Parshas Vayishlach
1. From the verse1 "ויקחו שני בני יעקב שמעון ולוי אחי דינה איש חרבו גו׳" ("And two of Yaakov's sons, Shimon and Levi, Dinah's brothers, each man took his sword...") — where Shimon and Levi are called "איש" ("man") because they were then thirteen years old2 — we learn3 that when a person reaches the age of thirteen he becomes an "ish," a man, and is obligated in all the mitzvos.
Now, everything in the Torah is absolutely precise. We must therefore understand: How is it that such a fundamental matter in Yiddishkeit — the time when the good inclination enters a Jew4, the completion and principal entry of the holy soul into a person5, when his fulfillment of the mitzvos begins6 — should be derived from "And two of Yaakov's sons... each man took his sword," which was seemingly an undesirable course of conduct?
It is true that, even at the plain level, it is understood that by "ויהרגו כל זכר" ("and they killed every male") they did not, Heaven forbid, commit any transgression. For they (the people of Shechem) deserved death*, because7 they did not bring Shechem to judgment for his crime8, or for their own sins, which they had committed even before the incident of Dinah9.
Nevertheless, we find that this conduct of Shimon and Levi did not please our father Yaakov, to the point that he described it as "כלי חמס" ("instruments of violence"): that "אומנות זו של רציחה" ("this craft of murder"), even though at the time it conformed to the law, came to them from Esav10.
And this is hinted at in the very words of the verse, "And two of Yaakov's sons..." (for since we already know from earlier that Shimon and Levi are sons of Yaakov, we must say that the verse means to convey by this): Although they were "sons of Yaakov," they conducted themselves "כשאר אנשים שאינם בניו שלא נטלו עצה הימנו" ("like other people who are not his sons, who did not take counsel from him")11.
It emerges, then, that the verse too seemingly intends by this to state the opposite of praise. And yet the Torah chose specifically this verse and episode from which to derive the time when the obligation in the mitzvos begins, and so on.
From this itself it necessarily follows that the conduct of "And they took... each man his sword" contains within it (also) a great and most exceptional quality — as will be explained further on (Sections 2 and 10).
2. This will be understood by first considering what the Midrash says12 on the words "כי באפם הרגו איש" ("For in their anger they killed a man")13: "וכי איש אחד הרגו והרי כתיב ויהרגו כל זכר, אלא שלא היו כולם לפני הקב״ה אלא כאיש אחד" ("Did they then kill only one man? Is it not written, 'and they killed every male'? Rather, before the Holy One, blessed be He14, all of them were only as one man").
Seemingly, one could ask: The expression "they killed a man" (according to the Midrash's explanation) would fit only if the act of Shimon and Levi ("and they killed every male") had been in accordance with the Will of the Almighty. Then, since "before the Holy One, blessed be He" they are only "as one man," they would have that same standing also in relation to Shimon and Levi, who were carrying out the Will of the Holy One, blessed be He, and were receiving His strength for this purpose15.
But we find that our father Yaakov actually rebuked them for "in their anger they killed," taking it that they had done something undesirable — to the point of saying (as cited earlier in Section 1) that this is a trait deriving from Esav. How, then, can one say that the same "they killed" is followed by "a man" because "before the Holy One, blessed be He" they were all regarded "as one man"?
We must therefore say: Our father Yaakov held that the manner in which they punished the people of Shechem was not as it should have been (even though they deserved the penalty of death, as stated above in Section 1), because it led to "עכרתם אותי להבאישני בישב הארץ" ("You have troubled me, making me odious among the inhabitants of the land")16.
[This reason of Yaakov's can be explained in two ways:
a) Since the only natural way to carry out this punishment of the people of Shechem at that time was by using a means that appears17 to be "מרמה" ("deceit") — first persuading them that if they circumcised themselves they were assured that "וישבנו אתכם והיינו לעם אחד" ("we will dwell with you and become one people")18, and this with the intention that afterwards the assurance would not be honored and they would even do the very opposite (as the sons of Yaakov in fact did) —
Yaakov therefore held that they should not be killed at all, in order to avoid the desecration of G‑d's Name that could result from it. (A comparable case is what we find19 regarding the Givonim: they departed from what the Torah had commanded about how to deal with them, so as not to violate the assurance given to them, since that would have caused a desecration of G‑d's Name.)
b) On the contrary: Yaakov held that they should indeed be killed, but not by means of "deceit" (which could cause a desecration of G‑d's Name), but openly. For since before the Holy One, blessed be He, they are as one man20, there is nothing at all to fear from them21.]
Nevertheless, Yaakov also knew that Shimon and Levi — according to their essential nature — did not have to and could not take into account the calculation of "You have troubled me..."22. For the fact of "הכזונה יעשה את אחותינו" ("Shall he treat our sister like a harlot?")23 aroused in them a great zealousness24 (of holiness — comparable to "בקנאו את קנאתי" ("in his being zealous with My zeal") with Pinchas, a zealot the son of a zealot, namely Levi25).
And zealousness reaches very deep into the soul, as it is written, "קשה כשאול קנאה" ("Zealousness is as harsh as the grave")26 — even to the essence of life27, to the essence of the soul, and all the more so a great zealousness28 — and in the essence of the soul there is no room for calculations29.
