Parshas Bo
1. Regarding the time of the Exodus from Egypt, it is stated in today's sidra1 that it took place "בעצם היום הזה" ("on that very day"), which means: "בחצי היום" ("at midday").2 As for what is written, "ליל שמורים גו' להוציאם מארץ מצרים" ("It is a night of watching… to bring them out of the land of Egypt"),3 and also in the Book of Devarim,4 "הוציאך ה"א ממצרים לילה" ("The L‑rd your G‑d brought you out of Egypt by night") — this refers to Pharaoh's granting them permission to leave Egypt,5 which happened at night, as is related in today's sidra:6 "ויקרא למשה ולאהרן לילה ויאמר קומו צאו מתוך עמי גו'" ("He called to Moshe and to Aharon at night and said: Rise up, go out from among my people…"). The actual departure, however, took place only by day.
What is more: not only did they in practice leave Egypt by day, but they were not even permitted to leave Egypt at night — for Moshe had instructed them, "לא תצאו איש מפתח ביתו עד בוקר" ("None of you shall go out of the door of his house until morning").7
Accordingly — since there are two times associated with the Exodus: the actual departure "on that very day," and the granting of permission for it at night — one could seemingly explain a dispute between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, as follows.
2. Regarding the recitation of Hallel on the night of Pesach (before eating the Pesach offering), the Mishnah says:8 "עד היכן הוא אומר" ("How far does one recite?") — up to what point does one say Hallel? Only until "אם הבנים שמחה" ("the joyful mother of children"), which is the opinion of Beis Shammai; or does one also say "בצאת ישראל ממצרים" ("When Israel went out of Egypt") until "חלמיש למעינו מים" ("the flint into a spring of water"), as Beis Hillel hold.
It is stated in the Yerushalmi9 that the reason of Beis Shammai is: "וכי יצאו ישראל ממצרים שהוא מזכיר יציאת מצרים" ("Had Israel then already left Egypt, that he should mention the Exodus?"). Beis Hillel, however, hold: since even if "ממתין עד קרות הגבר עדיין לא הגיעו לחצי גאולה" ("he were to wait until the rooster's crow, they would still not have reached even half the redemption"), one therefore says "When Israel went out of Egypt" immediately after the first chapter of Hallel (before eating the Pesach offering), because "מכיון שהתחיל במצוה אומר לו מרק" ("once he has begun a mitzvah, we tell him: complete it").
This seems difficult: what indeed is the reason of Beis Shammai for saying "When Israel went out of Egypt" after eating the Pesach offering? Then too it is still before the time of the redemption (as Beis Hillel ask)!
One can explain it (based on the above) as follows: since the verse also calls the granting of permission to leave Egypt "בהוציאך גו' ממצרים" ("when I bring you out… of Egypt"), and this10 took place (immediately) after midnight — Beis Shammai therefore hold that "When Israel went out of Egypt" should be said after eating the Pesach offering, whose11 time (that of the Pesach offering) is until midnight12 (the time of the granting of permission, which is also called "going out").
It is difficult, however, to interpret Beis Shammai's view this way. For according to this they should have held that one must wait with saying this chapter until after midnight (not merely until after the time of eating the Pesach offering, which can also end before midnight). Why do they hold that it is said right after eating the Pesach offering — even before midnight?13
3. This will be understood by first noting that we find a great many disputes between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel whose basis is this: Beis Shammai hold "אזלינן בתר בכח" ("we follow the potential") and Beis Hillel hold "אזלינן בתר בפועל" ("we follow the actual").14 For example:15
a) "חלות דבש16 מאימתי מיטמאות משום משקה" ("Honeycombs — from when can they contract impurity as a liquid?") — from when are they regarded as a liquid with respect to receiving impurity? "Beis Shammai say: משיהרהר ("from when he has it in mind")17 [according to another reading:18 משיחרחר ("from when he smokes out the bees")]. Beis Hillel say: משירסק ("from when he crushes them")."
For Beis Hillel hold that the reality of a thing is determined by the actual, and therefore they hold "from when he crushes them," since only then does it become a liquid in actuality. Beis Shammai, however, hold that the potential too suffices, and so they say "from when he has it in mind" (or, at the latest, "from when he smokes out the bees"): although the actual is not yet there, even then it is already a liquid in potential.
b) "באחד בשבט ראש השנה לאילן כדברי בית שמאי. בית הלל אומרים בחמשה עשר בו" ("On the first of Shevat is the New Year for trees, according to the words of Beis Shammai. Beis Hillel say: on its fifteenth").19 Why is the New Year for trees (according to both opinions) only in the month of Shevat?
It is stated in the Yerushalmi20 that this is because "עד כאן הן חיין ממי השנה שעברה, מכאן ואילך הן חיין ממי השנה הבאה" ("until here they live from the waters of the past year; from here on they live from the waters of the coming year"). That is: the effect of the waters on the trees comes only four months later, and trees whose budding occurred before the month of Shevat (before four months have passed from the start of the rains of the new year) draw their life "from the waters of the past year."
