Parshas Vayikra
1. The book of Vayikra speaks mainly about the service of the korbanos (offerings),1 which is one of the principal services in the Mishkan and the Beis HaMikdash.2
The Torah is eternal,3 meaning that in the laws of the Torah, and even in the narratives of the Torah, every Jew, man or woman, at every time and in every place, can find guidance for his day-to-day life: what he must do and what he must not do.
This is so with regard to all matters of Torah, and in particular, the Torah's instructions concerning the Beis HaMikdash and the service within it are relevant to every Jew in all generations.
The purpose of "ועשו לי מקדש" ("Make for Me a Sanctuary"), that Jews should build a Beis HaMikdash, is for the sake of "ושכנתי בתוכם" ("and I will dwell within them"), in the plural: that G‑d should rest within them, within every Jew, in his heart and in his home. Consequently, even now, when "ומפני חטאינו" ("because of our sins") the physical Beis HaMikdash was destroyed, nevertheless, when a Jew "builds" his home and conducts his family life in the manner of a Mikdash, with holiness, he can be certain that this conduct will bring forgiveness for the sins of the past, and that his home will be a "Mikdash," a place where "and I will dwell within them" is fulfilled, where the Shechinah will rest. And this will also bring blessings in everything he needs.
2. As mentioned, the service of the korbanos was one of the principal services in the Beis HaMikdash. Every day, the service of the korbanos began and concluded with the Korban Tamid (the Tamid offering was brought twice every day: once very early, before all the other offerings, and the second time toward evening, after all the other offerings).4
The Korban Tamid teaches that the "seder tamidi," the regular, ordinary order, is that a Jew need not bring and burn his entire property on the altar. The Tamid consisted of no more than one lamb, a small measure of wine and oil, a little flour, and salt. Furthermore, the regular order was that not every Jew had to bring his own separate Korban Tamid on the altar twice daily. Rather, every Jew had to contribute his share to the general fund, from which lambs, wine and so forth were bought for the offerings of the entire year. Understandably, when the cost of the offerings of a whole year is divided among all Jews, each individual Jew's share comes to no more than a small sum. And yet this brought G‑d's blessings for a good year to every Jew, wherever he was.
The service of the korbanos teaches us: G‑d does not demand that a Jew's regular order be to give away his entire fortune to the Beis HaMikdash to be burned on the altar, leaving nothing for himself. What He does demand of a Jew is the whole heart.5 The most important thing is not the quantity6 (how much strength, money and general possessions the Jew gives away for G‑d) but mainly how he gives it. The main condition is that he give it with a full heart. Then, even if the measure of his giving is (for some compelling reason) not large, only a small part of each kind of his possessions (as we find with the Korban Tamid, that it consisted of all categories:7 a lamb from the animal kingdom; flour, oil and wine from the vegetable kingdom; and salt from the mineral kingdom), nevertheless, since it is given with a whole heart, with liveliness and joy, the intended purpose is accomplished, and it also brings all blessings and good influences, just like the Korban Tamid in former times.
3. There is another lesson in the Korban Tamid:
This offering was brought on the altar only twice a day, once very early and the second time toward evening. And yet this offering is called by a name that means constancy, "Korban Tamid" (the "constant offering"). This means8 that the time between the two offerings was also filled and permeated with the Korban Tamid. That is why the time of the first Tamid was very early, first of all, before any other activity, because the Korban Tamid must influence and permeate everything that follows.
From this we must learn how a Jewish home should conduct itself:
During the day one is busy at home with all sorts of things, relating both to the body and to the soul. However, since the G‑dly light is not apparent in the day-to-day preoccupations (for even the things that relate to the soul are carried out according to human understanding, which can sometimes lead one off the right path and bring one, G‑d forbid, even to the opposite of G‑d's will), a Jew must therefore safeguard himself right at the beginning of the day, even before he turns to his various daily occupations, by expressing first of all his complete devotion to G‑d.