And since for Shimon and Levi, standing in the mode of being "zealous with My zeal," a state beyond calculation and intellect, the manner of "And they took each man his sword and they killed every male" had to come about in this way, it is consequently understood that their deed expressed the strength of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is why "(they killed) a man" is said of it.
3. Seemingly, one could ask about this:
Since the incident of Dinah touched them in the essence of the soul, where there is no place for "calculations," as stated above, what complaint can one have against them for why "they did not take counsel from him"? Taking counsel, after all, is something that pertains specifically to intellect and not to what is beyond intellect.
The explanation is that this is precisely why the verse hints at the complaint against them with the words "two of Yaakov's sons" (meaning that although "they were his sons," "nevertheless Shimon and Levi conducted themselves like other people who are not his sons"):
True, one cannot demand of them that they should have consulted with Yaakov because he was greater than they in intellect, counsel, and so on — for when it concerns the essence of the soul there is no room for taking counsel. But one can demand of them that they should have taken counsel from him because "they were his sons" — on account of honoring one's father.
But this is still not understood:
If "they did not take counsel from him" was a deficiency in honoring one's father — a mitzvah in which one was obligated even before the Giving of the Torah
[as we see from the fact that the Torah must take care to prevent people from saying "לא קיים אברם את כבוד אביו שהניחו זקן והלך לו" ("Avram did not fulfill the honor of his father, for he left him old and went away")30; and so strong is the obligation that even Yaakov, though he did not transgress this obligation, was punished31 for not having (over the course of twenty-two years) actually fulfilled the mitzvah of honoring his father32]
— it must seemingly follow that "And they took... and they killed every male" was not in accordance with the Supreme Will. The question then returns to its place: How could it involve the manner of "(they killed) a man"?
4. To understand this, we must first introduce another difficulty: It is stated in the Gemara33 that at Marah the Jewish people were commanded with ten mitzvos: "שבע שקבלו עליהן בני נח והוסיפו עליהן דינין ושבת וכיבוד אב ואם" ("the seven that the descendants of Noach accepted upon themselves, and to which were added laws, Shabbos, and honoring one's father and mother"). It is thus clear from this34 35 that the descendants of Noach were not commanded to honor father and mother. Why, then, was Yaakov punished for his failure in honoring his father, and why also must the Torah take care regarding Avraham, lest people say "he did not fulfill..."?
As for Cham being punished because "ביזה את אביו" ("he disgraced his father")36, and also Lavan being called "wicked" because "קפץ להשיב לפני אביו" ("he leapt to answer before his father")37 — one can answer that although the descendants of Noach are indeed not commanded to honor father and mother, they do have the prohibition against disgracing a father38.
[And one can say that the source of this prohibition is39: The nature of ravens is such that "עין תלעג לאב גו׳ יקרוה עורבי נחל גו׳" ("The eye that mocks a father... the ravens of the valley shall pick it out...")40. And since even "אלמלא לא ניתנה תורה" ("had the Torah not been given") (Heaven forbid41), there would exist the obligation to learn certain modes of conduct from the animals, which possess them by nature42 — the descendants of Noach too are therefore obligated (to learn from the ravens and) to take care not to mock and disgrace their parents43.]
It is otherwise, however, regarding Avraham and Yaakov, where the discussion concerns (not disgrace, Heaven forbid, but) merely not giving honor. The question therefore arises: Having at that time the status of descendants of Noach, they were not commanded to honor their father!
5. The same question also arises regarding the sin and punishment of Sodom: The sin of the people of Sodom, for which they were (principally44) punished, consisted of their not giving charity to the needy, as the verse states explicitly: "זה הי׳ עון סדום* גו׳ יד עני ואביון לא החזיקה" ("This was the sin of Sodom... she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy")45.
And although on the verse "זעקת סדום ועמורה כי רבה" ("The outcry of Sodom and Amorah, because it is great")46 the Gemara expounds47 "על עסקי ריבה" ("because of the matter of a young girl") — that there was a girl there who gave food to poor people, and for this the people of Sodom took her up on a roof, smeared her with honey, and left her to the bees until they stung her to death; and on account of this transgression with the "young girl," the Almighty punished them with the overturning of Sodom and Amorah, and so on48 —
this does not contradict what was said earlier, that the punishment came upon them because "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy." For the sin of bloodshed in the matter of the "young girl" also has its root and origin in their not doing kindness and charity. That is, the conduct of "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" existed among them to such a terrible degree and went so far that, on account of her doing an act of charity, they tortured the "young girl" with an unusual death. And because "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor..." was carried to an extreme, this49 is what brought about "annihilation."
From this itself it seemingly necessarily follows that the descendants of Noach had upon them the obligation of charity50. For if not, they would not have been punished at all (and certainly not with so severe a punishment as "annihilation") for not permitting something they had not been commanded to do51.
But here the question arises: Why should "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" be counted as a sin, and especially as so grave a transgression that it should bring so great a punishment — since the mitzvah of charity is not among the seven mitzvos of the descendants of Noach?
6. According to the plain approach it could emerge that the verse "כי ידעתיו (לשון חיבה) למען אשר יצוה גו׳ לעשות צדקה ומשפט" ("For I have known him (an expression of affection), so that he will command... to do charity and justice")52 means to say: The special affection for our father Avraham derives from the fact that Avraham is the one who "will command... to do charity...," that is, he instructs "his sons" and "his household" to do charity, even though as descendants of Noach they are not obligated in it.