Accordingly it may be said21 that the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the time of the New Year for trees — whether it is "on the first of Shevat" or "on its fifteenth" — is (not a dispute about the facts, but) due to the fact that there are two times in the trees' drawing nourishment "from the waters of the coming year" (as will be explained in section 4):
Their drawing in potential from the "waters of the coming year" is on the first of Shevat, whereas their actual drawing from those waters is on the fifteenth of Shevat. Therefore Beis Shammai, who hold "we follow the potential," say that the New Year for trees is on the first of Shevat; and Beis Hillel, who hold "we follow the actual," say that it is "on its fifteenth."
4. The explanation of this is as follows:
The time of "נידונים על המים" ("being judged regarding the waters") (in actuality and openly) is "בחג" ("on the festival")22 (Sukkos) — the fifteenth of Tishrei. In potential and in concealment, however, the judgment is on the first of Tishrei, for on Rosh Hashanah (the first of Tishrei) there is judgment and sentence on all matters in the world23 — including "regarding the waters."24 And since the trees' drawing from the waters begins four months after the judgment regarding the waters, it follows that their drawing in concealment and in potential is on the first of Shevat — four months after the judgment in potential and in concealment; whereas their drawing in actuality and openly is on the fifteenth of Shevat — four months after the judgment in actuality and openly.
5. One of the explanations why the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel must be stated both regarding "honeycombs" and regarding "the New Year for trees" — although in both places their dispute stems from one and the same reason — is as follows:
"The New Year for trees" is itself no more than a matter of potential. For even when, four months later, the trees "live from the waters of the coming year," this "living" will then be merely a matter of budding, which is still very far from the completion of the growth, which comes much later.
So if Beis Shammai's view that "we follow the potential" were stated only regarding the New Year for trees, one could say that this is because even on the fifteenth of Shevat there will be no more than the budding of the trees — a matter of potential (only that the potential itself will then be actual), and within potential itself they make no distinction (between the potential and the actualization of that potential). Beis Shammai's view is therefore stated also regarding "honeycombs,"25 to let us know that even there — where after he crushes the honey it will become a fully actual liquid — Beis Shammai still follow their view that "we follow the potential."26
Conversely, were Beis Shammai's view stated [only] regarding honeycombs (then aside from the fact that one could say that Beis Hillel concede regarding the New Year for trees for the above reason, also regarding Beis Shammai), one could not have learned from there what their view is regarding the New Year for trees. For one could say that they hold "we follow the potential" regarding honeycombs because at the time he has it in mind (or smokes out the bees), although the crushing exists only in potential, it is within his power to bring it immediately from potential to actuality.27 Beis Shammai must therefore let their view be known also regarding the New Year for trees: that even in a case where it is impossible for the actual — the budding — to occur at the time of the potential, on the first of Shevat,28 even there "we follow the potential."29
6. Beis Shammai's view that "we follow the potential" means not merely that when something exists only in potential, this suffices (with regard to halachah) just as if the thing had already come into actuality
[as in the above examples: according to Beis Shammai, as soon as the "honeycombs" have become a liquid in potential they already have the status of a liquid; and likewise regarding "the New Year for trees" — since on the first of Shevat the trees already begin to draw, in potential, from the waters of the new year, this potential already suffices for that day (the first of Shevat) to be the time of the New Year for trees].
Rather, even more: according to Beis Shammai the potential has greater importance than the actual, and it is specifically the potential that determines the reality of the thing.
We see this in their dispute with Beis Hillel regarding "the mitzvah of Chanukah,"30 where Beis Shammai hold that the number of Chanukah lights is determined "כנגד ימים הנכנסין" ("corresponding to the days that are entering") — according to the days that will come, i.e., days that will come in actuality only later and for now exist only in potential. Therefore Beis Shammai say, "יום ראשון מדליק שמונה, מכאן ואילך פוחת והולך" ("On the first day one lights eight; from then on one progressively decreases"), since the beginning of the first day includes within itself (in potential) eight days, the second no more than seven, and so on.
Beis Hillel, however, hold that the number of lights is determined "כנגד ימים היוצאין" ("corresponding to the days that have gone out") — according to the days that have already been in actuality. Therefore they say, "יום ראשון מדליק אחד, מכאן ואילך מוסיף והולך" ("On the first day one lights one; from then on one progressively adds"), because on the first day only one day exists in actuality, on the second day two days, and so on.
We see from this, regarding Beis Shammai's view, that "we follow the potential" does not merely mean that the potential is reckoned as if the thing were already actual as well. On the contrary:31 the potential is the main thing, and according to it the reality of the thing is determined — which is why the number of Chanukah lights is determined corresponding to the days that are entering32 and not corresponding to the days that have gone out.33
7. Based on the above, one can also explain the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer with the Sages and Rabban Gamliel regarding the end of the time for the Shema of the evening: Rabbi Eliezer holds "עד סוף האשמורה הראשונה" ("until the end of the first watch"), while the Sages34 and Rabban Gamliel hold that the time (by Torah law35) is "עד שיעלה עמוד השחר" ("until the dawn rises").
