom Yom, p. 24.
29) See the opinions on this in the Shelah, Beis Acharon (12a–b). In the places indicated in the following note, it is shown to be according to the opinion cited in the text. And in "Biurim LeIgeres HaTeshuvah" (Likkutei Biurim on Tanya, vol. 2, p. 129 ff.) — that this is shown in Tanya as well; see there.
30) Yirmiyahu 2:19. Shaar HaTeshuvah (of the Mitteler Rebbe), vol. 1, 6b. See also ibid., 3, end of side c.
31) Seemingly one could say that the reason for Rashi's first explanation is: since the rain had already come into being (and it may be said that a miracle was needed for this, as rain is not at all common in Mitzrayim, as above in section 4), there is no reason to say that through the nullification of the sin the rain too would be nullified from existence, because after its coming into being it no longer depends on the sin [especially according to the second opinion in the Shelah ibid.]. But this is not so: since "לא נתך" was through a miracle also according to the explanation "לא הגיע" [and simply — a greater miracle than according to the explanation "לא הוצק"], it is understood that had the sin been nullified, the rain that came about because of it would automatically have been nullified too. And [see Shabbos (97a), cited in Rashi (Shemos 4:7): [OCR unclear] "ממהרת כו'" ("hastens, etc."). And one may say so. But in any case here it is different, because] if the rain continued to exist, there must be an ongoing miracle the entire time that it should not come down and reach the ground. This is like the miracle of the splitting of the Sea (contrary to the nature of water; see Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, ch. 2), where, had the wind stopped for a moment, the waters would have returned and flowed.
32) See Tanya, end of ch. 24: "וגם בשעת החטא היתה באמנה אתו ית'" ("and even at the moment of sin, it remained faithful to Him, may He be blessed"). See also below, note 47.
33) Rambam, Hilchos Gerushin, end of ch. 2.
34) Yoma 86, end of side a, and Rashi there.
35) Igeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 4.
36) Ra'aya Mehemna, Zohar III, 256, end of side b. Shaar HaYichud VeHaEmunah, ch. 7.
37) Igeres HaTeshuvah, end of ch. 9.
38) And this is also the reason why, with one who circumcises after the proper time because of illness, it is implied in the Rambam (Hilchos Milah, end of ch. 1, and in Tzafnas Paneach there) that the circumcision is effective also retroactively: because circumcision only reveals the essence of the soul (see at length in Likkutei Sichos vol. 3, Parshas Tazria; see there). And note that one who vows [reading "הנודר"; printed "הנולד"] regarding the circumcised is forbidden regarding uncircumcised Jews (Nedarim 31b).
39) Similar to one who does something on condition, where, when he says "מעכשיו" ("from now"), the matter takes effect retroactively through the fulfillment of the condition — although the fulfillment of the condition is not a mere clarification, and for the matter to take effect the condition must be fulfilled in actuality (see Rambam, Hilchos Gerushin 9:11, and Maggid Mishneh there, 8:22; Rashba, Gittin 84b; Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 143:18).
40) II Shmuel 14:14 ("לבלתי ידח").
41) Sotah 47a, and the sources cited there.
42) Tanya, end of ch. 39. See also Hilchos Talmud Torah of the Alter Rebbe 4:3.
43) Chullin 72, end of side b. See also Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer, beginning of sec. 126. Sdei Chemed, Klalim, Chaf, 142.
44) See Rashi on Yoma ibid.: "שמקצת שמו עליו" ("that part of the name [of sinner] remains upon him").
45) Ibid., side b.
46) And this also applies to teshuvah from fear, as is understood from what the Rambam writes in Hilchos Gerushin, end of ch. 2, cited above — although his saying "רוצה אני" ("I am willing") is because he was compelled. And see "Biurim LeIgeres HaTeshuvah" (Likkutei Biurim on Tanya, vol. 2, p. 112 ff.; Igeres HaTeshuvah with collected commentaries (Kehot, 5747), pp. 188–189), that even teshuvah out of fear of punishment is, in its inner truth, teshuvah from the essence of the soul; see there at length.
Nevertheless (teshuvah from fear) is not effective retroactively: since it appears to the person that he is returning only from fear of punishment (for his body and animal soul conceal the soul), the good from his essence does not come into actual revelation.
47) "As stated in the book on the difference between Jews and idolaters: idolaters are evil in their essence, and if they have any good thing, it is something added. Jews, however, are good in their essence, and whatever evil is in them is only something added to the essence" (the maamar of Shabbos Parshas Bereishis 5659; and there: "since the (sin) is only something added (in a Jew), it can therefore be helped through teshuvah"). And note Tanya, end of ch. 1. The pious of the nations of the world are different (see Rambam, Hilchos Melachim, end of ch. 8; and the root of their souls "is from nogah, etc., as is known from Shaar Chag HaMatzos in the Siddur" — Likkutei Biurim on Likkutei HaHispa'alus 46d).
48) See the notes of the Tzemach Tzedek on Eichah, on the verse "חטא חטאה" ("she has grievously sinned") (Ohr HaTorah, Nach, vol. 2, p. 1062): "ישראל שייך בהם עבירה ותשובה" ("with Jews, sin and teshuvah apply"). See also Yerushalmi, Nazir, beginning of ch. 9 ("יצאו עכו"ם שאין להן כפרה," "excluding idolaters, who have no atonement"). Teklin Chadatin (54b). Minchas Chinuch, end of mitzvah 364.
49) See Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chayim 60:4.
50) Although seemingly this is because Pharaoh's teshuvah was in the manner of "טרם תיראון מפני ה' אלקים" ("you do not yet fear the L‑rd G‑d") (9:30, and Rashi there),* it is stated explicitly in Scripture (10:1) that this was because "אני הכבדתי את לבו" ("I have hardened his heart"). But see Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 6:3. And note the law of "התחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס" ("it began with negligence and ended under duress") (Bava Metzia 42a), by which the difficulty against the Rambam mentioned from his own words (ibid. 5:4), that if it is a decree of G‑d, He punishes the wicked one for it, is resolved — but this is not the place for it. See below, p. 62 ff.
*) Although teshuvah from fear also nullifies (with Jews, and, according to the reasoning that before the Giving of the Torah there was no difference in this between Jews and the descendants of Noach, also with the descendants of Noach before the Giving of the Torah) from now on (at least) the willful sins — this is specifically when, at least out of fear, he resolves with a whole heart not to return again to his folly (which is the essence of teshuvah; see Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah 2:2; Igeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 1). This is unlike Pharaoh, who even now, when he said "חטאתי גו' ואשלחה אתכם גו'" ("I have sinned . . and I will send you out . ."), is told: "עדיין אינכם יראים ומשתהי' הרוחה תעמדו בקלקולכם" ("you still do not fear, and once there is relief you will persist in your corruption").
51) The Shelah, in his Tractate Shevuos (181a).
52) Berachos 28b, and the sources cited there.
Key Lesson
This Sicha shows how a seemingly small difference over one word in Rashi opens onto the power of teshuvah. Because a Jew's essence is good and holy and sin is only something that attached itself to him, his teshuvah does not merely hold back the consequences of sin but removes the evil itself. Every Jew can therefore turn to teshuvah knowing that it reveals who he truly is.