The Gemara53, however, says that the descendants of Noach too are obligated "to do charity and justice"; and charity in particular — both a "son of Noach" and a "daughter of Noach" are obligated in it, as the Gemara53 says: "בניו, לדין; ביתו, לצדקה" ("'his sons' — for justice; 'his household' — for charity").
And with this the Rishonim54 answer why Sodom was punished for the sin of "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy": because all the descendants of Noach were obligated in charity. And charity is not counted together with the seven Noahide mitzvos because the seven Noahide mitzvos contain only the category of commands of "שב ואל תעשה" ("sit and do not act"), whereas the mitzvah of charity is a matter of "קום עשה" ("arise and do").
But this answer resolves the matter only according to the conclusion of the Gemara55, which holds that only matters of "sit and do not act" are counted among the seven Noahide mitzvos. According to the Gemara's initial assumption, however, that one must count also mitzvos of "arise and do," the difficulty returns: Why is the mitzvah of charity not counted as well?
And on account of this very difficulty, the Maharsha56 brings a proof for the view of Rashi57, who learns that the word "צדקה" in the verse "For I have known him..." means "פשרה" ("compromise") — that is, the obligation to find a "just" compromise within justice itself — and does not mean charity in the plain sense, in which the descendants of Noach are indeed not obligated. For if they were, then the mitzvah of charity too would have to be added (according to the initial assumption) to the seven Noahide mitzvos.
From the Rambam58 too it is evident that he rules as law that Noahides are not obligated in charity. For when he speaks of the law of "בן נח שרצה לעשות מצוה משאר מצות התורה כדי לקבל שכר כו׳" ("a Noahide who wishes to perform a mitzvah from the other mitzvos of the Torah so as to receive reward..."), he gives as an example "נתן צדקה כו׳" ("he gave charity...").
There is thus a difficulty according to both views: According to the view that Noahides are obligated in charity — why are only seven Noahide mitzvos counted (according to the initial assumption) and not eight? And according to the view that they are not obligated in charity — why was their conduct of "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" (in Sodom) a sin, for which they were to be punished?
7. Regarding the mitzvah of "דינין" ("laws") — which is (according to all opinions) one of the seven Noahide mitzvos59 — there is a dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban. The opinion of the Rambam is60 that the mitzvah of "laws" means only the specific detail of "חייבין להושיב דיינין ושופטים כו׳" ("they are obligated to appoint judges and magistrates..."). The Ramban60, on the other hand, holds that the mitzvah of "laws" means not only "to appoint judges...," but also "דיני גניבה ואונאה ועושק ושכר שכיר ודיני השומרים ואונס ומפתה ואבות נזיקין וחובל בחבירו ודיני מלוה ולוה ודיני מקח וממכר וכיוצא בהן" ("the laws of theft, fraud, oppression, a hired worker's wages, the laws of guardians, rape and seduction, the principal categories of damages, injuring one's fellow, the laws of lender and borrower, the laws of buying and selling, and the like"). That is, "laws" encompasses all kinds of matters (between man and his fellow) that relate to maintaining "ישובו של עולם" ("the settlement of the world").
Accordingly, one can say (according to the view of the Ramban) that charity is not counted among the Noahide mitzvos because it too is included in the general category of "laws," since doing charity is also necessary for the settlement of the world. And that is why Sodom was punished61 because "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy"50.
The difficulty remains, however, according to the opinion of the Rambam, who holds that Noahides are not obligated in charity: Why were they punished because "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy," as discussed above?
8. To understand this, we must first explain the general difference between the seven Noahide mitzvos and the mitzvos that the Jewish people were commanded — beginning with the mitzvah of circumcision, and so on, and (all the more so) the mitzvos after the Giving of the Torah:
The world, including (of course) the species of speaking beings, was created for the sake of something else — "בשביל ישראל ובשביל התורה" ("for the sake of Israel and for the sake of the Torah")62. And since the existence of the descendants of Noach is for the sake of the Jewish people and the Torah (which are above the world), it is understood that their "mitzvos" (those of the Noahides) are also (not in [OCR unclear]63) — because through them they prepare the world so that the Jewish people can then properly perform their service of Torah and mitzvos, and elevate the refined world to what is above the world, and make of it a Torah world, a dwelling place for Him, may He be blessed.
This is also the reason why a Noahide who transgresses one of his mitzvos is liable to death64. Since the entire existence and task of the descendants of Noach is to bring about that the settlement of the world be as it should, therefore when they do the opposite of this (by transgressing their mitzvos), they lose the foundation of their existence in the world: when the cause is nullified, the effect is automatically nullified65.
According to this it is understood why the people of Sodom deserved death — even according to the opinion of the Rambam66:
It is true that as Noahides they were not obligated in the mitzvah of charity, and their failure to observe this mitzvah cannot therefore be counted as a "sin." But when "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" is carried to such an extreme that they do not even permit another person to give charity, and what is more, they sentence that person to death for it — such conduct is certainly a "sin," for it is the opposite of the settlement of the world. And therefore, if indeed "הכצעקתה עשו" ("they have done according to her outcry"), "annihilation" comes upon them.