Rashi explains36 that the basis of their dispute lies in the meaning of "ובשכבך" ("when you lie down"):37 Rabbi Eliezer holds that "when you lie down" means the entire time that "בני אדם עוסקין לילך ולשכב" ("people are occupied with going to lie down"), and being so "occupied" lasts only until the end of the first watch; whereas the Sages and Rabban Gamliel hold that "when you lie down" is the entire time that "בני אדם שוכבים" ("people are lying down") — which is the entire night.
Why indeed does Rabbi Eliezer learn that it means being "occupied with going to lie down," and the Sages with Rabban Gamliel — that "people are lying down"? The explanation (based on the above) is as follows:
When a person is occupied with going to sleep, there is included in this, in potential, the entire time that he will afterwards actually sleep. Therefore the Sages and Rabban Gamliel, who hold (like the view of Beis Hillel38) that "we follow the actual," learn that "when you lie down" means the time when people are lying down in actuality; but Rabbi Eliezer, who was among the students of Beis Shammai39 and therefore holds that "we follow the potential," learns that "when you lie down" means the time when people are occupied with going to lie down.
We see here that according to Beis Shammai's view one looks only at the potential — which is why Rabbi Eliezer (of the students of Beis Shammai) holds that after the first watch — although actual lying down exists then — one can no longer recite the Shema, since the potential no longer exists.
8. Beis Shammai's opinion that "we follow the potential" must be stated explicitly both regarding the time of the Shema and regarding the Chanukah lights, because there is a novelty in their view regarding the time of the Shema over their view regarding the mitzvah of Chanukah:
In the mitzvah of Chanukah one lights a different number of lights each night. Therefore, from Beis Shammai's words, "On the first day one lights eight; from then on one progressively decreases," one cannot yet see that they reckon only with the potential to that extent.40 For one could say that lighting the smaller number during the last four days only "corresponding to the days that are entering" — although in actuality more days have already passed by then — is in order to make a distinction40* between the number of lights lit in the last four days and the number lit in the first four days.
But from the fact that regarding the time of the Shema too Rabbi Eliezer holds that after the first watch — when only actual lying down exists — one can no longer recite the Shema, Beis Shammai's view is clearly seen: one reckons only with the potential, even when there are no side reasons not to reckon with the actual.
Conversely, from Rabbi Eliezer's opinion regarding the time of the Shema one could not know Beis Shammai's view regarding the mitzvah of Chanukah, because41 regarding the time of the Shema the issue is the meaning of the word "when you lie down" in the Torah, and Rabbi Eliezer holds that this Torah word means the potential: "occupied with going to lie down." And since "לשון תורה לעצמה לשון כו'" ("the language of the Torah is a language unto itself"),42 this is no proof that also apart from "the language of the Torah" we follow (only) the potential.
9. This dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel — whether the main thing is the potential or the actual — is found also regarding creation as a whole: "בית שמאי אומרים שמים נבראו תחלה ואחר כך נבראת הארץ . . ובית הלל אומרים ארץ נבראת תחלה ואחר כך שמים" ("Beis Shammai say: the heavens were created first and afterwards the earth was created . . and Beis Hillel say: the earth was created first and afterwards the heavens").43
This is explained44 thus: in the actual coming into being, "the heavens were created first." For since the coming into being of the worlds is by way of a chain of descent from above to below, the heavens were created first and from them the earth was created (just as after their creation the earth receives from the heavens45).
In thought and intent, however, the earth arose "במחשבה תחלה" ("in thought first"), before the heavens [and this itself is the reason the earth was created later, for "סוף מעשה במחשבה תחלה" ("last in deed, first in thought");46 as in the well-known example that when one builds a building, the reason and cause of all the construction is that he wants the building as it stands completed].
This, however, is not understood:
According to the above it follows that Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel are speaking of two separate matters: Beis Shammai about the actual coming into being, and Beis Hillel about the intent and thought. Yet the wording "Beis Shammai say and Beis Hillel say" indicates a dispute. So in what does their dispute consist?47
We must therefore say that the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel is about which is "first" — first in superiority and importance: the heavens or the earth. And what is stated in Chassidus (as above) — that "the heavens were created first" speaks of the actual coming into being and "the earth was created first" speaks of thought and intent — these are reasons48 for their respective views on which precedes in superiority and importance:
Beis Hillel hold that since the earth arose "in thought first" and the main intent is in it, it is specifically the earth that is "first" in superiority and importance.49
And Beis Shammai hold that since in actuality the heavens were created first and from them the earth was created
[to the extent that even "Israel and the Torah," the purpose of creation, which is found on earth,50 exist first in "the heavens,"51 and from there they were drawn down to earth52],
this means that the potential of the earth (which arose in thought first) is found in the heavens. Therefore the heavens are "first" in superiority and importance — for Beis Shammai follow their view that the main superiority lies in the potential.53
10. The novelty in Beis Shammai's view that "the heavens were created first" because the heavens are the potential — compared with their view that "we follow the potential" in all other places — is as follows:
With created beings, there must first be the potential, and specifically from it (and after it) can the actual emerge. With the creation of heaven and earth, however, which G‑d created, it is understood that since G‑d is not, Heaven forbid, limited by any limits, He can create the actual even before the potential (or altogether without a potential).