This is the meaning of saying "מודה אני לפניך מלך..." ("I give thanks before You, King...") immediately upon waking, as soon as one opens one's eyes in the morning. He thanks G‑d for returning his soul to him, and in doing so calls Him "King"; and the relationship to a king is that one devotes oneself to him with one's whole body and life. This devotion at the beginning of the day has its effect also on the later hours, which he uses for his needs. In them too the effect of "Modeh Ani" is seen; they too are permeated with self-surrender and dedication to the "King," to the Creator, and consequently they too are accompanied by G‑d's blessings and influences.
This is alluded to in the matter of the "Korban Tamid" and its details. When one begins the day with a korban, with devotion to G‑d, the offering is designated as "tamid": it is not limited to that moment in the early morning, but has a constant, continuous effect. When bringing the offering, its blood had to be sprinkled on the altar and its fats (chelev) offered there. Blood has the quality of liveliness, heat and fervor; fat indicates the feeling of pleasure (pleasure produces fatness).9 This means: the first step of the day is the Jew's firm resolve to direct his fervor only to the altar, to pure and holy matters, and that his pleasure should be only in them. And G‑d helps him maintain and carry out this resolve at all times of the day, which also brings with it G‑d's blessing and success for the entire day and the entire night.
4. Concerning the Korban Tamid, the Midrash relates10 that offering the Korban Tamid brought forgiveness for (certain) sins committed before the offering was brought:
G‑d gives a person who has, G‑d forbid, stumbled an opportunity to rectify his past. In his life a person goes through various difficulties and trials, and it can sometimes happen that he does not withstand a certain trial, G‑d forbid. But if he takes upon himself anew to be devoted to G‑d, and says with his whole heart "Modeh Ani Lefanecha Melech" (which, as said earlier, is also part of the "content" of the Korban Tamid), it atones for the earlier hours of the day.
Beginning with the Alter Rebbe, Chassidus emphasizes and explains, with a deep, broad and understandable explanation, that even when a Jew stumbles, Heaven forbid, he must not become entirely downcast and apathetic, and in no case may he fall into a state of despair, G‑d forbid. On the contrary, he must strengthen himself: straighten what he made crooked, complete what he failed to do, and hope that G‑d will accept his teshuvah.11
This teshuvah finds its expression in "Modeh Ani Lefanecha Melech": engraving in one's head and heart gratitude and devotion to G‑d, and making a firm resolve that the blood and the fat, the head [OCR unclear; probably "fervor"] and the pleasure, shall be only in holy matters. Then G‑d forgives him for what was done in the earlier hours, and at the same time G‑d gives him His blessing in the fullest measure, in everything he needs, both materially and spiritually, for himself and for his household.
Ultimately, this (the conduct of the Korban Tamid) will also bring the general blessing, the main blessing and the essence of blessing: that Moshiach Tzidkeinu will soon come, rebuild the Beis HaMikdash, take us out of the inner exile and the outer exile, and bring us "לארצנו הקדושה" ("to our Holy Land"),12 when we will merit to see, even with eyes of flesh, the Korban Tamid being offered in the Beis HaMikdash, speedily in our days, Amen.
(From the sichos of [first day of the week of?] Parshas Bamidbar, 5722)
5. At the end of Parshas Vayikra the Torah speaks about the asham talui (the "suspended guilt-offering"), which must be brought when one commits a doubtful sin. (For example, someone had before him kosher fat and non-kosher fat, and ate one of them. Later he was told that one of the two was chelev [forbidden fat], but it is still not clear whether he ate the chelev or the kosher fat. The law is that for this doubt he is obligated to bring an offering called an asham talui.) There is a dispute in the Gemara13 whether one is liable (to kares or a chatas) if one slaughters an asham talui outside the Courtyard (as one is liable with other offerings for "slaughtering outside"). Rabbi Meir holds him liable, and the Sages exempt him. Their reason: since the asham talui comes for a doubt, it is possible that he did no transgression at all. Therefore one cannot be held liable for slaughtering outside, for it may be that he slaughtered outside the Courtyard an animal that was not an offering at all. And the Rambam14 rules like the Sages, that one is exempt.