9. According to all the above, one can explain (at least according to the view of the Ramban) that this is why we find the obligation of honoring one's father also among the descendants of Noach. For honoring one's father is something that touches on the settlement of the world67. That is, the mitzvah of honoring one's father, in its completeness and as a distinct matter, was given to the Jewish people at Marah; but to the extent that honoring one's father bears on the settlement of the world, it had been commanded even earlier68.
And since the honoring of one's father at that time was not a matter in its own right, but only part of what is required for the conduct and settlement of the world, it will be understood that Shimon and Levi committed no sin by "not taking counsel" from their father. On the contrary: precisely when something like "נבלה עשה בישראל" ("he committed an outrage in Israel")69 so overtakes a person that no room remains for taking counsel, not even from one's father — such conduct is the true upholding of the settlement of the world.
In other words: Had honoring one's father at that time been a mitzvah in its own right, then even when a matter touches the essence of the soul, and consequently the actions do not come about in a calculated and measured manner, one must nevertheless fulfill the command of the Holy One, blessed be He (honoring one's father).
But since there was then no specific command to honor one's father, and it had to be observed (as a general rule) for the sake of "the settlement of the world," then when an exceptional case comes along that touches the essence of the soul (also for the reason of the settlement of the world), then, on the contrary, the settlement of the world is accomplished through "they did not take counsel from him," as stated above70.
10. According to all the above, the great elevation of "And they took... each man his sword" is understood:
The matter of "Shall he treat our sister like a harlot?" so overtook them that "they conducted themselves like other people who are not his sons" (of Yaakov). They were entirely permeated with this feeling, and consequently no room remained in them for anything at all other than "And they took each man..."71.
And this is also the reason why the time when the obligation in the mitzvos begins is derived (as stated at the beginning of this Sicha) from this very verse. For it is a directive for every bar mitzvah, that is, for every Jew when he stands at the beginning of his service, that when it comes to "the harlot"
— which in truth means every transgression, since it comes from "תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם אשר אתם זונים אחריהם" ("you shall stray after your heart and after your eyes, after which you go astray")72, and through which one is torn away, may G‑d spare us, from the Almighty, in the manner of a "harlot" who is "forbidden to her husband" ("this is the Holy One, blessed be He")73 —
one must not take into account any calculations and measures whatsoever, not even measures of Torah; rather, one must arouse in himself specifically the mode of mesirus nefesh, self-sacrifice.
After one has aroused in himself the power of mesirus nefesh — then one must indeed do everything according to reason and understanding, with measure and limitation, according to Torah. But in order that the service according to reason and understanding be as it should be, there must be first of all, as soon as one becomes an "ish," a man, the matter of mesirus nefesh that is above reason and understanding74.
(From the sichos of Shabbos Parshas Vayishlach 5725)
Notes
1) Our parsha, 34:25.
2) Bereishis Rabbah 80:10. Perhaps this is the basis for Rashi on Nazir (29b, end): "It is a tradition... they were thirteen years old." In Lekach Tov and Sechel Tov here — by calculation (each in a different way).
3) Rashi, Nazir there. The commentators on the Mishnah (end of ch. 5 of Avos), "a thirteen-year-old for the mitzvos." Machzor Vitry there. See also the letter of 20 Tammuz 5720 (printed below in the addenda to Parshas Vayishlach, p. 421).
4) Koheles Rabbah on the verse 4:13.
5) Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, second edition, end of siman 4.
6) For the mitzvos he fulfills on account of chinuch (training): a) this is of Rabbinic origin; b) the father must train him in them, but the minor himself is exempt (Hilchos Talmud Torah of the Alter Rebbe, at the beginning. See also there, Orach Chayim, siman 343. The opinions on this: in Sdei Chemed, Kelalim, Alef, 60 (vol. 1, p. 185d and on — Kehot edition)).
*) See also below, p. 190 and note 41.
7) In Radak here, verse 27: "For many saw when Shechem took her by force and did not protest." This needs explanation: Do we find a liability to death at the hand of man for failing to protest?
In Ohr HaChaim here: because all the people of the city wished to stand in the breach against them so that they would not kill their king, or because they helped Shechem seize Dinah. See there at length. But according to this, an explanation is lacking for why Yaakov was so angry with them, to the point of saying "instruments of violence are their weapons" (see below, note 16).
8) Rambam, Hilchos Melachim, end of ch. 9.
9) Ramban in his commentary on the Torah (34:13). Ran on Sanhedrin 57b.
10) Vayechi 49:5. Bereishis Rabbah 98:5; 99:7.
11) Rashi here (from Bereishis Rabbah 80:10).
12) Bereishis Rabbah 99:7. Tanchuma, Vayechi 10.
13) Vayechi there, 6.
14) In the Tanchuma there: "before the Holy One, blessed be He, and before them." One can say (so as not to multiply disputes) that its intent is that since before the Holy One, blessed be He, they were regarded as one man, they were therefore regarded so also "before them," as in the next note.
In Rashi's commentary on the Torah there: "And they are all regarded as only one man." From his omitting the words "before the Holy One, blessed be He," it seemingly implies that he means they were all regarded as one man in relation to Shimon and Levi in their own right, on account of their might. But see below, p. 257, note 37.