One could therefore not derive Beis Shammai's opinion regarding the creation of heaven and earth from their view that "we follow the potential" in the other places — for one could say that the superiority of the potential is because without it the actual cannot exist, unlike creation by the Holy One, blessed be He. Beis Shammai's view must therefore be stated also regarding the creation of heaven and earth:54 that even in the deeds of the Holy One, blessed be He, where the actual could have existed without the potential, since G‑d in fact created the earth in such a manner that it derives from what previously existed in potential in the heavens, in this case too "we follow the potential."
Nevertheless, the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel must be stated also in other places — to let us hear the view of Beis Hillel55 that even with created beings, where one must have recourse to the potential, here too they hold that "we follow the actual."
11. We must, however, still understand the reason of Beis Shammai that "the heavens were created first":
From the very fact that after the creation of the heavens the earth was created — although the earth already exists in potential in "the heavens" — it is evident that the intent lies in the earth as it is in actuality, and it is specifically this (the actual earth) that arose in thought first. How, then, can one say that the main superiority lies in the heavens, and that they are "first" in superiority and importance?
The same question applies to Beis Shammai's general view that "we follow the potential": the superiority of potential is, seemingly, only that from it an actuality can emerge (to the extent that the very meaning of the word "potential" is that it can bring about an actuality). So how can one say that the main superiority lies in the potential (to the extent that in several laws one reckons only with the potential and not with the actual56) — when the importance and superiority of potential consists in its being able to bring forth the actual?
12. This will be understood by first noting the connection of the two views — "we follow the potential" or "we follow the actual" — to the nature of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel:57
The root of Beis Shammai is in gevuros, and the root of Beis Hillel is in chassadim58 (which is why Beis Shammai are stringent and Beis Hillel lenient59). And since gevurah is the level of "concealment" and chesed is "revelation," Beis Shammai hold that the main thing is the potential and Beis Hillel hold that the main thing is the actual — for potential by its nature is concealment, and actuality is revelation.
This is also the explanation of the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel whether "the heavens were created first" or "the earth was created first":
For the intent of creation to be carried out, there must be both "heaven" and "earth." The practical difference, however, is this: from the perspective of the level of gevurah — the root of Beis Shammai — since its nature is "concealment" and "ascent from below to above," it follows that the ultimate intent in the creation of the "below" (earth) is that it should strive and ascend to the "above" (heaven). Therefore Beis Shammai say "the heavens were created first."60 From the perspective of the level of chesed, however — the root of Beis Hillel — since its nature is "revelation" and "drawing down from above to below," it follows that the intent lies in the "below" itself, and that the purpose of the "above" too is that it should be drawn down and revealed below. Therefore Beis Hillel say "the earth was created first."
And the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel regarding the creation of heaven and earth is the basis for their dispute in all the laws of the Torah, whether we follow the potential or the actual:
According to Beis Hillel's view that the purpose is the "below," it follows that the main superiority lies in the actual, and the role of the potential is that from it the actual emerges.
According to Beis Shammai's view, however, that the ultimate superiority consists in "heaven," and the task of "earth" is to strive and ascend to "heaven," it is reasonable to say that potential is not a means toward the actual. On the contrary: the main superiority lies in the potential itself, and the actual is merely the "אבן הבוחן" ("touchstone") through which the potential is revealed and verified.61
13. Based on all the above, we will also understand the reason of Beis Shammai for saying "When Israel went out of Egypt" immediately after eating the Pesach offering (even before midnight):
The Exodus took place in the merit of the blood of the Pesach offering.62 And since the "reward of a mitzvah" is caused by the mitzvah63 and is thus also included in it (as with every cause and effect, where the effect is included in potential in its cause), it is understood that at the time of eating the Pesach offering [when the matter of the Pesach offering is completed, for it "לא בא מתחלתו אלא לאכילה" ("came from the outset only to be eaten")64] the Exodus from Egypt is already accomplished, in potential and in concealment.65
Therefore Beis Shammai say that immediately after eating the Pesach offering one says "When Israel went out of Egypt" — because the Exodus already exists then in potential, and they follow their view that "we follow the potential."66
14. It is written, "כימי צאתך מארץ מצרים אראנו נפלאות" ("As in the days of your going out of the land of Egypt, I will show him wonders").67 Just as regarding the Exodus Beis Hillel hold (and between Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel the halachah follows Beis Hillel,68 to the point that "בית שמאי במקום בית הלל אינה משנה" ("the opinion of Beis Shammai where it opposes Beis Hillel is not considered a Mishnah")69) that "we follow the actual," and for an Exodus in potential one cannot say "Hallel,"
so too regarding the "I will show him wonders" of the future Redemption: Jews cannot content themselves with a Redemption in potential and in spirituality;70 rather, they demand of G‑d (and they will surely achieve it, and very soon) the Redemption in actuality and in physicality. "עד מתי קץ הפלאות" ("How long until the end of the wonders?")!71 All the appointed times have passed; it is long since time to go out of exile, simply and physically, and "בנערינו ובזקנינו בבנינו ובבנותינו" ("with our young and with our old, with our sons and with our daughters"),72 to the extent that "לא תשאר פרסה" ("not a hoof shall remain"),73 and in the manner of "שמחת עולם על ראשם" ("everlasting joy upon their heads").74
May there now be fulfilled in actuality the assurance:75 "כי אלקים יושיע ציון ויבנה ערי יהודה וישבו שם וירשוה וזרע עבדיו ינחלוה ואוהבי שמו ישכנו בה" ("For G‑d will save Zion and build the cities of Yehudah, and they shall dwell there and possess it; the seed of His servants shall inherit it, and those who love His Name shall dwell in it"),76 speedily in our days.