There is another dispute15 concerning someone who brought an asham talui, and before the offering was slaughtered he learned for certain that he had committed no transgression, or he learned for certain that he did commit a transgression (in which case the offering cannot be brought, because an asham talui comes for a doubt). Rabbi Meir says: "יצא וירעה בעדר" ("It goes out and grazes in the flock"), meaning that the animal becomes ordinary (chullin). The Sages say: "ירעה עד שיסתאב כו'" ("It grazes until it becomes blemished, etc."), meaning that the animal has the status of an offering, but an offering that cannot be brought; one must wait until the animal acquires a blemish, and then it is redeemed from hekdesh. The Rambam16 rules like the Sages, and the reason is: "לבו של אדם דוה על עונותיו והואיל ועל ספק הפרישו גמר בלבו להקדיש" ("A person's heart is pained over his sins, and since he set it aside on account of a doubt, he resolved in his heart to consecrate it"), meaning that the heart of the one who brings the offering pains him over his sins, and since he set it aside on account of a doubt, he resolved in his heart that the animal should be consecrated in any event.
The question is asked: according to the view of the Sages (and the ruling of the Rambam) that even when he later knows clearly that "לא חטא" ("he did not sin"), the animal still remains consecrated because "he resolved in his heart to consecrate," it should seemingly follow (indeed, all the more so) that where the doubt remains, the animal should certainly remain an offering. For even if in truth he did not sin, still "he resolved in his heart to consecrate." So why do the Sages (and the Rambam) rule that if the offering was slaughtered outside, it does not have the law of "slaughtering outside"?
The explanation may be as follows. In the sanctity of offerings there are two aspects: a) in the laws of man (dinei adam), meaning how a person must conduct himself with the animal he consecrated as an offering. In this respect it suffices that we know, according to the laws of man, that "he resolved in his heart to consecrate" it, that it should be hekdesh, even when in truth he did not sin, or even when it later became clear that he did sin. b) With regard to the laws of Heaven (dinei shamayim): the asham talui is an offering with respect to the laws of Heaven only if he actually sinned, except that to the person it is a doubt. Because of the sin he committed in a way that, to him, it is doubtful whether he sinned, he must bring an asham talui (if the person also knows that he committed a sin, he must bring a chatas).
Therefore, the reason that "a person's heart is pained, etc., and he resolved in his heart to consecrate" helps for it to be hekdesh only with respect to the laws of man;17 but with respect to the laws of Heaven it is an offering only if he actually sinned.18 And since it may be that he did not sin, in which case it is no offering with respect to the laws of Heaven (kares), he is not liable to kares for slaughtering it outside deliberately, and consequently he also need not bring a chatas for it if he did so inadvertently, since it is specifically "דבר שזדונו כרת שגגתו חטאת" ("a matter whose deliberate violation incurs kares, its inadvertent violation requires a chatas").19
6. This will also be understood from the fact that although a chatas comes for a definite transgression (committed inadvertently) and an asham talui for a doubtful transgression, we nevertheless find greater stringency in the asham talui than in the chatas: "חטאת בת דנקא ואשם בת שתים" ("a chatas worth a danka, and an asham worth two"):20 a chatas had to be worth no less than a "danka"*20 (a certain coin), and an asham talui no less than two sela'im, which equals 48 dankas!
Rabbeinu Yonah21 explains this: the main atonement of an offering comes through the teshuvah one does with it. Therefore, when one knows for certain that he sinned, the person is aroused to regret and teshuvah in truth. But when it is a doubt to him, and he thinks that perhaps he committed no sin at all, one must seek means to "bring about" in him that he should regret and do teshuvah in truth. That is why an asham talui had to cost much more than a chatas.