15) Comparable to "כי אהי׳ עמך (and therefore) והכית את מדין כאיש אחד" ("For I will be with you (and therefore) you shall strike Midian as one man") (Shoftim 6:16). Note also "וראית סוס ורכב" ("and you shall see horse and chariot") — "in the eyes of all they are as one horse" (Devarim 20:1, Rashi there): since "when you go out to war" is by the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, that which in My eyes they are as one horse, you too shall see them so.
16) Our parsha, 34:30. That is, that this could give rise to a desecration of G‑d's Name, as below in the text (see also Ramban, Vayechi 49:5). But one cannot say that Yaakov's complaint was only that they placed him and his household in danger — "and I and my household will be destroyed" — for if the act itself had been proper, he would not have said of it "for in their anger they killed a man," and all the more so would not have called it "instruments of violence — violence is in your hands, from the blessing of Esav."
According to what is written above, the question of the Radbaz on Hilchos Melachim there is resolved.
17) See Bereishis Rabbah 80:8: "What do you think..." See also the marginal note to note 71.
18) Our parsha, 34:16.
19) Gittin 46a. See also Yevamos 79a.
20) According to this, it is understood why Yaakov said "for in their anger they killed a man" (seemingly: what bearing does it have on the rebuke that they were only as one man?)* — for this is the reason why "they killed" (in the manner in which they did it) is an instrument of violence...: they should have killed them without deceit, as in the text.
*) See below, p. 256 and note 31.
21) As for Shimon and Levi having done this with deceit — one can say**: a) that out of their humility, they thought they were not worthy of a miracle*** [and although they were confident in the strength of the elder (Bereishis Rabbah 80:10; Rashi 34:25) — that applies specifically "when they were in pain," for then this is enclothed in nature]. b) Because they were in anger, and therefore came to error (see Pesachim 66b; Sifri and Rashi, Matos 31:21). According to this, what Yaakov emphasized, "for in their anger they killed a man... cursed be their anger...," is all the more understood.
**) The explanation of this in terms of the inner dimension of the matters — see the marginal note to note 71.
***) Perhaps one can say that this depends on the different wordings in Bereishis Rabbah and Tanchuma: according to Bereishis Rabbah, "before the Holy One, blessed be He," as in the note in the text; whereas according to the Tanchuma, "before the Holy One, blessed be He, and before them."
22) What he said to them, "You have troubled me...," was before he heard the reply "Shall he treat our sister like a harlot?"
As for his rebuking them even afterwards for "for in their anger they killed a man" — see below, note 71.
23) 34:31.
24) Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, ch. 38.
25) Sanhedrin 82b. And in Rashi there: that he was zealous in the incident of Dinah, as it is written "Shall he treat our sister like a harlot?"
26) Shir HaShirim 8:6.
27) As it is written, "And Rachel was zealous... and she said... I am dying" (Vayeitzei 30:1. Note also Ohr HaTorah there).
28) See Zechariah 1:14; there, 8:2.
29) According to this, the question of the Ohr HaChaim (34:31) is resolved. Note that the self-sacrifice of "zealots strike him down" as it was with Pinchas [a zealot the son of a zealot — see above] is also above the measure of Torah (see Likkutei Sichos, vol. 8, p. 158 and note 65).
30) Rashi, end of Parshas Noach. See also Bereishis Rabbah 39:7.
One cannot say that this is because our father Avraham fulfilled the entire Torah before it was given (Kiddushin 82a; Yoma 28b), for [apart from the opinion of the Ramban (Toldos 26:5) that "his observance of it was in the Land alone" — and when he "left (his father) old...," he was in Charan (and it is very forced to say that the complaint is that he did not return to his father after coming to the Land of Israel)] it does not make sense that the nations of the world would demand this of him.
31) From which it is proven that he was obligated in this. Note Parshas Derachim, Derush 3, that according to the opinion that the Avos did not leave the category of Noahides, they were punished only for the seven Noahide mitzvos.
32) Megillah 17a. Rashi (old version), end of Parshas Toldos. Vayeishev 37:34.
With difficulty one could say that Yaakov's lack of honor from Yosef* for twenty-two years was [not a punishment, since he was not punished then for honoring his father, and all the more so for its non-fulfillment, but rather] a matter of cause and effect — measure for measure (Rashi's wording, end of Toldos. See also Megillah there: "Yosef, who separated... just as Yaakov separated"). That is, since Yaakov lacked the service of honoring his father for twenty-two years, he also lacked its effect.
[According to this, it is understood why they said (there, 15b end) "Studying Torah is greater than honoring father and mother, for in all those years that our father Yaakov was in the house of Ever he was not punished" — even though seemingly, even if Torah study were equal to honoring parents, he would not have been punished (as the Maharsha asks in Chiddushei Aggados there). For if Torah study were only equal to honoring parents, then since he lacked the service of honoring his father also during the years in the house of Ever, the effect of this would also have had to be lacking.]
However, the wording of the Gemara there, "he was not punished" (16b end); "that he was not punished" (17a), implies that he was commanded in honoring his father, which is why punishment applies to it.
*) The principal one of "the offspring of Yaakov" (see Bereishis Rabbah 84:5; Rashi, Vayeishev 37:2). This resolves the point that even during these twenty-two years Yaakov had honor from the other tribes.
33) Sanhedrin 56b.