(From the sichos of Acharon shel Pesach and Shabbos Parshas Kedoshim 5727)
Notes
1) 12:41, 51.
2) Yerushalmi Pesachim 10:5. Tosefta ibid., 6. Sifri and Rashi, Haazinu 32:48.
3) Our parshah, ibid., 42.
4) Re'eh 16:1.
5) Berachos 9a, end, and Rashi there. Rashi on Re'eh, ibid.
6) 12:31.
7) Our parshah, ibid., 22.
8) Pesachim 9:3.
9) The above-cited Pesachim. And so too in the Tosefta there.
10) In Korban HaEidah on the Yerushalmi there (and so too in Minchas Bikkurim on the Tosefta there): "For Beis Shammai hold that the redemption and the going out were at midnight." Possibly the intent here is regarding the granting of permission, as in the text.
11) Or: because "כל כמה דמצינן למקרבי' מקריבינן" ("whenever we can bring it nearer, we do so") (Minchas Bikkurim there).
12) Zevachim 5:8.
13) In Korban HaEidah there: "And he eats the Pesach until midnight, and afterwards says 'When Israel went out,' for Beis Shammai hold, etc." But nowhere is it mentioned that the recitation of Hallel (according to Beis Shammai) must specifically be after midnight.
14) See Beis HaOtzar by R. Y. Y. Engel, Ma'areches Alef, principle 26; Ma'areches Beis, principle 2. L'Or HaHalachah by R. S. Y. Zevin, "The Views of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel" (the necessity [for stating each dispute] is not explained there). Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 114, sec. 5 ff. (and there, that this is also the reason for the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel (Niddah 10:8) on the law of "one who sees on the eleventh day"; see there). See also below, note 28; note 61, in the gloss. And see at length the Hadran on the Six Orders of Mishnah (Kehos 5748; printed in the supplements to Sefer HaSichos 5748, vol. 2).
15) Seemingly one could say that this is also the reason for the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel (Bava Metzia, end of ch. 3) on the law of "החושב לשלוח יד בפקדון, בית שמאי אומרים חייב, ובית הלל אומרים אינו חייב עד שישלח בו יד" ("one who intends to misappropriate a deposit: Beis Shammai say he is liable, and Beis Hillel say he is not liable until he actually misappropriates it") (see Beis HaOtzar there). But from what is said in the Yerushalmi (Shevuos, beginning of ch. 8), "[If it] was standing in the public domain and he thought to steal it . . if before he drew it [to himself], all agree he is exempt," it is evident that regarding misappropriation Beis Shammai too hold that we do not follow the potential, and their imposing liability "when it stands in his stall" is for a different reason. (See Tzafnas Paneach, second edition, in the omissions (p. 180), that the reason of Beis Shammai is: at first this place where the object lies was the domain of the depositor, "and through his thought, by which his guardianship ended, it became the domain of the bailee, and this is a formal drawing [of the object]" — and a "formal drawing" too is a drawing in actuality. See below, note 53.)
*) It may be said that the reason is: since the object belongs to the depositor, the bailee's thought cannot have any effect on the depositor's object so that it be acquired by him thereby. But one cannot bring proof for this from matters of impurity, prohibition, and the like (Rambam, Hilchos Keilim 25:11 (and Mishneh LaMelech there, 24:7); Kilayim 7:4–5; see Tosafos Yevamos 83b, beginning; and elsewhere), for robbery and theft are different, etc., since the Torah said that the object leaves the possession of the victim and becomes the robber's. This is not the place for elaboration.
16) Uktzin 3:1.
17) The reading of some in the commentary of Rav Hai Gaon, Rash, Rosh, and others.
18) The Aruch, the Rambam, and others. And so in the printed editions.
19) Beginning of tractate Rosh Hashanah.
20) Rosh Hashanah 1:2. According to the explanation of Tosafos (Rosh Hashanah 14a, s.v. b'echad), the Bavli too holds so (see Turei Even on Rosh Hashanah there).
21) See also Likkutei Sichos vol. 1, p. 147.
22) Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah 16a.
23) See Rosh Hashanah there (in the opinion of R. Yehudah; and according to the Yerushalmi (Rosh Hashanah 1:2) this is also the intent of the Mishnah): "הכל נידונין בראש השנה" ("All are judged on Rosh Hashanah"), and what is taught about being "judged regarding the waters" refers to the sealing of the verdict, each being sealed at its time. Also according to the Tanna of the school of R. Yishmael (according to whom, per the Bavli, our Mishnah is taught) — since the judgment regarding the waters concerns man, and "man is judged on Rosh Hashanah," we must say that the judgment of Rosh Hashanah also includes (in concealment) the judgment regarding the waters. See Likkutei Torah, Nitzavim 46b, beginning: On Rosh Hashanah there is drawn down the revelation of the general life-force of the entire year, and from it life-force is drawn to the division of particulars . . and in the four periods in which the world is judged.