This reason, however, is seemingly insufficient. True, there had to be teshuvah, but there is also a significance and a virtue in the offering of the korban itself, which has within it the special power to atone and to remove the blemishes created by the sins. And according to the differences between the blemishes caused by the various sins, so are the differences between the offerings that must repair the blemishes. We must say, then, that the fact that an asham talui had to cost more than a chatas is not only in order to arouse the person to true teshuvah, but also because an asham talui must atone for a blemish greater than the blemish that a chatas atones for. But this is not understood: how can one say that a doubtful transgression produces a greater blemish than a definite transgression?
7. Offerings in general atone only for sins committed inadvertently,22 for even an inadvertent sin requires atonement.23 Although the actual commission of the sin was unintentional (he did it without awareness), nevertheless the very fact that the person was able to commit a sin inadvertently is proof that he is not as he should be. For if he were as he should be, he would not have stumbled even inadvertently, as it is written:24 "לא יאונה לצדיק כל און" ("No iniquity shall befall the righteous"). That is, the guilt of one who transgresses inadvertently is that he allowed his animal soul to grow strong through his earlier, animal-like actions25 (even before he committed the sin), and this is what brought him to the point that he could commit a sin inadvertently.
The things a person does automatically, without awareness and without intent, show his essential nature: where he is invested and what he relishes. The deeds of a tzaddik, whose relish is in G‑dliness, are acts of good and holiness; and if someone could stumble into a sin, this is proof that his relish lies in matters that are not good.
And although the sinful act was only inadvertent, in a certain respect the blemish of an inadvertent act is even greater than that of a deliberate act. When a person does something intentionally and knowingly, it does not show so much about the deep bond between the person and the thing he did; it may be that his entire connection with the act comes only at the time of doing it, and only with his power of action and the level of intent and awareness at which he stands at that time. But an act that happens with him by itself is proof of his essential nature: that his "I," which is deeper than intent and awareness, is bound up with it. Therefore it draws him, instinctively, to do these acts, and so strongly that it came down to actual deed.
8. With this we will also understand what is written in the writings of the Arizal26 that one who is careful about even the smallest amount (mashehu) of chametz on Pesach is assured that he will not sin the entire year. This is not understood: a person has free choice; he can always choose to go whichever way he wishes. So how can one say that by guarding himself from a mashehu of chametz for eight days, his free choice will be taken from him?
But the explanation is that the Arizal is speaking here about inadvertent sins. Deliberately, it is indeed possible that he may, G‑d forbid, transgress, since he always has free choice and is always free to act according to his will. But in an inadvertent sin, committed without awareness, he will not stumble (to that extent), because through being careful about a mashehu of chametz his essential nature has become, to a certain degree, a nature of holiness,27 which consequently will not draw him to sins.28
9. Accordingly it will also be understood why, when the Gemara29 wishes to describe a case for which one must bring an asham talui, it gives the example of a doubt between chelev and shuman (permitted fat). Seemingly, there are many other cases of a doubtful transgression; what is the reason that the Gemara takes specifically the case of a doubt between chelev and shuman?
The explanation is: as said, an asham talui comes for a doubtful inadvertent transgression, where he has a doubt whether he committed a sin inadvertently. And since forbidden acts done inadvertently stem from pleasure, from the relish he has in them, as mentioned above, it follows that whatever the doubtful prohibition may be, the content of the doubt is: in what does his pleasure lie? Is his pleasure a permitted one, which brings him to act [OCR unclear: text missing here] ... has stumbled, and he knows that it is not right for him to be as he is. But with a doubtful prohibition, when he does not know at all whether he stumbled, and he feels entitled to think, "מתברך בלבבו" ("he blesses himself in his heart"),*29 that he committed no transgression at all, this shows, in a certain sense, a deeper connection to evil, because of which he does not know at all that he is not right.