34) From what they said (Kiddushin 31a), "And if one who is not commanded..." (and likewise in [OCR unclear] 61a), there is not such a proof for our subject. For a) one can say (at least with difficulty) that before the Giving of the Torah they were commanded in it, and only afterwards it was taken from them. And although "every mitzvah that was stated to the Noahides and repeated at Sinai was stated to both these and those" (Sanhedrin 59a), this rule does not apply when there is a new element when it is repeated at Sinai (see there, 59b), and regarding honoring one's father it says "so that your days may be lengthened." b) One can say that he is not commanded in it as a mitzvah in its own right (and consequently its force and reward are not as great, and so on), but is commanded in it as part of (the settlement of the world and) laws; see below in the text, Section 9.
35) That is why it asks in Sanhedrin there, "Were not the Noahides commanded regarding laws?"
36) Bereishis Rabbah 36:6. Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, ch. 23. Rashi, Noach 9:22.
37) Rashi, Chayei Sarah 24:50.
38) According to this, it is simply understood why a convert is forbidden to disgrace his father, so that people should not say "we have come from a stricter holiness..." (Rambam, Hilchos Mamrim 5:11; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, end of siman 241) — for Noahides too are forbidden to disgrace a father. (See Chiddushei Rabbi Akiva Eiger on Yoreh De'ah there; seemingly it is forced.)
39) One can also say that the source for this is from the very fact that Cham was punished for disgracing his father, like the source for forbidden relations according to the Tanna of the School of Menasheh (see Sanhedrin 57a, beginning; Tosafos there).
40) Mishlei 30:17. From the plain sense of the verse it is implied that this is a natural matter.
41) So the Rebbe (Rashab), of blessed memory, would add (in a whisper) whenever he cited this saying of our Sages.
42) Eruvin 100b, end. See Rashi there, s.v. behemos: "that He gave... to teach..."
43) According to this one can understand: (a) Why after the Rambam brings proof (there, end of ch. 5) that "anyone who disgraces his father... even by a hint is cursed by the mouth of the Almighty" from what "is stated, 'Cursed is he who degrades his father and his mother,'" he adds: "And it also says, 'The eye that mocks...'" — seemingly, why did he need to bring a proof also from the Writings, as the Radbaz asks there* — and according to the above one can say: "Cursed is he who degrades..." was stated only regarding the Jewish people. He therefore adds "And it also says, 'The eye...'" — regarding anyone who disgraces... also among the Noahides.
(b) Why the Tur and Shulchan Aruch (there, se'if 6) — which follows the Rambam's wording — though they quoted "even by a hint" and copied the verse about one who degrades and also the end of the Rambam's words, "and the court may...," skipped and omitted what comes between them, "And it also says, 'The eye that mocks...'" — because the laws of Noahides are not in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch.
*) As for his answer, that "he brings the verse from the Writings for what he said, 'even by a hint,' for the verse about one who degrades his father and mother implies to him one who degrades explicitly" — I have not merited to understand it. For if so, how does the Rambam know that even by a hint one is cursed by the mouth of the Almighty? He should have said "and even by a hint" at the end of his words. And it is very forced to say that from "the eye that mocks" in the Writings we know that "degrades" in the Chumash means also by a hint.
44) Even though they transgressed many sins — among them idolatry, forbidden relations, and bloodshed (Sanhedrin 109a; Radak, Lech 13:13) — the decree (the overturning of Sodom) was because of "the hand of the poor...," as in the text. (This is like the generation of the Flood — whose decree was sealed only because of theft (Sanhedrin 108a, cited in Rashi, Noach 6:13).) That is why in Parshas Vayeira it says only "for it is great... according to her outcry" [the outcry of the young girl (see below in the text, that the main point here is (not the prohibition of bloodshed but) that "the hand of the poor..." she did not strengthen), and "exceedingly wicked and sinful before G‑d" is not mentioned], because this is the reason for "annihilation." According to this, the connection of "For I have known him... charity and justice" to the section about Sodom is all the more understood.
*44) In Chiddushei Aggados on Sanhedrin 106b: "For Sodom it was reckoned only as a chatas, since they were not commanded regarding this, but for Israel, who were commanded regarding this, it was reckoned as an avon, which is deliberate." Seemingly this is not understood: a) It is stated in Yechezkel, "This was the avon of Sodom." b) If they were not commanded — why were they punished for this, and with so severe a punishment (see Ran on Sanhedrin (56b), quoted in the second marginal note to note 45).
The reason for the change of wording in the verse (Eichah 4:6), "ויגדל עון בת עמי מחטאת סדום" ("The sin of the daughter of my people is greater than the sin of Sodom") — even though the Noahides (Sodom) are also obligated in charity (and the meaning of "is greater" is that they were "more wicked than Sodom" (Rashi on Sanhedrin there; see also Chiddushei Aggados there, in the second explanation)) — one can say that since among Noahides, charity is not a mitzvah in its own right but only as part of (the settlement of the world and) laws (as below, Section 8), it does not have such force (see above, note 34). Therefore, in relation to "the sin of the daughter of my people," it is counted only as a chatas.
One can further say that in Sodom even the minors were punished, for whom a deliberate sin does not apply [see Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin 10:8, and Tosefta there 14:1 — that Sodom had the status of a condemned city (the Rogatchover elaborates on this — see Tzafnas Pane'ach on the Torah (see Likkutei Sichos, vol. 9, p. 107 and on)), and in a condemned city even children are killed (Rambam, Hilchos Avodah Zarah 4:6, and the discussion of the commentators there). Also according to what is written in the text, that they were punished because of the matter of the young girl and so on — see Migdal Oz (there) that the same applies to the congregation of Korach and to Yavesh Gilad. This is not the place to elaborate.]