24) The same applies to the general judgment of Rosh Hashanah: on the festival "אנו יודעין דישראל אינון נצוחייא" ("we know that Israel are the victors") (Vayikra Rabbah 30:2). Note also what is known (Siddur 235b; see also Likkutei Torah there, 48b end) on the verse "בכסה ליום חגנו" ("at the concealed moon, for the day of our festival"), that all the drawings-down of Rosh Hashanah are "concealed," and their revelation is on the festival of Sukkos.
25) It may also be said (simply) that the novelty of Beis Shammai regarding "honeycombs" is (not the very matter of following the potential even in such a case, but) the measure and manner of the potential: "from when he has it in mind" or "from when he smokes out the bees" (similar to what is explained below, note [number cut off in the OCR, apparently 66], regarding the recitation of "When Israel went out of Egypt").
26) A further superiority in the potential of "honeycombs" — for which reason one cannot learn from it that we follow the potential also regarding the New Year for trees — see below, note 33 (in the gloss).
27) Similar to "כל הראוי לבילה אין בילה מעכבת בו" ("Whatever is fit for mixing, the mixing does not impede it") (Yevamos 104b).
28) Although also regarding "one who sees on the eleventh day" Beis Shammai hold that we follow the potential (see above, note 14) — even though the potential of the eleventh day is entirely remote from actuality, for it will never come to actuality (which is why Beis Shammai's view had to be stated regarding "one who sees on the eleventh day" and could not be learned from their view on the New Year for trees) — nevertheless, for this very reason one cannot learn from there Beis Shammai's view on the New Year for trees (and honeycombs). For since the potential of the eleventh day will never come to actuality, it must be that the definition of "we follow the potential" there is due to the potential in itself (that the eleventh day by its nature could lead to major zivah, in other days of zivah), as explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 7, p. 116, note 52. Regarding the New Year for trees, however, whose matter is the budding of the fruit of the tree (a matter of actuality), one could have said that we do not follow the potential. Their dispute therefore had to be stated also regarding the New Year for trees: that here too we follow the potential because it includes the actual.
29) A similar necessity applies also to the words of Beis Hillel, that we do not follow the potential.
30) Shabbos 21b.
31) For this is the novelty in Beis Shammai's view on "the mitzvah of Chanukah" over their view [not only on "honeycombs" — where it is within his power to bring about the actual even while he has it in mind (as above, sec. 5; see Likkutei Sichos there, p. 115), unlike Chanukah — but also over their view] on "the New Year for trees."
For from Beis Shammai's holding that the New Year for trees is on the first of Shevat there is no proof that the potential surpasses the actual. Even though according to their view one may not tithe from fruits that budded from the first of Shevat until the fifteenth on behalf of the fruits of the past year, although in actuality they live from the waters of the past year — that is because one time cannot belong to two years. Therefore even if we say that potential equals actual (and even if we say that the actual surpasses the potential), nevertheless, since the potential too is considered like the actual, (therefore) the first of Shevat was set as the New Year for trees — and so it automatically leaves the category of the past year.
*) A further novelty in Beis Shammai's view on the mitzvah of Chanukah: The potential (of the New Year for trees) on the first of Shevat exists when its actual has not yet begun (and similarly regarding honeycombs). On the mitzvah of Chanukah, however, the fact that the first day of Chanukah includes eight days in potential is because it is one of the days of Chanukah, i.e., because the actual days of Chanukah have already begun. Since the potential derives from the actual, one could have said that in such a case even Beis Shammai agree that the main thing is the actual and we do not follow the potential.
32) Seemingly one could say that even Beis Shammai agree that the potential does not surpass the actual, and their holding that also in the last four days one lights only corresponding to the days entering and not corresponding to the days gone out is because: since on the first day one lights eight lights corresponding to the days entering (and similarly in the three following days), because according to Beis Shammai the potential too suffices, it follows that one cannot light this same number also in the last four days — for there must be a distinction (as below, section 8).
But this is somewhat forced. For if both of them (potential and actual) are equal (and especially if we say that the actual surpasses the potential), the matter is not self-evident, for there is reason to say the opposite as well:* that in the last four days one should light corresponding to the days gone out (which already exist in actuality), and consequently in the first four days one would not light this number. From Beis Shammai's holding that the fixed number of lights is such that specifically on the first day one lights eight,** it is proven that in their opinion the potential surpasses the actual.
*) For from the outset the question here concerns all the days of Chanukah. Regarding the New Year for trees, however (see the preceding note), the question concerns fixing the start of the coming year (only that as a consequence this is the end of the preceding year).
**) But it may be said with difficulty [OCR unclear] that on the first day, where there is reason on both sides, we are stringent to light eight, and consequently the order of the other days is set.