For one who transgresses a definite prohibition inadvertently, his essential nature is still good, and a sin is a contradiction to him and opposed to him. That is why he ultimately feels that he transgressed the Supreme Will; he feels the evil that opposes him and disturbs his essential nature (the animal soul merely surrounded him and drags him toward evil, but it did not become his essential nature; on the contrary, it is opposed to his essential nature). Whereas for one who transgresses in doubt and blesses himself in his heart, this has become his essential nature, and it is no opposition or disturbance to him at all. That is why he does not feel at all, and does not know at all, that he committed a sin.
And therefore, for a doubtful prohibition one must bring an asham talui, which costs much more than the chatas that one must bring for a definite prohibition, because the asham talui must wipe away a deeper blemish.
10. Accordingly it is understood that when someone has a doubt whether he committed a prohibition, even if it is revealed before Heaven that he did not transgress the prohibition (and consequently no punishment comes upon him, since punishment comes only for a forbidden deed), nevertheless, with regard to the state of his soul, the very fact that there is a doubt about him that he transgressed a sin (even if in truth he did not transgress) is proof that he has a connection to it (had he no connection to evil, there could not have been any doubt at all that he committed a prohibition).30 And if nevertheless it is no disturbance to him, and he feels entitled to think that he is as he should be, that his pleasure and fervor are permitted ones (a doubt of shuman), then the state of his soul is, in a certain sense, worse than that of one who transgresses a definite prohibition, whether inadvertently or deliberately.
According to this, it emerges that the asham talui, with its greater stringency than the chatas, applies to anyone who becomes aware of a doubtful prohibition, even if in truth he committed no prohibition.31 That is why the Sages hold that even if it afterward became clear that "he did not sin" or that he definitely sinned, nevertheless, regarding what pertains to him, to the state and condition of his soul, there is "he resolved in his heart to consecrate" and "it grazes until it becomes blemished."
All this concerns the state of his soul, which he wishes and needs to repair. But regarding the laws of Heaven, "המעשה הוא העיקר" ("the deed is the main thing"). In punishments from Above, what matters is the actual commission of the sin.32 Committing an actual sin is contrary to the will and command of the Holy One, blessed be He, in His Torah: "אשר יעשה אותם האדם" ("which a person shall do"),33 "אשר לא תעשינה" ("which shall not be done").34 Therefore, if it is revealed before Heaven that he did not actually transgress the prohibition (even though, because of the state of his soul, he is connected to it), no punishment comes for it under the laws of Heaven.
And that is why the Sages (and the Rambam) rule: "אשם תלוי וכו' שהקריבן בחוץ פטור" ("An asham talui, etc., that one offered outside: he is exempt"). For since it may be that he did not sin in actual deed, in which case, with respect to the laws of Heaven, it is no offering, there is no kares for offering it outside; and whatever does not incur kares when done deliberately does not require a chatas when done inadvertently. He is exempt.
(From the sichos of Simchas Torah, 5742)
Notes
1) See the Ramban's introduction to Sefer Vayikra.
2) See the maamar "Basi LeGani" 5710, beginning of ch. 2.
3) Tanya, ch. 17; Kuntres Acharon, sec. 5.
4) Pesachim 58b, and the sources cited there.
5) See Zevachim (13a): "not for its own sake, or for its own sake and not for its own sake" [OCR unclear: "the same pattern"]. And in the Mishnah at the end of ch. 4 of Zevachim: "for the sake of G‑d... for the sake of a pleasing aroma." Even according to Tosafos and the Mishneh LaMelech it is a mitzvah; and especially according to the Lechem Mishneh, that according to the Rambam (Laws of Maaseh HaKorbanos, end of ch. 4) it invalidates the offering even after the fact.
6) See the Mishnah at the end of Menachos; Vayikra Rabbah 3:5.
7) See Taamei HaMitzvos of the Arizal, Parshas Vayikra. See also Tanya, ch. 34.
8) See the Rishonim on Chagigah 26b; the dispute between Rashi and the Ramban on Tetzaveh 29, b [as printed].
9) See Gittin 56b.
10) Bamidbar Rabbah 21:21; Tanchuma (Buber edition), Pinchas 12, and the sources cited there.