45) Yechezkel 16:49. The implication of the plain sense of the verse is that this is the reason for "ואסיר אתהן" ("and I removed them") (there, 50)* — see the commentators there. See also Rashi, Sanhedrin 104b, s.v. middah — in his first explanation**.
Even according to the second explanation in Rashi there, that this verse (49) only recounts the conduct of Sodom (which resembled Jerusalem) [and on the contrary: from this verse we learn incidentally that they did not suffer poverty, even though on account of the sin of "pride... and the hand of the poor..." they should seemingly have been punished with hunger — the opposite of "fullness of bread," in which they took pride (measure for measure)],
so that one could say that the cause of "and I removed them" is "and they committed abomination," which is unrelated to "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" — nevertheless, from the fact that the verse calls "the hand of the poor..." "the sin of Sodom" (at any rate, even if "and I removed them" was for another reason), it is proven that they were obligated to strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy.
*) As for what is written (there, 50), "and they became haughty and committed abomination before Me" — since it does not specify what the abomination was, it is proven that this is not a separate matter but rather the manner of "she did not strengthen" (written before it), as below in the text regarding "the matter of the young girl." And see below, note 50, that had their denial of charity not been extreme ("and they committed abomination"), they would not have been punished with "annihilation" ("and I removed them"). Especially according to what is explained below in Section 8 (according to the Rambam), that "she did not strengthen" is counted for them as a "sin" only because with them it was extreme.
**) In Parshas Derachim, Derush 18, that the connection of "she did not strengthen" to "and I removed them" is (not that they were punished for this sin, but rather — that the punishment was on account of other matters, only) that had they strengthened the hand of the poor and the needy, this trait would have atoned for them as it atoned for Jerusalem. But from the wording of the verse, "This was the sin of Sodom" (and especially since "and they committed abomination" does not specify what the abomination was, as in the preceding (marginal) note), it is proven that the punishment "and I removed them" came because of the sin of "she did not strengthen" — which is why the Ran (Sanhedrin 56b) proves plainly from the punishment of Sodom that Noahides are obligated in charity.
46) Vayeira 18:20. In Rashi's commentary on the Torah this is cited on "according to her outcry" (there, 21).
47) Sanhedrin 109b.
48) As is evident from the continuation of the verses there: "outcry... great... according to her outcry... annihilation."
49) This explains why regarding "the matter of the young girl" it is related in Sanhedrin there, "for she was taking out bread to the poor," and likewise in Rashi on the Torah there, "because she gave food to a poor person" — for the main sin (for which they were punished) was, as stated explicitly in Yechezkel, "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy." See the next note.
50) Except that had the withholding of charity not been extreme with them, they would not have been punished with so severe a punishment — "annihilation." Only because the absence of charity among them went so far "that they killed her with an unusual death because she gave food to a poor person" were they punished (also with an unusual death — measure for measure) with annihilation.
51) For the denial and withholding of something in which there is no obligation at all, even when the denial is extreme, cannot be counted as a sin, all the more so not so grave a sin as to incur annihilation.
As for Cham being punished for disgracing his father (although Noahides are not commanded to honor a father): a) disgrace (is not merely the absence of honor but) is a matter in its own right (the opposite of honor). b) Noahides too are forbidden to disgrace a father, as stated above in Section 4.
52) Vayeira 18:19.
53) Sanhedrin 57b.
54) Chiddushei HaRan on Sanhedrin 56b. See also Yad Ramah there, 57b.
55) Sanhedrin 58b, end.
56) There, 56b, s.v. beferush.
57) Sanhedrin there, s.v. dinei kenasos.
58) Hilchos Melachim 10:10.
According to this, one must say that what he writes in Hilchos Rotze'ach, end of ch. 12, "that he should do a matter of mitzvah... to give charity" refers to a mitzvah that he is not commanded in and performs.
59) Sanhedrin 56a, end, and on.
60) In his commentary on the Torah (our parsha, 34:13). (According to this, it requires study why they were commanded regarding theft with a positive commandment. The same question is asked in the work cited as תוה"פ on the verse (Bereishis 2:16), but its answer is forced.)
61) Although according to the opinion of the Ramban there a Noahide is not executed for neglecting a positive commandment — that refers to death by a human court, unlike death at the hand of Heaven. This is like a non-Jew who keeps Shabbos, who is liable to death (Sanhedrin 58b, end*), although this involves no action.
Perhaps one can go further and say that since the manner of "she did not strengthen" was (also) through action (as cited above in Section 5), they are liable for this also by a human court.
*) And in the Rambam, Hilchos Melachim 10:9: "We inform him that he is liable to death for this, but he is not executed." Except that the Rambam's reason for his not being executed is that "he is executed only for the seven mitzvos" (Kesef Mishneh there), whereas according to the Ramban — even if "they shall not rest" had been among the seven Noahide mitzvos, he still would not be executed for it by a human court, just as they are not executed for not appointing judges. See Responsa Chasam Sofer, Likkutim, siman 4, that even according to the Rambam Noahides are not executed for neglecting a positive commandment, even among the seven Noahide mitzvos. See there.