33) The reason the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel had to be taught also regarding "honeycombs"* and "the New Year for trees" is that [aside from the novelty in their dispute there in the opinion of Beis Hillel, according to the above-mentioned necessity] during the days of Chanukah, even on the first day the actual of the eight days has already begun (for in the following days only further quantity of the actual is added), whereas regarding "honeycombs" and "the New Year for trees," the potential that exists at the time of the thought (or the smoking out), and likewise the potential on the first of Shevat, contains no actuality at all, not even its beginning.
*) Regarding "honeycombs," there is an additional superiority over the potential of the first day of Chanukah: the actual of the remaining days of Chanukah (included in the first day) will come by itself and lacks only time. With "honeycombs," by contrast, for the actual to come there must be the act of crushing (as explained in Likkutei Sichos vol. 4, there).
Accordingly it is understood (in addition to what was explained above, sec. 5) that there is a further novelty in Beis Shammai's view on "honeycombs" over "the New Year for trees" — for the actual (which will be on the fifteenth of Shevat) will come by itself, automatically.
34) Beginning of tractate Berachos.
35) See there, 4b, beginning.
36) Ibid., end of side a, ff. See also ibid., 3a, s.v. lav R. Eliezer hi.
37) Va'eschanan 6:7. Eikev 11:19.
38) Regarding the Sages — see the next note. And Rabban Gamliel was of the students of Beis Hillel (see Yevamos 15a).
39) Rashi (s.v. shamuti) and Tosafos (s.v. d'Rabbi Eliezer d'shamuti), Shabbos 130b. See Tosafos Beitzah 34b, beginning, who asks plainly on the dispute of R. Eliezer and the Sages that their views "are reversed" with respect to Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel.
40) But from there too it is necessarily so that according to Beis Shammai the potential surpasses the actual (and not only that the potential also suffices) — see above, note 32.
40*) Similar to what is written in Tosafos, s.v. umehadrin, Shabbos (21b).
41) In addition: the potential on the first day of Chanukah exists because the actual has already begun then, as above, note 31, in the gloss. By contrast, being "occupied with going to lie down" — although at this time there is also actual lying down (which is why it is the time of the Shema also according to the Sages and Rabban Gamliel) — being occupied with going to lie down is not caused by their lying down then in actuality.
42) Avodah Zarah 58b. Chullin 137b.
43) Chagigah 12a. Bereishis Rabbah 1:15.
44) Torah Ohr, beginning of Vayigash (and in Torah Chayim there, somewhat differently). Sefer HaMaamarim 5629, p. 18 ff. The maamar "Ki HaMitzvah HaZos" 5666. And in many places.
45) As it is written (Hoshea 2:23), "אענה את השמים והם יענו את הארץ" ("I will answer the heavens, and they shall answer the earth").
46) The hymn Lecha Dodi.
47) As is asked in Torah Chayim there (89c): According to this it would be very difficult regarding their dispute . . for seemingly there is no dispute in this at all according to the above. See there.
48) Note the law (Berachos 41a), "כל המוקדם בפסוק . . מוקדם לברכה" ("Whatever comes earlier in the verse . . comes earlier for the blessing"), because it is more important (see Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 211:4; Seder Birchos HaNehenin of the Alter Rebbe, 10:2).
49) From the parables of the upper chamber and the footstool in Chagigah and Bereishis Rabbah there, it is evident that their dispute concerns "first" in time. This will be understood from what is stated below, note 60.
50) See the sources noted in note 44. And because the earth arose in thought first, it has (superiority and importance —) the power to bring forth something from nothing (which is not found in the heavens).
51) As is known (cited in Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 199, note 62), "for the sake of Israel and for the sake of the Torah." (See there in the text, that the entire world is secondary to Israel and the Torah.)
52) For souls are hewn from beneath the Throne of Glory (Zohar III, 29b, and elsewhere; see also Rashi, s.v. bitzror hachayim, Shabbos 152b), which is in Aravos, "which is called heaven" (Chagigah 12b, end). Likewise, "the Torah is from Heaven" (Mishnah, beginning of Perek Chelek), and from there they were drawn down below on earth.
53) In Tzafnas Paneach, second edition, p. 180, the reason of Beis Shammai that "the heavens were created first" is that they hold form is the main thing. But it may be said that the superiority of "heaven" (according to Beis Shammai) is not only due to "form," but because in the potential (heaven) the "matter" (earth) too is included, as in the text.
54) And further (and primarily): Beis Shammai's opinion that "the heavens were created first" is the source and explanation for their general view that "we follow the potential" everywhere, as below, sec. 12. (Moreover: had we not known their opinion that the heavens were created first, one could have mistakenly thought that their holding "we follow the potential" everywhere is not due to the superiority of the potential in itself but because the potential contains the possibility of becoming actual, as below, note 61.)
55) It may be said that this is a novelty also in Beis Shammai's opinion: that even within matters of the earth itself, although its general nature (even the potential within it) is actual (below), nevertheless we follow the potential.
56) As with the time of the evening Shema, which according to the opinion of (R. Eliezer, being of the students of) Beis Shammai is only when people are occupied with going to lie down and not when they are actually lying down.*
And although according to Beis Shammai this is the meaning of "when you lie down" stated in the verse (see above, section 8, that it therefore cannot be used to learn other laws), this itself requires a reason: why did the Torah say (according to Beis Shammai) that the time of the Shema is only at the time of lying down in potential? See the above note.