11) See Iggeres HaTeshuvah, ch. 1.
12) For the order of these events, see Rambam, Laws of Kings, ch. 11; Kovetz Michtavim of the Rebbe Rashab, vol. 1, and the sources cited there.
13) Kerisos 18a.
14) Laws of Maaseh HaKorbanos 18:10.
15) Kerisos 23b.
16) Laws of Pesulei HaMukdashin 4:19.
17) See the Lechem Mishneh, Laws of Maaseh HaKorbanos, ch. 8 [as printed], halachah 10: "It is not complete hekdesh."
18) For although when one resolves in his heart to consecrate an offering not on account of a doubt, it becomes hekdesh also with respect to the laws of Heaven (even when he did not sin), when one consecrates it on account of the doubt, as an asham talui offering, it becomes hekdesh with respect to the laws of Heaven only if he sinned, since the asham talui offering comes specifically for a sin (that is in doubt).
19) Kerisos 25a.
20) Zevachim 48a.
*20) Tosafos, s.v. "Mikelal" (Kerisos 10b), unlike Rashi and Tosafos in Zevachim there. This is not the place to elaborate.
21) Berachos 1b, s.v. "VeHa DeAmrinan"; Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim, sec. 603.
22) Iggeres HaKodesh, sec. 28. See also the maamar "Vechol Adam Lo Yihyeh" of the Tzemach Tzedek (Or HaTorah, Yom Kippur, end of p. 1657 ff.), and that of 5723 (Sefer HaMaamarim Melukat, vol. 5, p. 18 ff.).
23) Rashi, Shevuos 2a, s.v. "Toleh."
24) Mishlei 12:21.
25) See Iggeres HaKodesh, end of sec. 28: "from the strengthening of the animal soul"; and Tanya, ch. 13: "it is in its full strength... and on the contrary, it has grown stronger over time, since he has used it much in eating and drinking and other matters of this world."
26) Cited in the Be'er Heitev, beginning of sec. 446. See also Zohar III, beginning of 82b.
27) And even in a Beinoni, in whom the vitalizing soul is the person himself (Tanya, ch. 29), nevertheless the animal soul in a Jew (in itself, when he has not lowered it, through desire for permitted things, into the three completely impure kelipos) is of the level of kelipas nogah, and desires only permitted things (Tanya, ch. 8).
28) Accordingly, the connection between the assurance that he will not sin and carefulness specifically in the prohibition of chametz is understood: matzah signifies bittul (self-nullification) and faith, which (automatically) leads to the fulfillment of all 613 mitzvos (Tanya, ch. 33), while chametz, the opposite of matzah, is yeshus (self-importance) and pride, which (automatically) leads to all kinds of evil.
29) Kerisos 17b.
*29) Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, Orach Chaim, sec. 603.
30) See Moed Katan 18, end of side b.
31) This explains why Bava ben Buta would volunteer an asham talui every day except the day after Yom Kippur (Kerisos 25a): he was not concerned that perhaps he had actually sinned, G‑d forbid, but was concerned for the state of the very essence of his soul. (This is similar to what is explained in Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 3d, and in the maamar "Ashreinu" 5697 (in Sefer HaMaamarim Kuntreisim, vol. 2), regarding Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai.) This is not so after Yom Kippur, when the level of "before G‑d," the level of the essence of holiness, shines.
32) See the discourse "Lehavin etc." at the beginning of Sefer HaTanya (Kitzurim VeHaaros LeTanya, p. 81 ff.).
33) Vayikra 18:5.
34) Vayikra 4:1 [as printed].
Key Lesson
The Korban Tamid teaches that G‑d asks above all for the whole heart: beginning each day with "Modeh Ani," a firm commitment to direct one's fervor and pleasure to holiness, permeates and blesses the entire day and even atones for earlier failings. The asham talui teaches that a doubtful sin, which a person may comfortably dismiss, can reveal a deeper attachment to the undesirable than a known sin, so a Jew must examine and refine the very state of his soul.