62) The Sages' exposition of the verse "Bereishis" — Tanchuma (Buber), sections 3 and 5. Lekach Tov. Rashi. See also Bereishis Rabbah, beginning of ch. 1. Vayikra Rabbah 36:4.
63) [OCR unclear: the text of this note, and the place of its marker in the text, are not in the source. Note 66* below refers to it.]
64) At the hand of man or (at least) at the hand of Heaven (see above, note 61).
65) All the more so than the principle that when the main thing is nullified, what is secondary to it is nullified (Keilim, end of ch. 9).
66) One can also say (at least with difficulty) that what the Rambam writes, that Noahides are not obligated in charity, applies only now. But before the Giving of the Torah they were obligated in charity* (see above, note 34, regarding honoring a father), and therefore in Sodom "she did not strengthen the hand of the poor and the needy" was counted as a "sin."
*) One can say that according to the Rambam's view all matters of "the settlement of the world" (charity among them) are included in "be fruitful and multiply," whose meaning is the settlement of the world, for "the world was created only for procreation, as it says... He formed it to be inhabited" (Gittin 41b, beginning). Therefore after the Giving of the Torah, when the mitzvah of procreation was taken from them (Sanhedrin 59b, beginning), they are exempt from charity, unlike before the Giving of the Torah. This is unlike what was said above in note 63.
67) See Jerusalem Talmud, Pe'ah 1:1 (see also Chinuch, mitzvah 33): "a matter that is the repayment of a debt" — and the repayment of a debt bears on the settlement of the world even more than charity. See also the Rambam's Commentary on the Mishnah, Pe'ah there.
According to this, the wording (Bereishis Rabbah 39:7, and similarly in Rashi, end of Noach) "and he went away in his old age" is all the more understood — for the main repayment of the debt here is when one's father is old.
68) According to this, the precise wording of Rashi several times (in Tractate Megillah 16b end and on, and also in his commentary on the Torah — cited above, notes 30 and 32), "the honor of his father" — and not "the mitzvah of honoring his father" (as is usual in many places) — is all the more understood: for at that time honoring a father was not yet a mitzvah (in its own right), but was included in "laws."
As for Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, ch. 23, stating "and he did not take to heart the mitzvah of honoring a father" — one can say: a) that this is a habitual turn of phrase. b) Since this is included in the mitzvah of laws, the term "mitzvah" can apply to it as well. Note Chullin 92a, end: "thirty mitzvos..." — and in the work Asarah Maamaros (Maamar Chakor Din, part 3, ch. 21), that these are details within the seven Noahide mitzvos. (But this requires some study according to what is explained in the text: Why is honoring a father not counted in Chullin there?)
69) The wording of the verse (34:7).
70) And that plainly, "they did not take counsel from him" is the opposite of praise — this is understood from what is explained in the next note.
71) Therefore, when they answered Yaakov, "Shall he treat our sister like a harlot?" he accepted the reply (see above, Section 2, note 22). Except that he nevertheless rebuked them for this (at a later time). For after he saw that "in their will they uprooted an ox" (although there the reason in the text does not apply), this was to him a proof that they had an inclination toward this (also) from their nature, and that also in the incident of Shechem (although it was mainly on account of "Shall he treat...") there was some admixture of this nature of theirs (similar to what is explained in Torah Or 19b, end, and on).
According to this, it is all the more understood why at the beginning of his rebuke he said "Shimon and Levi are brothers — brothers to Dinah and not brothers to Yosef" (Bereishis Rabbah 98:5; 99:7). For seemingly: the rebuke was not only for "in their will they uprooted an ox" but also for "in their anger they killed a man," so what bearing does their being "brothers to Dinah" have on this? For their being "brothers to Dinah and not brothers to Yosef" proves that even in "they killed a man" there was an admixture of "instruments of violence are their weapons"*.
*) According to what is explained above, p. 63, that with tzaddikim the "sins" are only a lack of light within the level of holiness itself, and for the sake of the ascent that comes afterwards — one can say that the matter of "instruments of violence, from the blessing of Esav" is the matter of refining the sparks (which for the moment is a descent, since the one who refines must enclothe himself in the garments of what is being refined). The same applies to "and they answered... with deceit" — this is like what is explained in several places (the maamar Podah BeShalom 5703, ch. 2, and elsewhere) regarding "your brother came with deceit and took your blessing." See also the maamar Lo Sacharosh 5627, ch. 4.
72) Shelach 15:39.
73) See Likkutei Torah, Korach 53c.
74) According to what is explained in the letter of 2 Tammuz 5720 (printed below in the addenda to Parshas Vayishlach, p. 421), that "ish" indicates maturity of intellect, and so on — one can say that the fact that the law of a thirteen-year-old for the mitzvos is learned from "And they took each man his sword" hints that even in the service according to reason and understanding there must be an illumination of the power of mesirus nefesh that is above reason and understanding.
Key Lesson
This Sicha teaches that the zealousness of Shimon and Levi, which left no room even for taking counsel from their father, is the source for the age of mitzvah obligation. When a Jew faces anything that would tear him away from the Almighty, he must not weigh calculations, but arouse the mesirus nefesh in the essence of his soul. Afterwards, everything is to be done with reason and measure according to Torah, but it is this power beyond reason that must stand at the very beginning of one's service.