*) Regarding Beis Shammai's opinion on the mitzvah of Chanukah, it may be said (with difficulty) that this is in order that there be a distinction, etc., as above, beginning of sec. 8.
57) See also Beis HaOtzar there.
58) Likkutei Torah, Shir HaShirim 48c. And in many places.
59) See Tanya, in the Introduction (6a, beginning).
60) Since according to Beis Shammai the intent in the "below" (earth) is that it should ascend to the "above" (heaven), it is understood that the manner of the earth's creation accords with the manner of the heavens — see Rashi, Chagigah there (s.v. sharfaraf): "According to the height of the throne he fashions the footstool." According to Beis Hillel, however, for whom the intent of the "above" is for the sake of the "below," the manner of the creation of the heavens accords with the earth. Note Likkutei Torah, Vayikra 4b: "So too it will be understood from this analogue above . . or that as it is above so it is below."
Accordingly it may be said that the intent of "first" is also in time (as is evident from the plain wording in Chagigah and Bereishis Rabbah there), i.e., in the sense of "cause and effect": according to Beis Shammai the earth is an effect of the heavens — the heavens were created first; and according to Beis Hillel the earth is the cause of the heavens — the earth was created first.
61) Seemingly one could say that the reason of Beis Shammai for following the potential is [not due to the superiority of the potential in itself, but] because the potential contains the possibility of the actual. And as for the potential surpassing the actual — although its main superiority is the possibility of the actual — we would explain that this is because the existence (of the actual) came into being when the potential and the possibility for it came into being, and therefore the potential is the main existence of the actual*
[and for this reason they hold that "when you lie down" is only when people are occupied with going to lie down and not when they are actually lying down, for the essential reality of "when you lie down" is that one is occupied with lying down, while the actual lying down is only the continuation and revelation of the main reality of lying down — which came into being at the time he was occupied with going to lie down].
But since regarding the creation of heaven and earth too Beis Shammai hold that the main superiority is the potential — even though the ultimate intent in what arose in thought first is the earth as it is specifically in actuality (and not as it is included in potential in the heavens), i.e., it does not suffice that there is a potential and possibility for the actual (for otherwise the earth would not have needed to come into being) —
it is proven from this that Beis Shammai's opinion is that the superiority of potential is due to the matter of potential ("the above") itself, and the need for the creation of the earth is so that the "below" too should be elevated to the "above." It therefore stands to reason that in the other places too their view that "we follow the potential" is due to the superiority of the potential itself, as in the text.
*) Also, from Beis Shammai's holding that we follow the potential regarding "one who sees on the eleventh day" (although it will never come to actuality) there is no proof that the superiority of potential is due to itself. For (a) the definition of "we follow the potential" there is only that the potential too suffices, etc. (but not that it is the main thing and surpasses the actual). (b) That the potential will never come to actuality is due to the days that follow, but from the perspective of the potential itself it can also come to actuality, like all days of zivah.
62) Pirkei DeRabbi Eliezer, ch. 29. Mechilta and Rashi, Bo 12:6.
63) See Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 135, note 23, and the sources noted there.
64) Pesachim 76b.
65) Note that the Pesach offering was eaten in the manner of freedom (Shulchan Aruch of the Alter Rebbe, sec. 472, par. 14).
66) The novelty in Beis Shammai's opinion here (see similarly above, note 25) is not the very matter of "we follow the potential," but this: in the potential of the Exodus there are several matters: G‑d's assurance, "ואחרי כן יצאו ברכוש גדול" ("and afterwards they will go out with great wealth"), which came even before the exile; the cessation of labor for our forefathers, which was on Rosh Hashanah (Rosh Hashanah 11a, beginning); "החודש הזה לכם ראש חדשים גו'" ("This month shall be for you the head of the months…") (which relates to their redemption then), which was on Rosh Chodesh Nissan. And Beis Shammai teach us that the potential for the recitation and matter of "When Israel went out of Egypt" is the eating of the Pesach offering.
67) Michah 7:15.
68) Eruvin 13b.
69) Berachos 36b, beginning.
70) As is known, the reply of the Tzemach Tzedek to the Rebbe Maharash (to his question regarding the "end" that was to be in the year 5608): "But Likkutei Torah has been printed!" And the Rebbe Maharash said: "We need to have Moshiach below ten handbreadths!"
71) The wording of the verse (Daniel 12:6).
72) Bo 10:9.
73) Ibid., 26.
74) Yeshayahu 35:10; 51:11.
75) Tehillim 69:36–37.
76) On the three matters in this (they shall possess it, shall inherit it, shall dwell in it), see the letter of Yud Kislev 5731 (printed in Likkutei Sichos vol. 5, p. 419 ff.).
Key Lesson
This Sicha shows that the dispute of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel over potential and actuality runs from the laws of honeycombs, trees, Chanukah lights and the Shema to the creation of heaven and earth itself, and the halachah follows Beis Hillel: the actual is what counts. So too with the Redemption: a Redemption in potential and in spirituality cannot satisfy us; Jews demand of G‑d the true and complete Redemption in actuality, physically, here below.